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This thesis is intended to contribute toward our understanding 
of the problem of why the Loyalists were unable to prevent 
the American Revolution. The Loyalists were particularly 
weak in Massachusetts, and this thesis continues and extends 
the investigations of historians by studying the Loyalism, 
ideology and political behaviour of the conservatives and moderates 
of Massachusetts who opposed the Whig protest movement, 1765- 
1776, many of whom became Loyalists. They are known collectively 
as the "friends of government" -a term used by contemporaries. 
The ideology of the friends of government, their political 
behaviour in the General Court (the assembly) and town meetings, 
and their political relationships with the royal governors 
are examined in thirteen chapters. In addition, a prosopographical 
survey of 727 friends of government supplements the study of 
ideology and politics as behavioural determinants (determinants: 
place of birth; residence; age; education.; religion; occupation; 
tax assessment; membership of quasi-politcal voluntary associations; 
subscription to various political protests; proscription as 
a "Tory" by the Whigs; acts of Loyalty; proscription as a Loyalist 
by the Patriot authorities and state government; and 
the compilation of the dates of political awareness and 
political activity for or against the provin cial government. ) 
v 
The failure of the Loyalists is traced to the ideological and 
political conflicts of the 1760s and early 1770s when the friends 
of government were unable to form durable anti-Whig political 
coalitions and overturn the political dominance of the radical- 
led Whig party. Consequently, in 1775-1776, few colonists (and 
just over half the number of friends of government) were prepared to 
declare their allegiance and Loyalty to Great Britain. A popular- 
based Loyalist movement never emerged in Massachusetts because of the 
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INTRODUCTION. 
This dissertation continues and extends the investigations 
begun by previous historians of the American Revolution and 
aims to contribute toward our appreciation of the problem of 
why the Loyalists were unable to prevent the Revolution. 
It approaches the problem from the perspective of the part 
played by the Loyalists and their associates in the ideological 
and political conflicts of Massachusetts during the 1760s and 
early 1770s. It is my contention that we can understand 
more fully the Loyalists' failure by studying the ideology 
and political behaviour of the conservatives and moderates 
who opposed the Whig protest movement, 1765-1776. 
These men and women are known collectively as the "friends 
of government". This term was used commonly by contemporaries 
to denote those persons whose political affiliation before 
1775 lay with the royal governor and the provincial administration, 
although they were, as often as not, called "Tories" by the 
Whigs. 
, 
Its use here avoids the anachronisms of labeling 
anyone a "Loyalist" before the outbreak of the Revolutionary 
War and describing pro-government moderate Whigs as "Tories". 
The friends of government comprised two main ideological-political 
groups: the Tories or conservatives - who opposed the Whigs 
from the outset of the dispute between Britain and the colonies 
over the Stamp Act of 1765 - and moderate Whigs who had become 
disenchanted with resistance to Britain and alarmed at the 
power/ 
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power and influence of the radical leaders of the protest movement. 
The overwhelming majority of the friends of government, however, 
were neither Whigs nor Tories, yet responded to the leadership 
they offered. All three groups came together in a loose 
anti-Whig coalition. In all, this dissertation studies 
the ideology and political behaviour of 727 Massachusetts friends 
of government. 
1 
By 1775, the friends of government constituted the nucleus 
of the Loyalist pro-British elements in the political life 
of the province. Loyalism, for them, entailed a commitment 
toturn back and overthrow the progress of the revolutionary 
movement. But only half the total number of friends of 
government became Loyalists, while virtually all the others 
remained neutral and took no part in the war. Why was 
this so? Ultimately, it is this question that demands 
our attention, for in the answer we may perceive the reasons 
for the Loyalists' failure to prevent the Revolution. In order 
to provide answers, we must retrace our steps and examine the 
development of proto-Loyalist ideology and the political careers 
of the friends of government before the commencement of military 
hostilities. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, historians of the Loyalists have 
shown little interest in the Massachusetts friends of government. 
Their neglect stems from their preoccupation with broad, comprehe- 
nsive analyses of a wide range of topics - social, economic, 
political, military and religious - relating specifically to 
the Loyalists and applied to the American Loyalists in general. 
2 
The study of the Massachusetts Loyalists has formed an integral 
part of this approach, and the Loyalists of this colony have 
been well documented. However, none of the studies currently 
available to scholars provide a thorough explanation of the 
pre-war activities of the Loyalists and their associates. 
3 
10 
Students of Loyalist ideology have examined the views 
and careers of prominent friends of government and Loyalists 
such as Thomas Hutchinson and Jonathan Sewall of Massachusetts. 
4 
The most recent scholar of Loyalist ideology, Janice Potter, has 
laid the foundations for further research relating, in particular, 
to the Loyalists of those colonies that were the focus of her 
attention - Massachusetts and New York. Potter concluded 
that the Loyalists' conservatism acted as a counter-revolutionary 
ideology. 5 But like previous historians, Potter failed 
to study adequately the development of Loyalist ideology in 
conjunction with the pre-war political activities of the Loyalists. 
6 
Moreover, she confined her research primarily to the works and 
views of political pamphleteers and essayists,, and made no attempt 
to consider whether their opinions were representative of rank- 
and-file Loyalists who were, for example, merchants, shopkeepers, 
professional men and yeoman farmers. 
7 (In contrast, historians 
of revolutionary ideology have studied their subject within 
a much broader social-political context. 
8) 
Historians primarily concerned with the Whigs' and Patriots' 
roles in the Revolution have drawn attention 
to the friends of government, particularly those of New York. 
9 
But those whose works are concerned with the Revolution in 
Massachusetts only briefly discuss the friends of government 
and the Loyalists. 
10 
It would be quite untrue to say that the friends of government 
and the Loyalists have been ignored by American historians - 
except in one respect. Their political ideology was inherently 
conservative, yet there has been little in the works of scholars 
concerned with the antecedents of American conservatism to 
suggest that the friends of government or the Loyalists had 
made a significant contribution to their subject. Above 
all, they have studied the relevance of eighteenth-century- 
British conservatism to modern American conservatism and looked 
to / 
11 
to the thoughts and writings of an Irishman, Edmund Burke, 
before they considered the views of an astute native son such 
as Thomas Hutchinson. 
11 
Those who searched for Americans 
to compare with Burke unearthed Patriots like Alexander Hamilton, 
17 
whose politics became more conservative during the 1780s and 1790s. - 
Curiously, since the 1950s, if not earlier, the Loyalists 
have never been an attractive subject for the attention of 
American conservatives either. Perhaps the negligence 
of both historians and conservatives is a result of their 
potentially acute embarrasment at the fact that the Loyalists 
were the "losers" and "failures" during the Revolution, or 
13 
first "Un-Americans" as one historian has suggested. 
Loyalism was not a mirror image of everything British, 
nor were its ideological principles so self-evidently American. 
An historian writing on this side of the Atlantic, unencumbered 
by the Americans' cultural baggage, may be in the advantageous 
position of being able to perceive one genesis of American 
conservatism in the responses of the friends of government 
to the revolutionary movement. 
It is hoped, then, that this dissertation will in some 
measure redress a pervasive bias in the writings on the history 
of the American Revolution by American historians, as well 
provide a more accurate analysis of the Loyalists' failure 
to halt the revolutionary movement. It raises and attempts 
to answer various questions which have been inadequately treated 
by historians. Did a community'of feeling based on a common 
ideology and political purpose develop among the friends of 
government? Did their proto-Loyalist ideology cut across 
political and social boundaries? or, did it reinforce them? 
Could the last royal governors of Massachusetts, Francis Bernard, 
Thomas Hutchinson and General Thomas Gage, depend upon the 
political support of men who were ideologically commit^ d opponents 
of the Whig protest movement? Answers to these questions 
may/ 
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may provide the solution to the problems of why so few friends 
of government became Loyalists and why the Loyalists were unable 
to defeat the Patriots. 
In search of the answers, I have given preference to 
the public and private thoughts of rank-and-file friends of 
government such as Nathaniel Coffin, a customs officer from 
Boston. 14 The rank-and-file must be allowed to speak for 
themselves so fully that there can be no suspicion of merely 
strengthening a preconceived theory with the aid of a few well 
chosen quotations. (Ironically, the correspondence of 
senior government officials proved to be one of the most valuable 
type of sources for assessing the political behaviour of the 
friends of government. ) 
This dissertation demonstrates that the failure of the 
Loyalists was a direct result of the inability of the friends 
of government to curb the political power of the Whigs, 1765- 
1775. 
Chapter One introduces aspects of the Whig protest movement 
against which the friends of government reacted. It considers, 
in particular, the rise of anti-Tory sentiment in the province, 
which involved the extra-legal intimidation of political and 
ideological opponents of the Whigs and government officials 
who attempted to execute unpopular acts of Parliament. 
It was, in essence, an attempt to impose an orthodoxy of opinion 
upon'the protest movement and the people of Massachusetts in 
general. 
15 
Ultimately, anti-Toryism contributed to the 
political demise of the friends of government and undermined 
the Loyalists' efforts to mount effective resistance against 
the Patriots in 1775-1776. The chapter also discusses 
the view of senior government officials that the Whigs' resistance 
to British colonial policies was irrevocably weakening the 
power of the provincial government to enforce acts of Parliament 
and maintain imperial authority. 
13 
Chapter Two shows that from the time of the Stamp Act 
Crisis of 1765-1766 conservative friends of government underwent 
a process of ideological self-discovery or self-realisation 
that led them to denounce the aims and ideals of the Whig protest 
movement. The Tories perceived a cause and effect relationship 
between the struggle over imperial issues and the beginning 
of what they believed was a social and political revolution, the 
like of which had threatened to turn upside down English 
society during the Civil Wars of the 1640s. Their counter- 
revolutionary ideology reinforced traditional, authoritarian 
and deferential political attitudes and ideas. At the 
same time, however, they were critical of Great Britain for 
precipitating the crisis of authority and, as they maintained, 
doing little to solve it. Their criticism was always guarded 
and rarely made in public. Later chapters will show in 
greater detail that dissident moderate Whigs also came to acknowledge 
the undesirability of political and social reformation. 
They too resented the political conformity demanded by the 
Whig leaders. 
Chapters Three through-Nine study the political behaviour 
of the friends of government and their relationship with 
Governors Bernard and Hutchinson between 1765 and 1774 in 
the House of-Representatives, the. Council and the town meet- 
ings. They reveal that the friends of government 
did not attract enough support from moderate Whigs and non- 
aligned persons to be able to end the political dominance of 
the Whig party and its radical leaders. The friends of 
government did not function as a court party, for they rarely 
took collective action in response to the leadership offered 
by Francis Bernard and Thomas Hutchinson. It was largely 
through their own efforts that the friends of government organised 
the opposition to the non-importation agreements in 1770 and 
brought about their defeat. 
16 Bernard's successor, 
Hutchinson, was also unsuccessful in his attempts to build 
and lead a Tory-moderate coalition in the General Court. 
14 
Chapter Ten concentrates upon the activities of the friends 
of government during 1774, when they undertook their most concerted 
attack on the Whigs. Their goal was to win for themselves 
the opportunity of mediating in the dispute between Britain 
and the colonies over the Boston Tea Party and the introduction of 
the Coercive Acts. Their failure, however, left the Whigs 
in a commanding and unassailable position to continue and extend 
their policy of resistance to Britain. 
The collapse of the authority of the provincial government 
outside of Boston in the autumn of 1774 left the Whigs a free 
hand to proscribe all friends of government, government officials 
and would-be Loyalists who refused to submit to their authority. 
Chapters Eleven and Twelve trace the part played by the friends 
of government in the Loyalist "movement" following the collapse 
of the provincial government. Loyalty to Britain in 1775 
and 1776 was synonymous with a faith in the righteousness of 
counter-revolutionary activity. But only half the friends 
of government became Loyalists, for they had been left diýlusioned 
and dispirited by anti-Toryism, their political defeats at 
the hands of the Whigs and the apparent reluctance of Britain 
to implement measures for their relief. The proscription 
of loyal friends of government and the withdrawal of-the British 
from Boston in 1776 discouraged Loyalist sympathizers from 
declaring their allegiance to Britain to the extent that counter- 
revolutionary activity in' Massachusetts for the duration'of the war was 
minimal. Only in Boston in 1774-1776 did a popular-based counter- 
revolutionary party exist. 
In the end, we must conclude that a Loyalist movement 
in Massachusetts could never have emerged because the political 
basis for such a movement had never fully developed between 
1765 and 1775. The failure of the Loyalists has its roots 
in the political behaviour of the friends of government. 
Thus, in trying to understand the predicament of the friends 
of government we may able to perceive how revolutionary the 
American Revolution was for the Loyalists. 
15 
CHAPTER ONE: THE WHIG PROTEST MOVEMENT, ANTI-TORYISM AND THEIR 
EFFECTS ON THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, 1765-1770. 
The purpose of this synoptic chapter is to describe aspects 
of the Whig protest movement against Britain that were of prime 
significance to the friends of government, their ideology and 
political behaviour. 
The Whig protest movement grew largely in response to 
the introduction of the Revenue Act in 1764 (also known as the 
Sugar Act) and the Stamp Act in 1765 by the administration of 
George Grenville. In 1766, after much opposition from the 
colonists and pro-American sympathizers in Britain, as well 
as from some British mercantile and manufacturing interests, 
the Stamp Act was repealed and the Revenue Act substantially 
modified by the Rockingham administration. But the Whigs 
continued to protest at the reforms brought in by succeeding 
British governments, including the Townshend Acts. The 
protest movement was composed of interest groups, classes 
and institutions who questioned the propriety of British policies 
and analysed their effects on the political and constitutional 
rights of Americans within the empire. In their struggle 
to overturn the reforms, the Whigs could count on the support 
of the General Court, the towns, the merchantsi organisations, 
the Boston newspapers, Whigs in other colonies and people from 
virtually every rank in society; initially they were aided 
by/ 
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by senior government officials. 
But the Stamp Act Riots, in Boston in August, 1765 and 
the sporadic outbursts of popular violence during the 1760s 
that accompanied the formal legal protests raised other questions 
concerned with the prospect of civil and social disorder in 
the province, and compelled the friends of government to challenge 
the radical Whig leadership over its strategy of resistance. 
On the whole, they placed their faith in peaceable opposition 
by supplications and petitions as being the most likely means 
to secure a redress of grievances. One important aspect 
of the protests, however, was the radicals' attempt to turn 
public opinion against those who advocated obedience and submission 
to British authority. At first, their anger was directed 
at government officials whose duty it was to enforce the unpopular 
measures. They were arraigned as "Tories" and "enemies" 
to their country, or, in other words, as collaborators with 
an oppressive, foreign power. Soon, the radicals denigrated 
as "Tories" friends of government in the General Court, 
merchants in the east coast commercial communities and 
disaffected Whigs who espoused conservative attitudes and advised 
against resistance. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, 
anti-Toryism contributed greatly to the political weakness 
of the friends of government in Massachusetts. 
1. The Whig Protest Movement. 
The most articulate and forceful criticism of the Grenvillian 
programme and the Townshend Acts came from the Whig pamphleteers 
and essayists. The Revenue Act, although it reduced the 
duty levied on foreign molasses imported into the colonies 
under an act of 1733 from 6d per gallon to 3d, aroused suspicions 
that/ 
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that the Grenville ministry would attempt to introduce more 
far-reaching reforms. And so it did. The Stamp Duty, 
enacted in March, 1765 was the first direct tax imposed on 
the colonists by Parliament. 
Direct taxation, they argued, had changed the colonists' 
relationship with Britain. Initially, the Whigs did not 
deny Parliament's sovereignty in the colonies, only its authority 
to tax them without providing for their direct representation. 
They used natural rights philosophy and the Lockean contract 
theory of government in support of their arguments that the 
legislative authority of Parliament in America was established 
on the basis of a compact, which neither party, Parliament 
nor the colonists, could alter without the other's consent. 
The royal charters granted to the colonists in the seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-centuries, in particular the Massachusetts 
Charter of 1691, were primary sources for Whigs like John Adams 
who maintained that the compact had also been decreed in positive 
law. Whigs tended to blur distinctions between political- 
constitutional rights derived from common law and those derived41OM 
natural law. But their arguments were similar: a refusal 
to honour the colonists' right to consent to legislation providing 
for direct taxation was an infringement of Parliament's constit- 
utional and contractual obligations. 
Writers on both sides of the Atlantic drew up plans for 
constitutional reform that would have given Americans more 
say in the decisions that concerned them had they been adopted. 
But because of the great travelling distance between the colonies 
and London, the Massachusetts Whigs never seriously considered 
propositions for sending representatives to Parliament. 
Instead, their arguments implied or explicitly stated that 
the authority to levy direct taxes lay with the colonial 
assemblies, not Parliament. 
18 
The Townshend Acts, introduced by the Chatham-Grafton 
administration in 1767, however, laid taxes on articles of 
trade (painter's colours, tea, paper, glass), and thus, according 
to the Whigs' own reasoning of 1765-1766, were admissible. 
But the Whigs objected . 
to the fact that the underlying purpose 
of the Duties was to raise a revenue for an expanded colonial 
civil list. This too, they claimed, was unconstitutional: 
if allowed it would set another precedent whereby Americans 
could be deprived of their property without their consent. 
The Duties were partially repealed by the government of Lord 
North in 1770. 
Interpretations of the colonists' rights became more 
radical in the 1770s. Following the introduction of the 
Coercive Acts in 1774, which among other things closed Boston 
harbour and abridged the Massachusetts Charter, the Whigs 
questioned outright the supremacy of Parliament in the colonies. 
The Whigs' attention was also drawn to the wider economic 
consequences of the reforms. They complained often that 
much-needed specie would be drained from the Colonies to fill 
coffers in Britain. Such arguments were not without foundation. 
The Stamp Act was introduced at a most inopportune moment, 
when the Bay colony was in the midst of an economic depression 
as a result of its exertions in the mid-century wars with France. 
Massachusetts's financial contribution to the imperial war 
effort had exceeded that of any other colony, 'at the cost of 
£818,000. Britain reimbursed over £350,000, but the province 
had had to raise the rest. Consequently, the government 
of the colony increased provincial taxes to unprecedented levels. 
In 1765, the people of Massachusetts were paying £197,000 in 
provincial taxes - the highest amount ever. Taxes never 
dropped below £100,000 per year until 1769, and the debt was 
not liquidated until 1773.2 As a result of their contri- 
butions, Americans in general and New Englanders in particular, 
nurtured/ 
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nurtured increasing expectations of the rewards to be had from 
the empire. But for many, the Revenue Act and Stamp Act 
left a legacy of discontent with Britain's imperial policies. 
The burden of taxation fell heaviest on'the colony's 
traders. During the eighteenth century, Boston had 
become the hub of a trading network which included the ports 
of eastern New England and extended out to the British Isles, 
Southern Europe, Africa and the West Indies; along the Atlantic 
seaboard from Nova Scotia to Georgia, and inward to the rural 
hinterland of New England. By the 1760s, trade with Great 
Britain was the major concern of most Massachusetts merchants. 
More than ever before, their prosperity was intertwined with 
the fate of the trans-Atlantic commercial economy and decisions 
taken in Whitehall. 3 The balance of trade, however, was 
singularly in Britain's favour. The Navigations Acts and 
the mercantilist system excluded colonial merchants from attractive 
Northern European markets and hindered the growth of native 
manufacturing industries. Paradoxically, the high influx 
of'British goods and capital during the French and Indian War 
made Americans more aware of the deficiencies of this arrangement. 
Many circumvented the acts of trade by smuggling. 
5 
Constructive opposition from the merchants materialised 
after the Grenville administration made the decision to press 
for a renewal of the Molasses Act of 1733. In the "State 
of Trade" of 1763, the Boston merchants delivered a stinging 
rebuke of the government's proposal. Their condemnation 
of the 3d duty levied under the Revenue Act was loud and vocal. 
Although the duty on molasses was reduced to 1d per gallon 
when the act was revised in 1766, the merchants protested at 
the extension of the duty to cover imports not only of foreign 
molasses, but of molasses from British colonies and territories. 
They also complained of the multiplicity of bonds required 




monopolized by Britain that were not repealed by the Rockingham 
ministry. 
6 Over one hundred and forty Boston merchants 
formed the Boston Society for Encouraging Trade and 
Commerce (BSETC). This body made the decisions concerning 
the merchants' political action until the late 1760s. 
In December, 1765, two hundred and fifty merchants and shopkeepers 
(about three-quarters of the traders then operating in Boston) 
subsoribed to an agreement not to import British goods until 
the Stamp Act and Revenue Act were repealed. The merchants 
of Salem, Marblehead and Plymouth entered into similar agree- 
ments. A boycott of British goods and an embargo on trade 
were again the favoured responses to the introduction of the 
Townshend Duties and the appoinment of a Board of Customs 
Commissioners at Boston in 1767.7 
The arguments of the Whig leaders and merchants were 
repeated in the petitions of the Massachusetts legislature 
that were sent to the King and Parliament. In 1764-1765, 
the assemblies of Massachusetts and seven other colonies sent 
to Parliament their objections to the prospective Stamp Duty 
and to the provisions of the Revenue Act. However, not 
one of these petitions was ever read in the House of Commons. 
8 
The House of Representatives took the initiative when, in June, 
1765, it proposed that each colony send a delegation to a congress 
at New York (which was to meet in the first week of October), 
and there concert plans for obtaining a repeal of the Stamp 
Act and Revenue Act. Again, in 1768, the House led the 
way 'for the colonies when it issued a circular letter to the 
speakers of the other assemblies calling for united opposition 
to the Townshend Acts. 9 
Senior government officials shared some of the popular 
apprehensions about Grenville's reforms. Governor Francis 
Bernard/ 
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Bernard predicted that the retention of the duty on molasses 
could reduce by one quarter the quantity of imports into the 
colony. It was not "an idle or groundless fear, which 
makes... people dread the consequences of continuing & enforcing 
this Act. " 
10 
In November 1764, he sent a long letter 
to the Earl of Halifax, Secretary of State in Grenville's admin- 
istration, in which he itemised his objections to the Revenue 
Act as it related to the impact on commerce, the trial of offen- 
ders in the juryless admiralty courts and the possible reactions 
of the colonists. 
11 
Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Hutchinson 
dispatched to Grenville's private secretary, Richard Jackson 
M. P., a similar list of complaints, although like Bernard he 
never questioned Parliament's sovereign authority to tax the 
colonists. Neither Bernard nor Hutchinson welcomed the 
Stamp Act and were relieved when it was repealed. 
12 Secre- 
tary of State for Massachusetts, Andrew Oliver, was urged by 
William Bollan, the former agent for the province, to do all 
he could to oppose the. passage of the Stamp Act. Oliver 
took heed, and, describing it as a "public misfortune", 
wrote to his friends in England exhorting them to work, for 
its defeat. Oliver once claimed that he had done "more 
to prevent this measure... than any other Man". 
13 Never- 
theless, when the act had passed Parliament he accepted Grenville's 
offer of the post of Stamp Distributor for Massachusetts. 
The reaction of senior officials to the introduction 
of the Townshend Duties was very different. Bernard supported 
Townshend's proposals for using the revenue from the Duties 
to pay the salaries of government officers in the colonies. 
Bernard, Hutchinson and Oliver were adamant that if Parliament 
was disposed to repealing the Townshend Acts then it should 
not abrogate its legislative supremacy by conceding to the 
colonists' demand of self-taxation. 
14 
Apart from the 
inherent value of Townshend's proposals, what changed their 
minds/ 
22 
minds on the expediency of parliamentary taxation was the Whigs' 
refusal to submit to the implementation of the Stamp Act. 
In their opinion, resistance to the Stamp Act had weakened 
the authority and power of the provincial government to 
execute acts of Parliament. 
Six weeks before the Stamp Act Congress was due to meet 
at New York, the protest movement in Massachusetts took a new, 
violent turn in direction. On the morning of August 14, 
following rumours that the stamps had arrived in Boston, an 
effigy of Distributor Oliver was found hanging from a tree 
on the crossroads between Essex and Orange Streets in the South 
End. (It was renamed "Liberty Tree", see Map 1. ) 
A card had been placed around the neck of the figure and carried 
this inscription: 
Fair Freedoms. glorious. Cause I meanly Quitted, 
Betrayed my Country for-the Sake of Pelf, 
But ah! at length the Devil hath me outwitted, 
Instead of stamping others have hanged my Self. 
(Emphasis mine: in the eighteenth-century suicides were often 
buried at crossroads. ) Henceforth, Oliver was to be regarded 
as a "traitor" for accepting the Distributor's commission. 
A mob gathered to prevent Sheriff Stephen Greenleaf 
from removing the effigy. Later in the day, a mob led 
by Ebenezer McIntosh, ä cordwainer, marched to Oliver's store 
in Kilby Street where they believed the stamps were being kept. 
They demolished the building in under half-an-hour. In 
the evening, the mob broke into Oliver's mansion house and 
destroyed his garden, furniture and other valuables. 
Oliver resigned his commission the next day. (On December 
17, he was required to make a public resignation before a crowd 
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24 
On the evening of August 26, the mobs acted once more, 
and with even greater ferocity, aqainst the property of government 
officials whom they supposed would enforce the Stamp Act. 
They systematically looted the house of Thomas Hutchinson (in 
the process destroying his treasured library) and besieged 
those of William Story, Deputy Register of the Court of Vice- 
Admiralty, and Benjamin Hallowell, Comptroller of Customs for 
Boston. 15 That night, recalled Hutchinson,, the whole 
town was "under the awe" of the mobs"with field officers 
of the militia, standing by as spectators; and no body, daring 
to oppose or contradict [them]. " 
16 Hutchinson estimated 
that the damage done to his property was worth over £3,000; 
Hallowell's losses were in excess of £2,000.17 
That morning, fearing that the fury of the mobs might 
be vented on him, Story had issued a hurriedly prepared state- 
ment that he had nothing to do with the decision to introduce 
the Stamp Act. Thomas Hutchinson gave a similar denial 
in court the following day. Benjamin Hallowell, like 
Hutchinson and Oliver, had also protested at the Revenue Act 
and Stamp Act, although he too was obliged to try and implement 
them in the course of his duties. 
18 
Riots and demonstrations against the Stamp Act were not 
confined to Boston. They occurred in Salem, Marblehead, 
Newbury, Scituate, Plymouth, Maine and Berkshire County. 
None, however, were so violent and destructive as those in 
the province capital. Also, mobs precipitated the resig- 
nations of Stamp Distributors in every colony except Georgia. 
19 
Like Andrew Oliver, they were labeled as "traitors" and "enemies" 
to their country. 
20 
The riots in Boston were anything but spontaneous. 
They/ 
25 
They were organised by the Loyal Nine, a committee of Whig 
artisans and shopkeepers closely associated with Samuel Adams 
and the party "caucuses". 
21 One of their members was "not 
a little pleased to hear that McIntosh has the Credit of the 
Whole Affair. " 
22 
The mobs themselves were responsive to the Whig leadership. 
They consisted of people drawn mainly from the lower and middling 
orders. In addition, according to Governor Bernard, on 
August 14 their numbers were boosted by around fifty gentlemen 
disguised as tradesmen. 
23 The presence of gentlemen and 
merchants gave the actions of the mob a respectability which 
they otherwise would not have had. The mobs acted with 
the authority of a "posse comitatus". Historian Dirk Hoerder 
has shown that "crowd action" was a traditional form of social 
and political protest in Massachusetts. Boston's Pope's 
Day celebrations of November 5, land riots, smallpox riots 
and anti-impressment riots, for instance, were rarely perceived 
as being anti-imperial or as a threat to the established social 
order; rather, they were extra-institutional in character 
and usually occurred when the normal processes of redress were 
temporarily non-functional. In other words, riots supple- 
mented but did not supplant other forms of political action. 
24 
Thus, according to William Pencak, when the Whigs and the Loyal 
Nine realised that the petitions of the colonial assemblies 
and the entreaties of individuals had been ineffective in defeating 
the Stamp Act, they transformed the mobs "from a sporadic non- 
political force into a quasi institutionalized instrument of 
the popular party. " 
25 
- Henceforward, the mobs were to 
occupy a central role in the political strategy of the radical 
Whigs and in the planning of the protest movement against Britain. 
Moreover, there was an element of class conflict in the 
behaviour of the Boston rioters. Gary Nash has noted that 
those/ 
26 
those from the lower orders gave "vent to years of resentment 
at the accumulation of wealth and power by the prerogative 
faction" when they gloried in the destruction of Hutchinson's 
house. Dirk Hoerder believed that the Whigs were "taken 
by surprise" at the excesses of August 26.26 Never in 
the recent history of the British Empire had senior government 
officials to endure such humiliation as Hutchinson and Oliver 
did. But the class-based resentment of some of the rioters 
was not characteristic of the mobs as a whole, nor did it spread 
to the rest of the province. - Hoerder concluded that 
Whig opinion about crowd action... was essent- 
ially placed between the two poles of no crowd action 
because it violated deference, and the acceptance 
of popular direct action as the means for redress 
of grievances when the public good could by 
no other means be protected against encroach- 
ments. 27 
In short, the objectives of the rioters and those who organised 
them were limited: they acted to obstruct the exercise of 
parliamentary authority in a specific instance and not to 
undermine the structures of government and society in the 
colony; the actions of the mobs complemented the efforts of 
the Whig pamphleteers, the merchants and the General Court. 
2. The Stamp Act Crisis and the Decline in the Traditional 
Authority of Government. 
The Stamp Act Riots, however, precipitated a crisis 
of authority in Massachusetts, for the provincial government 
was quite unprepared for such intense opposition. to the act. 
In the aftermath, it was clear to many officials that Governor 
Bernard/ 
27 
Bernard did not have sufficient coercive power at his disposal 
to compel submission to British authority once the agencies 
of government - the General Court, customs officers and civil 
magistrates - had declined to assist in the execution of the act. 
Bernard criticised the Grenville administration for 
placing him in such a predicament: 
The first thing... [that ought to have been] done 
was to regulate support & strengthen the Governments 
[of the colonies]; so that their Authority might 
in no Way be dependent on the humours of the People. 
To introduce Parliamentary Taxations into America 
before the Establishment of a Power sufficient 
to enforce Obedience to them is... beginning at the 
wrong End. The People know at present 
they may chuse whether they would be taxed or not; 
& in such a deliberation it is easy to say what their 
Choice will be. Whereas it should have first 
been made evident to them that they had no Choice; 
and their Submission would have followed.... 
Surely it is not known in Whitehall how weak & 
impotent the Authority of American Governors is in 
regard to Popular Tumults. 28 
Bernard's difficulty in executing the Stamp Act was compounded 
by what he saw as a conspiracy of "designing Men" (he named 
James Otis, the Boston representative, as the ringleader) 
"tct-tümble the Government, & bring it to the level of the very 
people. " 
29 
These. were not isolated opinions. Judge Peter Oliver 
reflected that it would have been "Much better... never to have 
planned it [the Stamp Act] in Idea, than to have suffered it 
to fail in Execution. " To Henry Hulton, the Commissioner 
of Customs who came to Boston in 1767, "the event shewed how 
erroneous the measure was of attempting to raise a Revenue 
in a remote Country where the powers of Government were weak. " 




on four main considerations: he could request the British gov- 
ernment to send troops to enforce the Stamp Act and protect 
officials in the exercise of their dujies; he could also ask 
the British to sanction the arrest of the Whig leaders who 
were organising the resistance; another short-term solution 
was for Bernard to enlist the political support of conservatives 
ideologically opposed to resistance to imperial authority and 
willing to endorse moves to implement the act; and finally, 
Bernard and other senior officials recommended wide ranging 
reforms of the structure of government in Massachusetts and 
the colonies that were designed to nullify the influence of 
the popular Whig parties. 
It had proved impossible for the Justices of the Peace 
or Boston's town officials to contain the mobs, devoid as they 
were of-an effective police force. On August 27, the 
town meeting voted its "utter detestation" of the preceding 
night's events (although some of the rioters would have been 
present), and the selectmen, militia officers and Council 
met to consider what extraordinary steps to take to prevent 
further disturbances. A volunteers guard was organised 
to patrol the town, and consisted of town officials, merchants, 
gentlemen and militia men. Volunteer guards were 
also formed in Marblehead, Salem and Plymouth. (Friends 
of government such as Samuel Curwen figured prominently among 
the recruits. )' 
31 
Bernard paid little heed to these associations. He 
was sceptical of the value of what he saw as the self-interested 
actions of "well-disposed" citizens. 
32 
Bernard's misgivings 
were not ill-founded. The Boston guard proved to be an 
unreliable law enforcement agency. After the riot of August 
26, McIntosh and a few others had been arrested, but soon released 
after/ 
29 
after Nathaniel Coffin and a committee of gentlemen threatened 
to disband the guard if McIntosh was not set free.. It 
is likely, as Dirk Hoerder has suggested, that their action 
was prompted by fear of reprisals from the mob. 
33 
Bernard 
agreed, though he protested that law-breakers could now "walk 
the Streets with impunity. " According to historian John 
Reid, the episode demonstrated not only that imperial law was 
weak, but "that to enforce any law remotely associated with 
the political controversy" it was necessary "to accept Whig 
ordained conditions. No Whig rioter was again arrested 
in Boston. " 34 (A few, however, were shot! ) 
Nor did Bernard envisage a military solution to the Crisis. 
When the Council rejected his suggestion that troops might 
be necessary to keep order, he let the matter rest. General 
Gage at New York could send a detachment of only one hundred 
troops, and Bernard was convinced that such a small, ineffective 
force would simply antagonise the mobs. 
35 
Instead, Bernard deployed the province militia. 
He requested Richard Saltonstall, Colonel of the Essex County 
militia, to raise a company of sixty men from that county and 
bring them to Boston to reinforce the garrison at Castle William 
in the harbour to await the arrival of the stamps. It is 
the first 
Äication that Bernard perceived the existence of 
deep ideological divisions within the colony following the 
riots. Saltonstall was to take "especial Care" that the 
men whom he recruited should "be not tinctured by the Seditious 
Spirit". A crowd of three hundred local people surrounded 
the Colonel's house at Haverhill and demanded that he disband 
the company. Saltonstall refused and managed to complete 
the assignment. After this incident, however, the Council 
unanimously voted down Bernard's proposal to raise other levies 
for duty in Boston. The councillors, like the Boston volunt- 
eer/ 
30 
eer guard, were reluctant to defy the Whigs and the mobs. 
36 
Bernard approved the Council's recommendation of September 
5 that when the stamps arrived they should be stored in Castle 
William out of the way of rioters. This was done on September 
23. On October 2, the Board resolved that "there was no 
occasion to take any further measures concerning them at present. " 
(The stamps remained in the Castle until they were reshipped 
to Britain. ) 37 The Council further advised Bernard to 
suspend the Boston guard and to call upon the militia alone 
if and when required. Bernard protested that he feared 
disturbances during the Pope's Day parades. Indeed, on 
November 4, the day before the celebrations, the commanding 
officer of the militia in the town reported that he could not 
raise enough troops to patrol the streets effectively. 
But the day passed off without any violent incident. 
38 
With the stamps safely stored in the Castle, Bernard 
looked to the moderates and conservatives in the House and 
Council to support his call for the execution of the act. 
But he was forced to acknowledge defeat. With Oliver's 
resignation as Distributor, Bernard alone did not have the 
authority to distribute the stamps; nor -did he care to hazard 
such an attem t. 
39 do 
p Unable to^business legally without 
stamped papers, both the courts and the custom houses remained 
closed. The ports were re-opened in December after mounting 
public pressure on Bernard, the judges and the members of the General 
Court. By March, 1766 all the courts were again doing 
business, and, like the customs houses, proceeded without 
the stamped papers. (For more detailed accounts see Chapter 
Three, pp. 96-106 and Chapter Five, pp. 157-160. ) Thomas 
Hutchinson concluded that "timidity pervaded both the legislative 
and executive powers. Every measure which forwarded the 
determined design of compelling... all the officers within the 
province/ 
31 
province to pay no regard to the stamp act, succeeded. " 
40 
Bernard's long term solution to the crisis of authority 
brought on by the riots was to reform the structure of the 
provincial government in such a way as to limit the power of 
the Whigs. He took as his model the system in Ireland - 
a country with a large civil list and its own parliament, but 
whose laws were required to be ratified by the British Parl- 
iament. For the moment, his pleas fell on deaf ears. 
41 
I 
While more peaceable methods of protesting for a redress 
of grievances were preferred by the Whigs, the Stamp Act Riots 
revealed their potential for organising an alternative, violent 
response to an intractable government and Parliament. 
The crowds' logic was simple and highly effective: if the government 
officials were sufficiently intimidated not to distribute the 
stamps, then the much-hated act could not be enforced. 
The riots acted as a deterrent to Oliver and the others from 
fulfilling the obligations of their offices. The architect 
of the Stamp Act, George Grenville, was mistaken in his assumption 
that to use socially and politically prominent Americans as 
Distributors, such as Andrew Oliver, it would make direct taxation 
more acceptable to people who would know and respect the Distributor. 
All it did was to focus the resentment of the many on the few; 
which was all the more ironic because Oliver and the other 
victims were among the first Americans to advise against the 
Stamp Duty. 
42 
"All on a sudden, " said Hutchinson, they 
were "branded with the name of tories. " 
43 
32 
3. Anti-Toryism and the Stamp Act Crisis. 
Anti-Toryism took three main forms in Massachusetts: 
propagandists orchestrated a campaign against senior government 
officials and conservatives to discourage them from executing 
the Stamp Act; an orthodoxy of opinion was imposed upon the 
protest movement to dissuade moderate Whigs from calling for 
submission to the execution of the act; and, as we have already 
seen, extra-institutional violence was employed to prevent 
officials from implementing the act. 
As is well known, the Whigs were anxious to make a distinct- 
ion between the disturbances of August 14 and 26: the latter 
was publicly deplored for its excesses. Bernard reported 
that "a Line" was to be "drawn between the first Riot & the 
Last. " But the explanation which Bernard and historians 
have given for this - that the Whig leaders now feared they 
had lost control of the "devil" they had raised - 
44 
somewhat 
underestimates the ability of the radicals to turn both outrages 
to their advantage in their crusade against government officials 
and "Tories". 
The Whigs explained that the mobs had attacked the property 
of senior government officials because it was believed that 
their duty to enforce the Stamp Act commitd them to upholding 
a foreign authority which for the moment endangered the public 
interest. A contemporary diarist noted that Hutchinson, 
Oliver, Hallowell and Story were "supposed to be inimical 
to yr. Country". 
45 
The plural officeholding of the Hutchinson 
and Oliver families made the Lieutenant-Governor and the Secretary 
easy targets for accusations that they were prepared to sacrifice 
colonial liberties over the Stamp Act in exchange for more 
and better rewards from the empire. John Adams, who deplored 
the level of violence used against Oliver's property, did, 
nevertheless, perceive some justification for the attack: had 
not/ 
33 
not the engrossing of public offices by these families been 
"enough to excite Jealousies among the People? " 
46 Another 
Whig proclaimed that "The RESISTANCE of that Day (August 14, 
1765], roused the Spirit of America, which spread far and wide. " 
47 
The people were determined that the revenue raised 
in taxes from the Stamp Act and Revenue Act should not keep 
"lazy fellows in ease, idleness, or luxury. " They would 
do everything necessary to prevent a "hundred thousand hireling 
scribblers" and "a numerous tribe of Stamp-Officers and Task 
Masters" partaking of what could become an imperial feast. 
' 48 
The Boston town meeting denied any part in encouraging 
or organising the riots, but claimed that their occurrence 
merely demonstrated to what extraordinary . 
lengths the people 
were prepared to go in oder to defeat the Stamp Act. While 
the measure was "universally opposed" in the colony, Massachusetts 
still entertained "the most zealous attachment to his Majesty's 
person and government. " In a veiled attack on Hutchinson 
and Bernard, the Bostonians complained that "Enemys have endeavoured 
to represent [this] as-a paradox, and from an uneasiness... of 
its [the Stamp Act] being unconstitutional... would infer a 
settled design to bring the whole authority of parliament into 
contempt. " 
49 
Bernard Bailyn in the Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution maintained that one causal factor of the Revolution 
was the Whigs' perception of a conspiracy involving prominent 
colonial officials such as Thomas Hutchinson with the members 
of the British government to undermine the rights and liberties 
of Americans. The conspiracy theory was developed by Whig 
propagandists who found a speculative interest in the writings 
of John Locke and the Real Whigs of the Commonwealth tradition. 
Earlier in the century, the Real Whigs had warned Britons of 
a Tory-Jacobite plot to overthrow the limited monarchy established 
by/ 
34 
by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689 and restore the Stuarts. 
This libertarian tradition gave pre-eminence to the concept 
that society was a commonwealth of interests and individuals, 
and was dependent upon' the "virtue" and commitment of people 
to maintain it: citizens could not be passive or disinterested 
spectators to the conspiracies that were afoot or the commonwealth 
would degenerate into vice, corruption and tyranny. 
50 
But in Massachusetts at least, the hot-bed of radical 
anti Toryism, not only were prominent officials arraigned as 
"Tories". As will be shown in greater detail in later 
chapters, minor government officials, members of the General 
Court and merchants who broke the non-importation agreements 
were also to suffer the opprobrium of being labeled as collaborators. 
One Whig identified "four sorts" of "Tories": officers 
of the revenue, "poor indigent creatures. that are seeking little 
places or pensions from G[overnmen]t", smugglers (although 
in fact most smugglers were Whigs) and "high jacobites". 
51 
The Boston town meeting railed against a "multitude of Placemen 
and Pensioners, and an enormous train of Underlings and Dependants" 
that a large civil list would bring. To "Hyperion", Tories 
such as these were the "accursed betrayers of their native 
soil ." They "snuff with joy the tainted gale... [S]ee 
them even'now devouring in imagination, the vitals of their 
country, and anticipate the riotous feast they expect shortly 
to make upon the blood and. tresure of their fellow-citizens. " 
52 
Whigs argued that the Tories and all who preached submission 
to British authority over the Stamp Act and Townshend 
Duties stood outwith the mainstream of political and ideological 
opinions. To Sam Adams, they were the conspirators against 
the trans-Atlantic unity of interests created by the Pennsylvania 
Farmer (John Dickinson), the colonial assemblies and the friends 
of/ 
35 
of America, in Britain. James Otis characterised the Tories 
as the pariahs of colonial society: they were the Jews, Jesuits, 
and Jacobites--"low, dirty, rascally, artful, and designing 
Dogs. " While Americans were "claiming a Right of exemption 
from taxation by foreigners", said "Crito", the Tories were 
defending the principle of taxation by foreigners. 
53 
The attack on the Tories formed part of the conspiracy 
theory, and was utilised to discourage the spread of dissenting 
ideological and political opinions within the protest movement 
and province in general. Steeped in the Commonwealth 
tradition, the Whigs, regarded, "the people" as being a "unitary, 
property-holding, homogeneous body". Thus, according to 
historian Gordon S. Wood, "few found it necessary or even intell- 
igible to work out any theoretical defense of minority rights 
against the collective 
54 When power of the people. " 
fused, in an ideological sense, with the strong communitarian 
ethos of Massachusetts's Puritan traditions, the radical libertar- 
ianism of the Whig leaders became a forceful, intimidating 
political ideology. Stephen Patterson has observed that 
the Whig leaders "paid lip-service to individual differences 
of opinion" and asserted that "the end result must be a uniform 
acceptence of what was best for all. whether or not it was thought 
55 best by an individual. " The Whigs, noted another 
historian, firmly believed in the "coercive power of common 
attitudes and expectations. " 
56 
The Whig propagandists 
stressed above all the need to preserve the unity of 
a. heterogeneous political movement if they were to have any 
success at all. 
57 
Whig writers employed a compelling libertarian imagery 
58 
to illustrate the situation which Americans were now facing. 
They resurrected the moral fervour--of English 
religious and political dissenting traditions as "John Hampden" 
(James/ 
36 
(James Otis), "The Earl of Clarendon" (John Adams) and "Algernon 
Sidney" (identity unknown). 
59 
Comparisons too were made 
with. the Irish, both Catholic and Protestant, in their struggles 
against the English. 
60 
In the Dissertation on the Canon 
and Feudal Law and the "Governor Winthrop" letters, John 
Adams returned to Massachusetts's past for analogies with which 
to inspire the colonists. He re-told the oft-heard stories 
of how a century and a half before their Puritan ancestors 
had striven to preserve their liberties in a hostile wilderness, 
liberties which the British government and its American abettors 
were now trying to subvert. 
61 Biblical and classical 
analogies were also used as examples of how easily the common 
weal could be destroyed by conspirators and oppressors. 
62 
It was ironic then, but no paradox, that the radicals 
themselves became persecutors. 
Within the call for unity and commitment there was a 
strong tendency toward ideological coercion. Radical Whigs 
were determined to eliminate or at least neutralise dissenting 
attitudes which could threaten the well-being of the protest 
movement and their position as leaders. , According 
to the Boston shopkeeper Harbottle Dorr, the "First Spirited 
Piece" published in the newspapers against the Stamp Act was 
one which denounced disinterested attitudes. Passive 
spectators were like "passengers" on a ship that was sinking 
who "think that they would not be drown'd after the ship sinks. "'63 
The whole pageantry and iconography of protest that was displayed 
during the Stamp Act Crisis- riots, effigies, parades, celebratory 
dinners, Liberty Trees, political cartoons, pamphlets and 
essays - maximised the levels of popular participation and conformity. 
64 
37 
In part, anti-Toryism was a continuation of the conflicts between 
majority and minority groups that had littered New England's 
checkered history (such as between the Congregationalists and 
the Quakers, or the persecutions of the Salem Witch Trials ). 
From another perspective, it recalled the intolerance shown 
toward Roman Catholics in Britain and the colonies during the 
seventeenth-century. Yet, as will be seen later, in a more modern 
context, the effectiveness with which the radical Whigs were 
able to subdue their political opponents can be compared to the 
success of the Jacobins during the early 'stages of the French 
Revolution. 
4. The Continuing Crisis, 1767-1770 
Throughout the winter of 1765-1766, Governor Bernard 
received reports from Britain indicating that the riots, resistance 
and anti Toryism of the Whigs were endangering the possibility 
of Parliament repealing the Stamp Act. 
65 
He tried to 
impress this opinion upon the colonists, but met with little 
success. It was with great relief, however, that Bernard 
and the rest of the province learned on May 16,1766 that the 
act had been repealed by the Rockingham administration. (Grenville's 
government had been replaced by that of the Duke of Cumberland 
in June, 1765. Rockingham had become the leader of the 
administration when Cumberland died in November. ) The 
repeal was accompanied by the Declaratory Act, which asserted 
that Parliament was the sovereign legislative authority in 
the colonies and could pass laws respecting any sphere of business. 
As has already been mentioned (p. 19), the Rockingham Whigs also 
revised the Revenue Act. However, Bernard warned that 
by overturning the Grenvillian programme, the British government 
"will not reestablish the Authority of Government" in Massachusetts. 
Americans "see the Weakness" of the Rockingham ministry stemming 
from/ 
38 
from their desire to placate them. The "internal 
Divisions" in Britain had not helped Bernard's cause either. 
Many eminent statesmen, including William Pitt, -the Earl of 
Chatham, had spoken on behalf of the Whigs. In the future, 
Bernard concluded, the Whigs would not think twice about rejecting 
unpalatable acts of Parliament. 
66 As Bernard feared, 
the crisis of authority in Massachusetts did not end with 
the repeal. of the Stamp Act, and continued as a result of 
the introduction of the Townshend Duties in 1767. Rockingham's 
government fell in July, 1766 to be replaced by that of the 
Earl of Chatham with the Duke of Grafton as the effective head. 
Chatham took ill in March, 1767, and Charles Townshend, the 
Chancellor of. the Exchequer, emerged as the most dynamic figure 
in the cabinet, until he too became ill and died in September. 
The Townshend Acts came into operation in November, at the 
same time that the Board of Customs Commissioners took up their 
posts in Boston. 
Bernard thought that Townshend's scheme of using the 
revenue from the Duties to pay the salaries of provincial officers 
was "striking at the Root of the American Disorder. " 
67 
If the civil list could be extended, he reasoned, it would 
increase the numbers of those willing to support the provincial 
government. The political and ideological divisions in 
Massachusetts and the colonies made the use of "punishments 
& Rewards" more necessary. 
68 It "would afford the King 
[the] means to distinguish the Friends of Government & give 
greater Encouragement to People to desire to be reckoned of 
that Number. " 
69 (At first, only Thomas Hutchinson received 
a grant - not a salary - of £200 for his services as Chief 
Justice in 1768. In 1771-1772, an act was passed to award 
Crown salaries to the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Justices 
of the Superior Court and the senior law officers. ) 
70 
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Bernard clearly regarded the friends of government 
as indispensable political assets in his attempts to restore 
the traditional authority and power of the provincial government. 
What is more, as we can see from his correspondence with Britain, 
he continually projected the activities, politics, ideology 
and aspirations of the friends of government and government 
officials into the arena of imperial decision making. The 
less Britain, that is to say the Grafton administration and 
Parliament, appeared inclined to pursue a vigorous,: hawkish, 
reformist American policy along the lines suggested by Bernard 
in 1765-1766, the more he used the plight and dilemma of the 
friends of government to encourage the ministry to adopt such 
measures. 
In the spring of 1767, he informed Richard Jackson that 
the British government should make "some public act of disapprobation 
of the Opposition to the Governm[en]t here & approbation of 
the Supporters of it. " He reported to the Secretary of State 
with charge of colonial affairs in the Grafton administration, 
the Earl of Shelburne, that "The Friends of Government... exult 
upon the Prospect of the Authority of Government being restored 
71 
and the Independency of its Administration being established. " 
Bernard's concern for the fate of the friends of government 
reflected-the-situation. -in Massachusetts where anti-Tory 
propaganda was being directed-at members of. the General Court 
and mobs were being . turned against customs officials. 
Bernard and Hutchinson relayed this information to Whitehall 
and their friends in Britain. 
The Commissioners of Customs arrived in Boston on Pope's 
Day,. 1767 to a rude` reception. Mobs paraded through the 
streets/ 
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streets carrying effigies of the Commissioners and signs proclaiming 
"Liberty & Property & no Commissioners". The Whigs wrongly 
claimed that the Commissioners were responsible for the introduction 
of the Townshend Acts - as they had said of Oliver and Hutchinson 
over. the Stamp Act. Hutchinson sympathised with the Commissioners' 
plight: the people had "absurdly connected" the Duties and 
the Board, for both took effect in November. 
72 
One indication of the association made between Toryism 
and collaborating activities is the fact that at first the 
Whigs' abuse was directed at the two Commissioners who were 
well known in the colony and already much disliked: Charles 
Paxton and John Robinson. Robinson had been caught up 
in a notorious dispute with smugglers when he was a collector 
in Rhode Island, 1763-1764. The Boston-born Paxton had 
been at the centre of the Benjamin Barrons controversy of 
1760-1761, which led to the famous Writs of Assistance case. 
73 
According to one observer, the "inveteracy is inconceivable... 
against those in office who are Americans". By accepting 
appointments as Commissioners, -they were held to be "acting 
against their Country. " 
74 
The Whigs were convinced that 
when the "fawning, cringing, perfidious" Paxton had gone to 
London in 1766, he had encouraged Charles Townshend to tax 
Americans. 
75 For a while, William Burch and Henry 
Hulton were the "most favourably treated of any of the... 
Commiss[ione]rs as it is said they came here as Strangers to 
the Country". 
76 
Neither Burch nor Hulton had been to the 77 
American colonies before, and Hulton disapproved of Townshend's scheme. '" 
The attitudes of the other Commissioner, John Temple, 
set, him apart. Temple was the cousin of George Grenville, 
but also the son-in-law of the Boston Whig James Bowdoin. 
According to Henry Hulton, Temple resented the aboliton of 
his office of Surveyor-General for the Northern District: "He 
thought/ 
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thought himself reduced by being appointed a Commissioner. " 
He took a drop in salary and was required to work closely with 
his erstwhile enemies, Bernard and Paxton (who had sided against 
Temple in a dispute over the dismisal of a collector in 1764. ). 
Temple nurtured an "inveterate hatred" of Bernard, 
78 
and 
soon alienated Hulton and the others by his behaviour. 
Temple and his colleagues maintained a "distant Civility". 
79 
The Whigs were assiduous in cultivating the differences 
between Temple and other senior officials. They avoided 
publishing any libellous or scurrilous articles about him, 
partly because he was a valuable source of information. 
Temple pressed the *Secretary to the Customs Board, Samuel 
Venner, into releasing information damaging to the provincial 
government. A rumour was circulated that the Commissioners 
had sent letters to the Lords of the Treasury representing Jonathan 
Sewall, the Advocate-General (and later Attorney-General), "as 
a person very unfit" for office. Sewall was indignant, 
and felt strongly enough about the matter to be prepared to 
challenge the Commissioners publicly against the wishes of 
Bernard and Hutchinson. The differences between Sewall 
and the Commissioners were resolved, but not without a great 
deal of acrimony. 
BO After only one year in office, Temple 
complained to Grenville that he was "without the least weight 
or influence" on-the Board. 
81 By the spring of 1769, 
there was speculation that Temple was the author of newspaper 
articles attacking the Commissioners. The following year' 
he was recalled to Britain and eventually replaced by Benjamin 
Hallowell. 
82 
The Whigs refined their treatment of collaborators when 
they ostracised the four Tory Commissioners from Boston's 
social occasions. It was customary for the selectmen and 
gentry of the town to organise events and dinners in honour 
of/ 
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of visiting dignatories. Those for the Commssioners were 
poorly attended. "All of the Council and all men of large 
estates" stayed away. John Temple also avoided any event 
at which Paxton and Bernard were likely to be present. 
The Whigs claimed that the "mushroom gentry" - the Hutchinsons, 
Olivers and their friends - were the only townspeople who 
regularly attended. 
83 
Once, the town meeting refused 
to allow Faneuil Hall to be used for a public dinner because 
the Commssioners'names were on the invitation list. Hutchinson 
reflected that Bostonians were "generally very civil in entertaining 
strangers which makes this neglect more conspicuous. " 
84 
Instead, the Commissioners organised their own "brilliant 
assembly", which was partly intended "to wear of the prejudice 
of the people & to cultivate their Acquaintance. " 
85 However, 
it had the opposite effect and increased hostility toward them. 
Whig propagandists contrasted the lavish life-style of the 
Commissioners with that of Boston's lower orders. On one 
occasion, John Robinson sported a splendid suit of crimson 
velvet which had "cost a sum that would have been a full support 
to some one of the families that are almost reduced to poverty. " 
The Commissioners affected to "mimic" the "high life" of the 
English aristocracy by "rolling from house to house in their 
chariots" and receiving guests at one o' clock in the morning. 
Thomas Hutchinson noted that "there was a... hauteur in all 
their behaviour which Americans had never beeen used to. " 
86 
Robinson's infamous attack upon James Otis at" the British Coffee 
House on September 6,1769 can be explained as the result or 
release of one man's anxieties and frustrations at being treated 
as a collaborator and traitor. 
87 
Mobs also intimidated the Commissioners and their assistants. 
Henry Hulton recalled that in March 1768 
a/ 
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a number of people armed with Clubs 
assembled about the houses of some of 
the Commissioners, blowing horns beating 
drums and making hideous noises so that 
the families quited their houses expecting 
the mob would proceed to violence. 88 
Thomas Hutchinson observed that on the 18th, the anniversary of 
the repeal of-the Stamp Act, the populace never looked "more sowre and 
discontented". 
89 The "least hint from their Leaders would 
encourage them to any degree of violence. " 
90 That day, 
a crowd of eight hundred angry people confronted Inspector- 
General of Customs John Williams. Fortunately, according 
to eye-witness John Rowe, they did him "no damage - which the 
greatest part of the Gentlemen in the Town were very glad of. " 
91 
Wills Hill, the Earl of Hillsborough, who was appointed to 
the new office of American Secretary early in the year, taking 
over responsibility for colonial affairs from Shelburne, was 
inundated with reports concerning this latest outbreak of 
violence and its effect on government officials and the friends 
of government. The open manner in which the Whigs flouted 
the law and the authority of Parliament "with a Contempt... 
allmost treasonable... caused a great Despondency among the 
Friends of Government. " 
92 
But the disturbances continued. On June 10, a riot 
broke out after customs officers seized John Hancock's sloop 
Liberty for infringements of the acts of trade and had it 
towed out from his wharf and moored alongside the HMS Romney. 
(The captain of the Romney had already infuriated the townspeople 
by sending press gangs ashore. ) Despite the opposition 
of "Several principle Gentlemen", the mob proceeded to smash 
the windows in the houses of the customs officers who had 
been involved in the seizure (Benjamin Hallowell, Richard 
Harrison and John Williams. ). Harrison and Inspector- 
General/ 
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General Thomas Irving were beaten up, and a boat from the 
the 
custom& house was ceremonially burnt atALiberty Tree. 
The Liberty Riot prompted the four Tory Commissioners to flee 
to the Romney and thence to Castle William. They did not 
return to Boston until November. 
93 
Once again, senior officials insisted that the province 
was on the verge of rebellion and social conflict. They 
viewed the rise of the protest movement and its effects prin- 
cipally within the context of a problem of law enforcement. 
There was a common theme in their letters and thoughts: resistance 
to the authority of Parliament was productive of civil disorder 
that threatened to undermine the traditional authority of 
the provincial government and weaken the social structure. 
Whether these perceptions and assumptions were accurate and 
justifiable is a matter of debate for historians, as it was for 
contemporaries. The Whigs certainly disagreed with Bernard 
and the Customs Commissioners, for they could see no a priori 
connection between their protests and an incipient revolution. 
But as John Reid has commented, on both sides of the divide, 
"Facts were not the probative consideration, impressions 
created by facts were. " 
94 
"All real Power is in the hands of the lowest Class; 
Civil Authority can do nothing but what they will allow", 
wrote Bernard on July 2.95 After the Liberty Riot, Hutchinson 
reflected that "mobs a sort of them at least are constitutional", 
although Americans had "reason enough to fear [them]", because 
it was their "misfortune that the authority of government 
is so weak that we are not able to check them when they rise 
but are forced to leave them to their natural course. " 
Henry Hulton's sister echoed these sentiments: American mobs 
were "very different" from those in England where the magistrates 
were usually able to restrain them, because they "act from 
principle" / 
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principle" and there is "no person daring or willing to suppress 
their Outrages, or to punish, the most notorious Offenders 
for any Crimes whatever. " 
96 
Senior government officials urged the Grafton administration 
to take punitive measures against the Whigs, both to restore 
the power and authority of the government and to placate 
its rank-and-file supporters in the colony. Bernard 
informed Secretary-at War. Lord Barrington that: 
the indifference which has been shown 
in England to the checking the Demagogues 
of America for so long a Time has at length 
so effectually discouraged the Friends 
of Government, that they have been gradually 
falling off, 'til at length the Cause 
is become desperate. 97 
More than any other member of Grafton's cabinet, the 
Earl of Hillsborough was prepared to listen to Bernard and 
his associates. He was alarmed by what he saw as Massachusetts' 
rebellious and treasonable conduct. He was convinced 
that regular British troops were needed to restore imperial 
authority. To his discredit, he accepted at face value 
the accuracy of the pessimistic reports which he received 
from Bernard and the Customs Commissioners concerning the 
disturbances of March 1768. On the basis of these and 
earlier reports, Hillsborough, with the backing of the cabinet, 
wrote General Gage on June 8 ordering him to send to Boston 
one regiment, or such forces as he considered necessary, , to support 
the Civil Magistrates and the Officers of the Crown, in the execution 
of their Duty. " On July 30, having received information 
from Bernard and the Commissioners concerning the Liberty 
Riot, the cabinet, with the exception of Shelburne, endorsed 
Hillsborough's proposal to order two regiments from Ireland 
to/ 
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to Boston. 98 
The troops arrived in early October and remained until 
March 1770. Their main purpose was to act as a deterrent 
to those who set out to intimidate or abuse government officials. 
99 
In the meantime, the protests continued.. Senior 
officials suspected that the Whigs were making plans to resist 
with force the arrival of the troops. According to Hutchinson, 
the proceedings of the merchants in adopting a non-importation 
agreement in August wore a "threatening aspect". 
100 
When the Convention of Towns met in September to consider the 
prospect of military occupation, Bernard believed a plot had 
been laid to seize himself and members of his government. 
101 
The rebellion did not occur when the troops arrived. 
Nonetheless, reactions to their presence demonstrated how little 
co-operation Bernard was receiving from the agencies of government. 
The Council, initially, refused to vote funds or provisions 
for the troops in accordance with the Quartering Act of-1766, 
and joined with the selectmen and Justices of the Peace of 
Boston in declining to find quarters for them in the town. 
(See Chapter Six, pp. 175-187. ) The House of Representatives, 
when it met in 1769-1770, suspended its business in protest 
at Bernard's "standing army". (See Chapter Four, p. 144. ) 
While government officials were relieved to have the 
protection of the troops, it did not dampen their criticism 
of the Grafton ministry for its failure to take other measures 
to support the government. Bernard desired the British 
to make examples of the Whig leaders James Otis, Samuel Adams 
and Thomas Cushing and send them for trial in England. 
At the very least, he hoped that an act of Parliament could 
be passed to disqualify these men from holding provincial or 
municipal office. 
102 
- Bernard was still advocating 
the / 
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the reform of the colonial systems of government as being the 
only sure way of restoring Britain's power. In his letters 
to Shelburne and Hillsborough of 1767-1768, which later fell 
into the hands of the Whigs, he recommended the appointment 
of a mandamus Council for Massachusetts, thus removing the 
House's prerogative of electing councillors. As was revealed 
by the publication of the Hutchinson-Oliver Letters in 1773, 
the Lieutenant-Governor and the Secretary were at this time 
considering similar proposals. (See p. 546,. note 78. ) 
In the winter of 1768-1769, Hillsborough's hard line 
attitudes were to the fore in cabinet discussions. He 
approved the King's speech to Parliament of November 8, which 
dealt with Boston's decision to hold the Convention of Towns 
in defiance of Bernard's instructions and declared that town 
to be "in a state of disobedience to all law and government. " 
Hillsborough calculated that the news of this speech would 
"defeat and disappoint" the Massachusetts Whigs. On December 
15, Hillsborough moved a series of resolutions in the House 
of Lords condemning the proceedings and resolves of the General 
Court over its refusal to conduct business and 
the deliberations of the Boston town meeting for revealing "a 
design... to usurp a new unconstitutional authority. " The 
resolutions passed the House of Commons in the last week of 
January, 1769. In addition to commenting on the behaviour 
of the General Court and Boston, and justifying the deployment 
of troops, the resolutions proposed that Governor Bernard 
enquire into the rebellious activities of the Whigs after 
December 30,1767. It was thought legal to bring the 
rebels to trial in England under an archaic statute of Henry 
VIII. Later, Hillsborough pressed the cabinet to approve 
further measures to deal with the Massachusetts Whigs, and 
he tabled Bernard's suggestion for appointing a mandamus Council. 
But his views were not shared by the rest of the cabinet. 
Only one of his recommendations was accepted: that the Governor 
of/ 
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of Massachusetts be permitted to call the General Court to 
a place outside of Boston, away from the intimidating prescence 
of the Whig mobs and radicals. 
103 
Bernard and his advisers were heartened by the hawkish 
tones of the King's November speech. "The Friends of 
Government... have no Reason to conceal their Joy at seeing 
the Time coming when this Country will be delivered from the 
baneful Inluence of the Faction. " 
104 Hutchinson wasted 
no time in urging Britain to act upon the spirit of the King's 
speech. Unless Parliament's authority in the colonies was 
supported by punitive measures, he warned Thomas Whately, 
then "it is all over with us. The friends of government 
will be utterly disheartened, and the friends of anarchy will 
be afraid of nothing be it ever so extravagant. " "The 
most sensible people... despair of Success", he told Richard 
Jackson. " 105 These hopes and pleas are testimony to 
the central importance of the friends of government in the 
efforts of Bernard and Hutchinson to reinvigorate Britain's policies. 
But their disillusionment returned when they received 
copies of the House of Lords' resolutions. Bernard could 
see nothing in them that would restore the power of the provincial 
government to maintain British authority. On the contrary, 
he told Undersecretary John Pownall, they "serve here to elate 
the Faction & depress the Friends of Government... on Account 
of... their being, Resolutions without Activity. " 
106 
The Tory James Murray concurred: "if these Resolves are not 
attended with some more effectual Cure, it is not imagined 
here that our Disorders will be removed. " 
107 
Bernard followed Hillsborough's instructions and began 
investigations into treasonable activities committed since 
December 30,1767.108 Jonathan Sewall, the new Attorney- 
General, made inquiries into the seditious libels published 
in/ 
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in the Boston Gazette. 
109 It was a task for which Bernard, 
Sewall and other senior officials had little enthusiasm. 
Bernard complained to his'friend Lord Barrington that such 
an inquiry "will have no other Consequence that [meaning tb-U] 
to show the Impotency of Government. " The inquiry into 
the Liberty Riot was obstructed and defeated because witnesses 
were not prepared to testify against rioters or the Whig leaders. 
110 
Bernard's reply to Hillsborough, sent in May, was composed 
in consultation with Thomas Hutchinson, Andrew Oliver and 
Judge of the Vice-Admiralty Court Robert Auchmuty. Hillsborough 
was informed that they "cannot fix upon any [proceedings] that 
amount to actual Treason, tho' many of them approach very near 
to it. " Sewall could not prove that "treasonable consultations" 
had resulted in treasonable actions. Moreover, explained 
Bernard, when Parliament accepted the petitions from the Convention 
of Towns and the General Court it acknowledged the _ 
and legality of these documents, although Hillsborough and he 
both believed they contained re'volOtionary political doctrines. 
111 
Bernard maintained that to be effective British policy 
had to be coercive, which fact, it seemed to him, Britain did 
not fully appreciate. For example, he approved Parliament's 
exclusion of the English liberal John Wilkes following the 
publication of a libel in the St. James Chronicle. "[It] 
encourages the Friends of Government to assure themselves 
that the same firmness will be exerted in vindicating the Honour 
of Government in America. " 
112 Even "the mildest measures 
are certainly the most eligible", said Hutchinson, "and they 
will answer the purpose as effectually as the most severe. 
Only shew us you are determined to execute them. " 
113 A 
"vigorous spirit in Parliament will yet set us right. " 
114 
There was little improvement in the situation in Massachusetts 
or change in Britain's policy to convince senior officials 
that/ 
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that the Whigs would cease protesting. From January, Britain had 
a new government led by Lord North, and its decision to repeal 
the Townshend Duties on painter's colours, glass and paper 
took much of the steam out of the merchants' enthusiasm for non- 
importation and was a significant contributory factor to the 
defeat of the boycott in Massachusetts and the other colonies. 
(See Chapter Eight, pp. 256,269. ) But Thomas Hutchinson, 
who succeeded Bernard as Governor, continued to face the problem 
of ensuring the protection of government officials in the exercise 
of their duties. Mob attacks on customs officials did 
not cease, and have been well documented. Victims were 
tarred and feathered and beaten up if they tried to execute 
the acts of trade against the wishes of the Whigs. 
115 
Clashes between the troops and the civilians of Bodton culminated 
in the King Street Riot or Boston Massacre of March 5,1770, 
when four townspeople were killed and another fatally wounded. 
After the incident, the 14th and 29th regiments were withdrawn 
to Castle William, and to Hutchinson's alarm were pulled 
out of Boston later. 
116 
****** 
The Whig protest movement was a broadly based coalition 
of interest groups, institutions and classes. Its radical 
leadership endorsed both violent and peaceful methods of protest 
in a strategy of resistance designed to defeat specific acts 
of Parliament. To this end, but also to preserve the 
unity of an ideologicially and socially heterogeneous movement, 
the/ 
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the radicals embarked on an anti-Tory campaign that was in- 
tended to discourage the spread of dissenting or conservative 
opinions opposed to resistance. Senior government officials 
bore the brunt of the Whigs' anger and resentment. They 
too, however, were critics of British policies. But they 
perceived in the protests and anti-Toryism the germ of a 
levelling revolution that threatened to bring down the social 
and political structures of the colony. Thus, Bernard, 
Hutchinson and their colleagues urged successive British 
administrations to take immediate steps to restore the authority 
and power of the provincial government that had been found 
wanting in the wake of the Stamp Act Riots. They recommended 
that the British arrest the Whig leaders, for such a task, 
fraught with dangerous repercussions, they felt was beyond 
the capabilities of the provincial government. They also 
favoured the implementation of wide-ranging constitutional 
reforms to curb the political power of the Whigs in the General 
Court and town meetings. In their official and private 
correspondence, Bernard and Hutchinson promoted the interests 
and aspirations of the oppponents of the protest movement - 
the friends of government - in such a way as to make these punitive 
measures seem attractive, essential and worthy solutions 
to the crisis, although the British refused to act upon them. 
Since 1765, Bernard and Hutchinson reasoned, the success of 
Britain's policies and her interests had depended not only 
upon the capability of government officials to implement 
acts of Parliament, but upon the provincial government 
being able to gain the political support of the friends of 
government. Their willingness to support Britain and 
make a stand Against the Whigs, according to Bernard and Hutchinson, 
had been undermined by Britain's failure to take adequate measures 
to halt the protest movement. To what extent, therefore, 
were the ideology and politics of the friends of government 
and senior government officials compatible? 
52 
CHAPTER TWO: IDEOLOGY AND THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT, 1765-1770. 
Between 1765 and 1776, political and ideological conflicts 
in Massachusetts took place within a broad spectrum of opinion. 
But the issues and arguments raised by the friends of government, 
1765-1770, were those that formed the basis of Loyalist-ideology: 
a"defence of the legislative supremacy of Parliament in the 
colonies; concern that the radicals' strategy of resistance 
to Britain would lead to revolution, civil war and military 
confrontation with Britain; resentment of the orthodoxy of 
opinion imposed on the colonists by the Whig leadership and 
their anti-Tory attitudes; and a sense of impending catast- 
rophe, of great changes to come. 
There were ideological and political differences 
between the the two main groups that comprised the friends öf 
government - the conservatives or Tories and the dissident 
moderate Whigs. Until we can actually pinpoint the moments 
when a moderate Whig began to question then challenge the majorita- 
rianWhig view, we must presume. that by his membership of the 
protest movement - and more so by his participation in the Whig 
leadership via town, merchant or House committees - he 
countenanced some form of opposition to British policies. The 
dissid- 
ents embraced a brand of moderate Whiggism which, as we shall 
see in more detail in later chapters, was greatly dependent 
upon the political climate: in moments of relative political 
quiet/ 
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quiet they sided with the royal governors, but on every contentious 
issue - until 1770 for some and 1774 for others - they joined with 
the radicals. The Tories or conservatives, on the other 
hand, generally did not belong to the protest movement, although 
they too were critical of Britain, and on virtually every major 
issue favoured submission to parliamentary authority. 
But it is the similarities between the Tories and dissidents 
that demand our main attention, not the differences, for we must 
decide whether they contributed to the development of a community 
of feeling among the opponents of the radical Whigs. Like 
senior government officials, Tories and some moderate Whigs 
came to realise that the authority and power of Britain 
in the colonies were weaker than ever before, and that their 
preservation depended upon themselves taking direct political 
action to counteract the radicals. Their proto-Loyalist 
ideology propagated the traditional authority of government 
and familiar institutions. 
ý I' 
1. The Moderate, Dissident Whigs. 
At least seventy-nine friends of government were active 
members of the Whig protest movement and publicly expressed their support 
for its aims. With few exceptions, they were moderate 
Whigs who eventually came to challenge the political ascendancy 
of the radicals and their strate3y of resistance. (See 
Appendix A. ) It should be noted that this group was probably 
just a fraction of the total number of friends of government 
who were originally in sympathy with the protest movement, 
but whose participation and views have gone unrecorded, and., 
moreover, they were just a handful of the thousands of New 
2 
Englanders who were neither Tories nor radicals, but "moderates". 
54 
Generally, the Whiggism of the friends of government 
(and of future Loyalists) can be inferred from their membership 
of organisations which participated in the protest movement. 
The annual anniversary dinners organised by the Sons of Liberty 
to commemorate the repeal of the Stamp Act on March 18,1766 
were attended by at least forty-four friends of government. 
On these occasions, they drank toasts to the King, the royal 
family and the Sons of Liberty. Of fourteen Bostonians 
who attended one dinner in 1768, -ten became-Loyalists. 
3 
At Dorchester the following year, forty of the three hundred 
and fifty-five guests were to come into conflict with the Whig 
movement. 
4 Friends of government associated with the Sons 
of. -. Liberty included Robert Hallowell, a customs officer 
whose brother had suffered in the Stamp Act Riots, and physi- 
cians James Pecker and John Jeffries who were to serve with 
British forces during the War of Independence. 
Dissident merchants joined with the rest of the commercial 
community in opposition to British policies. Sixteen dissidents 
served on Boston town and merchant committees, whose membership 
was overwhelmingly Whig. (See Table 1. ) Thomas Boylston 
served on committees which organised the trade boycott of 
1767-1770.5 Twenty-nine friends of government belonged to the 
Boston Society for Encouraging Trade and Commerce set up in 1763-1764 
(see Appendix A ). Most of Boston's "friends" who were traders 
would have subscribed to the town's non-importation agreement 
of December, 1765.6 Moderate Whigs John and Jonathan 
Amory, for example, who belonged to the BSETC, approved the 
"general combination" to boycott British goods. They feared 
that if the Revenue Act and Stamp Act were not repealed "it 
will be to the Ruin" of the colony's trade. 
7 Elsewhere, 
in Marblehead, Robert Hooper encouraged public protests against 
the acts and was a member of the merchants' committee that 
approved the trade boycott of 1768-1769. Thomas Robie, a Tory, 
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58 
friend of government) who did not sign the non-importation 
agreement of 1765-1766.8 
At first, the. Whig friends of government acquiesced 
in the leadership of the radicals and endorsed majoritarian 
Whig views. The Amorys were one family who were caught 
up in the feverish rationality of Whiggism. If the Stamp 
Act was not repealed, they maintained, "[we] shall consider 
ourselves as no other than slaves without any thing we can 
call our own. " 
After being deprived of our natural liberties 
as Men, & our Privileges granted our Ancestors 
by Royal Charter, we shall be very indifferent 
who our foreign masters are & perhaps 
we may like them the least, who we once 
lov'd the best. 9 
John and Jonathan praised the "determin'd Re utions among 
all Ranks of People not to submit" to direct taxation, and 
rejoiced in the repeal of the Stamp Act. They could not 
see how 
the Wisdom & Policy of the Government will 
suffer them again to attempt... (to abrogate] 
what we esteem our natural & inherent Rights 
or our Charter Privileges, for should they, 
they must expect that we shall not be wanting 
in making every Effort to preserve our Freedom 
more dear to us'than Life. 10 
Later, they explained to their correspondents in England the 
Whigs' position and views on the Townshend Duties: 
All they seek for is to be treated as 
Englishmen & not as Slaves. The 
whole Contest rests on this single point, 
whether the British Parliament has a Right to 
tax/ 
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tax them (for the purpose of a Revenue, 
not as Regulating Trade) without their Consent. 
Untill this point is given up on One Side 
or the Other, there can no harmony subsist. 
Animated by the rhetoric of John Dickinson's influential pamph- 
let Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, the Amorys cried 
out that . 
by the Townshend Duties Americans "are reduc'd 
by the Utmost Injustice to a State of Slavery for if the Parliament 
of Britain can take a pennny from us without our Consent they 
may rob us of our whole property. " 
11 
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity and commitment 
of the Amorys and other Whig friends of government to the protest 
movement, 1765-1767. 
Economic considerations, as well as political and 
ideological, played a part in determining the allegiance of 
these men in the 1760s. Like most Whig merchants, they 
believed their vital interests in commerce were being threatened 
by the imposition or retention of duties on articles of trade 
and by the reform of the customs service. 
Historian John Tyler has positively identified six friends 
of government whose illicit trading activities were jeopardised 
by the reforms: Richard Clarke, John Erving Sr. and his son George, 
Thomas Boylston, James Perkins and Henry Lloyd. 
12 With 
the exception of Clarke and Lloyd, who were Tories, the others 
were Whigs in the 1760s. (See Appendix A. ) 
Evidence uncollated by Tyler supports his thesis that 
smuggling was one factor which determined the ideological-political 
allegiances of Whig merchants. Tories like Nathaniel Rogers, 
Hutchinson's nephew, also complained of the "severest restrictions" 
laid upon colonial commerce by the acts of trade, but were 
not 
60 
not inclined to flout them by engaging in illegal ventures. 
13 
Ward Nicholas Boylston expressed the apprehension of many Tories 
with smuggling when he instructed one of his captains making 
a voyage to the West Indies that he was "on no pretence [to] break the Acts 
of Trade whereby you may render the Vessell Liable to Siezure. " 
14 
Smugglers, said one Tory, were men "lost to all Sense of honour" 
and worked hand in glove with the radicals to undermine British 
authority. 
15 When the Ervings came into Hutchinson's 
camp in 1770-1771, they abandoned their illicit ventures. 
Hutchinson claimed that he was able to convince John Erving Sr. 
of the folly of his family's ways, "that they tend to his own 
destruction as well as [to] the distress of the Government. " 
16 
, 
The Boylstons were one family who were divided by politics 
and smuggling. Thomas Boylston and the firm of Joseph 
Green and Nicholas Boylston were among Boston's leading general 
merchants. 
17 
Nicholas Boylston was a Tory and Joseph Green 
a moderate Whig. There is no extant record that Green 
& Boylston was ever involved in smuggling. 
18 Thomas Boylston, 
on the other hand, was a smuggler and an out-and-out-radical. 
John Adams thought him "a perfect Viper -a Friend -a Jew - 
a Devil", but "orthodox" in his politics. He was a "firebrand" 
against Governor Bernard. 
19 One reason for Thomas Boylston's 
Whiggism was that he had suffered directly from the new powers 
given to customs officers under the Revenue Act of 1764.20 
Boylston nurtured a belligerent Whiggism because his vessels 
had been seized for smuggling, but under the Revenue Act. he could 
not sue for damages incurred during or as a result of the seizure. 
(Hitherto, customs officers were not protected against prosecution 
in colonial courts. ) 
21 He had 
a very considerable interest in shipping 
for [which] he's under the greatest concern 
& some in part w[hi]t he is greatly 
discouraged from fitting out well knowing them 
liable/ 
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liable to such abuses w[hi]ch may inevitably 
ruin him from the officers of the Customs 
[being], unrestrain'd, uncheck'd by any 
Obligations to make reparation for damages 
sustain'd or by the Apprehension of being 
Accountable for their conduct however 
founded in malice, humor or Avarice. " 22 
Whig propagandists supported the efforts of merchants like Boylston 
trying to secure compensation for damages. 
23 
Compelling ideological and political arguments and hard- 
headed economic considerations were the main reasons why friends 
of government were to be found in Whig ranks in the 1760s. 
From 1765 to early in 1768, they acquiesced in the leadership 
of the radicals in the town meetings, General Court and merchants' 
committees. 
But the moderates' early enthusiasm for protest waned 
considerably following the introduction of the non-importation 
agreements in March and August 1768. (See Chapters Seven 
and Eight, passim. ) Whigs like Samuel Quincy, a lawyer, 
as well as the merchants, became alarmed at the "Encreasing 
Zeal for Liberty, or Mobbism". 
24 By 1770, the Amorys, 
George Erving and Harrison Gray had come into conflict with 
the Whig leadership over the boycott, and were prepared to 
lead the opposition. Approximately two-thirds of the 
Whig friends of government went on to become Loyalists, although 
a few, like Thomas Boylston, did not leave the protest movement 
until after the commencement of hostilities in April, 1775. 
(See Appendix A. ) 
2. The Tories. 
The Tories constituted the main body of opposition to the 
radical and moderate Whigs. Their political role in the 
assembly/ 
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assembly, town meetings and province at large will be discussed 
at length in subsequent chapters. This section concentrates 
upon their ideology. The Tories were conservatives - politically, 
ideologically and socially. While they resented being 
called "Tories" because of that term's association with disloyalty 
to the Hanoverian succession, and much preferred the apellation 
"friends of government", 
25 "Tory" adequately serves the purpose 
of describing those who opposed the Whig protest movement from 
the outset (although a few did become Whigs. ) "Friends 
of government", of course, refers to all opponents of the protest 
movement - Tories, dissident Whigs and previously uncommit^ d 
persons. 
Like the Whigs, the American Tories Used the colonial 
newspapers to communicate their ideas and ideology to the 
American public. The growth of the press in the revolutionary 
era provided a popular forum for political debate, and the 
pages of newspapers were not exclusive to one side or the 
other. 
26 For economic reasons alone, proprietors accepted 
contributions from writers of all political persuasions. 
27 
British conservatives like Thomas Whately, Secretary to the 
Treasury in Grenville's administration, were impressed by 
the Tory pamphleteers. 
28 
But it was the, American Whigs and not the Tories who 
made the most effective use of the press as a political and 
ideological platform. Unlike Whig essays, the letters 
of Tories in one newspaper were rarely reprinted in those 
of other colonies. Generally, Tory contributions registered 
local or provincial reactions to events. Even by 1774, 
Loyalist essays in the press "did not enunciate a fully developed 
alternative ideology or a coherent political code" which was 
transmitted throughout the colonies. 
29 It was the Loyalist 
pamphlets of 1774-1776 that facilitated the inter-provincial 
transmission/ 
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transmission of conservative ideology on a popular level. 
30 
(a) Tories and the Stamp Act Crisis. 
During the Stamp Act Crisis, the Massachusetts Tories did 
not engage in a sustained press campaign to defend the much- 
hated Stamp Act or to attack the activities of the Whigs. 
Samuel Waterhouse was a lone figure daring to lampoon James 
Otis as a "lying dog" and a "filthy skunk". (For his 
efforts, the "Water-house rat" had to swear an oath that 
he had not solicited for the office of Stamp Distributor. ) 
31 
Tories readily accused the Whigs of intimidating newspaper propri- 
etors who were willing to publish anti-Whig propaganda. 
32 
Later, one Tory said he feared that his article in the Massachusetts 
Gazette would bring reprisals against the printers, Richard 
and Samuel Draper. The Drapers ignored the abuse thrown 
at them by the rival (and Whig) Boston Gazette and continued 
to publish the views of dissenters so "that our worthy Patriots 
might have Opportunities of confuting any ill grounded Opinions. " 
33 
Given the sparseness of Tory propaganda, 1765-1766, the 
most important primary sources with which to trace the develop- 
ment of Tory ideology are private letters, family papers 
and the correspondence of Governor Bernard and Lieutenant- 
Governor Hutchinson. These sources-reveal that while the 
public debate revolved around questions concerned with the 
political and constitutional rights of the colonists - as 
they related primarily to the issue of direct taxation by 
Parliament - and the economic effects of British policies, 
the Tories' attention was focused on the fundamental political 
and social consequences of resistance to British authority. 
64 
At the outset, it must be stated that on the whole the 
Massachusetts Tories did not support the introduction of the 
Revenue Act or the Stamp Act. Only isolated reports exist 
of Tories expressing their approval of these measures. 
Few in the colony would have agreed with the Scottish-born 
merchant James Murray that "far from being a hurt to the Colonies", 
they "will be a necessary Spur to their Industry. " Murray's 
opinions were untypical, and he had but recently arrived in 
Massachusetts from North Carolina. 
34 Another exception 
was John Lowell, a member of a Boston club attended by John 
Adams. It was said that he "ripps about" all those who 
denounced the acts, for he was an "A[r]se Kisser" of the 
Hutchinsons. 35 Nathaniel Rogers believed that the Stamp 
Act was "supported at most by a few persons of property". 
36 
Tories in general did not approve of the Grenvillian 
programme, and wished for a repeal of the reforms. In 
this view, they differed markedly from British conservatives 
who would brook no concessions to the Americans on the issues 
of taxation or repeal. 
37 But the Tories were less concerned 
with the virtues of the Stamp Act and Revenue Act than with 
the possible effects that resistance to Britain might have. 
The Stamp Act Riots and the radicals' claims to the right 
of self-taxation, they believed, would alienate opinion in 
Britain favourable to a repeal of the acts. Moreover, 
they perceived a cause and effect relationship between resis- 
tance to British authority and the decline in the tradiI nal 
authority and power of the provincial government. The 
radicals, it appeared, were leading the colonists along a 
road to social and political revolution and independence from 
Britain. They had imposed a "democratic tyranny" upon 
Americans in order to silence those who could see their true 
intentions. According to Judge John Cushing, "A Spirit 
of Levillism Seems to go Through the Country". 
38 
65 
From January 1765, Tories warned that political extremism 
would not in any way aid the colonists' efforts to have the 
duty on molasses abolished altogether and the Stamp Duty, 
approved in principle by Parliament in March, 1764, averted. 
The Boston merchant Arthur Savage went to London to lobby 
M. P. s and get them to move for a repeal of the Revenue Act 
and reject Grenville's proposal for a Stamp Duty. He praised 
both the manner and the means by which Thomas Hutchinson had 
attempted to block Grenville's plans: "People seem generally 
agreed that... no Man is so Sutable or so likely to Serve the 
Province as Mr. Hutchinson... which is greatly strengthned (sic) 
by a Letter of his to Mr. Jackson. " In contrast, Savage 
saw no value in James Otis's radical doctrines and exclamations. 
"People's opinions seem very Various in respect to Mr. Otis": 
some say his name "ought to be wrote in Letters of Gold" while 
others believe he has "little affect" on those in government 
or Parliament. 
39 
Otis's opposition was "not well timed". 
The "present Sentiments of the Ministry", he informed his 
brother at Boston, "are such that they will not be Bullied 
into Opinions contrary to their own. " 
40 
The Stamp Act 
became law on March 22. 
It seemed perfectly clear to the Tories that if the act 
was to be overturned then the colonists must refrain from 
offending Parliament or the new administration led by the 
Duke of Cumberland and the Marquis of Rockingham. For 
Thomas Hutchinson, Attorney-General Edmund Trowbridge and 
Peter Oliver. submission to parliamentary authority and acqui- 
es nce in the execution of the Stamp Act were essential prerequisites 
if Britain was to be persuaded to repeal the Stamp Act and 
the Revenue Act. Petitioning, not resistance, was the means 
by which to change the opinions of M. P. s and government ministers. 
41 
Such ideas were discussed at 'the weekly meetings of a club organised 
by Rev. Ebenezer Gay of Hingham, and attended by councillor 
Benjamin/ 
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Benjamin Lincoln and Braintree Tories Peter Etter, William 
Vesey, and Joseph Cleverly. 
42 They also found their 
way into the sermons of Congregational ministers Mather Byles Jr. 
and Eli Forbes. 
43 
Anglican clergymen were particularly outspoken critics 
of the Whigs. Henry Caner accused Congregational ministers 
Jonathan Mayhew and Charles Chauncy of fomenting "murmuring 
and discontent" among the populace over the -Revenue Act in order 
to stir up opposition to the Anglicans' proposals for an Amer- 
ican episcopate. It was a dangerous game played by Mayhew 
and Chauncy, one "which was likely to upset the colonies 
political connections with Britain. " 
44 Whereas many 
Congregationalists condemned the Stamp Act and the Presbyterian 
Synod of 1766 declared for repeal, Anglican clergy in the 
Northern colonies preached the virtues of submission to British 
authority. 
45 
For the Anglican preachers, of course, their 
Toryism was subsumed in their loyalty to the King as head 
of the Church of England. 
46 But it is unclear to what 
extent members of Episcopalian chapels and missions in Mass- 
achusetts shared their views. 
47 
In the first four months of 1765, Governor Bernard and 
most moderate Whigs agreed with the Tories' argument that 
petitions to the King and Parliament were the most propitious 
means by which to influence the repeal of the Revenue Act 
and Stamp Act. The Whigs were less inclined to endorse 
the Tories' grim prognosis that Britain would use military 
force to compel submission to the Stamp Act. 
48 By May, 
however, the Tories' case was greatly discredited by the arrival 
of news from Britain that Parliament had rejected the petitions 
against the measures sent from Massachusetts and other colonies. 
(See Chapter One, pp. 23-26. ) Over the summer, the Tories 
joined the Whigs in calling for a congress of the colonies 
to/ 
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to draw up remonstrances and petitions to the King and Parliament. 
(See Chapter Three, pp. 93-96. ) 
The August riots in Boston, however, confirmed the Tories' 
worst fears that the radicals had gained control of the protest 
movement and were intent on pbstructing: attempts to implement 
the Stamp Act, even to the point of provoking retribution 
from Britain and inciting civil disorder among the lower orders. 
Richard Clarke absented himself from Jonathan Mayhew's West 
Church, because he believed that Mayhew's sermon of August 
25 had encouraged the mobs to destroy Hutchinson's house the 
next day. 
49 
Nathaniel Rogers, who had denounced the 
Revenue Act and Stamp Act, - for which he gained the reputation 
of being "warmly attach'd to the cause of liberty" - declared 
he was "an Enemy to the factious proceedings" that had taken 
place in Boston. 
50 
Ebenezer Miller, a selectman of Braintree- 
and political rival of John Adams, was "fearful that they 
will be stomachful at Home and angry and resentful" on account of 
the riots. 
51 
Tories, therefore, welcomed reports from Britain indicating 
that despite the resistance of the Whigs, the ministry, 
now led by Rockingham, was considering repealing the Stamp 
Act. But their optimism was tempered by the situation 
in Massachusetts over the winter of 1765-1766: the courts 
and ports had been closed since November and, the following 
month, the east coast merchants entered into non-importation 
agreements. Once more, they preached the wisdom and expediency 
of restraint and mild supplications. Henry Caner hoped 
that New Englanders "may not... by some riotous improper Conduct 
bring upon ourselves the Resentment of the British government" 
apd so jeopardise the prospect of repeal. 
52 
The Massachusetts 
Gazette applauded the private remonstrances sent to Whitehall 
by Bernard and Hutchinson. It also reprinted letters 
of the London merchants to the Whig merchant John Hancock, 
in/ 
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in which the latter was warned that the "intemperate proceedings" 
in Boston had alienated British liberals. 
53 Curiously, 
the Tories said little about the effects of non-importation 
on British opinion, probably because many Tory merchants 
in Boston had subscribed to that town's agreement. 
54 
After the Stamp Act was repealed and the Revenue 
Act revised, the Tories maintained that the radicals' 
strategy of resistance had played no part in the calculations 
of the Rockingham government. Nathaniel Hatch of 
Dorchester asserted that "nothing hindered the repeal of 
the Stamp Act but what has been done here - the Riots, 
and Resolves. " 
55 
On reflection, few friends of government were Tories 
in 1765-1766. At best, we can determine the allegiance 
of around seventy Tories from the time of the Stamp Act Crisis. 
This number included thirty-two representatives in the 
House named in a Whig "Black List", 
56a few councillors 
and judges, members of the Hutchinson-Oliver clique, some 
government officers such as Benjamin Hallowell, four 
or five merchants and a handful of Congregational and 
Anglican clergymen. (See Appendix A. ) 
Francis Bernard and Thomas Hutchinson believed that 
many more people would have declared their opposition to the 
Whigs had they not been intimidated into silence by the Boston 
riots and anti-Tory propaganda. Bernard informed his corr- 
espondents in England that the "Defection... is not so general 
as it appears; because-People who are on the side of government, 
dare not [voice] their Sentiments. " 
57 "If a Gentlemen 
in common Conversation signifies his disapprobation of this 
insurrection, his person is immediately in Danger. " 
58 
Thomas Hutchinson accused James Otis and Samuel Adams of inciting 
the lower orders to riot in order to silence people of different 
ideological/ 
69 
ideological persuasions. They "have been endeavouring 
by their inflammatory writings to instill principles destructive 
of all government and then stir up the rage of the people against 
all who will not avow these principles. " 
59 They turned 
the tradesmen against Andrew Oliver's house "and then went 
on to more erroneous acts" until it was "thought they had done 
enough to deter all persons from giving the least countenance 
to the [Stamp] act. " 
60 
Hutchinson explained to Benjamin 
Franklin (who had himself solicited for a Distributor's commission) 
that after the riot of August 26 it was "not safe... to advance 
any thing contrary to any popular opinions whatsoever. 
Every body who used to have virtue enough to oppose them is 
now afraid of my fate. " 
61 In his History of Massachusetts, 
Hutchinson concluded that action against 
two of the principal officers of the 
crown... struck terror into people of 
inferior rank; and though they saw the 
danger from this assumed power in the 
populace, yet they would give no aid 
in discountenancing it, lest they should 
become obnoxious themselves. 62 
The testaments of Bernard and Hutchinson did not exaggerate 
the impact of the riots and anti-Toryism on the Massachusetts 
Tories. Tories themselves expressed their anxieties with 
the Whig orthodoxy. After August 26, the message from 
the Sons of Liberty was clear: "no body dare speak a word, 
in Opposition... if they did, down goes his house. " 
63 
Edmund Trowbridge confided in William Bollan: "No man 
is Safe unless he Joyns the Cry against the Stamp Act. " 
He feared that his house "would be demolished as the Lieutenant- 
Governor's was" if he took steps to implement the act. 
64 
Henry Caner observed that 
Bad/ 
70 
Bad principles are cherished and a riotous 
disposition kept up among the people by some 
popular leaders and every man is look'd 
upon with a jealous Eye who does not 
join in the popular Clamour, and is in 
Danger of being made a Sacrifice, if 
he expresses any Sentiment contrary to 
the present reigning Opinions. 65 
James Murray echoed Caner's views: 
The Multitude, among which are many men 
of figure and fortune, imagine that such 
proceedings will surely procure a Repeal 
of the Act and prevent further imposition; 
while a few, they call them the base 
few will not only rivet the Act in question, 
but bring the Colonies under a much stricter 
government than ever they have yet felt. 
The Truth is we are the Children of a 
most indulgent Parent who has never exerted 
her authority over us, till we are grown 
almost to manhood and act accordingly; 
but were I to say so here before our 
Chief Ruler, the Mob, or any of their 
adherents I should presently have my 
house turned inside out. 66 
While there are no recorded instances of violent attabks 
on the persons or property of Tories in 1765-1766, other 
than those on Hutchinson, Oliver, Story (a Whig in fact) 
and Hallowell, the treatment meted out to these men was 
enough to deter many conservatives from taking a public stand 
against the radical Whig leadership and their strategy 
of resistance. 
(b) Tory Ideology, 1767-1770. 
The controversies over the Townshend Acts, non-importation, 
the/ 
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the rescinding issue and the Boston Massacre sharpened the 
Tories'ideological awareness: they placed greater limits on 
the colonists' right to resist Britain. 
There was a bitterness in the exchanges between Tory 
and Whig writers that was never erased by the repeal of the 
Stamp Act. Tories fully realised the unpopularity of their 
views. But by 1767, they were in a better position to mount 
a counter-attack on the radicals in the press. The Boston 
Evening Post carried the ambitious projects of Jonathan Sewall 
and the anonymous "N. P. " who composed a series of rejoinders 
to Dickinson's Farmer's Letters. 67 John Mein's Boston 
Chronicle, which first appeared on December 21,1767, was, 
according to the Boston Gazette, a new instrument of the 
"Jacobite Party". Actually, it was not until the summer 
68 
of 1769 that Mein's paper adopted a clear pro-government stance. 
Nonetheless, it published the essays of a host of minor Tory 
writers. 
69 
Avid readers of the Chronicle included Andrew 
Oliver and Israel Williams. 
70 
Tory writers were more prepared to challenge the intimi- 
datory tactics of the Whigs than they had been hitherto. 
During the Stamp Act Crisis, according to "A True Patriot", 
the radicals had threatened with "fire & faggot to burn and 
destroy all those who presume to differ with them (in their 
enthusiastical political notions. )" "Phil. Paci" in the 
Essex Gazette called for reconciliation between the two parties, 
and reminded the Whigs of their blatant hypocrisy in proscribing 
the Tories whilst declaring their faith in doctrines of natural 
rights: 
If... any Measures are encouraged or pursued, 
which, if obtained, will lay the greatest 
Restraint upon the Liberty of Individuals, 
who / 
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who differ in Sentiment from the prevailing 
Party, we may. I think depend'upon it, 
that by such Conduct we sap the very 
Foundation of all true Liberty, and 
miss the Thing we profess to be aiming 
at. 
"N. P. " rounded on James Otis, Sam Adams, Joseph Warren and Dr. 
Thomas Young for producing virulent anti-Tory newspaper articles. 
, "Whoever contradicts a prevailing humour... draws upon himself 
the clamour of the multitude; His arguments are condemned, 
but not examined. " 
71 
The Tories did not like the Townshend Acts any more than 
they had the Stamp Act, whereas Governor Bernard approved Townshend's 
scheme. Once again, Tories were in favour of repeal on 
political and economic grounds, and advocated peaceful remonstrances 
as being the most likely strategy with which to achieve it. 
Yet, like Bernard and Hutchinson, they also believed that if 
Parliament chose to repeal the Duties it should not in any 
way abrogate its legislative supremacy in the colonies. 
Against the mainstream of Whig opinion, the Tories argued 
that'the colonists did not possess legislative powers independent 
of the authority of Parliament. They admitted that it 
made good sense not to impose direct taxes upon the Americans, 
but maintained that if Parliament so desired then it had the 
authority to do so. There was no paradox or confusion 
here: at first, they believed that. if the'Duties could be 
repealed without making concessions over the principles involved 
Britain and the majority of colonists would be satisfied. 
. Tory writers denied categorically that the Charters 
granted to the colonists by Charles I and William III contai- 
ned any concept of self-government that limited the sovereignty 
of the British Parliament to levy taxes or enact any other 
piece of legislation pertaining teethe colonies. It was 
a "fallacy" for the Whigs to have argued that Parliament could 
only 
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only levy "external" taxes (duties on articles of trade) and 
not "internal" taxes such as the Stamp Duty. (The Tories 
agreed with the Whigs that the Townshend Duties were in effect 
"internal" taxes. ) 72 With such claims, the Whigs were 
undermining not only the colonists' allegiance to the King- 
in-Parliament, but to the King-in-person: "The authority 
of the King [cannot] be denied in one respect and acknowledged 
in another; without destroying the whole chain of allegiance. " 
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Nor did the doctrines of natural rights and natural law justify 
the resistance to Britain. Instead, it leads "to the 
dissolution of all government, and ought never to be made 
use of but when the government, by the mal-administration 
74 of the governors, is already . 
xn 
a state of dissolution. " 
In a series of articles in the Boston Evening Post, 
Jonathan Sewall as "Philanthrop" advanced a conservative inter- 
pretation of. the Lockean contract theory of government . 
in order to rationalise and explain the Tories' opposition to 
the protest movement. Sewall argued that the Whigs were 
undermining the system of deference - or an ingrained respect 
for authority and those who maintained it - that prevailed 
in colonial society. But deference, he argued, was essential 
to the well-being of society. It was the duty of every 
person "to keep up in the minds of all about him an inviolable 
respect for the laws, a rational submission to those in authority 
and christian candor, brotherly love and good will one towards 
another. " The promise of political liberty, according 
to Sewall, could only be realised when people understood that there 
were "certain rules, to which... all of the community, must 
conform. " 
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"N. P. " advanced a similar thesis. The colonists, 
he reasoned, had a "moral obligation" to support the existing 
structure of government, for their allegiance and loyalty did 
not/ 
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not depend upon them knowing a priori whether that obligation 
was consistent with what the Whigs defined as their 
constitutional liberties and duties: 
'Tis the preservation of peace and order 
among mankind, which are incompatible 
with the riotous passions incident to 
our natures, that first depriv'd man 
of his natural liberty, and made him 
submit to political society. Such 
obligations as society enforced, being 
moral, must consequently have arisen 
with an original intent to promote public 
utility. 76 
For the Tories, the Liberty Riot of June 11,1768, the 
refusal of the House to rescind the circular letter later that 
month, the adoption of a unilateral non-importation agreement 
in August by the Boston merchants and the illegal meeting 
of the Convention of Towns in September were calculated exercises 
by the Whigs to inflame the populace against Britain and the 
opponents of the protest movement. The Hultons reported 
that "Many Persons awed by, the people, are obliged to court 
Popularity for their own Security.... If the People took a dislike 
to any One, they would make nothing of pulling down their houses. " 
"Veryfew", they continued, "[are] to be met with that will 
allow the right of taxation to the British Parliament. " 
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When Nathaniel Rogers returned from a visit to England, 
he wrote in a letter to the Boston Gazette that "a general 
alarm appeared in the kingdom that we were taking the most 
imprudent steps. " Rogers urged the Whigs to cease their 
protests because "men of all parties" in Britain were "willing 
to afford us every relief. " The repeal of the Townshend 
Duties would come "once we had returned to moderation" and 
delivered "representations, founded upon such reasonings as 
were admissable upon their ideas of the constitution. " 
Rogers/ 
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Rogers echoed Bernard's sentiments, although he was not the 
Governor's mouthpiece. Bernard "wished that he [Rogers] 
had advised with his Friends concerning the Prudentiality of 
this Publication. " When Bernard informed Rogers that the 
Convention of Towns had met in defiance of his instructions, 
he asked him if his "Hopes" that Massachusetts would be "treated 
with Indulgence had not been much abated". Rogers "owned 
that they were very much abated: & that he dreaded the Resentment 
of the Parliament. " 
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In September, fifteen New England clergymen signed an 
address to the Bishop of London expressing their grave concern 
at recent developments in the colony. Their refusal "to 
join in the popular clamours that now prevail" and speak out 
against the Townshend Acts left them at the mercy of the radical 
propagandists: "We are neither allowed to speak nor scarcely 
to be silent unless we join with those who we believe to be 
labouring the destruction of our constitution, civil and religious. " 
The only thing to be done was "to cultivate among the people 
committed to our care a spirit of peace and patience. " 
Little changed for the majority of Anglican clergymen in Massachusetts 
between 1768 and 1775: ten of the fifteen signatories 
became Loyalists. 
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By the summer of 1769, when the province received word 
that the Grafton administration was favourably disposed toward 
a partial repeal of the Townshend Duties, the Tories were increasingly 
apprehensive that the radicals would incense Parliament and 
the ministry and prevent a repeal. ' James Murray 
noted that the Whigs "think they are effectually bullying 
Britain into their Measures, while they seem to us (Tories) 
to be heaping up wrath against the day of wrath. " 
80 For 
one Tory, Massachusetts was now in the "headlong progress of 
political phrenzy", and the Whig leaders "would do well to 






These were the thoughts of men whose ideology was imbued 
with a sense of impending catastrophe. Few were now so optimistic 
as to think that the protests would cease once Parliament had 
repealed the Townshend Acts. For Thomas Hutchinson, the 
Whigs "will not be easy until all the Acts laying restraint 
upon our Trade should be repealed also. " 
82 In 
October, the Boston merchants resolved to continue with non- 
importation until all the Townshend Duties and the Revenue 
Acts of 1764 and 1766 had been repealed. (See Chapter 
Seven, pp. 235-236. ) "What can be done for a Sinking Country"? 
asked Israel Williams. "The contentions and clamours at 
home [Britain] and here, wear a very threatning aspect, and 
forebode a Revolution. Deus avertat omen. " 
83 
The Tories were certain of the long term consequences 
of resistance to Britain's policies: it presaged: an "internal 
revolution" , with the radicals leading the lower orders to 
power; a war of independence with Britain; and a bitter civil 
war between the friends of government and the Whigs. If 
the "extreme" arguments and doctrines of the Whigs were "allowed 
their full scope [it] would establish an entire independency. " 
84 
Israel Williams believed that there was "no way of avoiding" 
the wrath of the British government, for if necessary they would 
"carry their Acts and orders into Execution. " His kinsman 
Colonel William Williams was "settled" in his opinion that 
the "Conduct" of the House of Representatives "will bring a 
demolition of our Charter Unless we are treated by King & 
parliament as a people Insane & so not to be punished until 
we come to our Wits. " Henry Caner was equally despondent 
on the future of British-American relations: "God knows 
where or when these things will end, " he wrote, "perhaps'in 
a total alienation of the Colonies, or a forcible reduction 
of them -a terrible alternative. " 
85 (The Whigs, of course, 




events would necessarily come to pass. But their assurances 
did little to assuage the 
n ieties and fears of the conservatives. ) 
Nathaniel Coffin summarised the Tories' pessimistic and 
Manichean perception of the political situation in Massachusetts 
and Boston in particular. The colony had become a "sheer 
Democracy". "Power frequently shifts hands. One While 
a McIntosh, another, Otis & Adams, at another the Body of Merchants 
are our sovereigns. " 
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The mob and the lower orders, 
led by the radicals, had assumed the de facto control of politics 
in Boston: 
Demagogues, are left in possession of 
an unlimited Power, supported by all 
the Common people of this Town, who 
place an intire Confidence in them, & 
by being disposed to perceive any 
impressions they may please are wrought 
into the highest degree of Enthusiasm 
and Frenzy. This mighty Tyranny 
bears down every thing before it, overawes 
all the executive power of Government 
and by having the lead in the Legislature 
carry all their Points there. Their 
Influence becomes daily more and more 
extensive thro' all the Towns of the 
Province & indeed of the neighbouring 
Provinces, which is employ'd in alienating 
the Affections of the People from Great . Britain, & setting before them the alluring 
prospect of a total independence of, 
& exemption from the Government of it.... 
The basis of the Whigs' power was their control of the Boston. 
mobs: 
A storm in this Town is raised in the 
twinkling of an Eye, without your having 
the least Warning. Such an absolute 
Sway have our leaders over the Minds 
of the Common people, that in an instant 
they will raise you a Tempest, that would 
threaten Destruction to the Globe, & 
as/ 
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as instantaneously produce you a Dead 
Calm, & for months together when policy 
requires it preserve such Peace & quiet 
in the Town, that you would swear it 
to be the best regulated Town in the 
world. 88 
Coffin feared not only a political revolution by the radicals, 
but also a social revolution by the lower orders and lower 
middle classes: "In a very few Months, It is thought a division 
of property will take place amongst us. " 
69 (The Tories' 
vision of impending class conflict was characteristic of the 
arguments of Loyalist pamphleteers in 1774-1775. ) 
The Boston Massacre of March 5,1770 heightened the Tories' 
fears of revolution and civil war. Lying in his bed suffering 
from gout, Andrew Oliver could hear the ringing of bells 
and the beating of drums asAthousands of people8poured into 
King Street to confront Captain Preston and a detachment of 
soldiers on duty at the Town House: "[It] painted in my Imagination 
all the Horrors of a civil war. " 
90 
. 
Five civilians were 
killed in the affray, and Preston and his soldiers were tried 
for murder. All were acquitted, although two soldiers 
were found guilty of the reduced charge of manslaughter. 
"It was clearly justifiable homicide", thought Nathaniel Coffin, 
and he believed the judges and jury had done themselves a "great 
honor" in acquitting Preston. 
91 
The Boston Massacre was only one of many violent incidents 
in 1770-1771 that contributed to the demoralisation of Tories, 
particularly those like Coffin who were employed in the customs 
service. 
Customs officials had often complained of their inability 
to enforce the acts of trade when faced with angry Whig mobs. 
Henry Hulton maintained that just as senior officials in the provi- 
ncial/ 
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ncial administration did not have sufficient coercive power 
at their disposal to enforce unpopular acts of Parliament, 
so too customs officers "required more than the [Customs] 
Board possessed or than Government might chuse to exert" in 
order to carry out their duties. 
92 Governor Bernard agreed 
with Hulton that officers had become reluctant to attempt 
seizures "since it would only serve to expose their... persons 
to contempt & danger, without Any probability of detaining 
the goods. " 
93 (Officers were allowed to retain one-third 
the value of seizures. ) Customs officers could request 
the aid of the civil magistrates when making a seizure by obtain- 
ing a writ of assistance from the Superior Court. Since 
1761, only Massachusetts and New Hampshire had issued writs. 
In 1766, the Attorney-General of England upheld a ruling by 
the highest court in Connecticut that writs were illegal. 
But the decision was reversed and writs continued to be issued 
by the Superior Court. Another way to aid customs officers 
was for the Governor and Council to make a proclamation urging 
civil magistrates to maintain law and order and protect imperial 
servants. 
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Criticism of these existing police measures 
came most poignantly from Tories employed in the customs service. 
Their rebukes, reflected, and were reflected in, the criticism 
of Britain's colonial policies by senior officials in the 
provincial administration. 
On May 18,1770, Owen Richards, a tidesman at Boston, 
attempted to make a seizure without the aid of civil magistrates. 
He was apprehended by a mob who tarred and feathered 
him, then carted him through the town for upward of four 
hours. Richards made his escape when an argument 
broke out among his assailants whether or not to give the 
same treatment to another customs officer. It 
was an especially brutal assaualt, from which Richards 
was/ 
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was in danger of losing the sight of one eye. 
95 
Richards received no aid from the town constables, the 
Sheriff or the Justices of the Peace. Nathaniel 
Coffin, who witnessed the mobbing, noted caustically that 
"not a Magistrate appeared to interpose his Authority. " 
Hutchinson called the Justices of the Peace to the Council 
chamber the following morning. and made it clear to them 
that their "duty [was]... to interpose in order to suppress 
the Riots". One of the Justices ,a Whig, replied 
that he had received no complaint about the disturbance 
and so had taken no action to halt it. Hutchinson, 
CLIO 
who could 4nothing more for Richards, reminded the magistrates 
that "it is of great Importance that the Officers of 
the Customs should not be intimidated", and promised that 
as Chief Justice he would do all in his power to "promote 
a vigorous prosecution of the offenders. " 
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The incident left Nathaniel Coffin bitter and 
angry with the British government for placing its servants 
in such a predicament where they had to enforce the acts 
of trade in the face of hostile mobs without being 
given adequate means of protection. 
In the Name of Curiosity what can [the] 
administration be about, that they do not 
fall on some Measures to put a stop 
to the growing evil. If they should 
continue as supine as they have hitherto 
been, & shall neglect to take any Methods, 
to support their Servants, & restore 
order & obedience to Laws, they had better 
send for every Servant of Government 
home. It is impossible under these 
Circumstances, that they should continue 
long here in their present Situation, 
being 'mark'd with the greatest contempt, 
exposed to daily insults, & in constant 
hazard of their Lives & Property. 97 
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One month after the attack on Richards, Commissioner 
Henry Hulton, his family and guests (who included two customs 
officers) were besieged by a mob at Hulton's house at Brookline. 
The mob smashed windows and tried unsuccessfully to gain entry 
before it dispersed. The attackers wore disguises and 
had blackened faces. Hulton's neighbours could identify 
some of the assailants, but were "immediately... silenced, being 
given to undertsand... that if they made any further stir about 
the matter, they might expect to be treated in the same manner 
as Mr H[ulton] was. " 
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According to Hulton and his sister, 
This instance shows the State this Country 
is in.... It is not the case of one, but 
of every faithful Officer & Loyal Subject 
here that is; to suffer abuse persecution 
calumny & reproach & if they seek redress 
or any person attempts to do them Justice, 
it is not to be expected but threats 
of greater evils. 99 
Later, it was suggested by the Whigs that Hulton had fabricated 
this incident in order to slight them. 
100 
Another example concerns Arthur Savage, who had been the 
Comptroller of Falmouth since April, 1765. Savage had 
a reputation for rigorously enforcing the acts of trade. 
On February 2,1770, Savage and a landwaiter seized a vessel 
and her illegal cargo of French rum. But a mob interposed 
to prevent them from removing the cargo. Savage, evidently, 
possesed a writ of assistance, and requested the Sheriff to 
aid him in the recovery of the cargo. Although "Some 
doubt... arose [as to] what assistance the Sheriff is legally 
oblidged to afford... in Such cases", he accompanied Savage 
and his subordinates back to the wharf where the vessel was 
moored. They were halted by a crowd of some twenty people, 
who began to hurl "threatning words" at "every person" 
who/ 
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Who was employed" in securing the cargo. Eventually, the customs 
men had to cease their work. 
101 
In a letter to Thomas Hutchinson, by now the acting 
Governor, Savage analysed the reasons for his failure to seize 
the vessel's cargo. "The course of the Law was as much 
Impeeded as if Thousands [of] armed [men] had forceably prevented 
us from doing our duty. " The root of the problem was the 
ineffectiveness of the writs of assistance. The "Intention" 
of the writs was that "the laws should have their free course", 
but even when civil magistrates or the Sheriff did act in response 
it was "Impossable" for customs officers to secure cargoes 
'against the wishes of a determined mob. Greater protection 
was needed for customs officers than was available at present: 
The Necessity of Support Somewhere is 
needed in Such a place and in such Times 
as these, when common prudence and a 
Safety to a man's Self oblidges most 
to Speak cautiously, and to follow a 
more cautious conduct in order to enable 
them to do there duty even in the most 
temperate manner.... It must... be a Consideration 
verry dejecting to the Officers... with 
every other Inconvenience that we are 
exposed to the ludicrous Jests of the 
base and unthinking for not being able 
to do our duty, when on the other hand 
a Strict adherence to it is expected 
from us. 102 
****** 
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The ordeal of Arthur Savage 
103 
came after five years 
of political turmoil in Massachusetts in which Tories like 
himself had emerged as the main opponents of the Whig protest 
movement, but also as critics of British colonial policies. 
In order to explain the first count, we must understand that 
it was not the case (as the Whigs sometimes alleged) that. the 
Tories could not conceive of a situation where a people such 
as the Americans would be justified in rebelling against the. 
established government: not to have done so would have been 
to reject entirely Massachusetts's libertarian heritage, and 
this they could not do no matter how far their colony's Puritan 
and Whig traditions were being turned against them by the 
radicals; also, as conservative liberals who professed their 
faith in the constitutional arrangement settled by the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688-1889, they were commited to upholding the 
concept of political change at the highest level in order to 
overthrow "despotic" governments or monarchs. But deep 
in the Tories' ideological consciousness there was a compelling, 
almost atavistic desire to relate what was happening in the 
present to historical experiences that went beyond the Glorious 
Revolution to the time when the Puritans first settled in the Bay 
colony and England was torn apart by the Civil War of the 1640s. 
Then, Massachusetts had been largely isolated from developments in 
England, where, alarmingly for conservatives, the Levellers 
and other extremists held out visions of social and political 
revolution to the middle and lower orders. Later, in Tory eyes, 
they were succeeded by the Real Whigs , who revered pernicious 
concepts of popular sovereignty (although they were far from 
being revolutionaries ). Now, it seemed, these ideas 
had crossed the Atlantic, and were leading the Whigs to contemplate 
revolution and independence from Britain. With all this 
in mind, the Tories saw no need for a radical reformation in 
the constitutional arrangement according to Whig texts that 
would allow Americans the full "rights of Englishmen". 
They/ 
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They admitted that the colonists had grievances, but none that 
could not be resolved by dutiful petitions and remonstrances 
to the King and Parliament; Britain was not a tyrannical power 
and would listen attentively to their protests. The Tories' 
preferred method of safeguarding fundamental liberties was 
for the colonists to submit to the authority of Parliament 
whilst working for a redress of grievances. Riots, political 
extremism and anti-Toryism presaged an "internal revolution" 
that threatened to destroy the bases of their own freedoms: 
in other words, the Whigs were rebelling against the very inst- 
itutions, political culture and society that had given Americans 
their rights and liberties, and which still protected them. 
At the same time, however, senior government officials were 
thinking of radical constitutional changes that would curb 
the political power of the Whigs. It is unlikely that 
the majority of Tories would have approved of the reforms 
suggested by Bernard, Hutchinson and Oliver. But on the 
second count, they urged successive British governments to 
to take drastic steps (without,, on the whole, specifiying what 
measures) to arrest the decline Athe power and authority of 
the provincial government. * Their criticism was not always mild,. 
but usually general and vague, and rarely, if ever, voiced'in 
public. Eventually, some moderate Whigs came to share 
some of these assumptions (as will be shown in more detail 
in subsequent chapters. ). The allegiances of roughly a 
quarter of the friends of government - Tories, dissident 
Whigs and others - were formed during the period 1765-1771 
(see Appendix A. ). To what extent, therefore, did the dissidents 
and Tories co-operate to halt the progress of the radicals? 
and, did they respond to the political leadership of the royal 
governors? 
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CHAPTER THREE: GOVERNOR BERNARD, THE TORIES AND OPPOSITION 
TO THE WHIGS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1764-1765. 
Politics in the lower chamber of the Massachusetts legis- 
lature, the House of Representatives, did not depend upon the 
functions of a stable, well run party system. 
1 On any 
major issue which came before the House members formed 
coalitions that transcended rigid political boundaries and usually 
lasted so long as the issue in question was being debated. 
2 
This situation changed slowly and gradually, but not completely, 
during the revolutionary period 
3 
when three main ideological- 
political factions emerged: the radical Whigs and the Tories, 
who were at opposite ends of the spectrum of opinion, and the 
moderate Whigs and non-aligned members who formed a loose, often 
incoherent association in the middle. The radicals were the 
most politically dynamic of the three, for they provided the 
leadership of the Whig protest movement inside and outside 
the General Court. To back up their campaigns in the 
assembly, they had at their disposal the Boston newspapers, political 
organisations such as the Sons of Liberty and quasi-political 
voluntary associations such as the Masonic Lodge. The 
Tories, on the other hand, were an ill-organised group who 
looked principally to the royal governor for political leadership. 
There were approximately sixty Tories who sat in the House 
between 1764 and 1774. While it is impossible to establish 
accurately the numerical divisions within the House at any 
one time (for the House Journals rarely recorded the divisions 
on/ 
86 
on a vote or the names of the voters), it can be said with 
certainty that the Tories never constituted a majority of the 
members (see Table 2 ). The key, therefore, to their pol- 
itical success was their ability to work with the moderates, 
which fact was fully appreciated by Francis Bernard and Thomas 
Hutchinson. Between 1765 and 1769, Francis Bernard tried 
unsuccessfully to forge a lasting Tory-moderate coalition, 
and, in order to inspire the friends of government and make 
them amenable to his political leadership, he used his speeches 
and addresses to try and precipitate ideologically charged 
confrontations within the. House. 
TABLE 2: TORIES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1764-1774. 
Number of Number of 
Election Representatives Tories . In-Percentages 
1764 113 35 30.97 
1765 114 41 35.96 
1766 118 22 18.64 
1767 120 29 24.17 
1768 127 27 21.26 
1769 130 12 9.23 
1770 124 9 7.26 
1771 122 11 9.02 
1772 129 11 8.53 
1773 132 8 6.06 
1774 138 6 4.35 
Sources: Appendix B; House Journals, 1764-1774, vols. XLI-LIII 
But while the Tories and some of the moderates shared 
a common ideological outlook with Bernard, they rarely took 
collective action against the radicals in response to his 
bidding. Bernard's failure to inspire a court party 
can / 
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can be attributed not only to the overall strength of the Whigs, 
both radicals and moderates, but to the essential political 
weaknesses of the Tories and moderates who deserted the Whig 
faction. The Whigs ran anti-Tory electoral campaigns in 
which conservative candidates were proscribed as "traitors" 
to their country. Thus placed in an unenviable predicament, 
the friends of government had little or no desire to stand 
out in defence of an "oppressive", unpopular, "foreign" British 
power. Indeed, like the Whigs, they desired the repeal 
of the Revenue Act, Stamp Act and Townshend Acts. Para- 
doxically, while the Tories perceived the germ of social and 
political revolution in the radicals' resistance to British 
authority, they preferred to concentrate on the immediate issues 
at hand and rejected Bernard's overtures that made so much 
of ideological questions. They believed that if the 
unpopular measures were repealed without delay then 
peace would return to Massachusetts and the colonies. 
1. Francis Bernard and the Friends of Government, 1764. 
When Francis Bernard, an Englishman, career civil servant 
and, Governor of New Jersey since 1758, assumed the governorship 
of Massachusetts, he came to a province divided against itself. 
The political factions of the 1750s had created many problems 
for the royal governors in their attempts to direct the colony's 
war effort against the French. The prerogative or Court 
party was a loose congregation of executive officers, judges, 
Anglicans and merchants. The popular or Country party 
also included men of these stamps, but attracted much support 
outside the General Court from merchants, shopkeepers, artisans 
and yeoman. Disputes between the two factions often concealed 
competitions for posts and places in the provincial administration. 
Bernard's predecessor, Thomas Pownall, had allied himself with 
the/ 
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the Country party, and, on the whole, his period in office 
was a successful one. 
4 
Bernard's main aim was to unite the factions behind a 
benevolent administration. To this end, he distributed 
patronage freely to both parties, although the number of posts 
at his disposal was quite small when compared to those available 
to the Crown in Britain. 5 For example, he issued commissions 
for 462 Justices of the Reace, which represented about one 
in every hundred adult males in the province. 
6 He claimed 
he had "no other choice" but to remain above political disputes 
because he "found the province divided into parties so nearly 
equal, that it would have been Madness for me to have put myself 
at the head of either of them. " 
7 
Bernard, however, was criticised by conservatives and 
members of the Court faction, many of whom he would soon turn 
to for political support. John Cushing accused him of 
"Throwing about Commissions and promising almost Every body.... 
and so appointing persons in Civil and military stations Some 
Scandalous, Others Wholly unfit". 
8 Thomas Hutchinson, 
the leader of the Court faction, reasoned that a "governor 
in the plantations must support those who are friends to government 
as they cannot long support themselves. " 
9 Hutchinson's 
allegiance was secured with his appointment to the vacant seat 
of Chief Justice (he was already the Lieutenant-Governor), 
by which action, of course, Bernard alienated the powerful 
Otis family. 
10 
Bernard's idyll was shattered by the Writs of Assistance 
Case of 1761-1762 and the controversy over the Revenue Act. They 
convinced him'of the need to build a pro-government faction 
in the assembly. Bernard looked to the men who were 
called "Tories", 1764-1766, to provide the nucleus of the 
friends of government in the House. The thirty-five Tories 
elected/ 
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elected in 1764 were a potentially powerful political group. 
They formed over 30 per cent of the membership of the House. 
Moreover, their ranks included men with much political and 
public experience, such as General Timothy Ruggles, who had 
been elected Speaker of the House in 1762; John Winslow, who 
had commanded provincial forces during the French and Indian 
War; members of the Court faction during Pownall's day, Thomas 
Clap, Thomas Foster, Daniel Howard and Jacob Fowle. Nine- 
teen of the Tories had served in the assembly during the 1750s, 
and nineteen represented constituencies in Plymouth, Essex and 
Middlesex Counties where the Court faction had had many supporters 
(see Appendix B) and where now Toryism was prevalent. 
However, during the the session of 1764-1765, the Tories 
did not take collective action in support of Governor Bernard, 
nor form a durable coalition with the moderates. We 
can see this if we examine the Tories' reponses to three 
issues which divided the House: the debate on the petition 
sent to Parliament in November, 1764 concerning the Revenue 
Act and proposed Stamp Duty; in January, 1765, the choice of 
a province agent from three candidates - Richard Jackson, * Thomas 
Hutchinson, and Israel Mauduit (the brother of the incumbent, 
Jasper Mauduit); 2and in February, the vote on whether Thomas 
Hutchinson should receive a grant from the House for his services 
as Chief Justice. On each occasion, the result was in Bernard's 
favour, but the performance of the Tories made him more aware 
of their limitations as a government party. 
When Bernard addressed the General Court after the May 
election in 1764, he did so in an atmosphere charged with uncer- 
tainty and apprehension because the Revenue Act had recently 
passed Parliament and news had arrived of Grenville's decision 
to press for the imposition of a Stamp Duty the following year. 
Bernard cautioned the House to "Lay aside all Divisions and 
Distinctions"/ 
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Distinctions" in the coming session if they were to draw up 
petitions against the reforms. 
13 
But he expected it 
to be a "very turbulent" term because of the influence of the 
Boston radicals, whose antipathy to the reforms and to himself 
was common knowledge. He was surprised by the ensuing 
proceedings: it "proved [to be] the most quiet and moderate 
[session] I ever knew, considering the importance of the matters 
that were debated and the length of the deliberation. " 14 
Bernard's amazement stemmed from the moderate tones of 
the General Court's petition calling for the repeal of the 
Revenue Act and duties on molasses and the abandonment of 
plans to tax the colonists. When the Council rejected the 
first draft, which had been prepared by the Boston representatives 
(Thomas Cushing, James Otis. and Oxenbridge Thacher) and passed 
by the House, a three man committee, including Thomas Hutchinson 
(who was a member of the Council), was appointed to re-write 
it. The committee cut out several paragraphs that reflected 
the extremist views of the Bostonians. The revised version 
was accepted by the House and the Council, although there 
was protracted resistance from the radicals. 15 
Bernard did not fail to acknowledge the crucial part 
played by Hutchinson in moderating the petition when he transmitted 
an account of the dispute to Britain. But the unexpected 
outcome reinforced a confidence in his own abilities at being 16 
able to influence the Tories and moderates in the House. 
He was told that his conciliatory speeches had had "considerable 
effects" on the friends of government, and he believed "it 
convinced them of the expediency of moderate and united Councils 
upon this occasion"; 
17 
whereas he had "no influence on the 
generality of the representatives". 
18 
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But Bernard did not command the unswerving political 
allegiance of the Tories and moderates, and, furthermore, he 
overestimated the strength of the friends of government. 
When Richard Jackson, Bernard's business agent and favoured 
candidate for the post of province agent, was elected to that 
office in January 1765, it was with a majority of only four 
votes in the House. Bernard had expected that at least 
three-fifths of the members would have voted for Jackson. 
But fifteen of "the best friends of government" did not attend 
when the votes were cast because, he claimed, they were kept 
away from Boston by the heavy snows. The absence of Tories 
from Boston because of bad weather, long travelling distances 
or other reasons was to prove a hindrance to Bernard's schemes 
throughout the 1760s. But on this occasion, the Tories 
were divided among themselves. Perhaps twenty initially 
supported the candidacy of Thomas Hutchinson. 
19 
Bernard realised that for Jackson to win the election, in prefer- 
ence to the Whigs' choice of Israel Mauduit, he had to win 
the confidence of the pro-Hutchinson faction, but at the risk 
of splitting the Tories: "My first Care was to prevent the 
friends [of government]... being divided. " In the event, 
only one Tory representative voted for the Lieutenant-Governor, 
after Hutchinson, no longer interested in the post, declared 
his support for Jackson and urged his friends to vote for him. 
20 
The political unreliability of the Tories showed itself 
again in February. Nearly half the Tory representatives 
(fifteen) either did not vote or voted in favour of the Whigs' 
motion to deprive Thomas Hutchinson of the customary award 
for his services as Chief Justice. (The other 
executive and judicial officers received their awards without 
votes being taken. The motion on Hutchinson's was in retaliation 
for the part he had played in revising the petition against 
the Revenue Act. ) Consequently, the motion was only narrowly 
defeated, / 
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defeated, by forty-two votes to forty-one. 
21 This happened- 
in spite of Bernard warning members in private that their refusal 
would strengthen the case of those British ministers who were 
lobbying for Crown salaries for colonial officials. 
22 
More 
worrying for Bernard was the fact that prominent Tories 
Richard Saltonstall, Timothy Ruggles and John Chandler were 
absent from the House when such an important matter was being 
debated. The main Tory opposition to the Whigs came from 
the pro-Hutchinson faction, seven of whom had approved Hutchinson's 
nomination as agent. (See Appendix B. ) 
By the spring of 1765, it was clear that if Bernard 
was to mould the Tories and the moderates into a court faction, 
then he would have to "court" their allegiance. On the 
whole, however, Bernard did not attempt to "buy" their support 
with the offer of posts in the provincial administration. 
Eighty per cent of Tory representatives elected'to the House, 
1764-1774, were awarded commissions as Justices of the Peace. 
But of these forty-eight,. 77 per cent were appointed during 
1761-1762 when Bernard was still intent on placating all parties. 
Nor, we may deduce, did Bernard believe in giving positions 
to those whom he thought could be trusted politically, such 
as Timothy Ruggles, Israel Williams. and John Worthington. 
3 
Only, four Tory representatives received from Bernard posts 
other than that of Justice of the Peace: William Browne, Timothy 
Dwight, Joseph Lee and Oliver Partridge. ) 
24 This was in 
marked-contrast to . the policy of his successor, Thomas 
Hutchinson, who, for example, rewarded eight of the 
seventeen rescinders for their political loyalty with 
offices. (See Appendix B. ) 
Bernard was criticised by the Tories for his failure 
to cultivate their allegiance more fully. One particular 
comment by Customs Commissioner Henry Hulton demands our attention: 
He/ 
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He was perhaps too open & communicative[. ] 
a person of less abilities and merit than 
himself with more address art and intrigue 
might have succeeded better. He... was 
not sufficiently disguised and did not practise 
enough of the courtly manner and courtly 
arts, for one in his Station. 25 
These were the thoughts of an Englishman (c. post 1783) who spent 
seven years in Massachusetts, but who had a lifetime observing 
the backstairs intrigues of English politics. It is puzzling 
why Hulton should have thought Bernard "too open & communicative 
a person" and devoid of the ability to "practise" the art of 
Walpolean politics, because Bernard too was resident in the colonies 
for a relatively short period, 1758-1769, and thereafter lived 
in England and Ireland. It could be that Hulton pinpointed 
the special emphasis that Bernard placed upon ideas, arguments 
and ideology in his efforts to build and inspire a court faction 
amidst the rough and tumble of Massachusetts politics during 
the revolutionary era. After all, not only were the Whigs mot- 
ivated by political ideology; so too were the friends of government. 
"Argumentative speeches" rather than patronage posts were to 
be Bernard's main political weapons in his battle with the 
Whigs. 
2. The House and the Stamp Act Crisis. 
In 1765, the Stamp Act controversy excluded virtually 
all other matters from the political agenda. The arguments 
of leading Tory representatives Timothy Ruggles and John. Winslow 
were clear and concise: Americans should submit to the execution 
of the act whilst petitioning for a repeal. If resistance 
to the execution of the act was undertaken, then the colonists could 
expect/ 
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expect "that Fleets and Armies would be sent to inforce the Stamp 
Act. " 
26 
By late spring, the Tories' case had 
been severely damaged by Parliament's failure to act on the 
petitions sent from Massachusetts and the other colonies. 
(see Chapter Two, pp-65-67 Nevertheless, Governor Bernard 
still expected the House to see the wisdom of the Tories' 
counsel if it chose to draw up a petition against the Stamp 
Act. 
Bernard's confidence was based upon a number of considerations, 
but principally on the results of the May elections to the 
House. A net gain of six members took the total number 
of Tories to forty-one, roughly one-third of the representa- 
tives (see Table 2, p. 86)ß The Tories were still a potentially 
powerful and influential faction, and would be even more so 
if they could join forces with the moderates. Together, 
the Tories and moderates would have constituted a majority 
of the House. During the session, the number of. places 
on House committees allocated to the Tories rose by 13 per 
cent, thus improving the Tories' political standing in the 
chamber (seeTable 3 ). Bernard informed Richard Jackson 
that now "The friends of government are so greatly superior; 
27 He was that, it seems, they must prevail in the end. " 
sure that despite the "ill temper" raised by the radicals over 
the introduction of the Stamp Act, "the prudent part of the 
House will prevail. " 
28 
In the Governor's opinion, the 
"Moderation and Decency" of the General Court's petition against 
the Revenue Act and prospective Stamp Duty compared favourably 
to the extremist claims concerning the colonists' rights of self- 
taxation set forth in the Resolves of the Virginia House of- 
Burgesses, recently printed in the Rhode Island newspapers. He 
trusted that the moderates who so far had remained loyal to the Whigs 
would be appalled by the spread of radical doctrines and would 
come over to the Tories' point of view. Futhermore, the 
Tory/ 
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TABLE 3: TORY AND WHIG MEMBERSHIP OF MAJOR HOUSE COMMITTEES, 
o/ 
MAY'' 1764 - APRIL '1769. 
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1764- 17 5- 1766- 1767---, 1768- 
1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 
ANNUAL SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL COURT. 
Major Total No. Tory Whig 
committees of Appointments Appointments Appointments 
1764-1765 15 78 15 41 
1765-1766 10 93 30 48 
1766-1767 19 104 17 75 
1767-1768 16 86 15 65 
1768-1769 5 30 8 20 
65 391 85 249 
*Major committees are those whoses duties were concerned with 
important political matters, for example, preparing and presenting 
addresses to the Governor or reports on the "state of the province". 
They do'not include committees whose functions were mundane, such 
as supervising the printing of the House Journals, or those appoin- 
ted to consider the petitions of individuals or towns. 
Source: House Journals, 1764-1769 vols. XLI-XLV. 
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Tory dominated Council was expected to urge the House to be caut- 
ious. 29 However, there was a note of apprehension in Bernard's 
reports that recalled the lessons of the previous session. 
Tories and moderates were yet to be made amenable to his leadership 
and political discipline: although they were "generally favourable 
to Government", Bernard admitted that he "can't promise that 
they will be advised" by him. 
30 
The Stamp Act Riots in August and the spread of radical 
anti-Toryism altered Bernard's perspective of his relationship 
with the Tory and moderate representatives. A sense of 
urgency to have the Stamp Act implemented on the day it came 
into force, November 1, propelled him on a hitherto unchartered 
course of confrontation with the House designed to win the 
support of the friends of government for the execution of the 
act. It was taken after long, sober consideration, yet 
it can be said that Bernard greatly misjudged the nature of 
the political climate. 
Even after the disturbances in Boston, Bernard never 
surrendered all hope of executing the Stamp Act. He resolved 
"not to give it up till the last hour. " 
31 
An opportunity 
came on September 25 when, after agreeing to the Council's 
request to call the General Court, he was to address the assembly. 
It would be his "last and strongest effort. " 
32 
I had observed the Violence of the mob 
had intimidated some of the best people 
in the province, and left the Cause of 33 King and Parliament without an advocate. 
Bernard intended to make an abrasive, forthright attack on 
the radicals' strategy of resistance. His speech was des- 
igned to raise questions concerned with the effects and consequ- 
ences/ 
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ences of resistance to the authority of Parliament, and reiter- 
ated the basic doctrines of Tory ideology - that resistance 
was productive of social and political disorder, and would provoke 
retribution from Britain. Bernard offered an alternative cour- 
se of action to achieve the repeal of the act: remonstrances, 
petitions and private letters praying for the indulgence of 
the King, his ministers and Parliament. It would be an 
"antidote" to the radical poison in the Boston newspapers. 
34 
The political strategy behind Bernard's speech was to in- 
spire a Tory-moderate backlash against the radical Whig leader- 
ship, thereby enabling him to win the approval of the House 
for the execution of the Stamp Act. It was 
addressed to a particular people and 
for particular purposes, which requires 
me to treat a delicate subject with more 
Freedom than I should have done, if my 
cause had not required it. 35 
Bernard decided that after he had spoken he would adjourn the 
assembly. This would allow the friends of government, now 
heartened by his attack on the Whig leadership, to elicit 
support among their constituents for, his policy. When 
the representatives reconvened, therefore, they would be more 
prepared to endorse proposals for the implementation of the 
act. 
36 
The province newspapers always reprinted the gover- 
nors' addresses and the'replies of the House, so Bernard was 
guaranteed maximum publicity for his attack on the radicals. 
Bernard's sanguine expectations were not shared by his 
confidants. He was "advised by some who wish me well 
[probably Thomas Hutchinson and Andrew Oliver], to say as little 
on the subject as possible, but... saw the necessity of acting 
otherwise. " 
37 
He was "particularly cautioned against 
speaking freely" for "the People would not hear of a Submission 
to"/ 
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to" the Stamp Act. 
38 
Bernard discussed three topics in the address: the social 
and politti al consequences of resistance to British authority; 
the closure of the courts and customs houses if the act WAS 
not implemented on November 1; and the possibility of the 
General Court granting financial compensation to the victims 
of the Boston riots (Andrew Oliver, Thomas Hutchinson, William 
Story. and Benjamin Hallowell ). Undoubtedly, Bernard chose 
to discuss the first two topics because they were the mast 
serious problems that his government would face if the act 
was not executed. With the subject of compensation, however, 
Bernard presented the House with an opportunity to atone for 
the violent actions of the rioters. This was Bernard's idea, 
not that of the British government. It was not until the 
spring that Bernard received approval of this proposal from 
Henry Conway, Secretary of State for the Southern Department 
in the Rockingham administration. 
39 
"Disobedience" to the Stamp Act, declared Bernard, was 
"productive of much more Evil than a submission to it. " 
He called on the "whole legislative power" to uphold the authority 
of Parliament. For Bernard, like the Tories, resistance 
to that authority in this instance would weaken the power of 
the provincial government to execute other acts of Parliament, 
undermine the structure of civil society and provoke the British 
government to take coercive action against the province. 
If the parliament declares that this 
right [of taxation] is inherent in them, 
are theylikely to acquiesce in an open 
and forcible opposition to the exercise 
of it? Will they not more probably 
maintain such [a] right, and support 
their own authority? Is it in the 
will, or in the power, or for the interest, 
of this province to oppose such authority? 
If such opposition should be made, may 
it/ 
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may it not bring on a contest, which 
may prove the most detrimental and ruinous 
event which could happen to this people? 
Bernard used the second topic,. the closure of the courts and 
ports, important in itself though it was, to illustrate the 
broader issues of law enforcement and the consequences of resis- 
tance. 
All public offices must be shut up: for 
it cannot be expected, that any officer 
should incur penalties much beyond all 
he is worth, for the sake of doing what 
must be null and void when it is done. 
Citizens would be unable to sue for debt and injury, and criminal 
proceedings would be suspended. 
. 
"Fraud and Rapine" must 
surely follow. The closure of the ports would cause widespread 
unemployment among seamen and all connected with commerce: 
social discontent would be the result of economic hardship 
and social deprivation. Here, Bernard's rhetoric was en- 
livened by a vision of impending class conflict that was charac- 
teristic of Tory ideology: 
What will become of the tradesmen who 
'immediately depend upon the navigation 
for their daily bread? Will these people 
endure want quietly without troubling 
their neighbours?... Are there not 
numberless other families, who do not 
appear immediately concerned in trade, 
and yet ultimately depend upon it? 
Do you think it possible to provide for 
the infinite chain of the dependents 
uoon trade, who will be brought [down? -printing error in source] 
by the stopping of it? 
To prevent such disasters, Bernard advocated submission to the 
execution of the Stamp Act. 
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His call for compensation for the victims of the Boston 
riots was a calculated move. On the one hand, if the House 
agreed of its "own accord", said Bernard, it would offset any 
attempt by the British government to force resititdtion.. 
On the other hand, if the House refused, it implied that the 
representatives, including the friends of government, condoned 
mob violence and the destruction property as leg Ä ate forms of political 
action ( attitudes which Bernard always maintained were revolution- 
ary and bancuisic, and unfit for men of their social standing. ) 
More disturbing still, he told the House, was the probability 
of Britain taking steps to enforce the act, though he did not 
specify what measures he feared. 
Bernard acknowledged that Whig anti-Toryism countermanded 
the effectiveness of conservative and moderate arguments. 
He realised "how dangerous it is to speak out at this time. " 
But nevertheless, it was the duty of the House to see that 
acts of Parliament were enforced. The Whigs, however, 
were destroying the best chance of having the Stamp Act repe- 
aled. 
40 
By this speech, Bernard played for maximüm, political effect upon 
the Tories' fear of social and civil disorder, rather than att- 
empt to win outright their confidence or that of the moderates'. 
Two weeks before, he had decided that this strategy was the 
n..,...,.,,, 4-.. n..,... i. -- 4- r.. __ __ ai.. _ r_.. _.. _I n_.. _L. fL_ 4- ;,,., 
1 
necessary to save their Country from immediate Ruin. " 
iil: 
41 
Later, he explained to Secretary Conway that he employed every 
conceivable argument to convert the members - except one: that 
protracted opposition to the authority of Parliament could 
result in the forfeiture of the Charter, "because it might 
have [had] the appearance of a threat. " 
42 Had he used 
this argument (as he would in 1768), he might have alienated 
the moderates. His call for compensation he hoped would 
unite/ 
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unite the moderates and Tories. As it was, Bernard greatly 
misjudged the mood and disposition of the members. 
The Governor had indeed, said John Adams, "painted a 
dreadful picture of the times. " 
43 But Bernard's address did 
not have the impact that he had hoped it would. Although it 
was "better received" than he expected, and the House paid 
it the "unusual compliment" of ordering copies to be printed, 
it did not visibly bring the Tories or moderates closer together 
or over to Bernard's point of view. He adjourned the assembly 
as planned after only three days. He suspected that the commi- 
ttee which had been appointed to prepare a reply fully in- 
tended to adopt a radical stance. and challenge the very basis 
of Parliament's right to tax Americans-. - He saw no reason 
to give them an opportunity of airing their views 
The House met again twenty-six days later, and the committee 
delivered its report on October 24. Bernard at once acknowle- 
dged his failure. The Whigs had "entirely triumphed over 
the little remains of Government", for the House's reply to 
his speech "perverted the necessary obligations of my duty. 
(to-enforce the Stamp Act], into a voluntary attack of [ple(V'ting 
on] the liberties of the people, and thereby representing me... 
as an Enemy to the Province. " 
45 
The House berated the Governor for his thinly disguised 
accusations of disloyalty to Britain and the King. "An 
odium was intended to be thrown on the province. " The 
House contradicted Bernard's prognosis of social and civil 
disorder, and re-affirmed its opposition to the Stamp Act. 
This House... has too great a reverence 
for the supreme legislature of the nation, 
to/ 
102 
to question its authority: It by no means 
appertains to us to pressure to adjust 
the boundaries of the power of parliament; 
but boundaries there undoubtedly are. 
The House would continue to advocate a repeal of the Stamp Act 
on the grounds that it infringed their constitutional liberties. 
The representatives could see no prospect of revolution. 
Although the courts and ports were likely to be closed, the 
"estates of the people will remain guarded from theft or open 
violence. There will be no danger of force of arms becoming 
the-only governing power. " (This statement is an excellent 
example illustrating John Reid's point that the Stamp Act riots 
demonstrated that to.. -. enforce unpopular acts of Parliament, 
the provincial government had first to accept "Whig ordained 
conditions", see Chapter One, p. 29, ) 
In such a belligerent, free-talking mood, the House 
rejected Bernard's suggestion that it compensate the victims 
of the riots. The members denied it was a public responsi- 
bility, for the crimes "committed by a few individuals" should 
not be "chargeable upon the whole community. " They could 
see no reason to do it upon this and not "on any different 
occasion. " They were not "convinced" that restitution 
would discourage "such outrages in times to come. " Bernard 
had never indicated that it would, only that it could prevent 
Britain from making a direct request. 
46 
The House artfully 
twisted the context in which Bernard's proposal was first made: 
instead of being the issue on which to unite the friends of 
government behind him, it was made to sound ludicrous and quite 
unrealistic. 
The House's reply was prepared by a committee of thirteen 
representatives: six were Whigs, five were Tories and the 
other two were moderate non-aligned members. The Whigs 
included/ 
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included radicals Thomas Cushing, Samuel Dexter and Joseph 
Gerrish. According to Thomas Hutchinson, these men were 
"zealous for liberty". The Tories on the committee were: 
John Winslow, Thomas Foster, Thomas Clap, William Bourn and 
Joseph Lee. According to John Adams, the first three 
"were for submission in order to obtain a repeal [of the Stamp 
Act]. " Later, all five were named in the'Black List 
of Tory representatives. 
47 Four other Tories were members 
of the delegation which brought the House's address to Bernard: 
Richard Saltonstall, Andrew Oliver Jr., Israel Williams and 
Sampson Stoddard. On October 25, Winslow, Clap. and another 
Tory - William Browne - joined radicals Cushing and Samuel 
Adams (who had been elected for Boston to replace the deceased 
Oxenbridge Thacher) on a committee to consider the difficulties 
to be expected from the closure of the courts. 
48 Membership 
of committees is not an accurate indicator of political 
opinion on a particular issue, for reports were adopted by 
a majority decision. But in view of subsequent developments, 
it could be that the Tories, although in the minority in the 
House and on the committees listed above, for the moment joined 
forces with the Whigs to reject Bernard's overtures and in 
opposition to the Stamp Act. 
On October 29, the House adopted a declaration of "inalienable" 
rights. In a series of fourteen resolves, the House asserted 
the colonists' right of-exemption from direct taxation by 
Parliament. To support this claim, the 'House cited the list of 
now familiar. Whig sources : the Charter, the British Constitution 
and natural law. 
49 
To Bernard's relief, and probably with 
the approval of the Tories and the moderates, the declaration 
was made more "decent" by the inclusion of a clause which stated 
that American political and constitutional rights were "consistent 
with a subordination to the supreme power of Great Britain. " 
50 
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There is no reason to suppose that the majority of Tories 
and moderates opposed the declaration. Before it was adopted, 
Bernard observed that there were no representatives willing 
to obstruct its passage or challenge the doctrines it contained: 
At present the Denial of the parliament's 
right to tax this Province is only the 
Assertion of the people in particulars (sic) 
parties; in a few days it will probably 
be the Vote of the Representatives. 51 
The resolves were then "unanimously" approved when the House was 
three-quarters full. 
52 
The acquie ^ nce of the Tories 
and moderates in this instance can be explained by the fact 
that the "subordination" clause mentioned above allowed them 
to reconcile their opposition to the Stamp Act with their 
loyalty to Britain and the sovereig 
Ä 
of Parliament. 
Moreover, the House did not actually debate proposals-to suspend 
the implementation Of- the Stamp Act until October 30 and 31, 
after the resolves had been accepted. (A motion was presented 
stating that because Andrew Oliver had resigned as Distributor 
and Governor Bernard did not have the authority to distribute 
the stamps, then it would be unlawful for the people to do 
business without them. No action was taken on this motion, for 
the members decided to wait to hear of the deliberations 
of the Stamp Act Congress . 
53) 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that Bernard 
underestimated the capacity of the Whigs and Tories to work 
together in legal protests against the Stamp Act (though not) 
of course, to defeat its execution. ) They were hostile 
to the Governor for his attempt to divert their attention 
away from the immediate issue at hand and focus it upon the 
less tangible matters of potential class conflict and civil 
war. Paradoxically, although Bernard discoursed upon the 
fundamental/ 
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fundamental doctrines of Tory ideology, the Tories and moderates 
refused to take action in response to his bidding or follow 
the dictates of their "ideological conscience". For one 
thing, the friends of government were opposed to the Revenue 
Act and Stamp Act, and until the end of October that opposition 
in the House, but'not outside, was consistent with legal, moderate 
remonstrances. For another, we may presume that they had 
no desire to sacrifice their reputations for a measure intro- 
duced by the Grenville acüninistration, which since had been 
replaced by that of the Duke of Cumberland and the Marquis 
of Rockingham (which soon was disposed toward repealing the 
measure. ) Nor, we may surmise, were the Tory representatives 
any more willing than their counterparts outside the assembly 
to place their trust in an unpopular governor and run the risk 
of being labeled as "traitors" or "enemies" to their country, 
or perhaps even have mobs destroy their property. 
Bernard had also hoped to win support in the towns. 
But there is nothing to indicate that they were any more sym- 
pathetic to his cause than the House. In the session of 
1764-1765, over forty towns had instructed their representatives 
to oppose the Stamp Act. 
54 
After September, 1765, Bernard 
expected that his main support in the country would be in Salem, 
Marblehead. and Newburyport, whose inhabitants he considered 
"well disposed to government". But Salem's deputies 
William Browne and Andrew Oliver Jr., and Marblehead's Jacob 
Fowle and William Bourn were instructed to work for a repeal 
of the act. 
55 
Dudley Atkins of Newburyport, and the Tories 
representing Bridgewater and Plymouth were instructed to oppose 
the act and the call for compensation as they prepared to', take 
their seats for the October session. 
56 
'Defeat left Governor Bernard politically isolated, yet 
surprisingly/ 
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surprisingly unbowed. He offered excuses for the setback: 
the friends of government stayed away from the assembly on 
account of the mobs and "madness" in Boston. 
57 He conceded, 
however, in a letter to Conway, that "by Artifice prejudice 
and Passion, good Men and bad Men are unaccountably confounded 
together", yet insisted that a "little time & Management 
will separate them and bring them under their proper Arrangements. " 
58 
He repeated his request for compensation on November 8, and again 
instructed the House that submission to the execution of the 
Stamp Act was "the Readiest means to-obtain a repeal. " 
He pleaded with the members to understand the unenviable po- 
sition in which he and other senior officials had 
been placed by the act. "It brought upon me a necessary 
Duty which, it seems did not coincide with the Opinions of 
the People. This is my offence, but it is really the offence 
of my office. " Once again, Bernard could not get the 
members'support for his policies, and with the advice of the 
Council informed Conway that it would be better if "some 
Means may be found to make it consistent with the Dignity of 
Parliament to put the Stamp Act out of the Question at least 
for the present. " 
59 
3. Timothy Ruggles and the Stamp Act Congress. 
The first indication Bernard received that the Tory re-. 
presentatives were prepared to follow his leadership came 
with the apostasy of Timothy Ruggles, one of the Massachusetts 
delegates to the Stamp Act Congress at New York. 
Whigs and Tories both supported the proposal for a continental 
congress. The committee which, in June, had made the propo- 
sal, included more Tories than Whigs (Ruggles, Partridge, 
Worthington, / 
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Worthington, Winslow and Saltonstall. ). Bernard underestim- 
ated the Tories' commitment to the idea. Since they found 
it "impossible" to oppose a popular scheme, he reasoned, they 
"took to lead in it, and have kept it in their Hands. " 
60 
The House elected three delegates to attend the 
Congress at'Philadelphia: Timothy Ruggles, Oliver Partridge 
and James Otis. Ruggles and Partridge were favoured by 
the Tories and the moderates; Otis was the darling of the Whigs. 
Ruggles, like Otis, was a popular choice. He had 
first sat in the House in 1736, and had represented Hardwick 
since 1754. He was elected Speaker in 1762 and to the 
Council two years later (although he refused-the seat on the 
Board. ) He had gained the rank of Brigadier-General in 
command of provincial forces during the French and Indian War. 
Ruggles was much respected in the House. He had, said John 
Adams, "the most constant Prescence of Mind. " His "Grandeur" 
consisted "in the quickness of his apprehension, Steadiness 
of his Thoughts and Expressions, his strict Honor, conscious 
Superiority, Contempt of Meaness &c. People approach 
him 
with Dread and Terror. " At first, Ruggles did not wish 
to be selected for' the Congress, but accepted the invitation after 
John Worthington declined. 61 
Following the recommendations of a committee on which 
both Ruggles and Partridge served, the House instructed the 
delegates to assist in composing addresses to the King and 
Parliament praying for the repeal of the Stamp Act. On no 
account were they to sign any document which conceded that 
Americans were "in any manner Represented in Parliament". 
Nor were they-to "Urge, or consent to any proposal for a 
Representation. " 62 
It/ 
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It is the expectations of the House that 
a most loyal and dutifull Address to this 
Majesty and his Parliment [sic] will be 
prepared by the Congress, praying as well 
for the Removal of the Greivances [sic] 
the Colonies labour under at present, 
as for the preventing others for the future; 
which Petitions if drawn up, as far as 
you shall be able to judge agreeable to 
the mind of this House [emphasis mine], 
are empowered to Sign and forward, and 
you are to lay a Copy of the same before 
this House, and make report of Your 
proceedings upon your Return. 63 
Bernard approached the two Tory delegates in private, and 
tried to bring them round to his way of thinking. On 
September 20, he sent Ruggles a copy of the speech that he 
was to deliver to the House five days later. The Congress, 
he reasoned, could help restore the authority of the provincial 
government by recommending obedience and submission to the 
Stamp Act. 
If your Council [the Congress] should 
be of the opinion, with me, that a Submission 
to the Act for the present is quite 
necessary to-the-Measures taken for its 
Repeal; and should recommend such a proceeding 
to their several people, I believe it 
would be complied with in this province: 
and that is the only Prospect I have 
of saving it from Ruin. 64 
Bernard apologised for intruding upon Ruggles's commission, but reiterated 
the significance of the task that lay before him: 
Nothing could have induced me to have 
interfered in the business you are now 
engaged in but the extreme danger I conceive 
the province to be brought in by the 
indiscretion of the people. 65 
We may deduce that Ruggles and Partridge gave assurances 
that/ 
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that they would follow the Governor's advice. Bernard was 
quietly confidant that the two Tories could moderate the res- 
olutions or petitions of the Congress. Partridge and 
Ruggles "are of the same way of thinking", he told John Pownall; 
66 
"Prudent and discreet men such as I am assured will never consent 
to any undutiful or improper Applications to the Government 
of Great Britain. " 
67 (Subsequently, when Ruggles had 
denounced the proceedings of the Congress, Bernard described 
him as a "very valuable Man" of "a mast respectable Character 
and noted for his goood Sense, Integrity and Honour. " 
68 
Perhaps this praise for Ruggles's compliance was intended to 
show the ministry that Bernard did have some influence over 
the Tories. ) 
When Bernard realised that his speech to the House had 
failed to attract enough support for the execution of the Stamp 
Act, the role of Ruggles and Partridge seemed even more crucial. 
The "only possible means of procuring his. success", wrote Bernard, 
was for the Congress to recommend to the colonial legislatures that they 
submit to the execution of the act whilst petitioning for 
its repeal. It was a last desperate effort on Bernard's 
part to hope that Ruggles and Partridge could persuade the 
Congress to do what the Massachusetts assembly had refused 
.q 
When they arrived at New York, Timothy Ruggles was elected 
President of the Congress, defeating James Otis by just one 
vote. 
70 
But Ruggles refused to sign the petitions approved 
by the delegates, and left New York before the Congress adjourned 
on October 24. Otis and Partridge both signed the petitions. 
Why did Ruggles not sign the petitions? 
When it became evident that Ruggles would not subscribe, 
one young radical, Thomas McKean of Pennsylvania, challenged 
him/ 
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him to a duel. Ruggles left before McKean could carry out 
his threats. 
71 
This surely was not the reason for Ruggles's 
early departure: this fifty-four year old war veteran was not 
the sort of man who would shrink from personal confrontations. 
There was an element of personal rivalry that determined 
Ruggles's conduct, but it involved James Otis not Thomas 
McKean. Ruggles and the Otis family had long been at odds. 
Until he moved to Worcester County in the 1750s, Ruggles had 
been the Otises'major competitor in the legal profession in 
Barnstable. In politics too, they had taken different paths: 
Ruggles belonged to the Court faction of the 1750s, then the 
Tories, while the Otises left the Court party for the Whigs. 
Ruggles was elected Speaker of the House in 1762 after James 
Otis had declined the honour and then tried to block Ruggles's 
nomination on the grounds that as Ruggles was Chief Justice 
of the Worcester County Inferior Court he should not be permitted 
to hold both posts. 
72 At the Stamp Act Congress, Ruggles 
may have suspected that Otis was organising a radical conspiracy 
to have the petitions made more extreme. 
Primary information concerning the debates and proceedings 
of the delegates is sparse. Nevertheless, it has been 
shown that "the principal disagreement" between the delegates 
was "whether to balance the denial of Parliament's authority 
to tax the colonies with-an acknowledgement of what authority 
it did have. " 
73 
Many delegates believed that Parliament 
possessed only a superintending authority to make legislation 
for the colonies, and this did not include the right to levy 
direct taxes. 
74 
Ruggles did not lead a conservative junto in defence 
of Britain's powers of taxation or to question the majority 
opinion over what rights the colonists possessed. Only 
one/ 
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one other delegate out of the twenty-seven who attended, Robert 
Ogden of New Jersey, refused to sign the petitions on account 
of their contents, although others declared they could not 
subscribe because they had no mandate from their assemblies 
to do so. 
75 
Ruggles presided over the debates without 
making any significant protest at the political ideas that 
were discussed. At one stage, he moved that the address 
to the King be sent to the colonial assemblies for approval 
before being dispatched to Britain. He claimed that this 
proposal was seconded by "divers members", and a "long and 
warm" debate ensued before it was rejected. 
76 If Ruggles 
did fear a radical conspiracy, he did little to rally the other 
delegates against it. 
We may discount Ruggles's active opposition to the radicals 
as a -major reason for his apostasy. The petitions 
and Declaration of Rights and Grievances adopted by the Congress 
contained doctrines with which Americans were familiar, and 
that moderates who'dpposed the Stamp'Act could have. accepted 
without too much difficulty. " They said nothing new or extreme 
in respect of their discourse on Americans' political and const- 
itutional rights. (They did, however, recommend that each 
of the colonial assemblies appoint a special agent to receive 
their petitions against the Stamp Act. Massachusetts elected 
Dennis De Berdt. ) 77 
Ruggles's own testimony of why he did not subscribe to 
the petitions, though not watertight in its logic, is, neverthe- 
less, probably the most accurate explanation, for it contains 
the a6kruse thoughts and recollections of a man tormented by 
doubt and indecision that what he was elected to do was contrary 
to his deeply felt political principles and ideology. 
He offered four main reasons. He quoted the instructions 
issued/ 
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issued tü him by the House, and argued that the decision on 
whether to sign the petitions lay wholly with him ("as far 
as he shall be able to. judge". ) Here, Ruggles believed 
he was on solid ground, for he was a member of the committee 
that had prepared the instructions. Secondly, he justified 
his refusal on account of the decision to overrule his motion 
and send the petitions direct to Britain without seeking the 
prior approval of the colonial legislatures. Ruggles held 
that his scheme would have "authenticated" the documents and 
deliberations. Thirdly, Ruggles claimed that the petitions 
and Declaration were unrepresentative of the views of most 
Americans. He noted that Nova Scotia, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina and Georgia did not send delegates to the Congress, 
while those from New York, South Carolina and Connecticut 
did not subscribe because they had been given no mandate to 
do so from their respective assemblies. Finally, Ruggles 
expressed his alarm at the petitions' claim that Parliament 
did not have the authority to impose direct taxes on Americans. 
"However true", this was, he wrote, "I could not bring myself 
to adopt [it]. " 
78 
Like many Tories who disapproved of 
the Stamp Act, Ruggles was not prepared to countenance a rejection 
of Parliamentary supremacy. 
The Whigs were to make much political capital from Ruggles's 
"neglect of duty". But they also made some valid criticism 
of his testimony that attests to the crisede conscience Ruggles 
experienced during October, 1765. Ruggles did not quote 
any passages or extracts from the petitions that offended him. 
Thus, "had the petition[s] been altered an hundred times, he 
might still, under the same pretext, have refused to sign". 
As Ruggles was well aware, the instructions from the General 
Court did not bind him to seeking the prior approval of that 
body. Ruggles's behaviour was that of a man pleading 




was, as the Whigs realised, a political dissenter who followed 
the dictates of his Tory ideology. 
Ruggles never mentioned his contact with Governor Bernard 
before' he left for New York. According to one Whig, Ruggles 
"had secret instructions from a certain quarter to use his 
endeavours to render the general design of the Congress abortive" 
and "was fully determined not to sign anything. " 
80 
It is possible indeed that Ruggles went to the Congress with 
absolutely no intention of participating in any proceedings 
that challenged British authority in the colonies. The 
case for this is-"suppbrted by the evidence of Ruggles's early 
departure from New York and by Bernard's letter to him of September 
20. But we must not overlook the fact that Ruggles 
made his own decisions. He may have been Bernard's secret 
envoy, but as President of the Congress he took an active part 
in the proceedings until he decided that it was time for him 
to make his move. He was not a passive observer who, from the 
beginning had no intention of co-operating with the other 
delegates. 
The House of Representatives did not debate Ruggles's 
conduct until February 6,1766. On the 12th, the members voted 
to censure him for not signing the Congress's petitions. 
He appeared in the chamber the following day with a request to 
have his testimony printed in the House Journals. This was 
refused on the 19th, by which time the members had had time to per- 
use a copy of the testimony. Three months later, the Boston 




In the autumn and winter of 1765-1766, Timothy Ruggles 
was a lone figure willing to defy the Whigs and support Governor 
Bernard -a "Squadron of one ship". 
82 Bernard's anxiety 
deepened when, -on January 22, only five Tories, opposed the Whigs' 
motion that the courts should proceed to business without using 
stamped papers. Eighteen Tories were among those who voted 
in favour. 83 Bernard explained to Conway that "some of 
the most assured friends of government were frightened into 
voting for the Question. " They were "told that (if] they 
voted against it they would not be able to return. in Safety to their homes. " 
After the treatment meted out to himself, Andrew Oliver and 
Timothy Ruggles, Hutchinson concluded that there was one partic- 
ular reason for the failure of the Tories and moderates to 
support the Governor's policies - the effectiveness of Whig 
anti-Toryism which portrayed opponents of the protest movement 
as collaborators with an oppressive foreign power: 
Had our confusions, in this province, 
proceeded-from any interior cause we 
have good enough men in the country towns 
to have united in restoring peace and 
good order and would have put aij Snd to the influence of the plebianAparty 
in the town of Boston over the rest of 
the province. But as our misfortunes 
are attributed to a cause without us, 
many of those persons, who in other case 
would have been friends to government 
are now too apt to approve of measures 
inconsistent with government and unite 
with those whom they would otherwise 
abhor under a notion of opposing a common 
interest [, ] a power which we have no 
voice in creating and which they say 
has a distinct and separate interest 
from us . 85 
From their contact with Tories outside the General Court, Hutchinson 
and Bernard 'concluded that Tory and moderate members were also deeply 




They were thus inclined to doubt the sincerity of the Tory 
representatives' opposition to the Stamp Act, and failed to see 
that they had little compunction in acting independently of 
or against the interests of the provincial government and Britain. 
Nonetheless, Hutchinson's explanation of their political behaviour, 
1764-1766, gained greater credence in the coming years. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: BERNARD, HUTCHINSON AND THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1766-1770 
Francis Bernard was confident that when the protests over the 
Stamp Act had died down he would able to mould a Tory-moderate 
coalition in the House. But the elections to the House 
of May, 1766 irrevocably altered the balance of power in favour 
of the Whigs and illustrated the political effectiveness of 
anti-Toryism. Henceforward, the Tories were to be a small, 
politically feeble group in the House, and by 1769 were reduced 
to a mere handful. Bernard's deputy and successor as Gover- 
nor, Thomas Hutchinson, made some gains in 1770, and thereafter 
concentrated his efforts on building a Tory-led moderate party 
in opposition to the radical-led Whigs. 
1. The Election of 1766 and the Defeat of the Tories. 
The Whigs' electoral campaign for the House began in late 
March some weeks before most towns elected their representatives 
for the new session beginning at the end of May. The Boston 
Gazette published a "Black List" of thirty-two of the current 
forty-one Tory representatives who were, thought Bernard, 
"distinguishable for their integrity Ability & general Reputation. "1 
They were "proscribed... as Enemies to their Country; only 
for being in general Friends to Government, and having at times 
recommended/ 
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recommended moderate and decent terms in the Representations 
against the Stamp Act. " 
2 The Whigs agreed with Bernard 
that "there were many in both houses, who tho' they might 
not really like the act,... opposed a manly opposition Gto it]. " 
For this alone, they deserved to//'"Plabeled as "Traitors to their 
Country". 3A 
Whig propagandists instructed electors to inquire into 
the political conduct and ideology of their incumbent repre- 
sentative. Was he a plural office-holder? Had he 
tried, to bribe them with liquor on election days? Had 
he actually declared against the Stamp Act in public? 
"Or were they for saying their Catechism in such a Manner as 
that.. his Excellency might call them good children, and give 
them a Sugar Plumb"? Other directives were more specific. 
Was he for complying with Bernard's "precious Advice" to submit 
to the execution of the Stamp Act? Had he voted for or 
against the resolution for the opening of the courts? 
How did he vote when the House censured Timothy Ruggles? 
(Unfortunately, the division on this vote was not recorded 
in the-House Journals. ) 4 Whigs also attacked the moderates 
who had sided with the Tories and "all who in this Time of 
Anxiety and Distress have been silent, affecting to be mighty 
Prudent, in order to keep in with both-Parties. " 
5 
The election brought a crushing defeat for the Tories. 
Their forty-one representatives were reduced to twenty-two, 
a net loss on nineteen. (The "purge" contributed to the 
39 per cent change in overall membership. ) 
6 Although 
prominent Tories such as Timothy Ruggles were returned, the 
election registered local shifts in political power. Four- 
teen Tories who were ousted were never re-elected, despite 
the fact that many had sat in the House since the 1750s. 
John Adams rejoiced that Plymouth County had made a "thorough 
Purgation"/ 
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Purgation" of its six Tory representatives. With John 
Winslow removed, Marshfield was served by the Whig Anthony 
Thomas until 1773. Five towns with Tory incumbents elected 
Whigs who served until 1774 (Ipswich, Groton, Plymouth, Scituate 
and Northampton. ) Only five of the Tories turned out 
were ever returned to the House. 
7 (See Appendix B. ) 
Unfortunately for the Tories, the election coincided 
with the news, which arrived on May 16, that the Stamp Act 
had been repealed. With this in mind, electors gave their 
support to the Whigs, for it was evident that their strategy 
of resistance had been succesful in overturning the much-hated 
act. Radical Whig leaders Samuel Adams, Joseph Warren and 
Joseph Hawley (for the first. -time) were elected. Above 
all, 
'the election results demonstrated the political 
effectiveness-of anti-Toryism. Henceforth, noted John 
Cushing, the Whigs were in the habit of "laying a Foundation" 
for the May elections by beginning their anti-Tory campaigns 
early in the year. 
8 
These campaigns were successful. 
Between 1756 and 1764, the average length of service in the 
House for a Tory representative was 4.14'years, whereas from 
1766 to 1774 it was 2.14 years (calculation based on Appendix B. ) 
The election of 1766 confirmed the political ascendancy 
of the radical-led Whig party. Not even in Salem, Plymouth, 
Worcester, Marshfield or Marblehead, where they were the most numerous 
outside of Boston, did 'the Tories ever break the stranglehold 
of the Whigs, although they did manage to rally considerable 
local support on certain issues. 
9 
In Hampshire and Berkshire 
Counties and in parts of Worcester deferential political behav- 
iour acted as a counter weight to the power of the Whigs, and 
until 1774 the West in general showed little interest in the 
Whig cause. But it would be misleading to attribute the 
"disinterestedness" of Westerners to Toryism. 
10 The Tories 
were/ 
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were politically weakest in Boston, 
11 
although in 1770 and 1774 they 
were able to join with the dissident moderates to challenge 
the Whig party. One reason for the success of the Whigs 
in Boston was the influence which they extended over voters 
through the party "caucuses" and voluntary associations. 
12 
And with the Sons of Liberty, and later the committees of corr- 
espondence, the Whigs built a provincial and inter-provincial 
political network. The Tories or the friends of government 
never created any such organisations that could have co-ordinated 
and systematized their opposition to the Whigs. 
The election results left Governor Bernard downhearted. 
He consoled himself with the thought that the friends of government 
appeared to be more numerous than was expected; & among them 
were some of the ablest Men in the House. " But he admitted 
to Richard Jackson that with "The Friends of Government... 
outnumbered in the House", he did not "much expect" them to 
"Turn... the present humour. " 
13 
His first concern was 
to reject the choice of James Otis as Speaker. He accepted 
the nomination of Thomas Cushing who "had given no notorious 
Offence to Government". Bernard then proceeded to negative 
six of the councillors elected by the House. And with 
this "bold-stroke", he continued with his efforts to build a 
court party from among the friends of government. 
14 
2. The Compensation Issue. 
In the spring of 1766, Secretary Conway instructed Bernard 
to procure from the House compensation for the victims of the 
Boston riots. The House eventually agreed to make compensation, 
but the bill which passed was in a form quite different from what 
Bernard or Conway intended, for it flouted British authority. 
The/ 
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The episode illustrated the political weakness of the Tories in 
the House and their collective inability to work with the 
moderates in support of the royal governor. Whatever 
minor successes came Bernard's way were due to political oppor- 
tunism, and were not the result of a carefully planned strategy 
or the strength of the friends of government. 
On June 3, Bernard presented to the House a copy of his 
most recent instructions from Henry Conway. Enclosed were 
copies of the act repealing the Stamp Act and the Declaratory 
Act. In view of the repeal, it was the desire of the King 
"that a veil should be cast over the late Disturbances, provided 
it be covered by a general and uniform dutiful Behaviour for 
the future. " In the spirit of the Declaratory Act, -the 
conciliatory overtures were tempered by a threat: if the colonists 
returned to their "offensive Conduct", it will "be necessary 
to draw a line to distinguish who are and who are not the proper 
Objects of the gracious Intention of the King and Parliament. " 
The question of loyalty was the mask concealed by the veil. 
One condition of the British government's pardon for Massachusetts 
was that the General Court should make "full and ample compensation" 
to those whose property had been destroyed in the Stamp Act 
Riots. 15 In February, Parliament had decided that the 
victims of the Boston riots and the Distributors of other colonies 
should be reimbursed by the colonial assemblies. It should 
be noted at this stage for future reference that Conway's 
letter to Bernard enclosed a copy of the House of Commons res- 
olutions on the question of compensation and not those of 
the House of Lords which contained the explicit directive that 
the royal governors should "require" the assemblies to make 
compensation. 
16 
In transmitting Conway's instructions, Bernard was "determined 






He suspected that if the House refused 
Conway's request, the British government would force the General 
Court to comply (how, he did not say) and use the Declaratory 
Act to justify such action. Bernard communicated his 
concern to the House in his address. He explained that 
the "justice and humanity of this requisition [emphasis mine] 
is so forcible, that it cannot be controverted. The authority 
with which it is introduced, should preclude all disputation 
about complying with it. " 
18 
In this passage, Bernard repeated 
the hawkish directive of the Lords' resolution on compensation. 
He no doubt calculated that Conway's reputation as a "friend" 
to the colonies would also induce the House to comply. 
(Conway had made a speech against the Stamp Duty in February, 
1765, that had been widely publicised in America. In addition 
to his ministerial duties, he was Leader of the House of Commons 
for Rockingham's administration. ) 
19 
The House neglected to act upon Bernard's urgent plea 
and postponed consideration of compensation until the autumn 
session. The reason given by the members was that they 
needed to consult with their constituents over such an extraordinary 
matter. 
20 
The friends of government did challenge this decision 
however. But their motion to overturn the House's vote 
was defeated. And the Tories, considerably weakened by 
the May elections, were allocated just one member of the committee 
which was appointed to prepare the reply to Bernard's speech 
(Oliver Partridge. ) The committee's report was accepted 
by the House and reflected the opinions of the Whig majority 
on the committee and in the House. 
21 If the House saw 
fit to grant compensation, it read, it would not be "an act 
of justice, but rather of Generosity. " It repeated the 
earlier claim of the members that they did not have a mandate 
"to/ 
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"to make their Constituents chargeable" with any extraordinary 
expense. But the House did not ignore the ministry's warning 
and agreed to consider compensating the victims, but only after 
a committee undertook an investigation to establish the identity 
of the rioters and make them, rather than the province, provide 
financial compensation. 
22 
It was an absurd task, for it was over nine months since 
the riots had occu Ä d, and then the government had been forced 
to release Ebenezer McIntosh: there was little chance of being 
able to discover who actually had planned the destruction of 
Oliver's and Hutchinson's properties. Bernard remarked 
wryly, "I dare say it will be no difficult work to trace this 
matter to the Bottom. " He berated the House for being 
"tame Spectators of the Violence committed. " 
23 The House 
responded to the name-calling and declared that they were not 
obliged to grant compensation because Hutchinson, Oliver, Hallowell 
and Story had never actually petitioned the General Court for 
relief* 
24 
This much was true, and the following October 
the four presented their petitions. 
After receiving this "most weak and impudent final Answer", 
Bernard prorogued the General Court. 
25 
He did not expect 
the House to resume the business of compensation in the autumn 
session. Indeed, Bernard would have preferred to drop the 
matter. He did not care to "expose the Dignity of the 
King and Parliament to further Contempt, " if he "should again 
call the Assembly together for this purpose only. " 
26 
This statement was a frank admission of his political isolation. 
But the royal instructions compelled Bernard to continue in 
an unequal contest. Thus he waited for "the Opportunity, 
when there should appear a Disposition to make the Compensation, 
and then to lay hold of it. " 
27 
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Bernard's opportunity came during the summer and autumn 
when the Whigs' campaign against compensation backfired. 
The Whigs campaigned on two platforms. Firstly, 
the Governor was criticised for the "despotic manner" in which 
he had addressed the House and for insinuating that the British 
government would be justified in making a "requisition" of 
the assembly on behalf of the victims. 
28 Secondly, the 
idea of a forcible requisition conjured up images of another 
Stamp Act. It was argued that an award made from the province 
treasury was, in effect, another direct tax: "For what material 
difference is there between the people of America being taxed 
by the parliament, and their representatives being required 
to tax them by an indisputable, uncontroulable authority. " 
29 
Bernard complained to Lord Barrington that he was "obliged... 
to maintain a political Warfare with the Popular party" over 
the question of compensation. 
30 But Bernard himself had 
supplied the Whigs with their ammunition. Conway had never 
suggested that Bernard should "allude" to a "requisition" 
being made by Britain, only that he "recommend" the House to 
grant compensation. Bernard, of course, used the term 
"requisition" in accordance with the House of Lords' resolutions, 
probably in'order to frighten the representatives into compli- 
ance. The Amory brothers reported that 
The Governor has lost many Friends by 
these Speeches; had he delivered himself 
in the mild & kind terms used by 
Secretary Conway whose letter he had before 
him it would have tended much to have 
restor'd the Harmony & Quiet he seems 
so much to desire. 31 
But for Bernard, the situation improved considerably 
during the recess of the General Court when public opinion 
turned momentarily against the radicals. Following the 
refusal/ 
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refusal of the House, the people of Boston became anxious lest 
the Rockingham administration demand - "with the dash of a 
pen" - that they should meet the cost of compensation. 
According to Bernard, they "began to grow uneasy" about the 
attitude of their representatives (Otis, S. Adams, Cushing 
and Hancock) in ignoring his warnings about a possible 
"requisition" being made of them. In August, the town 
meeting reversed its stand on the issue and instructed the 
representatives to vote in favour of the House granting compensation 
from the province treasury. 
32 Boston's decision split 
the Whig party. It was out of step with other towns including 
Salem, Braintree, Haverhill and Concord who resolutely opposed 
making compensation until, as the House had resolved, an attempt had 
been made to apprehend the rioters and force them to pay. 
33 
Many western towns believed that Boston, rather than the province, 
should reimburse the victims, for the riots, after all, had 
occurred in the capital. Towns like Hardwick were quite 
prepared to let Boston shoulder the burden, for "numbers of 
the inhabitants were spectators of these horrid scenes, without 
34 interposition [meaning interposing] to prevent them. " 
The Amory brothers observed that "the Country deputies are 
fearful of offending their Constituents by bringing any part 
of the Charge on them", although there was a "general Desire 
to have it [compensation] done. " 35 
Bernard was not immediately impressed by the change in 
the political climate. He realised that the Boston repre- 
sentatives "have power enough" to "postpone their business, 
in hopes, some time or other to charge this loss upon the province, 
and exempt the town of Boston from it. " 
36 
Thus over the 
summer, he continued the General Court by short prorogations, 
not daring yet to confront the Whigs. In September, he thought 
that the "Difficulties which lie in the Way seem insurmountable, " 
and " there was not the least probability of Success. " 
37 
125 
But when the House met on October 29, Bernard's caution 
had evaporated: "I now really think it will be done", he told 
Richard Jackson. 38 Later, he claimed that Boston's reversal 
had been the "signal" for him to call the assembly. 
39 
Given that that had taken place two months before, and in September 
he was still despondent, it would appear that Bernard thought 
long and hard on whether to summon the General Court and continue 
with the request for compensation. 
As in September 1765 and June 1766, Bernard relied 
upon the Tory representatives to provide the nucleus of support 
for his policies. Indeed, he hoped that the Boston representatives 
would join the Tories and the moderates. (He later remarked 
in a letter to the Earl of Shelburne, that if the Bostonians 
"had at that time... joined the friends of government, it might 
have been done. " 40. ) Bernard's confidence in the strength 
of this seemingly incongruous political alliance was not mis- 
placed. There was a "general conviction" in the House that 
public compensation ought to be made. 
41 
Bernard realised 
that the Boston radicals, who revered the concept 
of constituent power, would not vote contrary to their town's 
instructions. But Bernard underestimated the Machiavellien 
abilities of the Bostonians, whilst responding to opinion in 
their town meeting, to turn the issue to their own advantage. 
On October 30, the day after the session began, the committee 
appointed to investigate the riots reported that the culprits 
could not be found. That day and the next, the petitions 
of the four victims were delivered, leaving the way clear for 
a vote. 
42 
The Northampton radical Joseph Hawley "open'd with great 
warmth" against the idea of the province compensating the victims, 
and declared that "the rioters ought to pay it. " He placed 
the / 
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the blame on Bernard's administration for the problem now 
before the House, as "proper care had not been taken to bring 
them to justice. " Jerathmeel Bowers came to Hawley's assist- 
ance and rounded on the Governor for daring to warn the members 
that a "requisition" might be made of the House: "among other 
things [he] pronounced that all the talk that if compensation 
was not made here it would be made in England and the province 
be taxed for [it] was a bugbear. " Bowers urged the House 
to ignore Bernard's scaremongering, for if the members "were 
steady and refused to do it then they would hear no more of 
it. 43 
The "Chief speakers in favour of" the petitions were 
the radical James Otis and the Tories Timothy Ruggles and William 
Bourn. 44 According tb Francis Bernard, "Otis laboured 
the Question as hardy as ever he did anything". The strange 
alliance of Tories and the Boston radicals "had all the success 
they could have [had]; they convinced every one present of 
the Expediency of making the Compensation; but they could not 
persuade the Members to act contrary to their Instructions. " 
45 
"After a very full debate", the vote was thirty-six in 
favour and forty-three against granting compensation to Thomas 
Hutchinson. The vote in favour of Andrew Oliver's petition 
"fell much more short, Hallowell's below that and Story had 
scarce any hands at all. " A second vote was taken on November 
4: Hutchinson lost by forty-three to fifty-one, and the others 
were also defeated. 
46 Compensation, it seemed, was not 
to be made from the public treasury. 
The Boston-Whigs capitalised on the result. The 
House appointed a committee to consider alternative means of 
paying the victims, "and it included the Boston representatives 
Otis, Hancock and Cushing.. The committee quashed any 
attempt / 
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attempt to have Boston bear the full burden of compensation 
when it reported to the House that its members could agree on 
no method of paying the indemnity other than from the province 
treasury. The House also rejected two motions proposing 
that a public lottery be organised to meet the cost and that 
the towns of Massachusetts should pay. On November 6, 
a committee including Joseph Hawley was appointed to bring 
in another compensation bill. 
47 
When the second bill was presented to the House the following 
day, Hawley introduced a proviso that made public compensation 
conditional on the granting of a general amnesty to the Stamp 
Act Rioters. (a "free and general Pardon, Indemnity, and oblivion 
to the Offenders in the late Times". ) The proviso was 
accepted by the House.. When the bill was read a second 
time, the members rejected an amendment (by forty-five votes 
to twenty-seven) that in future towns would be responsible 
for compensating victims of riots. Three days later, Bernard 
was informed by the House "that an Indemnification of the Offenders 
is of equal Importance and Necessity with the making [of] 
'Compensation to the Sufferers. " In this revised form, 
the Compensation Bill was printed for circulation throughout 
the colony. The members asked for a recess in order to 
consult with their constituents. Bernard obliged, and 
the House was adjourned to December 3.48 
Hawley's bill was'a calculated exercise to reunite the 
Whigs who had been divided over the question of whether Boston 
or the province should pay the compensation. In granting 
compensation in fulfilment of Conway's instructions, the second 
bill allayed the fears of the moderates and the country towns 
that Britain would be forced to make a "requisition". 
By attaching the amnesty clause, the Whigs re-asserted the 
independence of the House from what they saw as Bernard's 
arbitrary/ 
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arbitrary demands, thus satisfying the radicals whose towns 
had instructed them to vote in favour of public compensation. 
When the House re-assembled, the Whigs defeated two 
motions to have the amnesty clause omitted from the Bill, and 
on December 5 the revised Bill passed the House by a vote of 
fifty-three to thirty-five. The Council concurred, and 
Bernard gave his assent. 
49 
Why were the Tories and moderates unable to win the vote 
on the first compensation bill, and prevent. Hawley's proviso 
from being added to the second? 
The twenty-two Tories alone were not strong enough to 
have defeated the Whig majority in any vote. Had they had sufficient 
support-from. the moderates the first bill might have. passed, for 
by October the sentiment. inside and outside the House was that 
compensation ought to be made. 
But the Tories failed to act collectively when it came 
to voting. Ten Tories abstained from voting in considera- 
tion of the second bill (for which voting figures and names 
of voters are available. ) We cannot readily attribute 
their failure to disinterestedness. Personal circumstances 
and family matters prevented the attendance of Oliver Partridge 
and John Worthington during November and probably December 
too. 50 Three others were involved in committee work relating 
to the bills. 51 Timothy Ruggles was a prominent speaker 
during the debates and served on the committee which prepared 
the second bill. But Ruggles and two others, William Browne 
and Ezra. Taylor, ignored their towns' instructions to vote 
for the second bill and abstained. 
52 
We can conclude that 




decision taken in the belief that Hawley's amnesty clause was 
contrary to the spirit of Conway's instructions to Bernard, 
and that lawbreakers such as Ebenezer McIntosh should be impris- 
oned rather than applauded. 
The twelve Tories who voted on the second bill did not act 
in accordance with their political ideology, but instead 
followed the directives of their constituents. This divided 
the Tories and prevented them from taking collective action 
in support of the first bill and to defeat the adoption of 
Hawley's proviso. Thomas Hutchinson complained that many 
of the Governor's "best friends", including Andrew Oliver Jr., 
Richard Saltonstall and Charles Prescott, and (referring 
obliquely to the moderates) "20 more [he]... could name were 
tied down by their towns. " Hutchinson reflected on the 
restrictive nature of constituent democracy: "Instructions 
to restrain a representative from voting always appeared to 
me to be unconstitutional and absurd. " 
53 The Salem represen- 
tatives, Oliver and Browne, were instructed to vote against 
the first bill because the town meeting believed that Boston 
and not the province should pay the compensation. But with 
little dissent, the town meeting later resolved that the province 
should pay after all, and instructed Oliver and Browne to vote 
for the second bill. 
54 
In Salem's case, and undoubtedly 
in others, 
55 Tory representatives were committed to support- 
ing the second bill by the sentiment in the towns that compensation 
should be made in spite of the proviso attached by Hawley 
(although, as has been noted, William Browne ignored these 
instructions. ) Four Tories voted against the second bill 
(Tisdale, Bagley, Saltonstall. and Prescott) on account of 
their instructions. These men, said Bernard, were "obliged 
to consult with their constituents, who otherwise would have 
acted freely according to their own judgement. " 
56 Later, 




tended to weaken the inherent uncontroulable 
Right of the People, to dispose of their 
own Money to such Persons and Purposes 
as they shall judge expedient... And that 
under these Apprehensions, it is not 
improbable, some of the Towns may have 
framed their Instructions to their 
Representatives, against a Compensation 
out of the public Treasury. 57 
, 
The victory left the Whigs in a defiant mood. The 
House adopted two resolves prepared by Hawley, Otis and Sam 
Adams "setting forth the Motives" that "induced" the House 
to grant compensation. The House had acted loyally and 
dutifully in response to Conway's instructions, but not in 
compliance With Bernard's repeated requests: 
Without Regard to any Interpretation of 
His Majesty's Recommendation into a Requisition, 
precluding all Debate and Controversy; 
and under a full Perswasion that the Sufferers 
had no just Claim or Demand on the Province. 
And that this Compliance ought not hereafter 
to be drawn into a precedent. 58 
For Governor Bernard it was a time for re-asses ent an 
reflection. His "argumentative speeches" of September 
1765 and June. 1766 were an "Experiment" that had now been 
seen to fail: "there seemed to be no Danger in trying an Experiment 
which could not make things worse than they would be without 
it. " 59 He conceded, however, that his "argumentative 
speeches" had been a political liability. 
60 We 
must agree. It was clear that by the end of 1766 Bernard 
had been unable to win and retain the political loyalty of 
the Tories and moderates in the House. 
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To British ministers and M. P. s the Massachusetts Indemnity 
Act - as the Compensation Act became known - was another instance 
of disobedience to British authority. It was the subject 
of Parliamentary debate for over three months. On May 
13,1767, the House of Lords ruled that it was unconstitutional, 
for only the Crown could grant pardons, not any provincial 
government or assembly. Eventually, Bernard was informed 
that a new bill of compensation should be passed by the General 
Court without the amnesty clause. But he did not care to 
try again as more pressing matters demanded his attention. 
In any case, the money had already been paid out to the victims. 
There the controversy ended. 
61 
3. The Tory-Moderate Coalition, 1767-1768. 
Despite the doubts and failures, and advice from the 
Earl of Shelburne, the Secretary of State in the new Chatham-Grafton 
administration, to adopt a "temperate conduct" in his relations 
with the House, Bernard did not immediately. give up his "argumentative 
n 62 
speeches. When he addressed the General Court in January 
1767 his oratory was heavily tinged with Tory doctrines. 
He recommended the representatives to "Support the Authority 
of Government, the Maintenance of the Honour of the Province, 
and the Promotion of the Welfare of the People.... These are 
Duties common to us all; whilst they are truly pursued, there 
can be no room for Disagreement or Dissatisfaction. " The 
House replied with a concise statement prepared by the radicals 
Hawley, Sam Adams, Otis and Artemis Ward that revealed the 
widening ideological gap between the Tories and the Whigs. 
Before they could pledge themselves to maintain the traditional 
authority of the provincial government, the representatives 
had/ 
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had first to "inform themselves of the true extent of there 
[sic] Rights and Powers. " The members reiterated their 
intention to maintain the rights of "the Body of the People" from 
whom they derived their mandate. 
63 
Bernard could see little to change his opinion that the 
friends of government had deserted him. He informed Shelburne 
that "There is not the least probability that the present majority 
of the House w[oul]d assist the Governm[en]t in ye support 
of [the] Laws. " 
64 "Some well wishers to the Government 
here flatter themselves that upon the opening of the New Assembly 
[in May] Things will ta[ke] a new Turn. " But Bernard had 
"not great hopes of it.,, 
65 
The number of Tories in the House was increased by seven 
(see Table 2, p. 86. ) Bernard was pleased that "2 or 3 Men 
of Superior ability" came into the House for the first time 
(such as Peter Frye and Jonathan Bliss), but saw "little Alteration" 
in the political situation overall. 
66 One source of hope 
came from James Otis's recurring bouts of illness and madness. 
Otis's "reign is quite over", Bernard remarked, and "the only 
way left is to detach his deluded Partisans from him. " 
67 
The balance of power changed significantly over the summer, 
a period of relative political quiet. Bernard perceived 
that when there was no contentious issue to disturb the peace, 
the divisions within the Whig ranks were much clearer. 
"Many voted & some spoke on the Part of Government who used 
to be reckoned on the other side. " Bernard was "gaining... 
by the Change of the Minds of Men, who begin to be tired of 
Altercation, & apprehensive of the Consequences of what has 
allready past. " Together, these dissident moderate Whigs 
and the Tories "seem to have near an Equality with the [Whig] 
Faction. " Bernard was prepared to bide his time in the 
hope that the defections from the Whigs would continue to increase: 
We/ 
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We must wait for a Reconciliation with 
the generality of the Party 'till it 
can be brought on with Safety to the 
Dignity of the Crown: the more it is 
hurried, the more it will be at the Expense 
of Government. 
Bernard prorogued the General Court on June 30. In November, 
he resolved to postpone the next session until January, hoping 
that during the long recess many more Whigs would desert their 
radical leaders. Then he would "endeavour to bring them 
into such a Temper that they may know their real Friends & 
their true Interests. " 68 
But Bernard called the assembly together on December 30 
because of the growing unrest over the Townshend Duties. 
Quickly, the pair were at loggerheads. A committee spent 
eighteen days preparing a remonstrance against the new duties. 
Bernard spoke privately with the Speaker, Thomas Cushing, and 
warned that Parliament would not tolerate any affront to its 
authority and sovereignty, and could invoke the Declaratory 
Act to justify its legislative supremacy in the colonies. 
69 
But the committee did not cease its work. Bernard then looked 
to the friends of government to reject the petition if it was 
-too radical. He believed that they would be able to attract 
enough support from moderates hitherto loyal to the Whig leader- 
ship to defeat or water down the petition. He had 
Upon the whole... some hopes that when 
the House comes to be... divided,... the 
Friends of Government will be found more 
numerous than they have been of late; 
People [are] beginning to be tired of 
Altercations, of which they see no End, 
and can see no probable Advantage to 70 their private selves or to the Public. 
The friends of government did not prevent the adoption 
f/ 0 
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of a series of remonstrances against the Townshend Acts supporting 
the Whigs' claim that the colonists were independent of direct 
taxes imposed on them by Parliament. (They included 
petitions and letters addressed to the King, the Lords of the 
Treasury, Secretary Shelburne, the House agent Dennis De Berdt 
and the Marquis of Rockingham - now in opposition. ) 
71 
The petitions were composed "with Temper and Moderation", 
72and, 
according to one historian, were "framed with great care to 
take into consideration the sensibilities of those not yet 
prepared to accept the extreme radical point of view" 
73 that 
challenged the legislative supremacy of Parliament to enact 
laws binding on the colonists. The vote in favour of the 
remonstrances "outweigh[ed] all the Authority of Numbers for 
the Contrary Opinion. " 74 
To Bernard's satisfaction, the friends of government gave a 
good account of themselves in their attempt to moderate the 
remonstrances. The debates were "very long and extremely 
well managed on the side of government", and the Tories were 
able to take advantage of the inconsistencies in the radicals' 
arguments. 
75 
Joseph Hawley "retracted all his former 
Opinions" and stated that he was now "convinced that the Power 
of parliament over the Colonies was absolute. " Hawley maintained 
that the British government "ought not to tax them untill they 
allowed them Representatives" in Parliament. 
76 He spoke 
in favour of sending representatives to Parliament if the oppo- 
rtunity to do so ever arose, although this was out of step 
with Whig opinion in general. James Otis "treated this 
as the revery of a madman" 
77(on 
which subject - madness - 
Bernard no doubt thought that Otis was an authority! ) 
Hawley's volte face "surprised the House a good deal; 
but some Time after their Eyes began to open. " 
78 Timothy 
Ruggles took from his pocket one of Otis's pamphlets (which 
one cannot be determined) and read out sections "which confirmed 
everything that Hawley had said. This was truly Argumentum 
ad hominem. " 
79 Another government supporter charged 
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the Whigs "with a fixed design to enforce an American representation, 
by making the want of representatives a reason for disobedience 
to all Acts of Parliament that are now enacted. " Ruggles 
re-entered the debate to announce that a number of merchants 
were ready to fit out ships to take the delegates to Parliament 
if the House desired to choose them. The beauty of the 
Tories' proposal was to offer the colonists something which 
the Whigs had once maintained that they ought to have. 
With American representatives in Parliament, thought Bernard, 
"there could be no Dispute about American Rights and Privileges; 
n_____Le__ ý_ --.. .... 80 - anu uppusition to Treat Britain would have but one Name" 
rebellion. 
By "frequently canvassing" the members, the friends of 
government were able to get "a great part of the most offensive 
matter struck out" of the remonstrances. Moreover, with the 
support of the moderates, they defeated by a majority of two 
to one the radicals' proposal that a circular letter be sent 
to the speakers of the various colonial assemblies calling on 
them to petition against the Townshend Acts. 
81 The argument 
which brought them victory was that this attempt to co-ordinate 
action by the colonies "would be considered at home as appointing 
another [Stamp Act] Congress. " Bernard was elated by the 
success of the friends of government: "No one Transaction in 
the House has given me so great hopes that they are returning 
to Right Sense of their Duty and their true Interest as this 
has done. " 82 The "Faction has never had so great a Defeat 
as this has been. " 
83 
However, Bernard, as he himself confessed, was "too 
hasty" in his "Approbation of the Conduct of the House. " 
In February, the House approved the circular letter prepared 
by a committee of radicals (including Sam Adams, Otis and 
Hawley. ) The Whigs also succeeded in having the defeat 
of the earlier motion expunged from the House Journals. 
84 
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The circular letter contained nothing that was not already 
written into the other remonstrances. Its radicalism lay 
not in its ideas, doctrines or assumptions. Indeed, it 
stated that "Parliament is the supreme legislative power over 
the whole empire. " 
85 But to Bernard, the Tories, and 
the British government, its offence was its purpose of eliciting 
inter-colonial opposition to the Townshend Acts. 
86 
Bernard blamed the backstairs machinations of the radicals 
for the defeat of the friends of government. Timothy Ruggles 
was a lone figure daring to stand against them during February. 
Bernard also asserted that many Tories were absent from the 
House when the vote on the circular was taken. 
87 Both 
explanations are probably accurate. Eighteen Tories (including 
John Worthington who had been elected to the Council) abstained 
or were not in the House on February 26 when the Whigs won 
a crushing victory eighty-two votes to one in favour of the 
province-, giving preference to native manufactures over British 
goods. Ruggles was the sole dissenter, while seven Tories 
voted for it (see Appendix B. ) The British government 
accepted Bernard's explanation that the circular passed only 
because there was a "thin House". Its ideas "were contrary 
to the real sense of the assembly, and procured by surprise. " 
88 
The confrontation over the circular letter did not take place 
until June, by which time Bernard had received fresh instructions 
from the Earl of Hillsborough, the new American Secretary, 
In the meantime, Bernard continued to monitor the progress 
of the friends of government. They-were narrowly defeated, 
thirty-nine votes to thirty, on a votetaken to decide whether 
a newspaper article about Bernard was libellous or not. (see 
Chapter Five, p. 165. ) When the session ended on March 
4, Bernard praised the "moderation and good Temper" of the 
members. 
89 He was confident that the Tory-moderate 
coalition/ 
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coalition could continue to offer strong opposition to the 
Whig majority. His conciliatory address, so verydifferent 
from his "argumentative speeches", he expected "will have 
very good Effects [judging] from the general Approbation it 
90 has received from all Parties in this Town [Boston]. " 
One dark cloud on the horizon, however, was the Whigs' 
anti-Tory campaigns which they pursued with renewed vigour as 
the May elections drew near.. Samuel Adams. (as "Puritan") 
led the campaign with a series of "Anti-Pope" letters for the 
Boston Gazette. In the political imagery of Whiggism, 
Toryism was associated with Jacobitism and the alleged "conspiracy" 
of the unpopular Lord Bute to restore the Stuarts to the British 
throne, with the assistance of American office-seekers. Adams 
pinpointed the towns in which the Tory electors were strongest: 
Charlestown, Salem, Cambridge, Marblehead, Medford and Hatfield. 
91 
Oliver Partridge, the incumbent for Hatfield, was "artful and guarded" 
in expressing his opinions, so much so that 
it could hardly be determig'd with any 
certainty, what he meant by what he said 
.... A man who is double tongu'd, if he 
is not in his heart a friend to POPERY, 
will be oftentimes speaking the language 
of the Beast, whether he is sensible 
of it or not. 
Inexperienced representatives and moderates hitherto loyal 
to the Whig cause, such'as Simeon Strong of Hadley, Adams 
claimed had been "so far led away" by Partridge to leave him 
with the opinion that "A man who WAVERS, is but a step from 
a TOTAL APOSTACY. " 
92 
Adams was clearly alarmed that the 
friends of government had grown stronger at the expense of 
the Whigs. 
The Whigs'campaign again had a significant impact on 
the/ 
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the voters. Overall, the Whigs were able to prevent the 
election of new Tories or the return of those ousted in previous 
years. Only four Tories were re-elected or came into the 
House for the first time. Cambridge and Charlestown did 
not return Tories as Adams feared they might. Oliver 
Partridge was not re-elected, although he was replaced by another 
Tory, Israel Williams. Salem's Peter Frye and William 
Browne, Medford's Stephen Hall, Marblehead's William Bourn 
and Jacob Fowle and Haverhill's Richard Saltonstall were all 
returned. The Tories were left with twenty-seven members, 
but hoped to win the support of the moderates as they had 
done in the previous session. (see Table 2, p. 86 and Appendix 
B. ) 
Bernard received instructions from Hillsborough concerning 
the circular letter soon after the General Court convened on 
May 25. Although copies of the circular had already been 
dispatched, Bernard was directed to "require" the Speaker of 
the House to propose a resolution rescinding the vote of approval 
for the letter. If the House refused, then he was to dissolve 
it until further notice. 
93 Bernard consulted with Thomas 
Hutchinson and Andrew Oliver, and decided that he should wait 
for a favourable moment when to present the instructions to 
the House. Because of the controversy over the Liberty 
Riot, Bernard delayed until June 21, a Tuesday, a day when 
the House was usually fuller than at weekends or Mondays 
(and the friends of government from the West more likely to 
attend ). 
94 
To avoid making the "requisition", the Whigs first of 
all staged a filibuster. After the Governor's message 
was read, James Otis made a rambling two-hour speech in which 
he "abused all Persons in Authority" in Massachusetts and Britain 
with the exception of the King. 
95 
The House stalled proceedings 
further/ 
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further by requesting copies of Hillsborough's letter to Bernard 
to compare with the extracts communicated by the Governor. 
Bernard obliged, but refused the request of the committee appointed 
to reply to his message that the House be adjourned. He 
wanted "to bring this Matter to a Crisis" and deny the Whigs 
the satisfaction of gaining a mandate from their constituents. 
96 
But the division in the House when the vote was cast marked 
the end of the Tory-moderate coalition which, since the previous 
summer, had provided strong opposition to the Whig majority. 
Once again, the radical Whig leaders won the allegiance of 
the moderates. And this time also, the Tories themselves 
were divided. 
The House refused to rescind by ninety-two votes to seventeen. 
Twenty-five Tories voted on this issue. 
97 The seventeen 
"rescinders" were a combination of old and new Tory members. 
Among the former'were Richard Saltonstall, Timothy Ruggles, 
Israel Williams and Jacob Fowle. For four of the new 
Tories elected in 1767 and 1768 (Jonathan Bliss, Joseph Root, 
Peter Frye and William Jernigan), it was the first significant 
demonstration of their support for the government. The 
rescinders represented 'towns where Bernard believed the 
friends of government were strongest: six came from the 
western counties of Berkshire and Hampshire and five from 
Essex County, (see AppendixB ). To these men, the ideological 
and political issues before them-were clear. Although 
the circular letter expressed a faith in the legislative supremacy 
of Parliament, Israel Williams believed its effect would be 
to "prosecute. the dispute with the Supream Authority of the 
Nation" and "procure harder measures" from Britain, including 
the cancellation of all plans to repeal the Townshend Acts. 
With this in mind, Jonathan Sayward followed his ideological 
conscience: "I acted uprightly and [according to] what I thought 
best/ 
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best as one of that assembly and I think I had not any sinister 
views in so doing. " 
98 Eight Tories were in the majority 
who voted with the Whigs, but they were the least likely of 
all the Tory members to support Governor Bernard. Only 
three (Joseph Williams, Jonathan Bagley and Stephen Hall) 
had voted with the government on a major issue since 1765 
(see Appendix B ). Among the moderates who were in the 
majority, according to Bernard, "were Members who were scarce 
ever known upon any other occasion to vote against the Government 
Side of a Question. " 
99 
To follow up the victory, the House presented Bernard 
with an address on June 30 in which it was asserted that he 
had misrepresented the true intentions of the House regarding 
the circular letter, and had led Hillsborough to believe that 
the vote should be rescinded. (As an insult to Bernard, 
one of the rescinders, Richard Saltonstall, was elected to 
the committee which presented him with the address. ) 
When he received the address, Bernard dissolved the assembly. 
It did not meet again until May. 1769.100 
The rescinders came to occupy a special place in Whig 
demonology. Their names were printed in the province news- 
papers, as was soon to be done with merchants who broke the 
non-importation agreements. They were proscribed as "traitors" 
and "enemies" to their country who "endeavoured to sacrifice 
their own and your children to Moloch". Their actions 
were explicable only "in the odious light of a party", 
101 
and originated in the conspiracy of Grenville, Bute, Bernard 
and Hutchinson to bring "confusion to the Whiggs and the Wiggish 
[sic] cause. " 
102 Before the House was dissolved, the 
members approved a letter to Hillsborough on the same theme: 
It seemed to be the evident design of 
a/ 
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a party, to prevent calm, deliberate, 
rational and constitutional measures 
from being pursued; or to stop the distress 
of the people from reaching his Majesty's 
ear, and consequently to precipitate 
them into a state of desperation and 
reluctant extremity. 103 
Even the moderate John Rowe caught the anti-Tory fever: 
the rescinders were "so mean spirited" as to "vote away their 
Blessings as Englishmen, namely their Rights, Liberty & Properties. " 
The significance of the rescinding issue lay not only 
with the termination of the Tory-moderate coalition in the 
House and the splintering of the Tory group, for it precip- 
itated local political confrontations. 
Sixteen of the seventeen"rescinding" towns rebuked their 
representatives. Hardwick refused to pass censure on Timothy 
Ruggles, which it had not done either over his conduct 
at the Stamp Act Congress. It was a place, said one Whig Ins 
where "nineteen in twenty" were afraid to contradict Ruggles. '-- 
At a town meeting in Salem, called specifically to consider the 
conduct of Peter Frye and William Browne, support for the rescinders 
was much in evidence. The Tories, led by the moderator, 
Benjamin Pickman, councillor Nathaniel Ropes and Judge Benjamin 
Lynde, "appeared without masks" and spoke in defence of the 
rescinders. After the meeting passed a vote of censure 
on Frye and Browne, thirty townspeople subscribed to a memorial 
denouncing the proceedings of the town meeting as irregular 
and unjustified, and voted their thanks to tho pair. 
106 
Local support for the Tories was evident also. in the reac- 
tions of communities to the Convention of Towns called during 
the recess of the assembly. The trappings and proceedings 




those of the House, with Thomas Cushing acting as Speaker and 
Sam Adams as the Clerk. One hundred of Massachusetts's 
then current total of 250 towns and districts sent delegates 
to the Convention, though less than half were representatives 
elected to the House that year. While many non-political 
reasons can explain the non-attendance of delegates (such as 
long travelling distances to Boston) 107 towns served by Tory 
representatives were conspicuous by their absence. Of 
the twenty-seven towns who elected Tory representatives in 1768 
only eight sent delegates to the Convention, and these delegates 
included four Tories who voted not to rescind (Joseph Williams, 
John Wadsworth, Sampson Stoddard and Stephen Hall. ) Thir- 
teen of the thirty-two towns named in the Black List of 1766 
were also unrepresented at the Convention. 
108 Oliver 
Partridge presided over a town meeting of Hatfield which drew 
up a widely publicised denunciation of the Convention, calling 
it "unconstitutional, illegal and wholly unjustifiable. " 
109 
When the Convention met on September 22, Bernard sent 
a message ordering it to disperse. He also refused to 
accept the petition protesting at the imminent arrival of British 
troops and calling for the General Court to be summoned. 
This "spirited" action, according to Bernard, won the approbation 
of the friends of government, who said "it was the boldest 
110 I have ever yet done. " 
Throughout the winter, Bernard asked Hillsborough for instruc- 
tions as to when he should call the assembly. He reminded 
the Secretary of the Charter's stipulation that it should meet 
at least once a year in May to elect councillors and officers. 
Hillsborough instructed Bernard that it was to meet in May. 
1769. 
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From the summer of 1767 to June 1768 the friends of 
government were at their strongest in the House. But the 
rescinding issue effectively ended Bernard's hopes of being 
able to build a powerful government party in the House from 
among the Tories and moderate Whigs. While the responses 
of towns iith. Tory. representatives to the rescinders and the 
Convention of Towns did reveal a measure of'local support for 
the Tories, when the House met again the Tories had ceased 
to be a force to be reckoned. with. 
4. The Decline of the Tories, 1769-1770 
The election of May 1769 brought a crushing defeat for 
the Tories at the polls that irrevocably altered the distribution 
of power in the House of Representatives. The Tories were 
reduced from twenty-seven to just twelve members. Ten 
of the seventeen rescinders were not returned and only eight 
were ever re-elected (see Appendix B. ) William Browne,, 
for example, confessed that he "lost his Popularity" because 
of his stance. 
112 The rejection of those rescinders 
who had otherwise been inconspicuous Tories, such as Josiah 
Edson, served as a "warning to Representatives rather to act 
the sentiments of their Constituents than to please by a cringing 
113 
conduct the greatest enemy to the Government [Francis Bernard]. " 
For Bernard and the Tory candidates, the publication of the Governor's 
correspondence with Shelburne and Hillsborough in the April 
issues of the Boston Gazette was particularly ill-timed, 
for it undermined their political credibility at the hustings. 
Little was expected of the Tory rump. "The few who will 
be left in the House will be only Spectators so that the [Whig] 
Faction will have every thing in their Hands. " 
114 Those 
who escaped the purge included three Tories who had defected 
to the Whigs (Stephen Hall, Joseph Williams and John Wadsworth, 
see 
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see Appendix B ). 
Bernard's worst fears materialised. After the 
House assembled on May 31 and elected the councillors and other 
province officers, it refused to proceed to any other business 
in protest at the presence of British troops in Boston. 
115 
On June 21 and 29, the House approved two series of resolves 
that had been prepared by a committee of radicals, in which 
Bernard was accused of having "acted against the spirit of 
a free constitution" by recommending to the British government 
the arrest of the Whig leaders, -the--appointment of a mandamus 
Council and the necessity of sending troops to Boston. 
On June 27, the House adopted a petition to the King calling 
for Bernard's dismissal. The following day, he informed 
the House of his pending return to Britain on leave. He pro- 
rogued the assembly on July 15 giving no indication of when 
it might be called again. 
116 
No dissenting Tory or moderate voice was heard during 
the session. , 
Andrew Oliver observed that 
there is but one party now in either 
the House or Assembly, Brigadier Ruggles 
had not attended the Court this session 
nor is there any gentleman however well 
disposed that seems inclined to share 
the fate of those 17 who were proscribed 
last year so that every measure that 117 is proposed is carried without opposition. 
Thomas Hutchinson confirmed the accuracy of Oliver's report on the 
decline of the Tories: 
Few of them would have voted as they did 
last year if the same question [whether 
to rescind the circular letter] should 
be again put. One of the Members 
who/ 
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who has generally been friendly to government 
was asked whether he held to his principles. 
He replied that last year he was afraid 
the measures taken by the province and 
by the town of Boston would bring upon 
us the indignation of Parliament. 
Henceforth, he would be "with the Stream". 
118 When Hutchinson 
visited Maine on judicial circuit, he inquired of the rescinder 
Jonathan Sayward whether he would be interested in accepting 
a post in the provincial administration if it were to be offered. 
To Hutchinson's surprise, Sayward refused. He drew Hutchinson's 
attention to a rabidly anti-Tory pamphlet, A Dialogue between 
Sir George Cornwall... and Mr. Flint, in which prominent Tories 
were ridiculed. Hutchinson was no doubt accustomed to the 
tirades of the Whigs, but not so Sayward. The Sons of Liberty, 
he said, "want only for some others that are obnoxious to them, to 
be Cald up into View, that they may be a more publick Mark 
to Shoot at (and they Shoot bitter Arrows)%119 
The General Court did not meet again until March 18, 
1770, and then out of Boston at Harvard College, Cambridge, 
according to royal instructions. It quickly became clear 
to Bernard's deputy as Governor, Thomas Hutchinson, that the 
Tories had ceased to be a political force in the House. 
Hutchinson prevailed on seasoned campaigners like Israel 
Williams and moderates like Simeon Strong to attend the sessions 
and confront the radicals, but to little purpose. Many 
of the friends of government, including the Tories, stayed 
away, convinced that the stranglehold of the Boston representatives 
could not be broken. 
120 Timothy Ruggles and John Murray 
complained that following the popular outrage at the Boston 
Massacre they "have lost their interest" among their constituents 
and for the present "can come no more". 
121 Hutchinson 
moaned that not a "single person" was willing to join "in supporting 
Government. " 122 
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Only eight Tories were elected to the House in May. 
Of these and the moderates, according to Hutchinson, only 
Timothy Ruggles and Daniel Oliver Jr. (also representing Hardwick) 
were not intimidated by the Boston radicals. 
123 Once again, 
the House refused to do business, this time in protest at 
meeting outside of Boston. This dispute was to last two 
years. 
124 
On June 6, the House resolved by ninety-six 
votes to six to continue in its refusal. Ruggles, Worthington 
and Oliver, along with three moderates opposed the motion. 
125 
When the House commenced its second session on July 25, Hutchinson 
requested the representatives to rescind this and previous votes. 
The Earl of Hillsborough was "persuaded" that Hutchinson's 
request should have encouraged the friends of government to 
defy the Whigs. 126 But Worthington, Ruggles, Murray 
and other members "capable of opposing Adams &c. " did not attend 
the session's debates. 
127 
John Worthington explained to Hutchinson that now all 
hope of defeating the Whigs lay not with the Tories, but in 
the hope that the moderates could be persuaded to defect from 
the radicals. Worthington trusted that he and other Tories 
could work to inspire the defections. He promised Hutchinson 
that he would attend the third session, which began on September 
26, for he thought "it the Duty of every Friend of Government 
and of his country, in every reasonable way, and with almost 
any degree of Self-denial as to private concerns, to aid and 
assist you. " He 
might help to'keep some others in Countenance 
who are secretly well disposed but afraid 
to be singular. The Jealousy and 
Suspicion with which I seem'd to be View'd 
by Most of the Members the last Session 
made my Scituation [sic] at Court very 
unpleasant, and the Apprehensions... have 128 
conceived of me as an Enemy to my Country. 
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On October 9, the House decided by fifty-nine votes 
to twenty-nine to resume business, against the wishes of 
Sam Adams and many radicals. 
129 But throughout November, 
the radicals were in the driving seat. Benjamin Franklin 
was chosen as agent for the House and Arthur Lee (a Virginian 
and author of "Junius Americanus") as his deputy. A provincial 
committee of correspondence was appointed to transmit intell- 
igence to other assemblies. The House also protested 
that Hutchinson had abrogated his authority as Commander-in- 
Chief by allowing Colonel Dalrymple and British regulars 
(on Hillsborough's instructions) to take over from the province 
militia the garrison duties at Castle William. 
130 
****** 
From the point of view of Massachusetts's royal governor., 
Francis Bernard, and his deputy, Thomas Hutchinson, the friends 
of government in the House of Representatives were politically 
unreliable and undisciplined. The desire of both Tories 
and moderates to achieve the repeal of the Stamp Act and the 
Townshend Acts often precluded their support for Bernard's 
schemes. One other major reason for their failure to 
side with Bernard was their fear of being proscribed as "traitors" 
to their country; anti-Toryism played a significant part in 
the demise of the Tories at the polls, until only a handful 
were left in the House. When they were inclined to follow 
Bernard, the friends of government were often hamstrung by 
the Whiggish instructions they received from their constituents. 
The/ 
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The Tory-moderate coalition had only a brief life, from the 
summer of 1767 to June 1768, a period of relative political 
quiet when they were able to give strong opposition to the 
Whig majority. Tories and moderates did join forces on 
specific issues before and after this period, but it was in 
these twelve months that they achieved their only real success- 
delaying the adoption of the circular letter in January 1768. 
It was the controversy over Hillsborough's instruction for 
the House to rescind the vote approving the circular letter which 
broke and splintered the coalition. Thereafter, the dissident 
moderates sided with the Whig majority, and the Tories ceased 
to have any influence in the House. The failure of the 
friends of government to rally behind Governor Bernard was 
repeated in his relations with the Council and merchants during 
the Non-Importation Controversy. The situation in the 
General Court and with the merchants improved considerably 
during the first few years of Hutchinson's administration. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: GOVERNOR BERNARD AND THE COUNCIL, 1765-JULY 1768. 
Governor Bernard's failure to win the consistent political 
support of the Tory and moderate Whig councillors contributed tv 
the weakness of the friends of government. Had Bernard 
won their co 0eration and support, the Council would have been 
able to counteract the Whig dominated House. But, remarked 
Bernard'in 1768, since 1765 the councillors had "suffered so great 
a Change that they don't appear to be the same Persons: and 
I can no longer depend upon them in Support of the Rights of 
the Crown. " Bernard attributed the demise of the Council 
to the success of the Whigs' anti-Toryism: the councillors 
"seem to have caught the general Intimidation, to look upon 
the Cause of the present Government to be desperate, and to 
think that it is high Time that they should take Care of their 
Interest with the prevailing Party of the People. " Yet, 
Bernard was convinced "that these Gentlemen or the greatest 
Part of them are in their Hearts Friends to Government. " 
1 
How accurate was Bernard's assessment of his relationship with 
the Council? 
1. The Council and the Stamp Act Crisis. 
Traditionally, the Council was a more conservative insti- 
tution than the House of Representatives. Its conservatism 
derived/ 
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derived from its main constitutional functions of advising 
the Governor and approving legislation passed by the House. 
(The Council could also initiate legislation. ) Social 
and political considerations reinforced the Board's conservatism: 
members were prominent and wealthy citizens, and between 1760 
2 
and 1764 the Court faction were in the majority. The Stamp 
Act Crisis altered the balance of power in the Council. 
Francis Bernard quickly realised that one part of the 
Whigs' political stratey was to weaken the position of the 
conservatives or Tories on the Board. Early in 1764, 
when there was "no apparent ill humour" , the House ignored the 
constitutional procedure of consulting with the Council when 
it composed separately a set of instructions for the province 
agent Jasper Mauduit. At the same time, it was proposed 
that a congress of committees from the various colonies should 
meet to discuss ways of defeating the Revenue Bill. (No 
congress met until the Stamp Act Congress of October 1765. ) 
To Bernard, these schemes were intended "to make a schism 
in the General Court... and also to lay a foundation for 3 
connecting 
the demagogues of the several governments in America. " 
But the Council did not give way to the Whigs in the 
House. In November, the Board refused to accept the House's 
petition against the Revenue Act and proposed Stamp Duty until 
several words and phrases were altered (see Chapter Three, 
p. 90. ) Later, Bernard took the unusual step of 
interfering in the business of the General Court when a bill 
was pending between the two chambers. He warned the councillors 
that the House's bill for the regulation of customs officers' 
fees was an intrusion on Parliament's legislative prerogative 
in this matter, for which reason he could nöt give his assent to 
the measure. To Bernard's satisfaction, the Council rejected 
the bill. 4 But his influence over the councillors waned 
dramatically in the next year. 
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Bernard's main support came from the Tories, who were 
stronger in the Council during the session of 1765-1766 than 
at any other time. Of the twenty-eight councillors elected 
by the House in May 1765, fourteen were Tories, ten were Whigs 
(radicals and moderates) and four were non-aligned or of in- 
determinate affiliation. The nucleus of the Tory group 
was the "Junto" of Thomas Hutchinson and Andrew Oliver - Bernard's 
closest advisers. Attached to the Junto were Hutchinson's 
long time associate Israel Williams and Andrew Oliver's brother, 
Peter. Four other Tories were valued supporters of the 
government: Timothy Paine, Nathaniel Ropes, John Chandler 
and Thomas Flucker. 
5 
The allegiance of the remaining 
six Tories (Trowbridge, Leonard, Hubbard, Lynde, Lincoln and 
Russell) was not automatic, but they were counted 
among the Governor's supporters nevertheless. 
6 
The Tory councillors did not conduct Council business 
with a sense of collective responsibility. Throughout 
the 1765-1766 session, the Tory majority rarely functioned at 
Council meetings. The Council met a total of seventy-six 
times, thirty-one of which were held while the General Court 
was in session. On no single occasion were all twenty- 
eight members present, even when Bernard called general meetings 
of the whole Council. The average number of members in 
attendance while the assembly was sitting was seventeen, and 
outwith the Court, nine. The attendance of members varied 
considerably. The executive officers Andrew Oliver (Secretary), 
Thomas Hubbard (Receiver-General) and Harrison Gray (Treasurer) 
missed only nine meetings among them. The Whigs John Erving, 
Royal Tyler and James Bowdoin, and Tories Flucker and Russell 
were also regular attenders. These men lived in or near 
Boston and could easily come to Board meetings when summoned 
by Bernard. They constituted, in effect, a cadre of semi- 
professional politicians. The infrequent attendance of 
the Tories, however, eroded the Tory majority in the day-to- 
day/ 
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day running of affairs, but also, as we shall see, in the handling 
of extraordinary matters during the Stamp Act Riots. 
John Chandler and Timothy Paine, whose homes were in Worcester, 
forty miles from Boston, each came to less than ten meetings. 
Israel Williams from Hatfield managed only five. Thomas 
Hutchinson, the "leader" of the Tories, came to less than half 
the Council meetings. Hutchinson's duties as Chief Justice, 
and those of Superior Court Justices Benjamin Lynde and Peter 
Oliver meant that these men were frequently absent from Boston 
on court circuit. Of the seventeen members most likely to 
attend Board meetings when the General Court was sitting, six 
were'Tories, nine were Whigs and two were neutral. Of 
the nine mostlikely to attend meetings held outwith the General 
Court, one was neutral, while the Whigs and Tories had four 
7 
apiece. (See Table 4., pp. 153-154. ) 
A forceful opposition to the Tories was provided by the ten 
Whigs elected in 1765. James Bowdoin, Colonel James Otis Sr. - 
and Royal Tyler were prominent in the protest movement. Samuel 
Danforth came to the fore in 1768-1769, when he acted as "President" 
of the Council during the Board's disputes with Bernard. 
Thomas Hutchinson identified the Whiggism of six others: the 
"valiant Brigadier Royall... is at the head of all popular measures 
and become a great orator. Erving, Brattle, Gray... and 
Bradbury and Sparhawk... are in the same box. " 
8 While 
Hutchinson made no distinction between the radicals and the 
moderates, it is clear that during the 1760s Erving, Brattle, 
Gray, Danforth, Sparhawk, Royall and others elected to the 
Council later were moderate Whigs who became known as friends 
of government. (Erving, Brattle, Royall and Gray became 
Loyalists. ) 
John Adams observed that in 1765 Harrison Gray "was as 
open and decided an American [meaning Whiq] as James Otis. " 
Rightly, he attributed one source of Gray's Whiggism to the 
influence/ 
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TABLE 4: THE ATTENDANCE RECORD OF COUNCILLORS, 
MAY 31,1765- May 26 , 1766. _ 
ATTENDANCE 
Alleg- While G. C. Outwith During Session 
Councillors lance is Sitting G. C. (in Percentages) 
Andrew Belcher 
.? 
James Bowdoin Whig 
John Bradbury Whig 
Gamaliel Bradford ? 
William Brattle Whig 
John Chandler Tory 
John`Choate+ ? 
Samuel Danforth Whig 
John Erving Whig 
Thomas Flucker Tory 
Harrison Gray Whig 
John Hill ? 
Thomas Hubbard Tory 
Thomas Hutchinson Tory 
George Leonard Tory 
Benjamin Lincoln Tory 
Benjamin Lynde Tory 
Andrew Oliver Tory 
Peter Oliver Tory 
James Otis Sr. Whig 
Timothy Paine Tory 
Nathaniel Ropes Tory 
Isaac Royall Whig 
James Russell Tory 
Nathaniel Sparhawk Whig 
Edmund Trowbridge Tory 
Royal Tyler Whig 


























































TABLE 4, contd. 
Total number of meetings during session= 76 
Average attendance whilst General Court was sitting= 17 
Average attendance when General Court was not sitting= 9 
+ John Choate died during the session. 
*Councillors most likely to attend meetings. 
Source: Records of the Massachusetts Council, Massachusetts Archives 
XVI, pp. 1-120. 
influence of Rev. Jonathan Mayhew whom Gray much admired. 
According to Adams, when Mayhew died in April 1766, Gray lapsed 
into "a very tender Mind", becoming an "extremely timid" Whig. 
He was forever reluctant to confront a "Man of the other Side", 
lest that "every Body will be against him. " 
9 Adams's 
judgment, as will be seen, was on the whole accurate, in spite 
of the fact that he made no references to Gray's other connections 
with the Whigs. 
10 
Like. John Adams, Governor Bernard also doubted the strength 
of the moderates! convictions to the Whig cause. 
William Brattle, a veteran soldier and politician went 
to great lengths to offend the Governor. On October 14, 
1765, Brattle was the moderator of the Cambridge town meeting 
when a proposal was made that the Governor's speech to the 
General Court of September 25 be read out. The person 
who made the proposal claimed that he already possessed a copy 
of a reply to the speech. Both documents were read out; 
after16hich, a set of instructions for the town's representative 
(the Tory Joseph Lee) was composed. Bernard, when he saw 
a copy of the instructions, thought them "outrageous & indecent" 
and an "infamous libell" on the authority of Britain. 
Edmund/ 
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Edmund Trowbridge, who attended the meeting, reported to Bernard 
that Brattle was the author of the town's reply to his speech 
and the greater part of the instructions, and that both had 
been prepared in secret a few days before the meeting. 
It seemed to Bernard that Brattle's intention was to "make 
the business a personal Quarell... [and] a merit of being an 
object of the Governor's anger. " Previously, Brattle had 
been "remarkably civil" to Bernard. 
11 The old general 
went even further in his efforts to ingratiate himself with 
the Whig leaders when, during the Pope's Day parade, he walked 
arm-in-arm with Ebenezer McIntosh at the head of the crowd 
and "complimented him on the order he kept. " 
12 Nevertheless, 
Sam Adams distrusted Brattle, for he was forever "veering about" 
and changing sides. Adams called him the "weathercock". 
13 
But despite the latent divisions within the Whig group and the exis- 
tence of a Tory majority, the Council did not follow Bernard's 
leads during the Stamp Act Crisis. Tories and Whigs combined 
to defeat the execution of the Stamp Act. Six Tories, 
four Whigs and one neutral member were present on August 21, 
1765 when it was decided that, because of the riot of the 14th, 
the Stamps should be stored in Castle William when they arrived, 
rather than be distributed on the authority of the Governor and 
Council. ' The same members also rejected Bernard's 
suggestion that a military watch be appointed. 
14 Thomas 
Hutchinson later attested to the absence of Tory and moderate 
support for Bernard in the aftermath of the first riot: 
Several of the council gave it as their 
opinion, Mr. Oliver [who had resigned 
from his Distributor's post] being present, 
that the people, not only of the town 
of Boston, but of the country in general, 
would never submit to the execution of 
the stamp act, let the consequence of 15 




After the riot of August 26, six Tories and five Whigs voted 
down Bernard's suggestion that British troops were necessary 
to restore order and assist the provincial government in the 
execution of acts of Parliament. Finally, on October 
2, the Tory and Whig councillors reached the unanimous decision 
that the stamps should be stored in Castle William indefinitely. 
16 
Thus, in August and October 1765, both Tory and Whig councillors 
combined to defeat the implemenation of the Stamp Act. 
In his correspondence with the Earl of'Halifax and Henry 
Conway, Bernard attributed the Council's refusal to assist 
in the execution of the act to their fear of the Boston mobs 
and the effects of anti-Toryism. "Nothing can pass the 
Council, that is like to be displeasing to Boston. " 
17 He 
informed the Lords of Tride-that. several councillors were "in 
their hearts well wishers to Government & ready to support 
it, when they can do it with safety &a due regard to their 
own interest & conveniency. " But there was a "prudence 
or Timidity... which persuades People to keep out of the Wa>i 
of Resentment. " 
18 
The unwillingness of the Tories and moderates to act 
in support of Bernard's recommendations is further demonstrated 
by the Council's response to events during the autumn and winter. 
James Otis Jr. precipitated a confrontation between the House 
and Council over the latter's decision to allocate province 
funds to Colonel Saltonstall's reinforcements for the garrison 
at Castle William. (It had been taken in September by 
the Governor and Council alone, which was normal procedure 
when the General Court was not in session; otherwise the House 
would have had to make the decision. ) In the Boston town 
meeting, Otis launched a tirade against the "acursed Septemvirate" 
of councillors who had approved Bernard's request. They 
had "endeavoured to destroy the liberties of the People" by 
infringing/ 
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infringing the House's prerogative to dispense money from the 
province treasury. 
19 
On November 6, a bi-partisan delegation 
from the House delivered a remonstrance inquiring into the 
alleged misappropriation of province funds. 
20 The Council 
prepared a statement the next day and denied the allegations 
of acting contrary to the principles and practices of parliamentary 
government. It defended the right of the Governor-in-Council 
to distribute money under the "emergency powers" of the Charter, 
as Bernard had done in a message to the House. But the 
Council's concurrence with Bernard was mitigated by its members 
desire to placate the Whigs in the House. It was said 
that the decision was taken reluctantly. They were "by 
no means fond of exercising such a Power. " The Council 
agreed to Bernard's request only because "the minds of the 
People were so agitated" and further riots were feared when 
the stamps arrived. Thus it-was thought necessary to 
support the garrison at the Castle. The Council assured 
the House that it never intended to assist in the execution 
of the act: "The Board are embarked in the same bottom with 
the... House; we must both sink or swim together. " 
21 
Pressure on the councillors, both Whig and Tory, increased 
during the Whigs' campaign to open the courts of law. 
On October 30, a joint committee of the . House and 
Council, 
with a Whig majority, resolved that Governor Bernard should 
order the law courts to. proceed to business without using the 
stamped papers, otherwise they would have to remain closed. 
The report was not approved and was returned to House committee. 
It was not reconsidered until January. 
22 In the meantime, 
the Council concurred with the House's motion calling for the postpone- 
ment of the county courts that were due to meet in December and January. 
A few days later Bernard prorogued the assembly. But on 
November 19, the Boston town meeting delivered a petition to 
the Governor-and-Council calling for the courts to be opened. 
23 
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The burden of responsibility fell heavily oh the coun- 
cillors' shoulders. They did not discuss the memorial until 
the next day, as there was not a quorum of members present. 
(William Brattle was conveniently absent with a cold! ) 
24 
Fifteen councillors attended the meeting on the 20th and engaged 
in a "long debate" which lasted well into the evening. 
They called on the advice of many lawyers (including John Adams) 
who, according to Bernard, attacked the "Injustice" of the 
Stamp Act and discoursed on the "impossibility" of its being 
executed, but "did not much attend to what was the main Question, 
with the Council, whether it was the Business of the Gov[erno]r 
& Council as having the executive power to direct the Courts 
of Justice in their proceedings upon this or any occasion. " 
The debate was resumed on the 21st when thirteen councillors were 
present (six Tories, six Whigs and one neutral. ) Throughout 
these proceedings, Bernard opposed the motions for re-opening 
the courts, arguing that for the Governor and Council to give 
such directions "either mandatory or recommendations... would be 
illegal. " 25 
For the moment, Whig and Tory councillors accepted Bernard's 
argument that a "question of law" arose from Boston's memorial, 
since an act of Parliament had been rendered inoperative. 
It was decided to refer the matter to the Justices of the Superior 
Court. Tories and Whigs then combined to compose a reply 
to the Boston town meeting. Both sides were agreed that 
the statement should be approved by unanimous vote, for the 
appearance of unity "was thought necessary for to give the 
determination the greater weight out of doors. " All the 
councillors, evidently, were anxious about possible repercussions 
if they made an unpopular decision. But the friends of 
government were reluctant to appear too conciliatory toward 
Boston: a "Majority of the Council were firm against discrediting 
themselves by too great a Submission to the demands of the 
People. "/ 
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People. " It was only after many alterations were made 
to the first draft that the councillors could agree on a state- 
ment. 
26 
As Bernard expected, the Council's reply was voted 
"unsatisfactory" by the Boston town meeting. 
27 Whigs cont- 
inued to attack his influence over the members: he was "teazing" 
them "with new precedents and practices drawn from the Canon 
Law. " 28 
In spite of the fact that the Council agreed with Bernard 
over the Boston memorial, and that the friends of government 
were anxious to dissociate themselves from the'Whig members, 
Bernard expected little assistance from the Council when the 
General Court met in January. 
29 
By this time, the customs 
houses and the Suffolk County courts were already doing business 
without stamped papers. It was known also that the 
probate judges of five other counties had decided to proceed 
at the March sessions. 
30 Thus, it seemed unlikely to Bernard 
that either the Whig or Tory councillors would stand in the 
way of attempts to open all the courts. When the House 
passed a resolution on the 22nd calling for this, he made up 
his mind that if the Council should concur he would refuse 
to acknowledge the resolution, though such might prove to be 
a "Signal" for the "popular Fury" to drive him from Boston. 
He had no intention of making the "Executive Power of this 
31 Government... be active against the Act of Parliament". 
To Bernard's surprise, the Council did not concur with 
the House. But the members' decision was not based on 
the Tories' defence of Parliament's authority or their desire 
to assist Bernard; rather, the councillors wished to absolve 
themselves of the responsibility of making a politically 
sensitive/ 
160 
sensitive judgment. The reason given for their non- 
concurrence was that the motion "would be more effectually 
answered" if it was referred to the Justices of the Superior 
Court. 32 At first, two of the Justices - Peter Oliver 
and Thomas Hutchinson - were opposed to the re-opening of the 
courts. 
33 
But the others (Benjamin Lynde, John Cushing 
and Chambers Russell) were in favour, and eventually persuaded 
Hutchinson and Oliver to agree. The Council accepted 
the recommendation of the Justices that all the county courts 
would be open in March. In February, the Council informed 
the House of the Justices' report and of their decision that 
no further action was necessary regarding the courts. 
34 
During the Stamp Act Crisis, it is clear that neither 
Tory nor moderate councillors were willing to approve measures 
to enforce the Stamp Act and the authority of Parliament contrary 
to the wishes of the Whig leadership and the protest movement. 
Thus far, Bernard's assessment of the Council's behaviour was 
accurate and correct. 
2. The Balance of Power in the Council, 1766-May 1768. 
The changes in the composition of the House in 1766 were 
paralleled by those in the Council. The election to the 
Board irrevocably altered the balance of power, and the Whigs 
emerged with a clear majority of members. 
In the days before the election, James Otis kept his 
promise made the previous year to try and purge the Council 
of the friends of government. He declared in the House 
that the Council "had got the Disease of Mary Magdalen, it had 
seven Devils in it which must be cast out before it could be 
in Health. " 35 The Whigs in the House "turned out without 
much/ 
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much difficulty" Thomas Hutchinson, Andrew Oliver and Peter 
Oliver. To make matters worse for Bernard, Benjamin Lynde 
and George Leonard - "steady Assertors of the Rights of the 
Kings Government" - resigned their seats "to avoid being turned 
out". 
36 
The House elected nine new councillors, all of 
them Whigs. Bernard accepted the nominations of three, 
but in retaliation for the dismissal of'-his friends he vetoed 
six. He later regretted not also rejecting William Brattle, 
who, on the day of the election, "acted with ... much Indecency" 
towards Hutchinson. 37 
The negativing of the Whigs, like his speech to the House 
of September 25,1765, was part of Bernard's strategy of confron- 
tation with the protest movement. It was "a bold Stroke, 
but very well timed", and he trusted it would have "very good 
Effects", 38 one of which, we may presume, would be to encourage 
the friends of government in the House and Council to stand 
up to the Whigs. Bernard, nevertheless, lamented the loss 
of his closest advisers on the Board. He accused the House 
of depriving the upper chamber of "its best and most able Servants, 
whose only Crime is their Fidelity to the Crown. " They 
had been "proscribed by the invidious Name of Friends to the 
Stamp Act... [when] in Truth such a Character did not exist 
in the Province. ý, 39 Bernard did not "arraign... [the House] 
for a discretionary exercise of a legal right but an improper 
exercise of it in a very uncommon case. " 
40 
Thomas Hutchinson claimed he was "patient" under his 
"misfortune". 41 But he continued to attend'Council meetings 
during 1766-1767, although he did not vote. Bernard tried 
to pave the way for Hutchinson's return. He argued with 
the House that every Lieutenant-Governor since the 1630s, with 
the exception of one, had been a member of the Board. 
But the House and the now Whig dominated Council refused to 
accept this historical fact as a constitutional precedent, 
and / 
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and declared that he would have to seek re-election like any other 
nominee. 
42 Hutchinson was narrowly defeated in the 
1767 election, and in the next he lost by only four votes. 
On both occasions, Tory and moderate representatives rallied 
behind Hutchinson. 43 
In the session of 1766-1767, the distribution of political 
power in the Council was as follows: eight Tories, six moderate 
Whigs, four radical Whigs and three non-aligned members. 
44 
Bernard was again denied the co-operation of the Council in 
urgent matters; at least, the Board refused to endorse his prop- 
osals and recommendations. The Council declined to assist 
in the investigation into the affair of Daniel Malcom, a Whig 
merchant who had used force to prevent customs officers from 
inspecting his house. 45 With the Tories in the minority 
in both chambers, they were unable to prevent the dismissal 
of Richard Jackson as province agent and his replacement by 
the Whigs' candidate Dennis De Deberdt. 
46 
Moreover, during the winter of 1766-1767, the councillors 
began to make decisions without the Governor being present, 
as was required by the Charter. This occured during a 
controversy between the House and the Council over the latter's 
decision to vote supplies for two companies of British soldiers 
who were on their way to Quebec when bad weather forced their 
transports to head for Boston. The troops remained at 
Castle William for two months. The General Court was in 
recess during this period, therefore the Council acted in accor- 
dance with its "emergency powers" to dispense province funds 
without the approval of the House. The cost involved was 
small, some £60. But, as Bernard reported to Grafton's 
Secretary of State, the Earl of Shelburne, the Whigs in the 
lower chamber believed the Council's action had infringed the 
House's prerogative to initiate money bills: it "appears to 
them-as real a grievance as the stamp-act". On February 
4, / 
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4, the House approved a message to Bernard in which they challenged 
the right of the Governor-in-Council to dispense public funds 
without the consent of the lower chamber. 
47 Bernard replied 
on the 17th, arguing that neither he nor the Council had conspired 
to do this, but acted in accordance with the Council's legislative powers 
and in fulfilment of the province's obligations under the Quartering 
Act of 1766.48 The Council repeated much of what Bernard had 
said in an address to the House composed by James Bowdoin. 
49 
Bernard, understandably, welcomed the concurrence of the Council on 
this issue. But he suspected that Bowdoin's message was 
approved by the councillors in an informal meeting before 
it was tabled before the whole Council. On this occasion, 
he was prepared to acquiesce in the Board's unconstitutional 
procedure "without entring [sic] intb Arguments or making 
conclusions there from. " 
50 
It was the first of many incidents 
in which Bowdoin and the other Whigs were to spur the Council 
to act independently of the Governor. 
The Whigs did not relent in their attempts to purge the 
Council of Tories. In the election of 1767, Israel Williams 
- "a constant Supporter of Government, &a known Friend to 
the L[ieutenan]t Gov[erno]r was flung out.,, 
51 Bernard 
"did not mean to decline the full exercise" of, his authority and 
vetoed five of the House's nominees. He accepted only those 
radicals elected in previous years (Bowdoin, Powell and Bradbury), 
as well as the moderates whose Whiggism was never deeply offensive 
to him and whose allegiance he wished to cultivate (Erving, 
Gray, Royall and Danforth). 
52 
He also welcomed back the moder- 
ate Nathaniel Sparhawk, left out in 1766, because he "had 
behaved with more decency than the rest. " 
53 
Seven Tories 
were elected (Paine, Flucker, Hubbard, Lincoln, Chandler, Ropes 
and John Worthington. ) 
54 
Bernard's anti-radical tactics won the approval of the 
Tories. Andrew Oliver believed that negativing the radicals 
was/ 
164 
was the only way to prevent the Whigs from having "it in their 
power to model the council as they please. " 
55 Before 
the election, four representatives - "Men of the first character 
for Ability Integrity & Rank, & constant Supporters of Government" 
came to Bernard and urged him to "keep steady" in his opposition 
to the Whigs. "They spoke in the name of the generality 
of the friends of Government in their House. " 
56 
While during 1767-1768, the Tories. and' dissident moderates 
in the House provided strong opposition to the Whigs, there 
were indications too that the moderate Whig councillors, who 
held the balance of power on the Board, discountenanced the 
radicalism of the Whig leadership. 
John Rowe recorded in his diary one "Disagreeable" incident 
that took place in February 1768 at the British Coffee House 
involving John Erving and the radical merchant William Molineux. 
A heated discussion took place among a group of merchants and 
Whigs concerning a seizure made by Timothy Folger, a recently 
appointed custom officer. Molineux asserted "most Cruelly 
and Barbarously" that the money Folger made from seizures he 
gave to Commissioner John Temple, in return for Temple having 
secured his appointment. Erving, whose son-in-law James 
Bowdoin was Temple's father-in-law, asked Molineux, "Surely 
you cannot believe [that Temple was] ... guilty of so 
Base a 
Design"? He admonished Molineux for having "behaved very 
Ill in making the company think so. " But Molineux replied 
several times, "I do Believe it. " Whereupon "Mr Erving & 
Molineux had some smart speeches with each other" that made 
their associates "very uneasy". James Otis ended the argu- 
ment by producing a copy of Folger's commission (conveniently 
at hand) which confirmed the truth of what Molineux had alleged - 
that Folger's one third profit from seizures was to go to Temple 
"for his Majesty's use. " 
57 
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The moderatism displayed by Erving (though it was, of course, 
in part a defence of his family's reputation) prevailed within 
the Council. On March 1, Bernard drew the councillors' 
attention to an article in the Boston Gazette by "A True Patriot" 
(Dr. Joseph Warren) which he thought libellous. The "Patriot" 
claimed to have "full proof" of the Governor's "cruelty" to 
Massachusetts, of inducing Secretary Shelburne "to form a most 
unfavourable opinion of the province in general, and some of 
the most respectable inhabitants in particular. " The Council 
shared Bernard's outrage at this "insolent and licentious" 
attack on the King's representative. It was "subversive 
of all order and decorum" and "manifestly tends to destroy 
the subordination, that is absolutely necessary to good government, 
and to the well-being of society. " 
58 Twenty councillors 
attended this particular meeting59and both Whigs and Tories 
sided with the Governor: 
most of the Gentlemen spoke to testify 
their abhorrence of it; and it was remarkable 
that some of those who heretofore had 
inclined to the Popular Side were most 
remarkable in their Resentment of this 
outrage. . 
It was agreed to send the libel down to the House for its consider- 
ation. 
60 
A contrast in attitudes between the Whigs of both chambers 
could not have been more apparent. The House debated the 
matter for two days. James Otis "behaved like a madman" 
and abused every councillor "in the grossest of terms". 
The vote was close, the members dismissing the Governor's charges 
by thirty-nine votes to thirty. 
61 In replying to Bernard 
on March 3, the House denied allegations that the "Patriot" 
had abused the "Majesty of the King, [and] the Dignity of the 
Government", for "No particular Person, public or private" was 
mentioned/ 
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mentioned by name in the article. 
62 The following day, Otis 
came into the Council chamber and "with oaths and Imprecations 
vowed Vengeance upon the whole Council at the next Election. " 
He threatened one councillor (it is not known whom that "He 
should never sit at that Board after his Year was out. " 
Intimidated by this display, the Council rejected Bernard's 
request that the printers of the Boston Gazette, Whigs Benjamin 
Edes and John Gill, should be prosecuted. One councillor 
advised the Governor "in the name of some Friends" not to 
proceed with the matter any further and thus put in jeopardy 
the bi-partisan co-operation he had but so recently received: 
"It was suggested that it would be better to leave this Matter 
where it stood with a continued Unanimity of the (allmost) 
whole Council, than by proceeding further to divide them. " 
63 
Bernard concluded that in spite of their "Spirited exertion" 
over the libel, in which they followed "the Dictates of their 
own Judgments", the councillors, like the friends of government 
in the House, grew "timid & irresolute" when attacked by the 
radicals. Bernard directed Chief Justice Hutchinson to 
present the libel to a grand jury. But the jury refused 
to make an indictment. 
64 
After the election of 1766, the moderate Whigs held the 
balance of power in the Council. During a period of relative 
political quiet, May. 1767-May 1768, when the friends of 
government gathered support in the House, Bernard won the active 
co-operation of both the moderates and Tories for his schemes - 
something which he had been unable to achieve during the Stamp Act 
Crisis. Bernard did not court the moderates' allegiance, 
save by continuing to accept their nominations by the House 
when he negatived others, and based his policy considerations 
upon their evident distate for the radicalism of the Whig leaders. 
By the time of the 1768 elections to the Council, the British 
government/ 
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government had sent its approval of Bernard's negativing tactic. 
The Earl of Shelburne thought it justified in view of the House's 
refusal to return the senior executive officers and judges 
to the Board. 65 Bernard put it to the House that Shelburne's 
approval was an "admonition, rather than a censure", and that 
"Prudent men, moderate men would have... made use of it as a 
means of reconciliation, rather than of further distraction. " 
66 
Despite this plea for the moderates to desert the Whig party, the 
House turned out from the Council John Chandler. But 
the friends of government were strong enough to prevent the 
removal of the remaining Tories "by a few Votes". - Bernard 
negatived six of the Whigs nominated by the House and again 
accepted the election of the moderates. 
67 
3. Bernard, the Council and the Liberty Riot, June-July 1768. 
In the session of 1768-1769, the moderates once again 
held the balance power. The seven moderates could ally 
themselves with the seven Tories to support Bernard or with 
There were two neutrals. ) the six radical Whigs to oppose him. (68 
It was therefore in Bernard's interest to build on the harmony 
that had prevailed within the Council during the early spring 
and try to win the confidence and support of the moderates 
and Tories. But his hopes were dashed when, following 
the Liberty Riot of June 10, the period of political calm was 
replaced by one of intense agitation, in which not only moderates 
but Tory councillors also chose to side with the radicals 
against him. 
The Liberty Riot left Francis Bernard in a quandary. 
He now resigned himself to the fact (as he believed) that 
British troops were necessary to support the authority of the 
provincial government and protect officials in the execution 
of/ 
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of unpopular acts of Parliament. But he had no desire to 
ask Britain for the troops. If he chose to, he was bound 
by law to acquire the consent of the Council. There 
was little chance of gaining the support of the Board for this. 
In March, the Council had rejected a similar request, and in 
no uncertain terms made it clear to Bernard that they could 
see no justification for regular troops to be stationed in 
Boston. Bernard's preference was for the British govern- 
ment to order troops direct to Boston, thereby alleviating 
his predicament. Although Secretary Hillsborough had already 
dispatched orders for the deployment of troops, General Gage 
never received them until late August or early September. 
69 
Thus, in the summer of 1768, Bernard was compelled to seek 
the advice of the Council in making a request to Britain for 
troops. 
-The Council met on June 11, the day after the Liberty 
Riot, to inquire into the disturbance. A committee of councillors 
who were Justices of the Peace was appointed to do this, and 
reported back that more disturbances were unlikely. The 
Council met again on the 13th, and Bernard read the members 
a letter he had received from the Customs Commissioners complaining 
that no action had been taken to prevent further riots and 
ensure their safe return to the town. Bernard intimated 
that he was "under apprehension of fresh disturbances" and urged 
the Council to consider what measures could be taken to prevent 
them. The councillors refused to be drawn into agreeing 
to making a request for troops, and reiterated their opinions 
regarding the unlikelihood of more disturbances. Bernard 
was advised'to consult with the House, now in session, and the Board 
promised to give an answer once the decision of the House had 
been heard. 70 
The joint committee appointed by the House and Council 
met/ 
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met at least three times during June. Bernard consulted with 
the committee, and, while denying the accusations that he had 
already made a request for the troops,. hinted that they could 
be sent by order of the British government in response to the 
riots of March and June regardless of what he or the committee 
thought. Their presence, he continued, "would be very 
satisfactory to most People of Property in the Town. " 
71 
The committee refused to be brow eaten. The introduction 
of the Townshend Acts, read the reply to Bernard, had been 
the original cause of the discontent, and the "new and unprecedented 
procedure" of the customs officers in seizing Hancock's Liberty 
and mooring her alongside the Romney had precipitated the riot 
of June 10. The committee recommended that the General 
Court "make [a] strict enquiry into all Grievances" surrounding 
the Liberty Riot, but maintained that troops were not needed 
to preserve civil order or protect government officials. It 
was suggested that the justices of the Peace should attend 
the Governor for instructions on preventing and ending disturb- 
ances and that the Attorney-General be directed to prosecute 
the rioters. 
72 
The committee was expressing the majoritarian Whig view 
concerning popular disturbances: riots did not undermine the 
authority of the provincial government nor threaten to bring 
down the social-political structure; they were symptomatic 
of popular fears that Britain was endeavouring to "enslave" 
the colonists by imposing direcxt taxes upon them. The 
Liberty Riot, like the Stamp Act Riots, occurred in response 
to actions of government officials who were committed to executing 
unpopular acts of Parliament. The report was probably 
the work of the Whig 'majority on the committee, though the committee did 
include five Tory representatives. But it did not pass 
the House. 73 
Bernard encountered increasing bi-partisan opposition 
to/ 
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to his schemes from within the Council. Circumstantial 
evidence suggests that Bernard alienated both Tories and moderates 
by his request for troops. While Tories were alarmed by 
the Liberty Riot and the "revolutionary" activities of the 
radicals, they were not prepared to countenance a request for 
troops and thus bring the resentment of the populace and radicals 
down upon their head; nor, we may conclude, did they believe 
that troops were warranted, and throughout June and July they 
joined the Whigs in composing a petition to have the "original 
cause" of the disturbances - the Townshend Acts - repealed. 
On June 29, the Council appointed a committee to prepare 
an address to the King on the state of the province. The 
members were James Bowdoin, Royal Tyler and William Brattle, 
and Tories James Russell and Thomas Flucker. The committee's 
business was suspended when Bernard dissolved the General Court 
on the 30th after the House had refused to rescind its vote 
on the circular letter. Bowdoin and another councillor 
remonstrated with the Governor and pledged that the Council 
would proceed to complete the address. Bernard warned 
them of the unconstitutionality of this action, that the Council 
could not exercise its legislative functions when the Governor 
was not present. But "after much altercation" Bernard 
was prepared to compromise and agreed tö send the address 
to Hillsborough on condition that it was "inoffensive". 
He refused to accept or transmit any petitions to Parliament, 
if they too were drawn up by the Council. 
74 The address 
to the King was composed principally by James Bowdoin and approved 
by the House on July 7.75 
Why did Bernard compromise with Bowdoin? He explained 
to Hillsborough that the reason for doing so was , to obviate 
the misrepresentation which this Business would otherwise be 
subject to. " 
76 
In other words, Bernard realised that 
the Council would press ahead with the petition regardless 
of/ 
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of what he said, and in a pique of resentment misrepresent 
his conduct to the King, ministers and Privy Council. 
But why should Bernard have been concerned at this? For the 
House many times before had claimed that he was guilty of such 
a charge. The main reason for Bernard's action, rather, 
was to satisfy the demands of the Tories who, with the appointment 
of Russell and Flucker to the committee to prepare the petition, 
had aligned themselves with the Whigs to protest against the 
Townshend Acts. (It was not until April 1769 that Thomas 
Hutchinson observed that the other councillors "leave Flucker 
out of their Secrets. " 
77) According to Bowdoin, the Council 
was "fully convinced" of the necessity of petitioning the King 
and Parliament to obtain a repeal of the Duties that had been 
the fundamental cause of the recent disturbances. Bowdoin did 
not claim that all the councillors were of this opinion, only 
"a number of the Council. " 
78 The petitions may have been 
supported by Tories other than Flucker and Russell, for the 
address to the King was of a peculiarly mild cast intended, 
perhaps, not only to persuade Bernard to send it to Britain 
but to please the seven Tory councillors. 
79 
Thus, by placating 
the Tories and moderates over the petition to the King, Bernard 
may have hoped to gain their support for his request for troops 
should he have to make it again in the near future. 
In the meantime, General Gage, hearing of the Liberty Riot, 
enquired of Bernard whether he needed military assistance. 
Bernard replied that he was bound by constitutional procedure 
to seek the approval of the Council and could not take the 
decision by himself. But still hoping for the British 
government to send the troops direct, he asked Colonel Dalrymple, 
the commanding officer of the regiments at Halifax, to "let 
me appear a Stranger to it [the direct order] untill it becomes 
necessary to communicate it to me officially. " 
80 
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Bernard submitted further requests for troops to the Council 
on July 22 and 27. He stated that General Gage was merely 
awaiting their approval , and reminded the Council that nothing 
yet had been done to ensure the safe return of the Customs 
Commissioners. If the Council refused to offer advice 
on this matter, he warned, it would be construed as a neglect 
of duty by the King and the British government. 
81 
The Council's reply was delivered on Friday July 29 and 
echoed the Whiggish sentiments of the joint committee's report. 
The Liberty Riot "seems to have sprung wholly from the Persons 
who complain of it, by the plan laid and the orders given for 
making the seizure [of the Liberty]... and carrying it away 
by armed Force. " The Commissioners and customs officers 
had a "preconcerted Plan" to seize the vessel. The "Violence 
and Unprece ` 
dentness of the Proceedure" in bringing the sloop 
alongside the Romney to prevent a possible rescue attempt was 
the immediate cause of the riot. Bernard was again enjoined 
to rely upon existing law enforcement agencies - Justices 
of the Peace and town officials - to preserve civil order 
and prevent riots. The address ended with a warning for 
Bernard: 
The Board being fully assured that his 
Excellency has not wrote for Troops, 
take this Opportunity to express that 
Assurance: and at the same time to declare 
that if any Persons have made Application 
to General Gage for Troops to be sent 
hither, we deem them in the highest degree 
unfriendly to the Peace and good Order 
of this Government, as well as to his 
Majesty's service and the British Interest 
in America. 82 
The reply was prepared by a bi-partisan committee of Whigs 
James Bowdoin, Harrison Gray and William Brattle, and Tories 
Thomas Flucker and Nathaniel Ropes. 
83 We cannot say for 
certain whether the address was composed with the-unanimous 
agreement/ 
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agreement of the committee members or reflected the opinions 
of the Whig majority only. Similarly, the address was 
approved by the Council when the Whigs were in the majority. 
84 
Nevertheless, as Bernard informed Lord Barrington, at the meetings 
of July 22 and 29 the councillors (Whig and Tory) unanimously 
rejected the request for troops. Bernard was quite 
unprepared for "the high Strain of the present Popularity with 
which this Question was treated; from whence I am, convinced 
that I am no longer to depend upon the Council for the Support 
of the small Remains of royal & parliamentary Power now left. "85 
On July 30, Bernard moaned that "now all the Burden is 
to be laid upon me. " 
86 
But the burden was lifted when 
that same day Hillsborough ordered two regiments from Ireland 
to Boston. Gage received his orders to send troops from 
Halifax to the Massachusetts capital late in the summer. 
87 
The problem which Bernard now faced was to obtain the assistance 
of the Council in quartering the soldiers. Of. this, there 
seemed little'prbspect-of success, given the opposition of both 
Tories and moderates to his request for troops. 
*" ***** 
With the Tory membership of the Council severely reduced 
after the Stamp Act Crisis, the moderates had held the balance 
of power on the Board. During 1767 and 1768 , there were 
indications that the moderates' disapproval of the. radicals' 
schemes/ 
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schemes would lead them to join the Tories in support of Governor 
Bernard. But in June 1768, following the Liberty Riot, 
moderates, radicals and some Tories united to defeat Bernard's 
request for troops. They believed that troops were unnecessary 
for maintaining civil order. The combination was not wholly 
artificial, for they had co-operated in refusing to implement 
the Stamp Act and in preparing a petition against the Townshend 
Acts. 
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CHAPTER SIX: BERNARD, HUTCHINSON AND THE COUNCIL, AUGUST 1768-1770. 
The arrival of the troops in Boston in October 1768 pre- 
cluded any possibility of the moderates coming over to Bernard's 
side. They were joined by a few Tories in their efforts 
to obstruct Bernard procuring quarters for the troops. 
Through coercion and pressure of his own, Bernard managed to 
win their co-operation momentarily, but the majority of councillors 
quickly united against him and called for the troops to be 
withdrawn. Thereafter, the radical councillors were successful 
in forging an alliance with the moderates 'and three Tories 
that lasted until 1770. The publication of Bernard's letters 
to Shelburne and Hillsborough, in which he recommended the 
appointment of a mandamus Council, alienated the moderates 
completely. Thomas Hutchinson, however, recovered some - 
of the ground vacated by Bernard and won the active co-operation 
and confidence of the moderate councillors. 
1. The Arrival of the Troops and the Dispute over Quarterin . 
In the first weeks of September, Bernard gave out hints that 
the troops would soon be arriving, but claimed misleadingly 
that he had still not received confirmation of this news. 
His duplicity was intended to precipitate a response from the 
Whigs 
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Whigs, whose fury he hoped would have lessened by the time 
the troops arrived. 
1 When the Bostonians heard the news, 
bonfires were arranged on Beacon Hill to warn of the arrival 
of the troop transports. Debates in the town meeting turned 
on the question of arming the inhabitants to defend themselves 
against the "foreign" invasion. 
2 On September 11, the 
councillors resident in or near Boston presented Bernard with an 
address warning that the news of the troops being sent to 
Boston had "a good deal agitated the mind of the people. " 
In the coming months, Bernard could expect little assistance 
from the Whigs and Tories who signed the address: John Erving, 
Harrison Gray, Royal Tyler, James Bowdoin, James Pitts, Thomas 
Flucker and Thomas Hubbard. 
3 
On September 19, Bernard broke the news to the Council 
that General Gage had dispatched troops from the 14th and 20th 
regiments at Halifax to Boston, and that another regiment 
was soon to be expected from Ireland. One of the Halifax 
regiments was to be billeted in Castle William and the others 
were to be placed in the town. 
4 The Council, however, 
declined to act on Bernard's request to procure quarters for 
the soldiers in the town and insisted that it was the resposi- 
bility of the town officials. 
5 Gray, Hubbard, Ervin@', 
Flucker and Tyler consulted with the selectmen of Boston, 
and on the 22nd reported back that the selectmen. would not 
consider arranging accommodation for the troops bntil_the'barracks 
at the Castle had been filled; this, they said, was in accordance 
with the procedures laid down in the Quartering Act of 1766. 
Bernard countered their intransigence by suggesting that the 
Manufactory House, a public building, be fitted out as a town 
barracks. 6 
Bernard suspected the councillors of complicity in James 
Otis's scheme to have the townspeople refuse to hire out buildings 
or sell provisions to the troops. 
7 (Also, he no doubt 
recalled that during the French and Indian War the town magistrates 
and General Court had resisted several times the pleas and 
the/ 
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the attempts of British commanders to place troops in private 
houses and buildings, and argued that a colonial quartering 
act was necessary for this to be done legally. More recently, 
the New York legislature had been in dispute with Governor 
Henry Moore and General Gage over the terms of the Quartering 
Acts of 1765 and 1766. Until June 1767, the legislature 
refused to pass bills furnishing the troops with supplies or 
provisions. Eventually, the House of Commons voted to 
suspend the assembly until it complied . With' the orders. 
) 8 
The Council had still to deliver their formal reply to 
Bernard's request. The members met on the afternoon of the 
22nd without Bernard and appointed a committee of Bowdoin, 
Gray, and Tyler to prepare their address. Bad weather 
prevented Bernard coming to Boston from his home at Roxbury 
until the 24th. Bernard received the Council's reply, 
but then asked the members to rewrite it and take out several 
passages which he thought objectionable. The Council ad- 
journed to 9 a. m. on the 26th. 
9 
When Bernard entered the Council chamber on the morning 
of the 26th, he interrupted a councillor (it is not known whom 
and a printer correcting proofs of the Council's address for 
publication. Bernard protested that the address could 
not be made public until it had been formally approved by the 
Board. On perusing the document, he noticed that several 
amendments had been made to the address which he had received 
from the Board on the 24th; not all the amendments concerned 
those passages which he had asked them to omit or rewrite. 
10 
There was one important addition to the draft prepared by 
Bowdoin, Tyler and Gray that was included in the final version 
approved by the Council on the 26th and presented to Bernard. 
Its 
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Its inclusion suggests that the Whig majority on the Council, 
possibly with the assistance of one or two Tories, had resolved 
to take a more radical stance in their opposition to Bernard 
over the quartering of the troops. The addition 
on the original draft is in the handwriting of James Bowdoin 
and reads: 
[The Council] are fully persuaded his 
Majesty's Ministers would never have 
judged it either necessary or expedient 
to go into such extraordinary measures 
as those of sending Troops hither unless 
in ye representations made from hence 
by some ill-minded Persons the s[ai] 
had been greatly magnified and exaggerated. 
11 
In July, the Council had warned Bernard that if troops were sent 
to Boston he would be adjudged as guilty as the Customs Commissioners 
for misrepresenting the state of the province to the ministry. 
The September address avoided all pretence and was a fully- 
fledged attack on the honesty and credibility of the chief 
magistrate. 
This attack on Bernard was too much for some of the councillors 
to accept. Bernard reported that on the 26th seven members 
approved the address while three voted against it. 
12 
Bernard's arithmetic was wrong, unless, of course, one member 
abstained, for eleven not ten councillors were present when 
the address was approved. We may conjecture that the 
division was Danforth, Erving , Brattle, Bowdoin, Gray, Tyler, 
Pitts and Powell versus Hubbard, Russell and Flucker. 
13 
One of the councillors who voted with the majority, nevertheless, 
did so under duress for he was alarmed by the radicalism of 
the document. He "rather acquiesced than approved" and 
refused to concur with the majority until he was taken aside 
by another member who lectured him on his folly: 
III/ 
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"I have no immediate Communications with 
them" (meaning the Sons of Liberty) "but 
I know pretty well what is going on by 
my intimately conversing with many of 
the middling People [. ] I say it 
again & again & would have it well understood, 
that if we dog't print the Answer to 
the Gov[erno] this Day there will soon 
be no Government. " 14 
The troops from Halifax arrived at Nantasket Roads in 
Boston harbour on September 28. Bernard invited their 
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel William Dalrymple, to 
attend a Council meeting at Castle William the following day. 
(The choice of venue was surely an attempt by Bernard see how 
the councillors would respond outside the intimidating and 
frenetic atmosphere of Boston. ) Dalrymple addressed the 
members in a "Genteel Manner", but to their dismay explained 
that he did not consider Castle Island to be part of the town 
of Boston, and that his orders explicitly stated that at least 
one regiment of troops was to be stationed in the town. 
He could not, therefore, agree with the Council's proposal 
that all the troops should be placed in the Castle. Bernard 
interjected and reiterated his suggestion that the Manufactory 
House be fitted out as a barracks. An "angry dispute" 
followed,. for on September 19 the Board had been informed that 
one regiment was to be sent to the Castle; now it seemed that 
all along Bernard and Dalrypmle had intended to place both 
of the Halifax regiments in the town. The Council refused 
to answer Bernard's proposal until Dalrymple had left the room. 
Then they submitted a deposition referring both Bernard and 
Dalrymple to the regulations and procedures of the Quartering 
Act. His patience finally exhausted, Bernard took the 
responsibility of designating the Manufactory House for use as 
a barracks. (Troops were also allowed to settle in the 
Common and Faneuil Hall. ) 
15 
Dalrymple appeared before the Council again, on October 
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180 
3, two days after the troops arrived in the town. This 
time he asked the Board to vote provisions and supplies for 
the soldiers in accordance with the terms of the Quartering 
Act. (The General Court was not sitting. ) The request, 
noted Bernard, was delivered "in very strong Words, not without 
some Hints of the King's Resentment which would follow their 
Refusal! " But the members were in a defiant mood. 
They rejected Bernard's proposal that a civilian quartermaster 
be appointed to supervise the operations and refused to allocate 
any province funds. Once again, they asserted that the 
troops should be removed from the province altogether and those 
expected from Ireland sent elsewhere. 
16 
The councillors were not of one mind however. Bernard 
considered that the ten councillors who regularly attended 
Board meetings during September could be divided into "4 principal 
Managers, 2 Aides & Abettors, 3 Acquiescers overawed, 1 opposer 
and Protester [against the Whigs] through the whole. " 
17 We 
may speculate that these members were: Bowdoin, Tyler, Pitts, 
and Brattle; Erving and Danforth; and the rest from Gray, Flucker, 
Hubbard and Russell. 
The divisions between the radicals (with Brattle) and 
the other concillors became more apparent at the next Council 
meeting of October 5. Immediately before the meeting, 
some of the members met to consider what steps to take to end 
the deadlock over the quartering dispute. Two of them 
visited Bernard in the chamber with a proposal that if he could 
persuade Dalrymple to put one of the Halifax regiments in the 
Castle they would vote money for provisions-for the other stationed 
in the Common and Fanieul Hall. To all intents and purposes, 
these men were giving up the fight. Bernard refused to make a 
bargain, no doubt realising that there was no guarantee that 
the majority of the Council would agree to a compromise. 
During the conversation, Dalrymple entered the chamber and 
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listened intently. He insisted that his orders would 
not permit such a compromise, but intimated that his superior, 
General Gage, was already considering moving one of the regiments 
into the Castle if the situation in the town remained quiet 
and peaceful. 
This scrap of information about Gage was encouragement 
enough for the moderates, and at the Board meeting a motion was 
. 
tabled that the troops should be supplied. It passed by 
eight votes to five. (The division may have been Flucker, 
Russell, Hubbard, Danforth, Royall, Erving, Gray, Brattle or 
Powell against Bowdoin, Tyler, Pitts, Dexter, Brattle or Powell. ) 
18 
But it was a hollow victory for Bernard, for the Council 
refused to allocate funds in accordance with their decision. 
If a quartermaster was to be appointed, the members argued, 
then he must be prepared "to take the risk" that the General' 
Court might never reimburse him. The assembly had been 
in recess since June 30, and it was well within the Council's 
legislative-jurisdiction to make the allocation. However, 
in the past, the House had berated the Board for taking such 
action without consulting it (see Chapter Five, pp. 156-157 ). 
The moderates who held the balance of power at this meeting 
had no desire to enter into conflict with the Whigs in the 
House again, but at the same time were looking for a way to 
end the quartering dispute. The adoption of the proviso 
respecting the quartermaster's funds, however, defeated "the 
whole Purpose" of the vote agreeing that provisions should 
be made, and demonstrated once more how little Bernard could 
rely upon the moderates to carry the Council. 
19 
Bernard pressed on regardless. He called a Council 
meeting for October 17 and again tabled his proposal to convert 
the Manufactory House. Eleven councillors were present 
(radicals Bowdoin, Tyler, Dexter and Pitts; moderates Gray, 
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Erving and Danforth; Tories Flucker, Hubbard, Russell and 
Worthington ). The motion was hotly debated, and they sat 
from early morning until 8 p. m.: "The Whole was a Scene of 
Perversion, to avoid their doing any thing towards quartering 
the troops. " 20 
Bernard left nothing to chance and tried to intimidate 
the moderates and Tories into compliance. He invited General 
Gage (who had recently come to Boston) to the chamber to lend 
weight to his arguments. And he employed a tactic that 
he had been using since September 29: he "began to take minutes 
of what they said in answer to him, in order that he might represent 
it to [the] administration at home. " 
21 As was revealed 
by the publication of Bernard's letters to Hillsborough in 
1769, this was no idle threat. 
22 One Whig source reported 
that the councillors were "greatly disturbed" at Bernard's 
"illegal method". 
23 
" Bernard's cajolery succeeded in winning the co-operation 
of the moderates and Tories and provoking the radicals into an 
act of rash defiance. The opposition to Bernard was 
led by one member who declared that the Manufactory House was 
an unsuitable building for use as a barracks. According 
to Bernard, this was "so notoriously contrary to the Truth 
that some Gentlemen expressed their Concern that it should 
remain upon the Minutes. " (Whether he meant the Council 
records or the personal notes he was keeping is uncertain. ) 
In order to "induce" the Governor to consent to it being 
expunged from the record, a proposal was made in writing agreeing 
to the refurbishment of the Manufactory House, but on condition 
that it should be used only for those troops that could not 
be accommodated in Castle William. "This was violently 
24 
opposed, but was carried in the Affirmative 6 to 5. " 
Unfortunately, we cannot put names to the division. 
But it is clear that most of the non-radicals desired to put 
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an end to the quartering dispute. When the Council published a 
vindication of its conduct from the charges levelled in Bernard's 
letters to Hillsborough, it was admitted that some members had 
made a "bargain" with the Governor. 
25 Later, seven councillors 
who were present on October 17 appealed to Bernard to withdraw 
their names and their votes. Bernard refused. 
26 
Bernard encountered severe problems in acting upon the 
Council's advice. The Manufactory House was in the hands 
of one John Brown who had leased it from the province. 
Since March, the premises had been given over to the production 
of linen goods, a scheme sponsored by the town's merchants. 
When the troops first arrived in the town, the Whigs filled 
the building with people in order to prevent its conversion 
into a barracks. On October 19, Sheriff Greenleaf and 
Justice of the Peace Sylvester Gardiner were refused admittance 
by the squatters. Greenleaf returned the next day accompanied 
by Thomas Hutchinson and a small detachment of troops. 
He forced his way into the building but was repulsed, and had 
to be rescued by the soldiers. 
27 
Bernard then summoned the local Justices of the Peace 
to the Council chamber and instructed them to procure other 
billets for the troops. He explained to the Council that 
the civil magistrates were legally obliged to find accommodation 
for the troops. 28 But on October 20, the Justices informed 
Bernard of their refusal. Two of them told the Governor 
that they "had been much influenced by the [Council's] Argument 
that the Barracks at the Castle ought to have been filled &c. " 
Bernard drew their attention to an obscure reference in the 
Council minutes which stated that the troops from Halifax and 
Ireland (who had not yet arrived) could not all be accommodated 
in the Castle. The Justices reconsidered their decision, 
but again resolved not to comply with Bernard's order. 
On October 24, eight of the Justices submitted a deposition 
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arguing that it was the duty of the municipal officers - the 
constables and selectment - to quarter the troops. 
29 
In fact, little had been expected of the Justices. 
Andrew Oliver and Thomas Hutchinson had long maintained that Whig 
J. P. s would not act contrary to the interests of the protest 
movement, and they criticised Bernard for not recognising this 
fact. 30 But, said General Gage, in consulting with the 
Justices Bernard had simply tried the next alternative that 
was available to him in order to find quarters for the soldiers: 
it "was known before hand they would have no Effect, but it 
was proper to try and get the Laws enforced. " 
31 The 
Earl of Hillsborough . 
had been concerned for some time at the 
inability and unwillingness of the J. P. s to suppress riots or 
follow Bernard's directions. Already, he had recommended 
Bernard to appoint Justices "who will be zealous to support 
the law and the constitutional authority of Parliament, " and 
directed him to deliver a proclamation to the Boston J. P. s urging 
them to exert themselves in the maintenance of law and order. 
32 
Hillsborough's instructions and the refusal of the J. P. s 
to quarter the troops convinced Bernard of the need to make 
new appointments quickly. He decided on "adding new Justices 
to the present Bench,... [and] by engaging Gentlemen who are 
already in the Commissions to fix [upon] Persons who will 
undertake to Act. " This method got round the "absolutely 
impracticable" task of persuading a Whig dominated Council 
to annul the commissions of Whig J. P. s. In the past, Councils 
had rarely rejected governors' nominees. 
33 
The first appointment under Bernard's "reforming plan" 
was the Boston Tory James Murray. His name was submitted 
to the Council for approval on October 26. The nomination 
was received "very cooly" because Murray was "not popular". 
Defending Murray's Tory credentials, Bernard retorted, "if 
he/ 
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he had been I should not have named him. " The Council 
did not veto Murray's candidacy, for he "was allowed to be 
in every other respect a most unexceptionable Man. " 
34 
Bernard continued in his "reforming plan" (as it was 
called by the Whigs) and the Council did not block any of his 
nominees. A total of twenty-one Justices were appointed 
from October 1768 until August 1769 when Bernard left the 
province. Among them were six friends of government; 
This son John Bernard, Robert Auchmuty, Oliver Partridge, 
Gardner Chandler, Joshua Loring and William Coffin Jr. 
35 
However, the "reforming plan" did not meet with the success that 
Bernard had anticipated, because few-friends of government 
could be persuaded to accept commissions (see Appendix C ). 
The Justices of the Peace, the Council and the municipal 
officers of Boston had all obstructed Bernard's attempts to 
procure quarters for the troops in Boston. But from his 
point of view, the situation improved considerably toward the 
end of October. 
The rebellion against the "standing army" predicted by 
the radical propagandists never materialised. Army and 
naval officers were surprised by the peaceable condition of 
the town, in contrast to the pessimistic reports dispatched 
to Whitehall by the Commissioners of Customs and Governor Bernard. 
36 
According to John and Jonathan Amory, there never was any likeli- 
hood of armed resistance: 
We entertain no Thought of opposing the 
King's Troops. The People here retain 
their Loyalty & Affection for the King 
& dont even wish for an Independence 
but they are determind not to be Slaves 
of their fellow subjects in Great Britain.... 
W\e don't yet despair of Redress in a Legal 
Way. 37 
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As the anger of the townspeople subsided, Dalrymple and the 
army quartermasters had been unexpectedly successful in procuring 
private accommodation for the troops to the extent that the 
Manufactory House was now surplus to requirements. Bernard 
informed Gage that Dalrymple was doing "pretty well" in hiring 
buildings. 38 Just six days after the troops arrived, 
James Murray, for example, let his dwelling house and sugar 
house for use as barracks, at the cost of £15 per month. 
39 
James Forrest leased a house at £60 per annum which he had recently 
purchased for £50.40 The Whigs in the Boston Gazette accused 
such men of Toryism and disloyalty to their country. 
41 
But Whigs such as John Rowe and William Molineux also charged 
the army exorbitant prices for the use of their storehouses. 
42 
With the non-importation agreement drawn up in August 
due to take effect on January 1, traders and citizens welcomed 
the opportunity to make money from the soldiers and sailors 
in the town. Anne Hulton observed that shopkeepers made 
the troops "pay more handsomely for every thing, than they 
do their own people. " Bernard thought that the "People 
in general are very well satisfied with the Troops being here". 
The country farmers " who supply the Boston Markets wish there 
was more of them. " 
43 A year before, General Gage 
had drawn a comparison between the situation of the army in 
the American colonies with that in Scotland following the Jacobite 
Rebellion of 1745: the hostility of Jacobites and non-Jacobites 
to the army of occupation was assuaged by the fact that "Butchers, 
Bakers or other People... benefit by the Troops". 
44 This 
was also one aspect of the economics of Loyalism in Boston 
in 1768. 
Encouraged by the favourable change in circumstances, 
Bernard called the Board together for October 26. He 
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announced that he was now "at the End of my Tether" and appealed 
to the members to appoint civilian commissaries for the troops. 
After a "long debate", they "declined by Silence". Bernard 
declared that he himself would appoint one, and trusted that 
this initiative would put an end to the Quartering Controversy. 
45 
And so it did. But the fact that in this instance Bernard acted 
upon his own authority without the advice of the. Council, 
after spending four months trying to win the Board's approval 
for a request for troops and their assistance* 'in quartering the troops, 
demonstrated how little co-operation Bernard could now expect from 
the Council. James Bowdoin stepped into the political vacuum 
and was able to unite the moderates, radicals and a few Tories 
against Bernard. 
2. Bernard and the Alienation of the Moderates, October 
1768-August 1769. 
The political basis for co-operation among the moderate, radical 
and Tory councillors and their opposition to Bernard had been 
laid during the Stamp Act Crisis, and was resurrected from the 
moment the Council heard of Bernard's plans to make a request 
for troops. By the same token, as Bernard maintained, 
the moderates' and Tories' reluctance to cross the radicals 
within the Board and without also dated from 1765, and was again 
much in evidence during 1768-1769. Bernard too tried 
to coerce the Tories and moderates, but in the end these groups 
succumbed to ideological and political pressures exerted by 
the radical Whigs, not the Governor. 
Prior to the Council meetings of October 26, Bernard 
knew that some of the councillors were preparing an address 
to General Gage calling for the withdrawal of the troops. 
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He knew also that the Whigs were expecting to "get a great 
Number of Hands to it"; or, in other words, to attract support 
from the moderates. The address, therefore, would mend 
the divisions in the Whig ranks that Bernard had exposed when 
the Council agreed to allocate the Manufactory House for use 
as a barracks. Anxious to prevent this, Bernard resolved 
that on the afternoon of October 26 he would "move a Matter that 
would show their Disposition to pay a proper regard to His Majesty's 
Commands. " 46 
He informed the Board of a letter he had received from 
the Commissioners of Customs asking whether the Council would 
advise if it was safe for them to return to Boston from Castle 
William (where they had been since mid-June following the Liberty 
Riot ). Bernard used the letter to play for effect upon 
the ideological consciences of the Tories and moderates. 
The question was "very embarrassing" to the Council: "if they 
said No, they would Contradict all their Assertions that there 
was no Occasion for Troops to support the Civil power. " 
47 
In considering the request of the Commissionsers, the Tories 
and moderates were caught between their concern for the maintenance 
of governmental authority, which in this instance revolved 
around the safety of senior officials, and their fear of being 
proscribed as "enemies" to their country for aiding the Commiss- 
ioners and the Governor. 
Nineteen councillors were present to hear the question: 
radicals Bowdoin, Bradbury, Pitts, Dexter and Tyler; moderates 
Danforth, Royall, Erving, 5parhawk, Gray and White; 
Tories Lincoln, Hubbard, Flucker, Ropes, Paine and Russell; 
and two neutrals, John Hill and Gamaliel Bradford, who rarely 
attended Council meetings. The Council deliberated for 
two hours before they answered. Five members refused to 
give an answer because they "lived out of town"j and claimed 
that they were too ill-acquainted with the situation in Boston 
to tender meaningful advice. We can deduce that the five 
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were drawn from the following list of councillors who lived 
outside Boston: Dexter (from Dedham); Danforth and Russell 
(Charlestown); Hill (? ); Sparhawk (Kittery and Boston); Royall 
(Medford); Bradbury (York); Bradford (Duxbury); White (Taunton). 
Two councillors refused to answer the question without giving 
a reason and submitted depositions condemning the Commissioners 
for leaving the town in the first place. (The identities 
of these radicals are unknown. ) Thus, twelve councillors 
were left to decide the issue, and those twelve advised Bernard 
that the Commissioners could return to Boston without fearing 
for their safety. The twelve members almost certainly 
included the five Tories (Lincoln, Hubbard, Ropes, Paine and 
Flucker. ) 48 
But the Governor's victory was short-lived. The 
following day, fifteen councillors, including the Tories James 
Russell and Thomas Hubbard and the moderates Danforth, Sparhawk, 
Gray, Erving and White, signed the address to General Gage 
calling for the withdrawal of the troops from Boston. 
Only three of the councillors present at the meetings on the 
26th refused to subscribe: Timothy Paine, Thomas Flucker and 
Nathaniel Ropes. (Benjamin Lincoln had left Boston before 
the address was circulated among the members. ) 
The moderates and the two Tories subscribed to a radical 
address. Once again, it was maintained that there never 
was any reason for the troops to have been sent to Boston. 
The Liberty Riot was blamed on the Customs Commissioners and 
the customs officers who made the seizure of Hancock's vessel 
They acted "all in a manner unprecedented, and calculated to 
irritate,... in order to excite a riot, and furnish a plausible 
pretence for requesting Troops. " The Liberty Riot was 
but one instance in the "Concerted plan" contrived by government 




The address was delivered to Gage on the 28th. He 
received it politely and cooly, and reminded the councillors 
of what they already knew: that he had no authority to order 
the immediate withdrawal of the troops (though he was, of course, 
in a position to recommend that they be removed, and could 
commence the reduction of the forces stationed in Boston on 
his authority alone ), 
50 
Whigs viewed the bi-partisan support for the address as 
a defeat for the six councillors who had voted in favour of 
Bernard's proposal to convert the Manufactory House. 
51 
So too did Bernard: he rightly suspected that the radicals 
and Bowdoin had used the address as a plot (a casus belli 
even) to win over the moderates and one or two of the Tories 
in a pact against him. It was "not... drawn [up] for the 
Purposes they profess, but as a Vehicle to the Press for Popularity 
or Invective. " 
52 
Once more, Bernard attributed his failure to win the 
backing of the moderates and (renegade) Tories to their fear 
of proscription and desire to placate the radicals and the 
mobs. 
It would have been unaccountable how 
so many persons of so Respectable a Station 
and many of them of a Respectable Character 
could join in signing such. a paper if 
we did not Consider that in public & 
popular proceedings the Leaders are few, 
and the Followers many; and that people 
called upon to sign papers frequently 
Act without Consideration and sometimes 
against their Judgement. And the 
Virulence with which the Commissioners 
have been treated seems to be too violent 
to be the Effect of public Zeal only, 
without the Interference of private Animosity, 
which at present I cannot take upon me 
to Account for. I can only Condemn 
and lament such proceedings in a Body 
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for which I have always had and Still 
Retain a great Regard. 53 
Bernard informed Hillsborough that 
one Gentleman said, that he did not now 
enter the council chamber with that free 
mind that he used to have; But he liked 
to be concerned in Public Business, and 
did not chuse to quit his Place in the 
Council and-therefore must be content 
to hold it upon such Terms as he could. 
So fair a confession deserves not to 
be passed unnoticed. 54 
Such "trifling anecdotes... seem to me to be the best Method to 
55 
convey a true Idea of the present State of this Government. " 
Intimidated by anti-Toryism without the Council, the 
members had fallen prey to the machinations of James Bowdoin 
within. Bowdoin had all "along taken the Lead of the 
Council in their late extraordinary proceedings. " 
56 He 
was the "perpetual President, Chairman, Secretary, & Speaker 
57 
of... [the] Council". 
Encouraged by the unity of the moderates and the radicals 
and the "defection" of Hubbard and Russell, Bowdoin completed 
a draft'petition to the King calling for the removal of Governor 
Bernard. The Council, he asserted, had a "total Want of 
Confidence" in the Governor. It cannot be said for definite 
whether the draft petition was a piece of political opportunism 
which he hoped would be endorsed by the moderates and Hubbard 
and Russell, or whether it was the goal to which Bowdoin had 
been working throughout October. The draft was never laid 
before the Council, although it is likely that some members 
knew of its existence. Perhaps Bowdoin judged it inexpedient 
to test the durability of the radical-moderate alliance on 
such a contentious issue. 
58 
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The influence of Bowdoin over the other councillors must 
not be exaggerated. While he composed many documents and 
initiated many proposals, his schemes did not always meet with 
the approbation of the moderates who, in times of political 
quiet, inclined toward the Governor. Ultimately, Bowdoin's 
success depended upon the willingness of the moderates to join 
with the radicals. 
59 
Nor must we exaggerate the effects of anti-Toryism on 
the political behaviour of the moderates and renegade Tories. 
These men were not coerced into supporting the radicals; rather, 
anti-Toryism was one of many factors which deter^ed them from 
actively supporting the Governor. Increasingly, as the 
controversy over the arrival and quartering of the troops had 
shown, there were other more compelling, positive reasons why 
they should join the radicals in opposition to Bernard. 
From November 1768 until August 1769, Governor Bernard 
obtained little active assistance or co-operation from the 
Council. Council policy came to be formulated by a group 
of between'eight and eleven members who met regularly and separ- 
ately from the Governor. They styled themselves the "major 
part" of the Council (although they did not actually constitute 
a majority of members until August. 1769 Y. Most were members 
who lived in or near Boston: radicals Bowdoin, Tyler, Pitts 
and Dexter; moderates Danforth, Royall, Erving, Brattle and 
Gray; and the Tories Thomas Hubbard and James Russell. 
They claimed to act "individually, and not as a body", and 
convened under the presidency of Samuel Danforth. 
60 Bernard 
refused to countenance their irregular, unconstitutional proceedings 
from which he and the other members were excluded. (By 
the Charter of 1691, executive meetings of the Council were 
to be presided over by the Governor and legislative sessions 
were to be held only when he was present. ) At the same 
time, Bernard came to rely for informal advice more and more 
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upon his inner "cabinet" of Thomas Hutchinson, Andrew Oliver 
and Robert Auchmuty. 
61 
In late November, the "major part" of the Council drew 
up -petitions. to Parliament at meetings unattended by Governor 
Bernard. The petitions were the result of the members' 
plans laid in the summer when Bernard had refused to transmit 
any petition other than that to the King. The "major part" 
of the Council were now prepared to by-pass normal constitutional 
procedures in order to complete and send their petition against 
the Townshend Acts and other matters. For this reason, the 
Council had followed the House--s"example'and-appointed its own agent - 
William Bollan - to receive and dispatch all matters relating 
to Council business. Thus Bollan could forward their remonstr- 
ances direct to Parliament without the interference of Bernard. 
62 
The "major part"-of the Council justified their extraord- 
inary proceedings on the grounds that Bernard had misrepresented 
the intent and purpose of the Council's memorial to the King 
of July. Bowdoin made such a claim at a Council meeting 
in November, but the members did not care to support him. 
63 
But the readiness of the moderates, in particular, to endorse 
Bowdoin's claim in December was an indication of how quickly 
the radicals and moderates had cemented their alliance against 
Bernard. Samuel Danforth, the acting "President" of the 
"major part" of the Council, explained the situation to William 
Bollan: the petition to the King prepared by Bowdoin in July 
had asked that Americans be "relieved from the operation of 
the Several acts [including the Townshend Acts]", if it appeared 
to the King "that it is not for the benefit of Great Britain 
and her Colonies that any revenue should be drawn [Danforth's 
emphasis] from the Colonies. " By this paragraph, the Council 
"intended it should be understood to pray for the repeal" of 
the Townshend Acts. However, the "major part" of the Council 
claimed, not without good reason, that Bernard's covering letter 
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to Hillsborough enclosing the petition had "introduced" it 
in such a way as to make it doubtful 
from the word drawn whether the Council 
did not intend to acquiesce in the said 
acts and only prayed that the revenue 
arising from said acts might not be drawn 
from or sent out of America to Great 
Britain. 64 
To be sure, the petition had said nothing explicit about the rights 
of taxation. But that was not the issue in question in 
this particular document: in no uncertain terms it prayed for 
relief and repeal on economic grounds. In the Whigs' view, 
Bernard had implied that the Council was prepared to concede 
the right of direct taxation to Parliament. 
65 
The petitions to Parliament were written in "the most 
explicit manner" to avoid possible confusion, and called "expressly 
for the repeal of the several American acts. " 
66 As with 
Bowdoin's petition to the King, the supplications were moderate 
in tone and did not assert any radical doctrines, such as the 
the right of the colonists to exemption from all taxes. The 
petitions, like Bowdoin's, expressed the aspirations of moderates 
as well as radicals. William Bollan approved, thinking 
that they would further the Americans' cause for a repeal of 
the Townshend Acts: 
If your petition for a repeal, without 
mention of taxation does not imply a 
relinquishment of your claim, then their 
[Parliament's] repeal on the grounds 
of inexpediency would not imply a relinquishment 
of the power of taxing. 67 
Bernard acknowledged that the petitions contained "no positive 
Assertions of Right, but several Intimations of it too plain 
to be unnoticed. " 
68 
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Bernard and his inner cabinet underestimated the solidarity 
of the radical-moderate coalition in their opposition to the 
Governor and British policies. Thomas Whately was informed 
that the petitions were "no more than the doings of a part 
of the Council", although they were $tamped "By order of the Council" 
and transmitted to the Council's agent, William Bollan. 
But this was only "a low piece of cunning" intended to deceive 
the King, his ministers and Parliament. 
69 They were 
"calling themselves Members of the Council" whilst acting as 
"Individuals... each one for himself. " 
70 All this was 
true enough, but Bernard believed it was all an elaborate sham 
intended to cover up the fact that the divisions ran deep between 
the radical and moderate councillors. Bernard explained 
to Hillsborough that "there was a Dispute" on how the petitions 
to Parliament should be signed: whether as individuals or in 
the name of the Council with Danforth's signature as President 
attached. It was decided to use the appellation "In the 
name and by the Order of a Majority of the Council. S. 'Danforth". 
Danforth came to Bernard and confessed that "he was not present 
when this manner of signing was resolved upon; and when he 
sat his name to it, he did not set the word 'President' after 
his. " This confession, reasoned Bernard, demonstrated 
"how little free Agency there is in a Business of this kind. " 
Of the eight councillors who signed the petitions (Danforth, 
Royall, Erving, Bowdoin, Hubbard, Dexter, Tyler and Pitts), 
he could name two who regretted doing so and could "fix upon another 
who I dare say acquiesced rather than concurred. " 
71 
72 But (This last councillor may have been John Erving. ) 
Bernard's conclusions were contradicted by the councillors 
themselves, and four members who had taken no part in the 
preparation of the petitions willingly gave their approval 
to the scheme: Harrison Gray, William Brattle, Benjamin Lincoln 
and James Russell. 
73 Thus indeed, by December 1769, there 
was a majority of councillors in opposition to Bernard (twelve 
from/ 
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from twenty-two), a coalition of moderates, radicals and three 
Tories. 
The petitions to Parliament from the "major part" of 
the Council achieved little. That addressed to the House 
of Commons was presented on January 25,1769. The House ruled 
that it could not be read in the chamber. Moreover, Bollan 
reported that five days before, when the M. P. s were debating 
the House of Lords' resolutions against Massachusetts, the 
irregular proceedings of the Massachusetts councillors encouraged 
many M. P. s to vote for their adoption and call for harsher measures to 
be taken against the-colony. Council meetings at which 
Bernard did not preside or was not present were declared un- 
constitutional. 
74 
These developments were of "deepest 
75 
concern" to Danforth and the others who had composed the petitions. "" 
However, Bollan's pessimistic reports did not precipi- 
tate divisions within the radical-moderate coalition, for 
his letter contained news which demanded the unity of these 
councillors: it enclosed copies of Bernard's letters to. Shelburne 
and Hillsborough dated 1767-1768, in which the Governor arraigned 
and criticised the Council for its attitude and conduct during 
the previous three years, and recommended the appointment of 
a mandamus Council. 
76 
The appointment of councillors by a royal writ of, -mandamus 
would annul the House's prerogative of electing the Council, 
thereby removing one. soürce of the Whigs' power in the General 
Court. Bernard had three "Rules" for the proposed mandamus 
Council, which reflected his concerns of the previous years 
to establish a political base in the General Court. These 
"Rules" were written down in February 1769 and were not part 
of the correspondence published by the Whigs. However, 
for our purposes they help to clarify the comments on 
Council politics which Bernard made in those letters that were 
published. / 
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published. Firstly, he wanted the British government to 
restore to the Board the executive officers and judges left 
out by the House since 1766 (Thomas Hutchinson, Andrew Oliver, 
Edmund Trowbridge, Peter Oliver, Benjamim Lynde and John Cushing. ). 
Secondly, Bernard did not want only Tories and old friends on 
the Council, for he was prepared to consider the retention 
of the moderates. He wanted councillors who opposed "the 
late violent Measures" as well as those who "appear rather 
to have acquiesced than joined in it. " He named six other 
Tories: Benjamin Lincoln, Thomas Hubbard, James Russell, Thomas 
Flucker, Nathaniel-Ropes and Timothy Paine. Bernard did 
not name the moderates he had in mind, but suggested as an 
inducement to their co-operation only twelve of the usual twenty- 
eight councillors should be appointed at first. (This 
"would leave a Door open for such of the present Councillors as 
cannot well be admitted now, untill they have taken some Steps 
to reconcile themselves to Government. ") Finally, Bernard 
recommended that the Attorney-General, Jonathan Sewall,. 
at least one Commissioner of Customs (he may have envisaged 
Charles Paxton), and "some Gentlemen settled & estated in the 
Province" should also be appointed to the new Board. 
77 
Bernard's plans for constitutional reform did not win 
the backing of Tories and moderate Whigs in general. The 
publication of his letters in April awakened moderates to the 
fact that if the Governor's proposals were implemented they 
would not only diminish the power of the Whig party in the 
General Court, but would abrogate their constitutional rights 
enshrined in the Charter. Bernard indicated in a letter 
to John Pownall that his critics included friends of government: 
I must not conceal from you that amongst the 
Talkers upon this Occasion the Officers 
of the Crown & the Friends of Government 
are very loud; it is said that [the] 
Administration must never more expect 
faithful/ 
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faithful Accounts of the Proceedings 
of popular Assemblies for Governors 
& Commanders in America. 78 
Tory writers did not appear in the Governor's defence. 
79 
The event left Bernard di llusioned and broken: it "puts and End 
80 to all my Hopes of doing any good here. " 
The Board published a vindication of its conduct in 
the Boston Chronicle. It was a final testimony to the 
fact that Bernard had alienated councillors of all ideological 
persuasions, for it was signed by radicals, moderates, and 
the Tories Russell and Hubbard. Bernard's "great wim Gsic]" 
was the "destruction of our constitution", as was clear by 
his support for a mandamus Council. While not expressly 
requesting Bernard's dismissal from the Governorship, the 
councillors declared they had "lost all confidence" in him 
and doubted "whether his Majesty's service can be carried 
on with advantage during his administration. " 
81 
Incensed by the revelations in Bernard's letters, the 
Whigs in the House rounded on the Tory councillors at the May 
elections. Nathaniel Ropes, Thomas Flucker, John Worthington 
and Timothy Paine had refused to participate in the radical- 
moderate coalition against Bernard (although the first two 
had joined the Whigs in opposition during the controversy over 
the arrival and quartering of the troops) and were turned out 
by large majorities. According to Bernard, they were "the 
only Men of Disposition & Ability to serve the Crown left in 
it. " 82 In retaliation, Bernard vetoed no less than eleven 
of the councillors elected by the House, including William 
Brattle and James Böwdoin. 
83 
The refusal of the House- 
to choose replacements left Bernard with a weakened upper chamber 
consisting of sixteen of the normal twenty-eight councillors. 




In the space of twelve months, Bernard succeeded in alienating 
the moderate Whigs who held the balance of power on the Council. 
His failure to win their support can be attributed to the un- 
favourable and unpopular issues on which he had to court 
their allegiance. But these were, in part, of his own 
making: his insistence that troops were necessary to restore 
order when the Council argued that they were not (and this 
happened before Bernard knew that troops had been ordered to 
Boston by the British government, as well as after); and his 
determination to secure the Council's agreement to the troops 
being quartered in Boston. In both cases, the moderates, 
radicals and a few Tories joined forces against him. 
Co-operation between these groups in opposition to Bernard 
had occurred during the Stamp Act Crisis, and was fueled again A 
by their active opposition to the Townshend Acts. Bernard 
realised this, as he did too the fact that the Tory councillors 
were reluctant to declare their opposition to the others because 
of their fear of being proscribed as "enemies" to their country. 
In the end, Bernard's representations to the ministry of 
the Council's conduct and of the state of the province destroyed 
whatever lingering hopes he retained of being able to work 
with the Council; the publication of his letters to Hillsborough 
and Shelburne was a fatal blow to that relationship. 
3. Thomas Hutchinson and the Council, 1769-1770: A Prelude to 
Co-Operation. 
Relations between the Council and the Chief Magistrate 
improved considerably when Thomas Hutchinson took over as acting 
Governor in August 1769, for he was able to win the confidence 
of the moderates. 
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Between August 1769 and May 1770, the moderates on 
the Board gradually and slowly came to question aspects of 
the radical Whig leadership's political strategy. Harrison 
Gray and John Erving discountenanced the proceedings of the 
merchants in proscribing traders who broke the non-importation 
agreements, although the Council as a whole refused to agree 
with Hutchinson that the proscriptions were illegal. (See 
Chapter Seven, pp. 222-223. ) The Council also declined 
to join Hutchinson in taking action against the "Body" - an 
illegal assembly of merchants, shopkeepers, artisans and towns- 
people that made the decisions concerning the enforcement of 
the boycott. (See Chapter Eight, pp 246-248. ) The 
moderates Gray, Erving -and Danforth, and the former Tories 
Hubbard and Russell acquiesced in the popular fervour surrounding 
the Boston Massacre of March 1770, and were among those who 
advocated the immediate withdrawal of British troops from Boston 
against the wishes of Hutchinson. 
85 They moderates also 
approved a Council address supporting the House's opposition 
af- 
to the General Court meeting outside of Boston at Cambridge. vv 
By May, however, when passions over the Massacre had subdued, 
Hubbard, Gray and Isaac Royall were in favour of the House 
proceeding to business at Cambridge. Danforth and Erving 
were not, and sided with Bowdoin and the radicals in demanding 
that the Court be adjourned to Boston forthwith. 
67 
The May elections improved the standing of the moderates 
on the Council. "Three or four very moderate men" came 
in for the first time. Hutchinson placed great hopes in 
the new men - George Leonard Jr., James Gowen, James Humphreys 
and Stephen Hall - "who have kept but just enough in with the 
 
88 Enemies to Government to save their places [in the House]. 
On Bernard's advice, Hutchinson had intended to continue 
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the policy of negativing Whigs elected by the House who had 
never previously sat on the Council. 
89 But he desisted 
on the recommendation of his Tory friends. The day after 
the election, John Worthington and Timothy Ruggles visited Hutchinson 
and reasoned that while negativing had been "extremely proper" in 
the past he (a newly appointed Governor) should now avoid antag- 
onising the Whig-dominated House, given that there was no immediate 
prospect of the Tories being elected to the Board. Hutchinson 
was advised to work closely with "these new moderate" men. 
Andrew Oliver, Edmund. Trowbridge and Joseph Lee offered Hutchinson 
the same advice. Moreover, all the Tories Hutchinson con- 
sulted stated forthrightly that they would never again serve 
on the Council if elected by the House. 
90 Hutchinson, 
therefore, accepted the election of nine councillors who, at 
one time or another, had been negatived by Bernard. 
91 
He rejected the nominations of only two: John Hancock and 
Jerathmeel Bowers, who had been in the forefront of the opposition 
to Bernard in the lower chamber. 
Hutchinson's conciliatory strategy was not without its 
results, as over the summer the moderate councillors drifted 
away from the radicals. In June, when the Council "officiously" 
sent him an address (introduced by Bowdoin and seconded by 
Brattle) proclaiming its support for the House in its refusal 
to do business at Cambridge, Hutchinson reported that it was 
strongly opposed and disapproved of by 
some who were this year newly admitted 
in to the Council but it was carried 
by force of a particular connection which 
for several years past has been very 
unfavourable to the prerogative. 92 
The "particular connection" which Hutchinson referred to was 
James Bowdoin and his father-in-law John Erving, who carried 
the/ 
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the majority of members with them on this issue. 
93 
However, Harrison Gray, Thomas Hubbard and James Russell sided 
91L 
with the "new men" and spoke "very zealously" against the address. "" 
By August, the situation for Hutchinson had improved 
even further as many of the councillors became weary of 
the House's intransigence and feared retribution from the 
British government as a consequence. When he prorogued 
the General Court on the 3rd, Hutchinson reported to Hillsborough 
that he had received "strong assurances that the major part 
of the Council will be for complying another session. " 
95 
He crowed that during the recent Council debates he had been 
able to separate Bowdoin and Erving. Erving, though he 
still approved of the Whigs' non-importation policy, disapproved 
of its radical tendencies; he also was of the opinion that 
the House should resume its business. Moreover, Erving 
promised Hutchinson that he and his family would refrain from 
smuggling. 
96 
Hutchinson expected to make "good use of 
the division" between Bowdoin and Erving, 
97 
although, as we 
shall-see, Erving's political allegiance continued to waver. 
All but a few were "very friendly" toward Hutchinson. 
98 
"The Council are now with me", he wrote on September 28. 
Even William Brattle, who had sided with the radicals on many 
issues, now left Bowdoin's allegiance because of the prolonged 
quarrel' between the House and the Governor. ' Bowdoin, Pitts 
and their supporters, however, "still go all lengths which 
99 the pale lean Cassius [Samuel Adams] would have them. " 
We may deduce that by September 1770, Hutchinson had 
won the confidence, if not the active support, of approximately 
twelve councillors, while Bowdoin counted on the assistance 
of at least fourteen. 
100 
It was a remarkable achievement 
for Hutchinson, coming as it did just six months after the 
moderates and radicals had united against Francis Bernard. 
But/ 
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But we should not overestimate the extent of Hutchinson's success, 
for it coincided with a growing disencha rent with the radicals' 
protests among the moderates and with the defeat of the Whigs' 
non-importation movement. Moreover, Hutchinson's working 
relationship with the friends of government on the Board had yet 
to be tested in a contentious political issue. These men 
embraced a moderate Whiggism which was hostile to Hutchinson's 
Toryism, and their political behaviour was greatly dependant 
upon the political climate: in times of trouble they leaned 
towards the radicals, and when there was no major issue to 
disturb the peace of the province they could side with the 
royal governor. 
Evidence of the moderates' hostility to Toryism was given 
in October, when there was "some abatement" in their goodwill 
toward Hutchinson following the publication of Andrew Oliver's 
Tory pamphlet A Fair Account of the Late Unhappy Disturbances 
at Boston New England, in which Oliver commented on the Council's 
response to the Boston Massacre and gave his own recollections 
of the debates in the Council chamber of Tuesday, March 6, 
the day after the Massacre. Shortly after the Massacre, 
Oliver had written down his thoughts and reflections at the 
request of Thomas Hutchinson. This deposition, along with 
other indictments of the "rebellious" province, was taken to 
Britain ten days later by Commissioner John Robinson and eventually 
published on the recommendation of Francis Bernard. 
101 
Oliver alleged that after the Council and Lieutenant- 
Governor Hutchinson had received a committee from the Boston 
town meeting, who demanded the immediate withdrawal of the troops 
from the town, councillor Royal Tyler announced that men 
of the best characters among us, men of 
estates and men of religion... had formed 
their plan... to remove the troops out 
of/ 
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of the town, and after that the Commissioners 
[of Customs]; that it was impossible 
the troops should remain in town, that 
the people would come in from the neighbouring 
towns, and that there would be ten thousand 
men to effect the removal of the troops. 102 
"Divers other gentlemen adopted what Mr. Tyler had said by 
referring expressly to it", including James Russell and Samuel 
Dexter. Harrison Gray and John Erving acted on this report 
to urge Hutchinson to have Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple withdraw 
the troops to Castle William. Oliver also claimed that 
the Council minutes had been altered by the councillors. 
The original entry, prepared by Oliver as Secretary, although 
it "was allowed strictly to express the truth" was expunged 
because "it would not stand well on the Council records. " 
An amendment prepared by James Bowdoin was substituted. 
103 
In early October, a committee of councillors investigated 
Oliver's charges and took depositions from eight councillors 
and others who were present in the Council chamber on March 
6. They had to establish, firstly, whether the councillors 
named by Oliver apprehended a "preconcerted plan" on the part 
of the Whigs and country people to drive the troops and the 
Commissioners from Boston; and, secondly, why Oliver's report 
had been erased from the Council minutes. Danforth, Erving, 
Dexter, and the other deponents supported Tyler's claim that he 
hadsaid nothing that could substantiate Oliver's allegations. 
Tyler explained that after the Massacre he believed the "disposition 
of the people" was to get the troops withdrawn. Indeed, 
when cross-examined, Oliver admitted that he could not recall 
with certainty whether Tyler had actually mentioned a "preconcerted 
plan". The investigating committee concluded that Oliver 
had misunderstood Tyler's comments. But they viewed with 
gravity Oliver's discourse on the amendment to the Council 
records. An amendment had in fact been made, but the committee 
agreed/ 
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agreed with the deponents that an alteration had been necessary 
because Oliver's Tory-biased precis implied that the whole 
Council shared Tyler's (alleged) view that an uprising against 
the troops had been planned by the Whigs; they did not. 
104 
On October 24, the Council accepted unanimously four 
resolutions prepared by the investigating committee asserting 
that Oliver had been guilty of a breach of trust and that his 
conduct in publishing the allegations had brought dishonour 
on the Board. 
105 
The British government and George III 
took exception to the treatment of Oliver, and in October 1771, 
in accordance with royal instructions, the Council submissively 
entered in its records an approbation of Oliver's conduct. 
106 
****** 
From 1765 to 1768, when the Tories and moderates were 
in the majority, Governor Bernard's relationship with the Council 
oscillated between periods of co-operation and confrontation. 
He could not depend upon them taking collective action in support 
of his schemes or in opposition to the radicals within and 
without the Board. He had to court their allegiance on 
virtually every issue as it arose. Like the Tories and 
moderates in the House of Representatives, they refused to assist 
in the implementation of the Stamp Act and desired also the 
repeal of the Townshend Acts; nor, generally, would they take 
action that ran counter to the wishes of the Whig leadership. 
The irresolution and opposition of the Tory and moderate councillors 
can/ 
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can be attributed to the unpopularity of the issues on which 
Bernard tried to win their allegiance and to their fear of 
proscription by the Whigs. The Tories were severely reduced 
in numbers at each election to the Council until, by October 
1768, the radicals were able to forge an alliance with the 
moderates over the issue of quartering British troops in Boston. 
The publication of Bernard's letters to Shelburne and Hillsborough 
in April 1769 confirmed the alienation of the moderates and 
a few Tories from Bernard. Acting Governor Hutchinson, 
however, was able to achieve a working relationship with moderate 
councillors who became increasingly dissatisfied with the 
protests of the radicals in the House and their role in the 
non-importation controversy. As in the House, by 1770, 
the dissident moderates had replaced the Tories as the mainstay 
of any potential opposition movement to the radical-led Whig 
party. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: OPPOSITION TO THE NON-CONSUMPTION AND NON-IMPORTATION 
AGREEMENTS, 1767-1769. 
The Non-Consumption and Non-Importation Controversies 
of 1767-1770 exacerbated the ideological and political conflicts 
in Massacchusetts, principally in Boston and the eastern ports, 
for the success of the boycott depended heavily upon the merchants' 
and Whigs' capacities to enforce observance. Economic 
factors played a major part in determining the responses and 
behaviour of opponents of the boycott, but the proscription 
and intimidation of dissenters also heightened the resentment 
of Tories, dissident Whigs and hitherto non-aligned persons 
toward the Whig leadership. The friends of government 
were to the forefront of the opposition. However, 
as in the-. General Court, anti-Toryism and their in to hostility 
toward Governor Bernard to a large extent prevented them from 
attracting widespread support and acting collectively to defeat 
the boycott, 1767-1769. 
1. The Adoption of the Non-Consumption Agreement, 1767-1768. 
News of the enactment of the Townshend Duties reached Boston 
in the summer of 1767. On October 28, the town meeting 
voted to discourage the "excessive use of Foreign Superfluities", 
of particular items normally imported from the British Isles. 
Although/ 
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Although the articles on which the Duties were levied were 
omitted (tea, paper, glass and painter's colours), over thirty 
other products were listed which the town agreed not to consume 
1 
or use. 
Whig propagandists embraced Boston's policy with fervour. 
Articles appeared in the province newspapers urging citizens 
to cease drinking tea in addition to giving up the use of those 
items listed by the town. It was "high time" for the 
"middling people" to eschew the luxuries of the British way 
of life - or, es Sam Adams put it, they must cast off "the 
ornaments of the whore of Babylon. " 
2 
By the end of January 1768 more than twenty towns had 
adopted non-consumption agreements. On February 26, 
their representatives in the General Court voted that the people 
of the province should give preference to American manufactures 
over British. 
3 Boston assisted' five merchants to begin 
the manufacture of duck or sail cloth which was normally 
imported from Europe and was not banned by the boycott. 
4 
Whigs were confident in the capacity of Massachusetts to remain 
self-sufficient in many items. 
5 
It is difficult to determine the extent of opposition 
to the hon-consumption agreements, given that observance depended 
greatly upon personal preferences and commitment, and did not yet 
involve the proscription and coercion of dissenters. Not 
all towns approved the policy started by Boston. Harwich, 
for example, voted its non-concurrence and disapproval at a 
meeting of March 7.6 At the same time in Boston, wealthy 
Tories such as Robert Auchmuty and Benjamin Hallowell refused 
to give up the habits of a lifetime and continued to purchase 
British ready-made apparel from small traders. 
7 Francis 
Bernard reported that the "Principal Gentlemen" rejected non- 
consumption/ 
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consumption when it was first suggested, but later "consented 
to [it] under many Protestations". 
8 
The concurrence of many merchants was conditional. 
The Amorys, for instance, subscribed to the agreement because 
they believed that the boycott would last only a few months 
or at most a year, and would achieve the desired result of 
effecting the repeal of the Townshend Acts; whatever they lost 
in the short term by way of trade would be compensated by the 
long term economic and political bdnefits of defeating the 
Acts. At the same time, however, the Amorys and other 
wealthy wholesale merchants took advantage of the restrictions 
on consumption to stockpile British goods in preparation for 
the resumption of normal trading. 
9 Non-consumption (and non- 
importation) created an artificially low demand for British 
goods while the boycott lasted, but promised an artificially 
high demand for these items when the market returned to normal. 
Consequently, the wholesale merchants of Boston followed the 
example of their counterparts and rivals in Philadelphia and 
New York and ignored the pleas of the Whigs to desist importing. 
The self-interested response of some merchants gave the Whigs 
cause for concern; non-observance, they declared, was evidence 
of Toryism. 
10 
The radical Whigs also pressed for the adoption of a 
non-importation agreement, but without success. The proposal 
divided both the Whig leadership and the commercial community. 
James Otis was one who warned against it. 
11 Francis Bernard 
noted that less than half the traders in Boston were in favour 
during 1767.12 
Bernard drew Shelburne's attention to the ide 
^gical-political 
and socio-economic divisions within the commercial communities 
of the east coast which, as it soon became apparent, were 
preventing the adoption of non-importation. Men of "Property 
&/ 
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& Credit" were against any scheme that threatened to undermine 
the source of their prosperity. So too were the "Midling 
& little Traders" whose livelihood would be "ruined by it whilst 
Men of Great Property & credit might be benefited by it by 
becoming Monopolists. " 13 The friends of government in 
the Boston town meeting also spoke out against the proposal: 
"so many exerted themselves with Spirit that they silenced 
the Sons of Liberty. " 
14 When the Boston merchants made 
inquiries as to what towns would support a trading boycott, 
they received an indignant reply from the merchants of Salem, 
composed largely by the Tory Peter Frye, warning them of the 
dangers of extremism. 
15 By March 1768 opinions within 
Boston had changed sufficiently to allow the adoption of a 
non-importation agreement. 
2. Oppostion to the Adoption of Non-Importation. 1768. 
By March, the majority of Boston's merchants and Whigs 
were in favour of non-importation, and an agreement was approved. 
The boycott was to take effect on June 1 and continue for eighteen 
months unless Britain rep Baled the Townshend Duties. 
A clause in the agreement made the boycott conditional on the 
concurrence of New York. and Philadelphia. Plymouth, Marblehead 
and Salem drew up. similar agreements, and. by May, 1770 more 
that twenty-five towns and ports had agreed to observe restrictions 
in the trade and consumption of British goods. 
16 
The decision to adopt a policy of non-importation was 
based on two vital considerations. Firstly, that in spite 
of the prevailing divisions within the commercial communities 
and protest movement in general, it was expected that if all 
parties concerned were united in their opposition to the Townshend 
Acts the British government would feel moved to effect their 
repeal. / 
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repeal. A second more hard-headed assumption was that 
once British merchants and manufacturers were deprived of access 
to colonial markets through American merchants and shopkeepers 
they too would clamour for a repeal; 
1mhis they had done with 
the Stamp Act after the introduction of non-importation in 
1765.18 
Nevertheless, a substantial number of traders hesitated 
when it came to signing the agreement. One hundred and 
sixty-six firms were consulted by the merchants' committee 
who circulated the subscription form. At first, 103 signed 
it outright; 29 agreed to sign "if it be generall"; 8 did not 
subscribe, but promised to observe the conditions of the agree- 
ment; 14 firms refused to sign (Henry Laughton, Jonathan Simpson, 
Lewis Deblois, Cox & Berry, Richard Clarke & Son, James Perkins, 
Thomas and Elisha Hutchinson, Rufus Green, Theophilus Lillie, 
John Taylor, John Mein, Thomas Hubbard and Whigs William Dennie 
and James Jackson. )19 Thus, over 30 per cent of firms 
consulted by the committee did not subscribe to the agreement 
or did so by stipulating that their observance depended upon 
certain conditions. This response revealed how widespread 
the uncertainty was concerning the advantages of pursuing 
a policy of non-importation, if not the actual extent of the 
opposition to the March agreement, for by March 9, the booksellers 
Cox and'Berry along-with 16 of the 29 recalcitrants 
had agreed to support the boycott. 
20 Six of the 14 
refusers followed suit later. 
21 
Governor Bernard attributed the success of the radicals 
and Whig merchants in securing the adoption of the agreement 
and the signatures of the dissenters to the effectiveness of 
their intimidatory tactics. Non-importation, he maintained, 
went "against the Sense of an undoubted Majority, of both Numbers, 
Property and Weight. " After many refused to sign when 
the agreement was first circulated, 
all/ 
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all Engines were set to work to encrease 
the Subscription; some were told they 
would be obnoxious to the lower sort 
of People; others were threatned with 
the Resentment of the higher; some were 
made afraid for their Persons and Houses, 
others for their Trade and Credit. 
The merchants' "Intercourses and Connections with the Politicians, 
and the Fear of opposing the'Stream of the People" silenced the 
opponents of non-importation. Yet Bernard was hopeful 
that "there are still remaining enough of the most respectable 
Merchants in Town, Non-Subscribers, to defeat this Scheme, 
even if the Subscribers were to keep their Promise [to observe 
trading restrictions]. " 
22 
Particularly encouraging for Bernard was the refusal 
of many merchants to abide by the request to desist from ordering 
goods from Britain until the boycott took effect in June. 
He informed the Earl of Hillsborough that 
the quantity of goods which have been 
lately order'd from Great Britain... has 
exceeded and Anticipated the Usual 
Quantities and times in order to provide 
for an Abstinence from Importation for 
a year. This is professed by some, 
and is undoubtedly true of others who 
are too attentive to their own Interest 
to desist from Importation. 23 
Boston's traders were still divided when, in August, it 
was decided to make the embargo unilateral without waiting 
for New York and Philadelphia to join in. The boycott 
was to run from January 1,1769 to January 1,1770, but traders 
were asked to forego sending orders for British goods during 
the five months before the new agreement came into effect. 
Sixty of the sixty-two merchants present at a meeting on the 
1st approved the proposed amendments. 
24 However, at sub- 
sequent meetings there were sufficient numbers of dissenters 
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to delay their adoption. Thirty-five merchants refused 
either to subscribe to the new articles or observe them- 
Forty others also refused to sign, although they promised to 
observe the agreement. 
25 But by August 10, after the 
merchants had accepted the amendments, 211 traders had signed 
the agreement and only 16 stood out. 
26 
Bernard concluded that the dissenters from the new articles 
were only "brought to Reason by Mob Law" and their fear of 
being proscribed as ""Tories". He told Hillsborough that 
if they were to succeed in defeating the boycott they must 
be "Sufficiently Secured from Mobs. " 27 
How accurate was Bernard's assessment of the nature of 
the opposition to non-importation? 
As he correctly pointed out, non-importation was a threat to 
the unity of the commercial community and the protest movement. 
The agreements wanted traders who normally imported or sold 
British goods to abandon the source of their livelihood and 
prosperity, albeit temporarily. Thus, in making a decision 
to support the boycott, traders had to weigh carefully the 
short term economic losses against the long term political 
and economic benefits of overturning the Townshend programme. 
The radicals, of course, were quick to remind them that non- 
importation and the co-operation between classes and interest 
groups had been instrumental in defeating the Stamp Act. 
28 
But coercion as well as persuasion was used by the Whigs and 
merchants to encourage conformity and observance. As will 
be shown, the treatment of dissenters and breakers of the agreement 
was an extension of the Whigs' anti-Tory campaigns of 1765- 
1767. The fear of proscription and intimidation, which 
Bernard believed was the main reason for the failure of dissenters 
to attract widespread support, did in no small measure deter 
traders from speaking out against non-importation. 
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Secondly, Bernard was also right in stating that the 
opponents of non-importation (subscribers and non-subscribers) 
included some of "the most respectable Merchants in Town" - 
such as Thomas Amory and Nicholas Boylston. Wealthy merchants 
feared that policy decisions mainly concerning the town's traders 
were being too much influenced by the opinions of radical Whig 
politicians and middle class shopkeepers, artisans and towns- 
people. Indeed, the job of enforcing the boycott soon 
came under the control of these groups who resolutely demanded the 
proscription of "well-disposed" merchants who broke the agree- 
ments. At the same time, these groups gained a greater 
say in the merchants' proceedings. Bernard was wrong, 
however, if he believed that the "well-disposed" were all on 
one side; John and Jonathan Amory and Thomas' Boylston 
supported the introduction of non-importation, as did John 
Hancock and William Phillips. Their doubts of being under- 
mined by their rivals in New York and Philadelphia were partially 
assuaged when the former adopted non-importation in the autumn 
and the latter in February 1769.29 They expected that 
Britain would repeal the Townshend Acts, and'were prepared 
to endure a trade embargo for a short while. Nonetheless, 
some, such as. the Amorys, fully expected a return to normal trading 
when the August agreement expired on January 1,1770, even 
if the Acts had not been repealed. 
30 When the radicals 
in the Boston town meeting, led by Sam Adams and merchants 
such as William Phillips, began a campaign to have 
the boycott extended indefinitely until not only the Townshend 
Acts had been overturned but other obnoxious revenue acts 
had been repealed also, the Amorys led a group of dissident 
moderates and Tories in trying to end non-importation. 
Bernard surely could not have foreseen this, and made 
a major error in evaluating the strength and political quality 
of the opposition in 1767-1768 that had repercussions for his 
handling/ 
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handling of the controversy. He expected that the majority 
of Tory and moderate Whig merchants and previously uncommitted 
traders would take collective action to rescind the August 
agreement on the basis of their antipathy to the radicals, their 
opposition to the-proscriptions, and their resentment of restrictions 
on trade. He placed his trust in the success of a spontaneous 
demonstration of strength and feeling 'against the Whig-merchant 
leadership by these groups. Only four of the fourteen 
firms who refused to sign the March agreement had proven records 
of Toryism or opposition to the Whigs (Thomas Hubbard, the 
Hutchinson, Richard Clarke and John Mein ). He could not 
have known that hitherto inconspicuous traders such as Theophilus 
Lillie would stand against the Whig-merchant leadership, or that 
the Amorys and other moderates who supported the adoption of 
non-importation would soon turn against it. 
3. Opposition to the Enforcement of the Agreement, 1768-1769. 
Opposition to the enforcement of the August agreement 
came principally from persistent importers, among them 
a few Tories and moderate Whig merchants. Both groups became 
increasingly alarmed at the economic effects of the boycott 
and the radical tendencies of the Whig-merchant leadership 
in enforcing it. In effect, they rejected the Whig- 
imposed authority that tried to determine the circumstances 
and conditions of their political and economic lives. 
This was the ideological basis of the opposition "movement" 
that Bernard believed already existed, but which came 
closer into view during the latter part of 1768 and 1769. 
Trading restrictions applied not only to those persons 
who signed the non-impartation agreement, but to all merchants, 
shopkeeperst! 
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shopkeepers and factors who were involved in commerce 
with Britain. The Boston merchants advocated the 
economic isolation of traders who deliberately ignored 
them. In March, citizens and traders alike were exhorted 
"to give a Constant Preference to such Persons as shall 
subscribe to these Resolutions" when they purchased goods 
from a store. 
31 The August agreement recommended 
that all persons should refrain from dealing with those 
traders who did not subscribe, or continued to import or 
sell listed goods while the boycott lasted. Merchants, 
as has already been mentioned, were required to desist 
placing orders for banned goods before the boycott came 
into force. 32 These measures served to ostracise 
the dissenters from Boston's commercial community, while 
at the same time they were an attempt to ensure that importers 
and non-subscribers could not take advantage of the temporary 
withdrawal of the Whig traders from the market in British 
goods. 
By the spring of 1769, additional measures were 
being pursued to compel observance. Handbills were 
circulated through Boston identifying the principal importers: 
Jonathan Simpson; John Taylor; Samuel Fletcher; William Jackson; 
Nathaniel Rogers; Thomas and Elisha Hutchinson, the Lieutenant- 
Governor's sons; Theophilus Lillie; Scottish merchants 
James and Robert Selkri4, and James and Patrick McMasters. 
The radical "Journal of the Times" defended the proscription 
of these importers. It was "disgraceful but necessary", 
for it would 
lead them to reflect on the baseness of 
their crime.... When their shops are deserted, 
and they feel their fortunes miserably 
impaired by prosecuting the plan of 
purblind avarice; when their guilty 
consciences have rendered this life 
insupportable; may they seriously attend 
to the consequences of another. 33 
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The Whigs and merchants held back from publishing the 
names of importers in the Boston newspapers for fear of alienating 
the moderates, 
34 but they "were resolutely bent upon pursuing 
every legal Method to guard against, and defeat any Attempts 
that may be made, by those who are inimical to us, to render 
the. ý. 
(boycott] ineffectual. " In July, a committee of 
twelve merchants circulated a subscription paper among the 
people of Boston urging them to desist from buying goods from 
importers or shopkeepers selling banned goods. Recipients 
of such articles were asked to place them in a common store 
designated by the merchants'-committee until such time as they 
would be allowed to use or sell them. 
35 In August, another 
committee was set up to restrict the sale of listed goods at 
public auctions. 
36 
Very few merchants and shopkeepers were prepared to run 
the risk of being proscribed. By the end of July, all but 
twelve firms in Boston had signed the agreement: Rogers, Mein, Lillie, 
the McMasters, the Hutchinsons, the Selkrigs, Jackson, Fletcher, 
Taylor, Simpson, Clarke, and John Bernard. 
In early August, Simpson, Jackson, Fletcher, Taylor and the Selkrigs 
acceded to the committee's demands and surrendered their imported 
goods to the common store. 
37 
Theophilus Lillie tried to reach a compromise with the 
committee of inspection appointed by the merchants. On 
August 4, Lillie, Fletcher and Taylor signed a paper promising 
not to order any more goods before January 1. Lillie, 
however, did not sign the agreement, and, because of which, 
the merchants' meeting refused to accept Lillie's paper. 
(Thomas Boylston was one merchant who defended the committee's 
decision to treat with Lillie, for which, said Lillie, he "was 
treated in such a manner as I dare say he thought he did not 
deserve. ") Lillie refused to obey the summons for him 
to attend the merchants' meeting, and on August 7 the merchants 
voted that his name should continue to be published in the 
handbills. 38 
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The Tory merchant Nathaniel Rogers refused to surrender his 
goods to a high-ranking committee of John Hancock, Henderson 
Inches and William Phillips and challenged the basis of their 
authority. He "asked them by what Law they had any thing 
to do with the disposition of his goods. They all replied 
the Law of Necessity. " Rogers demanded payment for his 
goods if he was to give them up, but this was refused. 
After "a long conversation gave him such apprehensions of 
consequences from his refusal", he gave his word not to open 
or sell the articles until January 1. Rogers' cousins, 
Thomas and Elisha Hutchinson, also agreed not to sell their 
goods but did not sign the agreement. "They had determined 
to hold until their persons were in danger. " Their submission, 
thought their father, would prove "fatal" to their business. 
39 
More goods arrived for the importers in the first two 
weeks of August, and subscriptions and handbills continued 
to be circulated through the town urging people to boycott 
their shops. On August 11, it was decided for the first 
time to publish the names of importers in the Boston newspapers. 
This brought the message of proscription to the attention 
of the province as a whole. Three days later, the names 
of the seven non-subscribing importers were printed on the 
front page of the Boston Gazette (Richard Clarke, John Bernard, 
Nathaniel Rogers, the McMasters, the Hutchinsons, John Mein 
and Theophilus Lillie. ) 
40 
The importers were vilified as Tories and "enemies" v 
to their country, a group of self-interested men with no concern 
for the welfare of the commonwealth. They 
ungratefully take an Advantage of those 
who are sacrificing their private Interest 
to the good of the Public; and at the 
same Time,... they discover a total Disregard 
to the Liberty and Welfare of their Country, 
manifest/ 
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manifest an unwarrantable, base and sordid 
Attachment to themselves, and their own 
private Concerns. 41 
Importers, said one Whig , would soon learn that the "body 
of the community, whose safety and protection is the only rational 
standard of obedience, have an indefensible [sic] right to 
assert and establish this prerogative of the people. " 
42 
Like the Tories, said another, they had "counteracted the 
UNITED SENTIMENTS" of the colonies. 
43 
Acting Governor Thomas Hutchinson and the Tories were 
outraged by the hypocrisy of the merchants and Whigs in pros- 
cribing the importers. Hutchinson informed Thomas Pownall 
that while they discourse upon natural rights "they themselves 
in the most arbitrary manner deprive others of these supposed 
fundamental rights. " 
44 Importers had to "bear insults 
in the newspapers and as they pass in the streets... and then 
they comply and their compliance is published by the Junto 
as their voluntary [action]. " He compared this behaviour 
to that of a highwayman robbing travellers. 
45 Nathaniel 
Coffin echoed Hutchinson's concern that the Whig-merchant 
leadership were denying the importers and dissenters the 
de facto protection of the law: 
Let any man be published in the publick 
prints by them as an Enemy to the Privileges 
4 
& Rights of his Country, and he is immediately 
avoided as a Leper, an outlawed Virginia 
Slave is not in a worse Condition. 
Every one thinks he has a right to knok 
[sic] him on the head. 46 
Hutchinson was disappointed that opposition to the boycott did 
not also come from within the ranks of the subscribers, now 
that threats, economic intimidation and proscriptions were 
being used to subdue potential resistance. He informed 
Francis Bernard, now in England, that "the people I had most 
dependance/ 
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dependance upon have either subscribed or given their words not 
to import. " When he asked the moderate Joseph Green "why 
he did not oppose measures so subversive of all government 
he replied that he and many others were well enough inclined 
to do it but they could make no judgment what was intended 
in England. " 47 Convinced that the repeal of the Townshend 
Acts would follow on from the adoption of non-importation, 
at this stage, the moderates were prepared to acquiesce in the 
mistreatment of the importers. Moreover, if the importers 
were allowed to continue trading it would damage the interests 
of those who observed the agreement. 
More goods arrived for the importers (and other merchants) 
in the first week of October. But again the harsh economic 
realities of proscription compelled the importers to capitulate 
to the demands of the merchants' committees. Hutchinson 
observed that they "are as effectually punished by losing their 
custom as if large fines had been imposed by legal authority. " 
48 
His sons 
do what little business they are able to 
do by stealth like smugglers and are 
forced to sell every thing under the 
market price as no body will run the 
risque of trading with them, unless they 
can make considerable profit.... 
If nothing is done they must either quit 
business or do as every body else does. 49 
Richard Clarke and his sons were "so distress'd" at the publication 
of the firm's name in the Boston Gazette "that they came to 
the Committee, begging that something might be publish'd to 
take off the odium cast upon them. " Their names weye removed 
from the list, in return for which they handed over to the 
merchants their consignment of recently arrived goods. 
50 
Clarke explained to Hutchinson the reason for his submission: 
He/ 
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He said his refusal must have hurt him 
and his sons so much in their business 
that he could by no means bear the loss 
and submitted when his judgment was as 
much against the measure as ever. 51 
Thomas Hutchinson Jr. and his brother Elisha met with the 
merchants' committee on the morning of October 4. They 
did not sign the agreement, but "declared their intention was 
in every respect to conform to the present agreement, without 
reserve. " However, by doing this they "did not mean to 
bind themselves to any future agreement the Merchants should 
come into. " The Hutchinsons and Clarkes pressed the committee 
to name a date when trading in British goods might be resumed. 
The committee would not be drawn, but allowed the Clarkes and 
Hutchinsons to lock up their goods in their own stores. 
52 
Theophilus Lillie agreed to do the same. Two. traders 
who had received imported goods for the first time, however, 
(Patrick Smith and Byfield Lyde) were persuaded to return 
them to Britain. 53 
Nicholas Boylston informed the town meeting that after- 
noon of the Hutchinsons' willingness "to treat with them". 
54 
But the radicals and the pro-Whig majority urged that sanctions 
be taken against all the importers who, 'like the Hutchinsons, 
had not signed the agreement. Sam Adams believed that 
they should be "Stigmatiz'd & declar'd Enemys of the Country" 
by the town as well the merchants; their names should be written 
into the town records as a warning to others. A few protested 
that the importers and non-subscribers had given evidence of 
their readiness to comply, and that further proscriptions were 
unnecessary. But Adams and another radical, Benjamin Kent, 
asserted that they were justified in view of the fact that 
in the past year the Hutchinsons' alone had imported nearly 
two hundred chests of tea in an effort to undercut merchants 
who had subscribed to the agreement. (The radicals ignored 
the pleas of the importers that they had been forced to reduce 
the/ 
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the price of tea to unprofitable levels. ) 
55 The Whigs won 
the vote, and six importers who had not signed the agreement 
were castigated for preferring "their little private advantage 
to the common Interest of all the colonies" (the Hutchinsons, 
the McMasters, Theophilus Lillie, John Mein, John Bernard 
and Nathaniel Rogers. ) 
56 
By October 9, only three traders held out, unwilling to 
sign the agreement or. surrender their goods to the 
merchants' committees (John Mein, the McMasters and John Bernard. ) 
They were determined to resist as long as they could. 
John Bernard pledged to "refuse to comply till it comes to 
the last extremity but will not finally refuse if he finds 
his person must suffer. " 
57 
James McMasters was "highly 
insolent" to the committee that visited him and told the merchants 
to "do as they pleased". The McMasters, who had only 
come to Boston between 1765 aad 1768, were unwilling to cease 
what was a profitable business importing British goods. 
They claimed to have imported £15,000 worth of British goods 
each year from 1769 to 1774.58 
Nathaniel Rogers requested legal protection from the 
provincial government, but there was little that Thomas Hutchinson 
could do to assist the importers in their struggle against 
the Whigs and merchants. Hutchinson doubted whether Rogers 
would be able to find a Justice of the Peace willing to act 
upon his testimony, and thought that he "will not (be] able 
to hold out unless he quits the town. " 
The proscription of the importers demonstrated the impotency 
of the provincial government's authority over the Whigs, merchants 
and Boston town meeting. Hutchinson had called the Council 
together on October 4 "to discountance" [sic] the proceedings 
taken in the town meeting against the six importers. But he 
could notobtain a quorum of members, for most had left the 
town/ 
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town following an outbreak of smallpox. However, Hutchinson 
discovered that at least three councillors (Erving, Tyler 
and Pitts) attended the town meeting of that day. 
59 
His investigations revealed that John Erving "disapproves of 
what they did" to the importers. 60 Harrison Gray was 
another moderate who did not support the radicals over the 
proscriptions: "he speaks freely against these proceedings. " 
61 
While the Council took no action to prevent the proscriptions, 
' the moderate members privately declared their opposition to 
the "unwarrantable" proceedings in the town meeting. 
62 
With the Council's refusal to act against the town meeting, 
Hutchinson and the importers looked to Britain to take action 
against those who engineered the proscriptions. Hutchinson 
suggested to Bernard that "a number of those people" who attended 
the town meeting on October 4, including Sam Adams, should 
be disqualified from holding provincial or municipal offices 
in the future; only an act of Parliament could do this. 
63 
Richard Clarke agreed, and informed Hutchinson that if "the 
, Ring Leaders had been punished by being rendered for ever incapable 
of bringing an Action in any of the Kings Courts it would 
effectually put a stop to the mischief... though such a punishment 
may appear severe. " 
64 
The merchants and Whigs of Salem were also active against 
importers and dissenters from their town's agreement. 
On January 19,1769, the Boston merchants-wrote Peter Frye, 
the Tory chairman of the Salem merchants'committee, expressing 
their concern at rumours that the merchants of Salem, Marblehead 
and Cape Ann were breaking their agreements. 
65 Their 
suspicions were again aroused when consignments of goods arrived 
for three of Salem's principal merchants and Tories: Benjamin 
Pickman, Francis Cabot and Frye. The total value of the 
goods was small - £350 - and only those delivered to Frye were 
actually affected by the boycott. Moreover, all three 
consignments/ 
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consignments were the results of orders placed before January 
1 when the boycott took effect. Nonetheless, the Whigs made 
political capital from 
ncident. The Boston Gazette published 
the cargo manifests to refute the "industriously propagated" 
rumours that violations of the agreement were commonplace, when 
they were in fact isolated and rare. 
66 
But action against the three importers soon followed, 
thus demonstrating the connection between anti-Toryism and 
the proscription of importers. In June, notice was given 
to townspeople to boycott the shops of importers or those supplied 
with goods by the Boston importers. 
67 Those who orchestrated 
the campaign against Frye, Cabot and Pickman could not have 
forgotten that Frye was a "rescinder" and that Pickman and Cabot 
had subscribed to the Tory petition supporting his action. 
68 
Recently, Pickman had led a committee of Essex County merchants 
in an investigation into the practices of customs officers, but to 
the dismay of the Whigs could find "no threat to American liberties". 
69 
More serious violations of the boycott occurred in Marblehead. 
Infringements of the the local merchants' agreement were common- 
place 1768-1770, despite the fact that the staple materials 
of the port's fishing industry - hooks and lines from Britain - 
were exempt from the embargo. All bar four of the toWf's 
merchants subscribed to the agreement of 1768. But two 
members of the committee which had drawn up the articles, Robert 
Hooper and Jeremiah Lee, imported banned goods on three and 
four occasions respectively. Other importers included 
three members of the pro-Whig Orne family, the radical Elbridge 
Gerry (whose family were reluctant to sign the agreement), 
70 
and the friends of government Jacob Fowle and John Pederick. 
In August 1769, the Tory Thomas Robie received the largest consign- 
ment of goods he ever had in one season. 
71 
Faced with such blatant disregard for the agreement, 
the/ 
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the Marblehead merchants elected a committee of inspection on 
October 17. The committee sprung into action in November 
when the brig St. Paul brought in goods for Jacob Fowle & Son, 
Israel Forster, John Sparhawk and Thomas Robie. A flurry 
of letters appeared in the Essex Gazette in which the importers 
claimed that they were not beholden to the dictates of the 
committee, and would not surrender their goods because they 
had not signed the non-importation agreement. But by 
December 29, the importers had conceded to the committee's 
demands. 72 On January 13, the Marblehead merchants proscribed 
the importers for their defiance and Toryism , of "blindly 
preferring the chains of slavery, to our most valuable inheritance 
ENGLISH LIBERTY. " 73 Thomas Robie complained to Richard 
Clarke that the committee of inspection was "assiduous in detect[ing] 
& removing any trifling package, as of [meaning if] all the 
Evils of Pandora's Box were inclos'd. " 
74 
By the autumn of 1769, Thomas Hutchinson could see that importers 
and non-subscribers to the non-importation agreements were 
prepared to resist the dictates of the Whigs'and merchants' 
committees. But if they were to succeed in defeating 
the boycott, they needed to attract the support of other merchants 
and shopkeepers. This seemed unlikely, because the 
Grafton administration had done nothing to curb the power of 
the radicals and merchants, and because the provincial government 
was powerless to prevent the proscription of the importers 
and dissenters, which, as Hutchinson believed, deterred opponents 
of the boycott from acting against the Whigs and merchants. However, 
the cause of the importers was greatly assisted by the efforts 
of the printer and publisher John Mein. 
In the Boston Chronicle for June 22-26, John Mein 
75 
claimed that since January 1,190 different traders, many of 
whom had subscribed to the non-importation agreements, had 
broken the embargo on British goods. With this evidence, 
taken/ 
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taken from customs house records, Mein argued that the agree- 
ments were being generally ignored, and refuted the claims 
of the merchants made in April that only six or seven traders 
were involved. He did not intend to publish the names 
of the importers "as it may excite great uneasiness in the 
province, and it is a most inhuman and invidious measure. " 
76 
But when Mein's and the other importers' names were listed in the 
Boston Gazette, he retaliated by publishing the names of all 
the importers and the manifests of their cargoes, beginning 
in the Boston Chronicle of August 14-17. In the next eighteen 
months, Mein was to list the names of 285 Boston traders and 
56 from other ports in Massachusetts who imported British goods 
after August, 1768, when the Boston agreement was drawn up. 
He ridiculed the "Well-Disposed" Whig merchants, including 
John Hancock, John Rowe and William Phillips, whose names 
appeared on his lists, for their "parade of patriotism" and 
"pretence of rescuing the endangered liberties of their countrymen. " 
The real purpose of the boycott, he maintained, was to allow 
the rich wholesale merchants who stockpiled British goods the 
opportunity of squeezing out of the market their smaller 
competitors, shopkeepers like himself who imported goods directly 
from Britain instead of purchasing them from wholesale merchants. 
The violations occurred within the course of trading per- 
mitted and controlled by the agreements, but they are not readily 
indicative of dissenting ideological opinions or divisions 
within the Whig movement or commercial communities. The 
overwhelming majority of Boston's importers did not sign the 
first non-importation agreement of March 1768, or agree to 
observe its restrictions or promise to sign; only 17.54 per 
cent (50 of 285) did so. 
78 
The violations, however, occurred 
when the August agreement was in force, and it is more than 
likely that most of the importers listed by Mein would have 
been among the 211 subscribers. The frequency with which imp- 
orters received goods suggests that for 80 per cent the violation 
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227 
TABLE 5: FREQUENCY OF VIOLATIONS OF BOSTON'S NON-IMPORTATION 
AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 1768,1768-1770. 
Violations 1 2-3 4-5 6-7 Over 7 
Importers 178 64 21 13 7 =283* [285] 
Percentage of 
Importers 62.46 22.46 7.37 4.56 2.46 =100 [of 2851 
*Excluding figures for violations by Samuel Barrett and Jonathan 
Barrett & Co. for whom none were available. 
Source: Boston Chronicle, June 1769-June 1770. 
TABLE 6: ESTIMATED VALUES OF TOTAL COMMODITY IMPORTS INTO NEW 
ENGLAND, 1768-1772 (THOUSANDS OF POUNDS STERLING. ) 
Region 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 
Great Brit- 
ain & 
Ireland 441 228 457 1,446 912 
West Indies 258 362 350 322 403 
Southern 
Europe 15 26 14 15 20 
Africa 
(slaves only) ? 0.225 000 
Total 714 616.225 821 1,783 1,335 
Source: James F Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, 
and the Economic Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge, 1979), 
pp. 104,113,143. 
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of the agreement was unintentional, probably the result of negli- 
gence in cancelling orders or of being unable to countermand 
orders already dispatched from Britain. Sixty-two per 
cent of importers were guilty of single infringements only 
(see Table 5. ). These, as historian John Tyler has pointed 
out, were considered to be minor offences by the merchants' 
committees. It was a matter of interpretation between 
Mein and the merchants as to what constituted an infraction 
of the boycott. The committees were inclined to overlook 
small quantities of contraband brought in by Whig merchants. 
79 
The importation of British goods into Boston and Massachusetts did 
not lessen the overall effect of the boycott on British-colonial 
commerce. The value of British. imports. into New England I- 
in 1769 was down 49 per cent from the total in 1768 (see Table 
6. ). Mein, nevertheless, like Hutchinson and Bernard highlighted 
some important aspects of the non-importation controversy that 
were of significance to the friends of government in their 
conflicts with the Whig-merchant leadership. 
For many merchants, the importation of banned goods and 
their resistance to the merchants' committees was a significant 
demonstration of their opposition to Whig-imposed authority 
that tried to control their commercial activities. 
Forty-seven firms were persistent importers, receiving 
consignments of goods on tour to twelve occasions. These 
traders 
, set out 
to circumvent the non-importation agreement. 
They included 11 Tories, not one of whom had supported the 
introduction of non-importation, although all except John Bernard 
eventually succumbed to the demands of the merchants' committees. 
For men such as these, with proven records of Toryism, the 
importing of listed goods was another act of defiance to the 
Whigs. For 24 friends of government, the non-importation 
controversy was the first-test of their allegiance. Thomas 
Hutchinson noted that Theophilus Lillie, for example, was "a 
very/ 
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(Green & Boylston) Tory 
Benjamin Clarke 
Richard Clarke & Sons Tory 
William Coffin Jr. Whig 
Samuel Fletcher 
James Forrest 
Sylvester Gardiner Tory 
Benjamin Greene & Son 
Daniel & William Hubbard 
Thomas Hubbard Tory 
Thomas & Elisha Hutchinson Tory 
Ralph Inman 
William. Jackson 
Jeremiah Lee Whig 
Joshua Loring Tory 
James &: Patrick McMasters 
John Pederick 
Thomas Robie Tory 
Nathaniel Rogers Tory 






















Jonathan Simpson R8 
John Timmons 04 
William Vassall 8 
George Watson 4 
Joshua Winslow Whig 5 
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(Green & Cleverly) 5 
William Dennie Whig R5 
John Greenleaf 4 





John Leverett Whig S4 
John Loring 5 
Jonathan Mason Whig S5 
Thomas Handaside Peck Whig G7 
James Pitts Whig S5 
John Rowe Whig Sa 
Epes Sergeant 5 
Jacob Sheaffe 4 
Isaac Smith G7 
Christopher Starbuck & Co. 4 
S= Signed outright. 
0= Did not sign but promised to observe trading restrictions. 
G= Promised to sign if the agreement became "generall". 
R= Refused to sign. - 
Sources: Boston Chronicle, June 1769-June. 1770; [Samuel P. Savage], 
List of Subscribers to the Non-Importation Agreement of March 1768, 
n. d. S. P. Savage II Collections, MHS. Allegiances determined 
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from Appendix A; Tyler, Smugglers & Patriots, 
pp. 258-277; "An Alphabetical List of the Sons of Liberty Who 
Dined at Liberty Tree, Dorchester, August 14,1769uß Procs. 
MHS, 1st series, 11 (1869), pp. 140-142. 
very inoffensive man [to the Whigs] except in this affair 
of Importation. " 
80 (. The exceptions were Barnes, Boylston, 
R. Clarke, Coffin, Forrest, Thomas Hubbard, Rogers, and 
Robie. ) 
81 By importing-. banned goods persistently, they ran 
the risk of proscription. The Scottish merchants, particularly 
the Selkrigs and McMasters, were renowned for their resolve. 
Francis Bernard thought it "remarkable that the Scotch Merchants, 
who are a considerable Body, are all, to a Man, importers. " 
82 
John Mein was not the only importer to mount an attack 
on the merchants and Whigs in the press. 
Colborn Barrell, a shopkeeper and Sandemanian, wrote 
a series of letters to the Boston Chronicle protesting at his 
treatment at the hands of the merchants' committees. On 
October 3, Barrell, along with two other importers, agreed 
to re-ship his goods to Britain. But two days later, the 
Boston Chronicle printed a letter in which he refuted the 
"implications that I was influenced to do what I did from the 
same principles that are there avowed" at the merchants' meetings. 
Barrell declared that he was not a Tory per se, but, nevertheless, 
was prepared to challenge the Whig orthodoxy of opinion: 
I am obliged in conscience to disclaim 
these principles [the merchants' and 
Whigs'] having never yet been able to 
see the almost universally adopted measures 
of the British American Colonies, so 
tending/ 
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tending to preserve the sacred institution 
of government and promote the peace and 
good of the country, as to engage my 
approbation of them. I was influenced 
to comply with that agreement because 
I had no desire to interfere with the 
regulations of the Merchants, and because 
I was willing to avoid their displeasure. 83 
In subsequent letters, Barrell claimed he was "hurried into 
[submission] by the threatning and cajolling conduct of some of ... 
[the] Committee-men, " and feared that his refual would result in 
"bodily harm from the resentment of an enraged multitude. " 
84 
On October 6, Barrell levelled further accusations at the 
merchants. He asserted that the committee had agreed to 
pay the freight costs of the items he was to return to Britain. 
When they did not, he refused to place his goods on the vessell 
designated by the merchants, the Wolf, and the ship sailed 
for Britain on the 21st without Barrell's consignment. 
On the 26th, Barrell was curtly reminded of his promise to 
return his goods, and was told that another ship was ready 
to take them aboard. 
85 Again Barrell declined, and replied 
to the merchants with a high-handed message proclaiming that 
his individual rights of freedom and liberty were being infringed 
by the merchants. It is an example of how far Tory ideology 
extended throughout the commercial community and imbibed the 
thoughts of hitherto non-aligned traders. 
I must say that it is extreme[ly] hard, 
that in a land where LIBERTY is the cry, 
and where pretended PATRONS for it abound, 
a poor man shall not be suffered quietly 
to enjoy the benefit of an honest and 
fair trade, which the very constitution 
of the nation is admirably adapted to 
secure him. 
The "Body", as the meetings of traders amd townspeople were now styled, 
was an "UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY", for it included many persons who 
did/ 
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did not possess the right to vote at town meetings. With 
the merchants' refusal to honour their part of the "contract" 
to pay Barrell's freight charges, he held himself "entirely 
FREE" from any obligation to observe the agreement he had made. 
At the end of this letter, John Mein printed a poignant extract 
from the Esprit des lois in which Montesquieu defines the nature 
of "political liberty". 
86 
On November 8, Barrell was met in the street by William 
Molineux who told him that his latest message "abused" the 
merchants "in such a manner as deserved never to be forgiven. " 
A committee was appointed to prepare a public statement on 
the dispute, for it was clear by now that Barrell would never 
return the imported goods. 
87 
In a pre-emptive action, 
Barrell published his correspondence in the December issues 
of the Boston Chronicle. Dr. Thomas Young replied for 
the merchants and Whigs with the "Protestant" letters in the 
Boston Evening Post. Barrell, said Young, was ignorant 
of the "Self-denying" aspects of non-importation, and henceforth 
should be considered as obnoxious as the Tories John Mein, 
James Murray, Thomas Hutchinson, Andrew Oliver and the Customs 
Commissioners. 88 In a Whig inspired charade, Barrell, 
along with General Gage, Oliver, Hutchinson, Bernard and the 
Commissioners was indicted for slander against the citizens 
of Massachusetts by a Grand Jury. 
89 
Theophilus Lillie echoed Barrell's sentiments in letters 
which were published in January 1770. On October 2, Lillie 
had signed a paper promising to store his goods until the boycott 
was lifted. This, he declared, "was no more my own act 
than as if I had been in prison, or upon the rack, and had 
made a promise on condition of being set free. " Lillie 
described himself as an ordinary shopkeeper who had "never 
entered into the mysteries of government, having applied myself 
to my shop and my business. " But the treatment he received 
convinced/ 
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convinced him that his rights and liberties were endangered by the 
activities of the radical Whigs and merchants' committees of 
inspection. 
It always seemed strange to me that people 
who contend so much for civil and religious 
liberty should be so ready to deprive 
others of their natural liberty; that 
men who are guarding against being subject 
to laws [to] which they never gave their 
consent in person or by their representative 
should at the same time make laws, and 
in the most effectual manner execute 
them upon me and others, to which laws 
I am sure I never gave my consent either 
in person or by representative.... 
If one set of private subjects may at 
any time take [it] upon themselves to 
punish another set of private subjects 
just when they please, it's such a sort 
of government as I never heard of before; 
and according to my poor notion of government, 
this is one of the principal things which 
government is designed to prevent; and 
I own I had rather be a slave under one 
master (for I know who he is... ) than 
a slave to a hundred or more whom I don't 
know where to find, nor what they will 
expect of me. 90 
The letters of Barrel! and Lillie, two merchant-shopkeepers, 
reveal that ideological divisions were running deep within 
the east coast commercial communities as a result of attempts 
to enforce the boycott. They complemented the efforts 
of John Mein that exposed the socio-economic divisions within 
the protest movement and the commercial communities, and the 
observations of Francis Bernard and Thomas Hutchinson. 
The provincial government hoped that these divisions -between 
the rich wholesale merchants and shopkeeper-merchants like 
Lillie and Barrell, and between moderate Whigs and radicals - 
would eventually undermine the non-importation agreement and 
'lead to a resumption of normal trading with Britain. 
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4. Moderate Whigs and Opposition to the Extension of the Non- 
Importation Agreement, October-December 1769. 
While the majority of merchants and moderate Whigs were not 
prepared as yet to challenge the Whig-merchant leadership 
over the enforcement of trading restrictions and the proscriptions, 
dissatisfaction with non-importation increased the longer 
the embargo remained in force. The news, arriving in the 
summer, that the Grafton administration was disposed toward 
a partial repeal of the Townshend Acts boosted the hopes of 
the moderates and discontented traders that the boycott would 
end on January 1,1770 as planned. But to their dismay, 
the radicals won a vote extending the boycott indefinitely 
until all the Townshend Acts and other revenue acts had been 
repealed. 
In August 1769, John and Jonathan Amory wrote Thomas 
Mifflin of Philadelphia inquiring the conditions set down by 
the merchants there as to when orders could be sent and fulfilled, 
and whether the ending of the boycott depended upon the repeal 
of the Townshend Acts alone or the Revenue Acts of 1764 and 
1766 as well. 
91 
At the same time, they instructed their 
agent in London, Samuel Eliot, to purchase banned British goods 92 
"in case publick Affairs take such a Turn as Goods may be sent. " 
But on no account would they "counteract the Design [of the boycott] 
by bringing [in] Goods till there is a general Importation. " 
93 
We think it absolutely necessary both for 
you & us to go with the Tide, indeed 
there is no stemming it. If any 
Importation should be made contrary to 
the general Agreement the Goods will 
be housed [in a common store]. 94 
Not wishing to run foul of the merchants and Whigs, the 
Amorys declined the offer of the London merchants Kilby and 
Syme and Lane, Son & Frazer & Co. to supply them during the 
period/ 
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period of the boycott. 
95 
Other moderates and merchants, however, did take the 
risk. In April, large consignments of goods arrived 
in Boston for prominent Whigs George Erving, John Rowe and 
John and Thomas Pitts. This was repeated in the autumn. 
According to Nathaniel Coffin, the arrival of goods for leading 
Whigs "occasions no small Commotions amongst the Sons [of Liberty]". 
Eventually, the merchants succumbed to pressure from the moderates 
and the importers, and on November 7 the merchants' meeting 
agreed that orders might be-placed with British firms but that 
delivery of the goods must wait until trading restrictions 
were lifted. Of that there seemed little prospect, for 
on October 20 the radicals had won a vote extending the agreement 
indefinitely until all the Townshend Duties and4Revenue Acts 
of 1764 and 1766 were repealed. 
96 
Moderate Whig merchants were unsettled by the radicals' 
victory. It meant that commerce would be disrupted for 
at least another year and the radicals would have a free hand 
to continue the proscription of importers. Harrison Gray 
and John Erving refused to sign the extended agreement. 
97 
Nathaniel Coffin observed the growing discontent among the 
merchants: 
There are many dissenters from this new 
agreement, & some very principal Merchants 
amongst them who look upon it as a piece 
of Quixotism. Among the Signers 
there are many Names put down by the 
Committee themselves, said to be done 
with the leave of those persons, but 
I myself have heard some of them, whose 
Names are to the agreement declare that 
as soon as they hear of [the] Repeal 
of the Glass & paper Act they will forward 
their orders for Goods. -- I am inclined to think that this new attempt wil[l] 
be the Rock they will Split upon. 





Thomas Hutchinson concurred with Coffin's assessment. 
The intimidatory tactics of the merchants and the divisions 
within the commercial community of Boston would weaken the 
power of the "liberty men". Now was the time to take ad- 
vantage of the dissensions and discontent: "If ever [a] 
Machiavellian policy is to be justified this is the time. " 
99 
But for the moment, in the autumn of 1769, Hutchinson 
could expect little co-operation from the moderates and hitherto 
loyal Whigs. The Amorys, for instance, did not subscribe 
to the extended agreement, but did nothing to challenge the 
Whig-merchant leadership over the necessity of extending the 
boycott. 
Tho' a great Number of Hands are already 
to it, [we]... have assur'd the Committee 
that if it should become in our Opinion 
sufficiently general we shall sign it - 
w[hi]c we shall be careful not to do is 
such openings are left a have been heretofore 
for particular Merch[an] s such as Mr. 
Jackson &c. to carry on an exclusive 
Trade. 100 
Most moderates were prepared to tolerate the proscription of 
importers, for wealthy importers such as William Jackson 
threatened to displace temporarily the "well-disposed" merchants 
from the market in British goods. Their acquiesence was 
conditional on the Whig-merchant leadership's capability of 
imposing trading restrictions which all traders would obey. 
The resistance of the importers to the committees and the 
large number of dissenters from the extended agreement persuaded 
the Amorys that they should wait upon further developments 
before they subscribed to the new agreement. But the- 
treatment of the importers also served as a warning to the 
Amorys and other moderates and discontented merchants not to 
oppose/ 
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oppose the leadership on this issue. 
We are persuaded that the Distress which 
those who have imported Goods contrary 
to the Agreement have met with, will 
deter ev'ry one from sending for any 
from hence, but upon the Terms generally 
agreed upon. 101 
To the moderates as well as the radicals, John Mein's 
campaign in the Boston Chronicle appeared to be a government 
inspired conspiracy, and for this reason did not attract the 
support of the moderates and discontented merchants. 
The Amorys were anxious to distance themselves from Mein and 
! 'his party". 
102 
. Moderates Francis Green and George 
Erving 
were no less prepared than radicals such as William Palfrey 
to publish rejoinders to Mein's accusations that they had broken 
the boycott. 103 Five prominent Whigs were importers 
in the autumn of 1769 (John Rowe, James Pitts, Thomas Handaside 
Peck, William Dennie and Joshua Winslow), but all turned 
their goods over to the committees of inspection when requested. 
John Hancock's Lydia returned to Britain the cargoes of eight 
vessels that included goods belonging to Whig importers. 
104 
-The Intimidation of John Mein also deterred the moderates 
and discontented from speaking out against the extension of 
the boycott. The Whigs and merchants knew that Mein was 
receiving his information from someone in the Boston customs 
house. William Palfrey hinted that the source was Inspector- 
General Thomas Irving. 105 On August 28, the merchants 
of Boston had published a statement refuting Mein's claims 
that the agreement was being generally ignored. Mein had 
exaggerated the quantity of imports and the number of importers 
"with an apparent design to create a jealousy among the merchants. " 
Mein was an outsider (a Scotsman) and a Tory - "a stranger 
who came among us for his own private emolument" and a "tool 
of a party. " 
106 On October 2, Samuel Adams declared in 
the/ 
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the town meeting that Mein's publications would "make a precedent 
for others, to avail themselves of the sacrifice of which our 
own merchants and tradesmen have voluntarily made for the publick 
good, and hereafter the safety of the country shall admit of 
its being again carried on! " 
107 
The radicals' support for 
the proscription of the importers was, in part, based on their 
anxiety that Mein could encourage traders to defect from the 
agreement. Whig writers made no effort to disguise their 
belief that Mein should be silenced. Mein should cease 
his attacks on the "Well-Disposed" merchants "lest some of 
the Tailors & Shoemakers lately metamorphos'd into Merchants, 
should take it in their heads to pat his pretty chops rather 
harder than he would chuse. " 
108 Mein was "aiming at a 
drubbing" as had happened to the Stamp Distributors in 1765.109 
Nathaniel Coffin had long feared for Mein's safety. He 
noted that "There is such a general resentment against him 
as must materially affect him in his Business. " Mein had 
made a dangerous enemy - John Hancock. Coffin told Charles 
Steuart that if it was not for the troops being stationed in 
King Street where Mein had his shop, "Mein would be tarred 
& feathered like an informer. " 
110 Coffin urged the deter- 
mined Scot to cease his attacks on the merchants that had "wrought 
the People into such a Ferment. " 
111 
Mein ignored Coffin's advice, and on Saturday October 28 pub- 
lished his most virulent attack on the Whig-merchant leadership. 
He ridiculed and taunted the leaders: Hancock was "Johnny Dupe, 
Esq., alias the Milch Cow of... faction"; James Otis was "Counsellor 
Muddlehead"; Samuel Adams was "the Publican" and William Molineux 
"William the Knave". 112 
Late that afternoon, Mein received the "drubbing" which, from 
the Whigs'point of view, he had long deserved. Mein and 
his 
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his partner John Fleeming were returning home from work when 
they encountered a group of Whigs, including William Molineux 
and Captain Samuel Dashwood whom they had lampooned in that 
day's paper. The printers were stopped and a crowd soon 
gathered about them, "people fleeing from all Quarters. " 
Threats and insults were exchanged on both sides before Mein 
and Fleeming made their retreat. Mein drew a pistol which 
he brandished at the mob. "An immediate Cry of Kill him, 
Kill him was raised", and the pair fled toward the guard house. 
The mob gave chase and landed several blows before Mein and 
Fleeming reached safety. Mein discharged his pistol, and 
the shot accidently tore the sleeve of a soldier's uniform. 
The mob, now deprived of a victim, vented its fury on George 
Greyer, a customs house informer, who was tarred, feathered 
and carted through the town. The assualt on Mein and Fleeming 
was not preplanned, but. was a spontaneous outbreak of 
of violence. 
113 Nevertheless, it was the best indication 
yet to the moderates and discontented merchants, as well as to 
the persistent importers, that the Whigs would use violence 
and the threat of violence to silence detractors and opponents 
of the boycott, if and when they were necessary. 
Afterward, Molineux and Samuel Adams procured a warrant 
for Mein's arrest because he had unlawfully discharged a gun. 
Mein took refuge on board the H. M. S. Hope and then the man 
of war Rose. His friends, including Nathaniel Coffin and 
James Murray, urged him'to leave Boston before the writ could 
be served or any other mobs attack him. This he did on 
November 17 on board the Hope, never to return to America. 
114 
In the autumn of 1769, Thomas Hutchinson expected that many 
shopkeepers would turn against the Whig-merchant leadership, 
because they could not withstand the worst economic effects of the 
boycott. By the 1760s, shopkeepers of middling status had assumed 
the/ 
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the functions of wholesale merchants by importing goods direct 
from Britain which they themselves retailed. This expansion 
in business functions was the result of the temporary boom 
in the Massachusetts economy during the French and Indian War, 
when English and Scottish merchant houses extended favourable 
terms of credit to traders who imported and sold British goods. 
115 
Non-importation, of course, damaged their vital interests. 
116 
Senior government officials viewed their possible demise as the 
consequence of a natural economic shrinkage occasioned by the 
over expansion of the credit system in the 1750s and early 
1760s. For them, there was no question that the rich whole- 
sale merchants were using the boycott to put out of business 
their smaller competitors. 
117 Thus, Francis Bernard expected 
that opposition to the boycott would come eventually from "those 
Traders, who have been drawn into the Scheme without having 
made Provision to prevent the Effects of it upon themselves. " 
118 
Bernard and Hutchinson, however, underestimated the commit- 
ment of shopkeepers and artisans to the non-importation policy. 
Hutchinson was surprised that- these groups were "so infatuated" with 
the newly extended agreement. 
119 But as early as the 
summer of 1767, shopkeepers, tradesmen and artisans were 
among those who "spoke-with great vehemence" in favour of a 
total trade boycott. 120 In the autumn of 1769, they supported 
the merchants' decision not to allow the Scottish shipbuilders 
leave to sell British goods in order to raise capital to construct 
four ships in Boston. Ships meant employment for those 
thrown out of work by the boycott, and the Scots took their 
business elsewhere. 
121 According to one Tory, this decision 
lost Boston £30,000 worth of trade with Glasgow. 
122 And 
in future, Francis Bernard expected that Salem, Newbury and 






Despite the uncertainty of many traders concerning the 
adoption of the non-importation agreements of March and August 
1768, and the extension of the boycott in October 1769, the 
opponents of the embargo did not coordinate their activities A 
or make a move to end it. They lacked sufficient support 
from within the commercial community of Boston to have challenged 
the dominance of the Whig-merchant leadership, for the pros- 
cription and intimidation of persistent importers in Boston, 
Salem. and Marblehead was enough to discourage dissenters 
and discontented moderates from making a stand. Those 
who: did resist the dictates of the merchants' committees 
pinpointed the ideological and socio-economic divisions within 
the east coast commercial communities and Whig protest movement 
which they hoped would eventually bring down the non-importation 
agreement. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ENDING OF 
NON-IMPORTATION, 1770. 
The opponents of non-importation increased considerably 
during 1770. Once again, the proscription of importers, 
. as well as economic considerations, alienated many merchants 
and shopkeepers. But this time, when they received news 
of the repeal of the Townshend Duties except that on tea and 
heard that merchants in other colonies wished to end the embargo, 
the dissident moderates moved to the fore to challenge the Whig- 
merchant leadership and end the boycott on all British goods 
except tea. 
1. The Proscription of Importers and Dissenters, January-March 1770. 
In the late autumn and early winter of 1769, the six importers 
who were proscribed by the Boston town meeting and other importers 
(Samuel Fletcher, William Jackson and Benjamin Greene & Son) 
received fresh consignments of goods from Britain. Only 
one was an unusually large delivery; that entered for the McMasters 
on November 17. Once more, the importers handed over their 
goods to the committees of inspection. 
1 
Committees of inspection regularly checked the common stores 
and the stores of known importers. By the end of the year, 
they/ 
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they had acquired evidence that some importers had , sold part of their 
stock. When a committee visited Theolphilus Lille on December 16, 
they were refused access to his store. This, said Lillie, 
threw Samuel Dashwood into a "great rage" and he "challenged 
me to come out of my house, and he would break my neck, my 
bones and the like. " Eventually, Lillie admitted his friend 
Samuel Fletcher, the importer. Fletcher reported back 
to the committee that some items were missing. Lillie 
made no effort to disguise the fact that he had sold some of 
his goods, protesting that he "could not be interrupted in... 
business, and would not submit to such slavery any longer. " 
He knew of at least "ten [traders] who had no notice taken 
of them, and were selling freely. " 
2 
Lillie's claim was supported by reports made at the merchants' 
meetings of December 28 and 29. John Taylor had been selling 
his goods taken from a common store. Benjamin Greene & 
Son had supplied John Chandler of Worcester with a large quantity 
of imported goods. The Greenes claimed that the transaction 
was of a "private manner",, although Chandler was actually one 
of their best customers. Greene wrote Chandler asking 
for the goods to be returned and dispatched his son to Worcester. 
Chandler refused. The merchants voted that Greene should 
deliver the rest of his goods to the committee of inspection 
and remit a cash deposit for those that had been sold. 
Greene wanted more time to consider the proposal than the meeting 
would allow, and his name was added to the list of proscribed 
importers whose shops the townspeople were to boycott. 
3 
William Jackson and Israel Williams of Hatfield were also pro- 
scribed when it was revealed that the former had supplied the 
latter with imported goods. 
4 
A meeting was called for January 17 to decide the fate 
oP the importers who had broken their pledges not to sell their 
goods. It was attended not only by merchants and shopkeepers, 
but/ 
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but by artisans and townspeople who had acquired a greater 
sayin the merchants' proceedings since the beginning of 
non-importation. The "Body", as the assembly was called, 
met throughout 1770. Almost 1,400 people crammed into 
the Town House and faneuil Hall to hear the speakers. 
Most of Boston's adult males attended; those that could 
vote at town meetings and those that could not. The Body 
was an extra-legal assembly, and the intensity of its deliberations 
were unmatched by even the most tempetuous town meeting. A 
Seven merchant firms were accused of violating the non- 
importation agreement or the "contracts" they had signed in 
October: Thomas and Elisha Hutchinson, William Jackson, Nathaniel 
Rogers, Benjamin Greene & Son, John Taylor, Theophilus Lillie. 
and Nathaniel Cary. It was voted that the whole Body 
attend first on William Jackson and the Hutchinsons. (The 
town's shops were closed especially to let the tradesmen 
participate. ) Jackson refused to consult with a delegation 
headed by William Molineux. The Hutchinsons agreed to 
surrender the goods they had left in their own warehouse, but 
later in the day reneged on their promise. 
6 
The Hutchinsons' refusal to compromise with the Body 
preciptated a crisis of resolve within the Whig-merchant leadership. 
Many Whigs believed that if the Body were to take further action 
against the sons of the acting Governor, Thomas Hutchinson, 
then they could be arraigned on a charge of treason. William 
Molineux was the only merchant among the political leadership 
who favoured the proposal that the Body should call on the 
Hutchinson once more. He was supported by radicals Thomas 
Young, Sam Adams and William Cooper (a retired merchant ). 
Lawyers Josiah Quincy Jr. and Richard Dana, and merchants John 
Hancock and Henderson Inches were unenthusiastic about the 
proposal. But despite the words of caution offered by 
some Whigs, the motion was carried on the 18th-with the backing 
of the radicals, artisans and' shopkeepers. 
7 
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The Body voted that the "unjustifiable and perfidious conduct" 
of the violators revealed a "disposition to do every thing 
in their power to counteract and make void the united efforts 
of the whole continent. " They were "meanly sacrificing 
the rights of their country to their own avarice and private 
interests. " Once again, the dissenters from the agreement 
were accused of Toryism, of acting "in conjuction with placement 
pensioners, and other tools and dependants, upon a formed and 
settled plan to entail upon the present and future generations, 
BONDAGE, MISERY, and RUIN. " On the afternoon of the 18th, 
the Body visited the seven violators they had proscribed. 
8 
When the Body convened on the 19th, it was reported that 
only two of the dissenters (Cary and Taylor) had acceded to 
its demands. Nathaniel Rogers and Benjamin Greene were 
conveniently absent from home. Theophilus Lillie was as 
insolent as ever: he "had nothing left but his life, which 
he would deliver up if they pleased. " 
9 Jackson kept 
out the way and sought the assistance of the provincial govern- 
ment. He informed Thomas Hutchinson that "he apprehended 
his person & property [to be] in danger. " Hutchinson presented 
Jackson's letter to the Council, and Jackson and his brother 
attended the Council chamber in person. They told of "sundry CSIQ 
threatning expressions they had severally heard, " although 
Jackson "thought himself safe for the night. " The Council 
called for the Sheriff and Justices of the Peace to attend 
the Council chamber the following day. But the Council 
meeting was postponed for there was not a quorum of members. 
10 
The moderator of the Body, William Phillips, reported 
that in the morning he had been interviewed by Thomas Hutchinson who 
informed him of his sons' willingness to surrender their current 
stock of goods and make a cash payment for those that they 
had already sold. 
11 
Hutchinson's desire to have his sons Thomas and Elisha 
"wholly/ 
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"wholly out of the question" is an indication of his intent 
to provide effective leadership for the opponents of non-importation. 
His family "involved... [him] in greater difficulty in protecting 
the rest, " whom he had "assured... to protect... even to the 
calling for the Troops if*necessary. " If Hutchinson was 
to encourage the moderates to defy the Whig-merchant leadership, 
he saw nothing to be gained from being accused of partiality. 
12 
He believed the readiness of "six or eight" importers to resist the 
Body was symptomatic of the underlying discontent of merchants 
who had been waiting patiently for trade to be resumed on January 
1, until their hopes were dashed by the extension of the agreement 
in October. For the moment, this "far greater number... 
were contented to wait". 
13 
In consulting with Phillips, 
Hutchinson may also have hoped to inspire defections within 
the Whig-merchant leadership, for he had heard that Phillips 
had "expressed himself in such terms as shew that he is tired 
of his part. " 
14 
The submission of his sons solved only part of Hutchinson's 
problem of how to encourage the defection of the moderates. 
Rash, precipitate action against the Body could alienate the 
moderates. Hutchinson had intimated to a few of the importers 
that he was prepared to use British troops to disperse the 
Body. --- But this frank confession was intended, perhaps, 
to soothe distressed minds, for, as he explained to Hillsborough, 
he would not deploy troops against the Body because of the 
"uncertain consequence" that such action might have. 
15 
On the one hand it would almost certainly anger the moderates, 
while on the other it could provoke an uprising against the 
troops. 
Hutchinson sought the advice of the Council on January 
22. He declared that with his sons no longer interested 
parties in the dispute between the Body and the importers, 
he expected the Council to approve action to break up the Body, 
for/ 
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for it was an assembly of "a dangerous tendency". He made 
three proposals: for the Board to issue a proclamation denouncing 
such meetings; to send the Sheriff to disperse it; or to call 
the moderator to the Council chamber to warn him of the illegality 
of the Body. The Council rejected all three proposals, although 
moderates such as Harrison Gray and John Erving were alarmed 
by the power of the Body. (The Justices of the Peace also 
refused to act against the ßody. ) 
16 
Hutchinson, therefore, acted on his own magisterial 
authority to try and disperse the Body. On the 23rd, he 
instructed Sheriff Greenleaf to go down to Fan, uil Hall, where 
the Body had convened, and deliver two letters; one was a personal 
letter to William Phillips and the other was addressed to the 
people there assembled. Both letters were read aloud. 
The second letter was carefully composed and designed to 
appeal to the moderates. Hutcbinson warned that the rich 
merchants and gentry had set out on a precarious path. 
The letter implied that the artisans, shopkeepers and tradesmen 
could quite easily turn against their leaders and social superiors 
now that they had gained much political influence through the 
Body. 
Such of you as are Persons of Character, 
Reputation and Property, expose yourselves 
to the Consequences of the irregular 
Actions of any of your Numbers who have 
been assembled together, altho' you may 
not approve of them; and altho' it may 
be out of your Power to restrain them. 
Hutchinson berated the moderates and discontented merchants 
for their political somnolence, and advised that they too would 
be implicated in the treasonable activities of the Body unless 
they took steps to break it up. His admonitions were "cloathed 
with Authority" derived from the King, and he pressed the crowd 
to "forbear all such unlawful Assemblies for the future, as 
you/ 
249 
you would those Evils to which you may otherwise expose 
yourselves and your Country. " 
17 
The next day Hutchinson composed a letter explaining 
why he chose to confront the Body. The letter indicates 
that Hutchinson's political thinking and strategy regarding 
the commercial community of Boston, like his relations with 
the General Court, were dominated by the desire to take advantage 
of the ideological and socio-economic divisions within the 
protest movement. 
If the Council had been in sentiment 
with me, I think this Assembly might 
have been prevented or soon dispersed. 
Left alone, I had to consider the danger 
from such meeting[s] from day to day, 
which I knew to be against [the] law, 
and yet it consisted of several Justices 
of the Peace who ought to execute [the] 
law, several professed lawyers, and a great 
number of inhabitants of property together 
with three Representatives of the town 
and a mixed multitude warmed with a persuasion 
that what they were doing was right and 
that they were struggling for the liberties 
of America. 18 
Hutchinson laid the letters he had sent to the Body and 
Phillips before the Council. Thus presented with a fait 
accompli which relieved the members of the onerous task of 
advising sanctions against the Body, they "expressed their 
19 Satisfaction" in the Governor's proceedings. 
But Hutchinson's letters had little visible effect on 
the moderates and discontented merchants. The Body and 
the radicals were wise to Hutchinson's intentions and called 
for further proscriptions of importers who had begun 
to sell their goods and for harsher measures to be employed 
against them. Citizens were instructed not only to suspend 
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commercial dealings with dissenters (as they had been doing), 
but also to withhold from them "every Art and Office of common 
Civility. " The violators of the agreement had shown a 
"very high Disregard to some of the most important moral Obligations... 
to the community", for which reason they deserved to be "severed... 
from the Commonwealth. " On January 28, the Body again 
advocated the social ostracism of the dissenters. They 
were outsiders and parasites, particularly those that were immi- 
grants to Massachusetts, who "deserve to be driven into that 
obscurity from which they originated and to the hole of the 
pit from whence they were digged. " 
20 No conciliatory 
or moderating opinions were heard at these meetings. 
The Body's anger was directed at those violators of the 
agreement that it did not visit: John Bernard, the McMasters, 
Ami and Elizabeth Cuming. These merchants came to the 
province in the 1760s, 
21 
and as they were "strangers in this 
Country" the moderates may have felt less inclined to protest 
at their proscription than if they had been native-born. 
(Benjamin Greene & Son acceded to the Body's demands to surrender 
their goods and submit cash for the value of those that they 
had sold. ) 
22 
Correspondents in the Boston newspapers reinforced the 
Body's call for the social ostracism of the violators. 
One Whig wished to see his countrymen 
break off - OFF FOREVER! - all social intercourse, with those, whose commerce 
contamihates.... whose avarice is insatiable, 
& whose unnatural oppressions are not 
to be borne. 23 
To "Civis", the violators and importers were "Tories" who had 
grown rich at the expense of the commonwealth. 
The man who is declared to be an outcast 
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by the community in which he lives, without 
discovering evident marks of Distress, 
betrays the total want of that very principle 
which alone can contribute to his own 
or others happiness, and therefore affords 
the strongest proof that he deserves 
to be an outcast. 24 
The citizens of Boston took it'into their power to enforce the 
Body's new directive. The Boston Gazette withdrew advertise- 
ments of William Jackson's after receiving complaints from 
the public. 
25 John Taylor, whose importing had brought 
him a temporary expulsion from the Boston Fire Club in August 
1769, was now expelled sine die. 
26 Known importers had 
their house windows broken and their walls daubed with"Hillsborough 
paint"(a mixture of faeces and urine) by "numbers of disorderly 
persons. " Boys and youths put up signs outside their shops 
with "Importer" emblazoned on them, and subjected their customers 
to verbal abuse. 
27 
When Ebenezer Richardson, a government 
informer, tried to remove a sign placed outside the shop of 
his friend Theophilus Lillie, he was surrounded by a mob. 
28 
The confrontation resulted in Richardson killing a young boy. 
Incidents such as these contributed to the growing unrest among 
the townspeople that culminated in the King Street Riot of 
March 5. On March 16, the Boston town meeting recorded 
the names of the eleven firms; who had recently violated the 
agreement by selling their goods: Thomas and Elisha Hutchinson, 
William Jackson, Ami and Elizabeth Cuming, John Taylor, John 
Bernard, Nathaniel Rogers, Theophilus Lillie, James and Patrick 
McMasters, John Mein, Israel Williams & Son of Hatfield and 
Henry Barnes of Marlborough. 
29 
The towns of Massachusetts approved the Body's dual policy 
of enforcing the economic and social isolation of the proscribed 
importers. Throughout the province, towns voted to have 
"no commercial or social connection" with those proscribed 
by Boston or local traders who ignored the boycott. The 
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Leicester town meeting followed the example set by Boston in 
1769 and proscribed five importers. Its inhabitants expressed 
the majoritarian point of view that justified the proscriptions: 
"Altho' it is the natural right of every man to dispose of 
his property, in such a manner as he shall see cause, yet every 
man ought to forego such right, when the interest of his country 
requires it. " 
30 
Like most towns who voted on this matter, 
Groton advised its "Buyers and Sellers" not to deal in imported 31 
goods and so "avoid the Odium and Resentment" of their neighbours. 
Names of the importers proscribed by Boston and of local traders 
who violated the boycott were posted up in towns or written 
into town records 
32(see Table 8 ). 
After the Boston Massacre of March 5, there was a note 
of caution in the towns' support for proscription. Sudbury 
declared its disapprobation of violence that had been used 
against the property of the importers in Boston. Sandwich 
emphasised that all "legal, just, fair, and prudent" methods 
be used to enforce the boycott. 
33 The disdain of violence 
did not suggest any irresolution on the part of the towns to 
take action against those who broke the agreement; many appointed 
committees of safety to enforce it. Rather, it was one 
effect of the Boston Massacre to alarm citizens throughout 
the province that the radicalism of the Body in the capital 
and its treatment of importers might provoke the provincial 
government into using the troops to protect the importers, 
thereby creating another flash point for a confrontation 
between the military and the civilian population. 
The proscription of the importers prompted Tory writers 
to launch an attack on the Body. It was the first time 
since the N, on-Consumption/Non-Importation Controversy began 
that the importers gained public support from outwith their 
own ranks. "Martyr", "Pacificus" and "Incredulous" all 
rounded on the divisions within the commercial community in 
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TABLE 8: MASSACHUSETTS TOWNS AND THE PROSCRIPTION OF IMPORTERS. 
Date of Importers 
Town Meeting Named Ostracism 
Abington 21 Feb. 1770 E, F 
Acton 1 Mar. 1770 E, S 
Boxford 24 Jun. 1770 E, F 
Brookfield 19 & 28 Mar. E 
1770 
Cambridge 19 Mar. 1770 E 
Charlestown 12 Jan. & 24 Full List of E, F 
Mar. 1770 11 
Dedham 5 Mar. 1770 E 
Gloucester 27 Mar. 1770 Full List of E, S, F, 
11 TR 
Groton 6 Mar. 1770 E, F 
Haverhill 9 Apr. 1770 E, F, TO 
Hingham 24 Mar. 1770 E, F 




Littleton 5 Mar. 1770 E, F 
Marlborough 29 May 1770 Full List of E, F 
11 
Medford 19 Mar. 1770 Full List of E, F 
11 
Milton 12 Mar. 1770 E, S, F 
Pembroke n. d. Mar. 1770 E 
Plymouth 26 Mar. 1770 E 
Roxbury 5 Mar. 1770 E, TR 
Salisbury 13 Mar. 1770 E, F, TR 
Sudbury 19 Mar. 1770 E, S, F 
Taunton 21 May 1770 E, F 





N-I, T, M 
N-I, T, M 
N-I, T, M 
N-I 
N-I, T, C 
N-I, T, M 





N-I, T, C 
N-I 
N-I, T, M 
N-I, T 
N-I 
N-I, T, M, C 
N-I, T, C 






TABLE 8, contd. 
Support 
Date of Importers For Non- 
Town Meeting Named Ostracism Importation 
Waltham 5 Mar. 1770 E, F N-I 
Watertown 5 Mar. 1770 Full List of F N-I, M 
11 
Worcester 26 Mar. E, S, F N-I, T, M 
Full List of 11= Those importers proscribed by the Boston and 
Charlestown town meetings: Thomas and Elisha Hutchinson, William 
Jackson, Ami and Elizabeth Cuming, John Taylor, John Bernard, 
Nathaniel Rogers, Theophilus Lillie, James and Patrick McMasters, 
John Mein, Israel Williams & Son and Henry Barnes. 
E= Voted not to have commercial dealings with the importers. 
S= Voted to ostracise importers from society. 
F= Voted not to purchase goods from local factors or shopkeepers 
supplied by importers. 
TR= Voted to write the names of importers into the town records or 
post them up in the town. 
TO= Voted to make importers ineligible for town office. 
N-I= Voted support for Boston's extended non-importation agreement. 
T= Voted to boycott tea. 
M= Voted to encourage the use of native manufactures. 
C= Voted to appoint a committee of inspection to enforce the 
non-consumption/non-importation boycott. 
Sources: The Boston Gazette and Country Journal, 1770; The Boston 
Evening Post, 1770; The Boston Chronicle, 1770. 
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an attempt to discredit the Whig-merchant leadership and encourage 
defections from the agreement. 
34 In reference to the 
assault on John Mein the previous October, "Bostonian" denounced 
the violent tendencies of the Whigs that alarmed many moderates: 
"We have substituted the Bludgeon and Cudgel, and occasionally 
the SHOVEL [a weapon used on Mein], as badges of authority 
instead of the Mace, wand &c. used in other countries. " 
35 
John Fleeming reprinted in the Boston Chronicle one item he 
selected from the London Morning Chronicle which served as 
a warning to all who supported the radicals: "Essay on the 
Causes of Sedition and their Remedy, and on the difference 
between Patriotism and Sedition &c. " 
36 Tories pleaded 
with the moderate Whigs to realise that the proscriptions would 
continue unabated and that violence would increase if they 
remained silent and did nothing to challenge the Whig-merchant 
leadership: 
The most respectable person in this metropolis 
[Boston], who are in the least conversant 
in mercantile affairs, must necessarily 
be convinced of the partiality and injustice 
of the present prevailing measures, and 
would,... be well employed in detecting 
the Ringleaders, so that the may be brought 
to CONDIGN PUNISHMENT. 37 
The growing discontent of merchants with the boycott, 
and the stubborn resistance of a handful of importers, some 
of whom were Tories or moderates who resented the Whig 
orthodoxy, convinced Thomas Hutchinson, as they had Francis 
Bernard and John Mein, that the majority of Boston's traders 
acquiesced in rather than fully supported non-importation. 
Hutchinson made a significant attempt to encourage defections 
from the movement in January 1770, but without any recognisable 
success. However, in the coming months, the increasing 
dissatisfaction of moderate Whigs with the boycott propelled 
them into action to challenge the Whig-merchant leadership over 
the necessity of continuing with non-importation following 
the repeal of the Townshend Duties on glass, paper and painter's 
colours. 
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2. The First Attempt to End Non-importation, April-May 1770. 
In the spring of 1770, Thomas Hutchinson received encoura- 
ging indications that many more merchants were prepared to 
defy the Whig-merchant leadership and call for an end to the 
boycott. Non-importation, he noted, had even undermined 
the demand for smuggled tea brought in by prominent merchants 
such as the Ervings: "[John] Erving assures me that he and 
his family know well as any body that it is not worth while to 
run - Tea from Holland. " 
38 Later, he promised Hutchinson 
that his family's (now unprofitable) illegal ventures would 
cease. 
39 
When large consignments of goods arrived in 
Boston in April, the Body, on the 19th, voted to continue with 
non-importation and took the extreme step of insisting that 
all importers should return their goods to Britain. (This 
had been done voluntarily by the merchants in 1769, although 
two - Patrick Smith and Byfield Lyde - were compelled to do 
it. ) John Hancock again offered to reship goods free of 
freight charges. 
40 
But when news was received in Boston 
on the 24th that the administration of Lord North had engineered 
the partial repeal of the Townshend Acts (leaving intact the 
Tea Duty), the discontent of the merchants and moderates surfaced 
for all to see. 
Gilbert Deblois, who had served on merchants' committees 
refused to surrender his goods. So too did his brother 
Lewis and William Bowes, a member of the Sons of Liberty. 
Later, however, all three complied. Hitherto politically 
inconspicuous traders (and friends of government) also resisted, 
and thus ran the risk of proscription: Benjamin Faneuil, Benjamin 
Davis, James Cazneau and Rufus Green. 
41 These and other 
merchants could see no reason for continuing with the boycott 
on British goods, with the possible exception of tea, following 
the partial repeal of the Townshend Acts. Defections from 
the agreement were also encouraged by the knowledge that traders 
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in Philadelphia and New York were calling for an end to the 
boycott. Rev. Andrew Elliot reported to Charles Steuart 
that in New York "one half of the people is ready to cut the 
others throats. " 
42 
Tories such as Nathaniel Coffin underplayed the signif- 
icance of developments at New York, Philadelphia and in Bri- 
tain and their influence on events in Boston and the Massachusetts 
ports. He looked closer to home for explanations as to 
why many more moderates and merchants wished to give up the 
boycott. Coffin perceived an a priori connection between 
the increased political power of the artisans, townspeople, 
and small traders over the merchants and the growth of dissent 
among the merchants; for that power was seen to be democratic, 
radical, and oppressive, no more so than in the Body's treatment 
of importers and dissenters. 
The Merchants of this Town [Boston] begin 
sensibly to feel the weight of this oppressive 
Power. Those of them who were warm 
in the non importation Plan, in order 
to intimidate the Discontents & bring 
them into their Measures foolishly called 
into their assistance all the Rabble 
of the Town, by publishing hand Bills 
inviting to their Meetings every one 
that had any sort of Connection with 
Trade, by which means the whole people 
were collected, who were excited by 
inflammatory haranges [sic] to proceed 
to violence with the importers. 
By this Policy they have intirely given 
the Regulation of Commerce out of their 
Hands. The Bells are ringing almost 
every Day of the Week to assemble this 
numerous Body, who stile themselves the 
Trade [or Body]. Committees of various 
Kinds are appointed by them, which used... 
to be composed of Merchants but are now 
made up of Carpente¬s, ýeather Dressers, 
Joiners, Carters &c &c who daily parade 
the Town inspecting the Conduct of all 
the Merchants, & if any unfavourable 
Reports are made of any of them their 
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House[s] are... bismeered with ordure 
in the Dead of the Night, & their Windows 
broke, but what alarms more than all 
this, anonymous Letters are thrown into 
their yards threatening Death & Destruction 
to them & their Families. [B]y these 
kind of Methods it is that they have 
obliged a Number of Merchants to reship 
their Goods... which tho' it is attended 
with absolute Ruin to some of them, they 
appear to have done it voluntarily. 
They wrote Letters to the Moderator of 
those Meetings expressing great Concern 
for the offence they had given the Publick 
by their importation, &a desire their 
goods should be sent back again, & thanked 
Mr. Hancock for the generous offer of 
his ship to carry them back & were finally 
obliged to put them on board themselves 
& clear them out at the Custom House. 
By no other means could they secure themselves 
from the Rage & Violence of the People. 
A Number of Merchants had a Meeting in 
order to contrive some means to shake 
of[f] this terrible yoke, which was no 
sooner Known than an Anonymous Letter 
was carried them by [John] Gill the Printer, 
forbidding them upon their peril to take 
any measures with the Trade without calling 
in the whole Body. 43 
The meeting which Coffin referred to at the end of this 
letter was the first occasion when dissident merchants met openly 
to plan counter-action against the non-importation agreement 
and the Whig-merchant leadership. On May 1, fifty "real 
Merchants" (wholesale merchants) convened at the British Coffee 
House to consider whether or not to resume trading in British 
goods. Unfortunately, their identities are unknown, but 
on the basis of the evidence mentioned below it can be deduced 
that they included disaffected moderate Whigs, Tories and 
proscribed importers. The meeting was organised without 
the approbation of the Body or merchants' committees. 
Dr. Thomas Young and John Gill were dispatched from Faneuil 
Hall, where the Body was in session, with orders for the dissidents 
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to disperse; this they did. 44 
Thomas Hutchinson played no part in organising the dissidents. 
He "was in hopes to have formed a party among the Merchants", 
but the dissidents rejected his overtures. 
45 On April 
27, Hutchinson had written to the Earl of Hillsborough informing 
him of his unsuccessful attempts to initiate an "Association" 
of merchants: 
I made an attempt to day to prevail upon 
a Merchant of the first Estate and Character 
to induce him to promote an Association 
but to no purpose. He gave me for 
Answer that until Parliament made provision 
for the punishment of the Confederacies 
all would be ineffectual and the Associates 
would be exposed to Popular rage. 
He observed farther that the last year 
when the Kings Speech and the Addresses 
of the Lords and of the House of Commons 
first came to us the Heads'of the Opposition 
were struck with Terror and the seditious 
News Paper writers laid aside their Pens 
for 5 or 6 Weeks but, as soon as the 
apprehension of vigorous measures ceased, 
their fears were over and they became 
more assuming and tyrannical than before, 
and although the Terror was not so great 
the present year, yet it was visible, 
and now that they expect nothing will 
be done, they are recovering their Spirits 
knowing that there is no power within 
the Government to restrain them. 46 
In a letter to Francis Bernard written the following day, Hutchinson 
indicated that he had approached the Tory Nicholas Boylston 
and two moderates, George Bethune and possibly Joseph Green, 
Boylston's sixty-five year old partner. These men rejected 
his solicitations. 
I cannot make any Impression upon Green 
Boylstone Bethine &c. I tell them 
there are enough [discontented merchants. 
to defeat the leadership] if they would 
exert themselves. 
. 
They answer it 
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must be done by a severe Act of Parliament 
and nothing else will do it. 47 
After their consultation with Hutchinson, Boylston and 
the others intended to distance themselves from the Governor 
in order to avoid alienating other moderates who distrusted 
Hutchinson but who wished, nevertheless, to end the boycott. 
The reasons which they gave for their refusal -a fear of 
proscription and a belief that Parliament should take the lead 
against the Whig-merchant leadership - Hutchinson readily 
accepted, for these were the very same reasons that he himself 
had used to explain the failure of the friends of government 
in Boston and the General Court to resist the leadership. 
Nonetheless, Hutchinson continued in his efforts to inspire 
the dissidents,. but it is evident that they did not welcome 
his assistance or interference. He suggested to them that 
legal action could be taken against the merchants' committees 
and the town meetings over the proscriptions. (He was, 
perhaps, thinking of making a cause celebre. ) But the 
dissidents "replied that there was no chance with a Jury, " 
and that if they should commence a lawsuit against the Whigs 
or merchants "neither their persons nor property [would be] 
safe while it was depending. " They also rejected Hutchinson's 
proposal that they should apply to the Council for protection; 
that too "would only expose them to the rage of the populace. " 
48 
Hutchinson had tried these methods or recommended them in the 
past as a means to improve the standing of the opponents of non- 
importation, although he himself had little faith in the Council 
and Grand Juries when it came to acting against the protest 
movement. The dissidents had no desire to embark on a course 
of action that had virtually no chance of success: they realised that 
if the boycott was to be defeated, it would be through their efforts. 
Between forty and fifty dissident traders assembled 
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at the British Coffee House on May 23. The group's delib- 
erations were led by the moderates John and Jonathan Amory, 
the Scottish importers 49and "One of the Greens" (possibly 
Joseph Green. ) 50 They drew up a subscription paper, 
which they signed, with the resolution that "there should be 
a free Importation of all Goods in the fall except Tea". 
If the Body did not see fit to end the total embargo, then an 
express letter should be sent to the "Southern Governments 
acquainting them that this was the mind of the Merchants who 
had assembled. " 
51 It was an astute move by the dissidents 
to bring the responses of other colonies into the decision- 
making process. Their discussions earlier in the month 
had made no mention of the need to consult with other ports. 
But if the dissidents could not persuade the Body to resume 
trading at once, then the possibility that the merchants of 
New York and Philadelphia, now convinced that Boston would 
remain steadfast to the agreement, could succumb to the growing 
pressure to begin importing at their rival's expense might 
be enough to persuade the Bostonians to end the total embargo, 
lest they leave the market in British goods open to their compet- 
itors. 
The dissidents tabled their proposal at a meeting of the 
Body in the afternoon. According to Thomas Hutchinson, 
"One of the Greens" objected to the intimidating presence 
of artisans and townspeople who were not directly involved 
in commerce: "It was unreasonable that the Merchants should 
be restrained from dissolving the Agreement they had mad(e) 
among themselves by the people who were then assembled most 
of whom had no concern in Trade nor any property. " Affronted 
by this attempt to rally the moderates and the discontented 
merchants against the power-base of the Whig-merchant leadership, 
the Whig John Ruddock "was so angry he burst into crying" 
and William Molineux "harangued the populace". This 
"frightened some of the young Merchants" among the dissidents, 
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and many dissidents withdrew their names from the subscription 
paper. 
52 Consequently, their proposal was rejected by, 
it was claimed, "99 out of a hundred" of those present. 
53 
Hutchinson was informed afterward that had "Greene and 
[Nicholas] Boylstone" not withdrawn their support for the proposal 
then "the point would have been carried. " It left him 
bitter and resentful to think that these men had declined his 
assistance and then had not the stomach to confront the Body 
and the leadership. The pair had "told the rest when they 
were applied to that they were intirely with them in sentiment 
but they would not render themselves obnoxious when they had 
no assurance of protection. They are afraid of their fine 
houses", Hutchinson noted wryly. 
54 Their "timidity" 
was not untypical, as he told the Earl of Hillsborough: 
"Such great numbers of people in opposition to them immediately 
discourages them [the dissidents] from pursuing what seemed 
to be their determination. " 55 
3. The Defeat of Non-Importation. 
The defeat of the dissidents brought only a temporary 
respite for the Whig-merchant leadership in its efforts to 
continue the boycott. The dissidents fully realised that 
the leadership and the Body had little influence on the course 
of events outside Massachusetts that were prompting merchants 
in the colony to call for an end to the boycott of all goods 
except tea. ' And as the radicals tried to enforce the 
agreement with renewed vigour, the defections increased. 
On May 21, the Boston Evening Post confirmed earlier 
reports that the merchants of New York and Philadelphia were 
greatly divided in their commitment to non-importation. 
56 
When the Body met on the 25th, it was revealed that traders 
of Salem and Nantucket, and Newport, Rhode Island were also 
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ignoring the boycott. The following day Newport rescinded 
its agreement, although it was resumed by early June after 
the merchants of New York had resolved to impose an embargo 
on the port. 
57 On June 2, it was clear that the dissident 
merchants of New York had gained the upper hand. The committee 
there dispatched a circular letter to the principal American 
ports requesting their opinions concerning the continuation 
of non-importation. Boston, on the 25th, and Philadelphia 
rejected any relaxation of the embargo. Boston also broke 
off commerce with Portsmouth, New Hampshire, when that port 
resumed trading in British goods. 
58 With these defections, 
the Earl of Hillsborough was confident that in Boston "the 
S9 
more sober and considerate" merchants would gain control. "" 
But it was in New York that the dissidents gained the first 
victory, when the merchants voted to end the non-importation 
of all British goods except tea on July 9. Philadelphia 
followed suit on September 22.60 
Throughout the summer, the leadership in Boston worked 
hard to preserve the agreement and stifle the growing opposition. 
They refused Nathaniel Rogers' request to have his name removed 
from the list of proscribed importers after he had been mobbed 
in New York as an example to other would-be dissidents. 
61 
It was reported that Sam Adams and the radicals had decided 
"to banish all Scotchmen" from Boston. 
62 
Whether they had 
resolved to make examples of the Scottish importers is uncertain, 
but on May 5 the Body rejected a proposal made by one of the 
Selkrigs that he be allowed to sell his imported goods in return 
for building two ships (which, of course, would bring employment 
to shipwrights and labourers. ) The Body preferred the 
Selkrigs "to be out of Business", and in June they left Boston. 
63 
The victimisation of the Scots continued when, on Friday 
June 16, Patrick and James McMasters were warned to quit the 
town within three days. They were reluctant to do so, 
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for since arriving from Scotland they had built up a profitable 
business, and had debts due to them of almost £4,000. 
Two weeks before, they had offered to shut up shop and return 
their goods to Britain, "or do anything else that the Committee 
should direct. " 
64 Thomas Hutchinson responded to their 
request for help by asking a "Gentleman of character and influence 
... to... use his good offices for the protection of these people. " 
(It is not known who. ) 
65 But the radicals were in no 
mood to compromise. 
On June 19, the brothers were still in town, and a crowd 
of several hundreds called on Patrick McMasters. He was 
dragged from his house and placed in a cart. The mob intended 
to tar and feather him. When McMasters fainted, the 
proceedings were delayed, and he was taken to a nearby apothecary's 
and revived with the help of smelling salts. "At the earnest 
Request of some prudent persons present", McMasters was spared 
the ordeal of tar and feathers. Instead, maximising the 
popular effect of the mobbing, they carted him four or five 
miles to Roxbury and foced him to swear an oath never to return 
to Boston. The Roxbury mob desired to have the same 
"amusement" with him, but McMasters was able to escape. 
66 
He and his brother were given asylum at Castle William for 
three months. The Attorney-General was given the almost 
impossible task of prosecuting his attackers. 
67 (The 
McMasters and the Selkrigs eventually returned to Boston. ) 
The violence used against the Scots served to prevent 
further defections from the agreement. One Tory estimated 
that ninety out of a hundred traders wished to end the boycott, 
but were "terrified to submit to [the] tyranny of that Power 
they at first set up. " 
68 
John Amory was lambasted in 
the Boston Gazette for his "warped" judgment in assuming that 
the majority of traders wanted to begin importing while the 
Tea Duty remained in force. 
69 Support for Boston came 
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from the towns of Massachusetts. By the summer, more than 
twenty had voted their support for the continuation of non- 
importation (see Table 8, pp. 253-254 ). As in the capital, 
violence was also used against selected targets to compel 
observance. 
Robert Jamieson, a Scotsman and school teacher of Marblehead, 
was the victim of a well organised campaign of intimidation. 
On May 10, the Marblehead merchants voted to continue with 
non-importation. They expected little dissent from 
the town's merchants and shopkeepers. - On May 22, the 
committee of inspection reported that since the arrival of 
the St. Paul in November "nothing has been received, but what 
was admissable by the Merchants Agreement" excepting one or 
two small items that had since been returned to Britain. 
The committee turned their attention to the townspeople. 
A subscription for the non-consumption of tea was circulated 
and signed by 712 heads of families. Originally, there 
were seventeen dissenters. But after a few days seven 
signed the pledge. The ten who did not included four 
women and Jamieson. 
70 Jamieson told Thomas Hutchinson, 
when he met him at his Milton home in May, that he believed the 
committee's conduct was "Repugnant" to the laws of Britain. 
71 
Because of his resistance and political views, Jamieson was 
singled out for rough treatment as a warning to others to observe 
the boycott. The committee of inspection encouraged parents 
to take their children away from his school. His wife 
was threatened, and then his house was "pull'd down and tore 
to piec[e]s by a Rabble at unreasonable hours of the Night. " 
The crowd called out "with a Loud Voice kill that dog Jamieson 
he is a Governours man a Bastard of Liberty. " According 
to Jamieson, he was able to calm the mob "with that Magnanimity 
of Mind which becomes a North Brittan [sic]. " Afterward, 
the committee employed a more effective strategy. Jamieson's 
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creditors were urged to demand immediate repayment of his debts. 
Jamieson, however, was able to honour them all - except one - 
that for £6 to a man in Rhode Island. This man granted his 
power of attorney to Jamieson's enemies, and eventually Jamieson 
was served with a writ. Unable to pay, he was warned 
out of Marblehead. His last known refuge was Salem prison. 
72 
Through foresight and resolution, Henry Barnes, the Tory 
merchant of Marlborough, was spared the fate of McMasters and 
Jamieson. Marlborough voted to continue with non-importation 
on March 13. It was well known that Barnes was selling 
imported goods supplied him by a "few very sly Tories" of 
Boston. On June 8, between 10 p. m. and 11 p. m., the Boston 
committee of inspection discovered that a wagon preparing to 
leave town contained imported goods consigned to Barnes. 
A crowd of nearly 1,000 followed the wagon as it was towed 
back to a common store in the North End. The Marlborough 
Whigs were spurred into action by the news. A meeting 
was held on the 10th to decide Barnes's punishment. It 
was reported by Barnes's wife that those in attendance were 
"chiefly young people who were not qualified to 'vote" at town 
meetings - the same who had boosted the majority that voted 
to continue with the boycott. They voted that the townspeople 
should boycott Barnes's shop. For the next few days, an 
effigy of Barnes covered in tar and feathers was placed on a 
horse and left to wander through the town. 
73 
The Boston importers Ami and Elizabeth Cuming informed 
Barnes of the ordeal of Patrick McMasters. 
74 Nathaniel 
Coffin also warned him of the fate of Ebenezer Cutler, a trader 
of Oxford who had been carted after receiving imported goods 
from Theophilus Lillie. Barnes was sufficiently alarmed 
by these reports to equip himself with firearms to protect 
his family and store. 
75 
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Events in Marlborough deserve further attention because 
Barnes resorted to extra-legal means of defending himself, 
which was unique, for a Tory or a. dissenter from the 
non-importation agreement, with the exception of John Mein. 
Barnes received a letter threatening him with death if he did 
not comply with the committee's directives. If he closed 
his shop, he would "sustain no more private damage"; if not, 
it would be razed to the ground and he would be tarred and 
feathered; "And if nothing else will do but death you will 
certainly have it. " According to Coffin, Barnes was "in 
daily expectation of... loosing his Life, " yet was "determin'd 
not to yield an Inch... [and] to assert his Rights as an 
Englishman. " 76 Barnes gave a copy of the letter to the 
local selectmen, but they dismissed it, thinking it was "hatched 
by Barnes's own party. " 
77 He sent the original to Thomas 
Hutchinson who laid it before the Council. A reward of 
£50 was offered for information concerning the authorship. 
78 
Barnes was dissatisfied with the Council's efforts. 
On July 9, he petitioned the Board to take further action, and 
reminded the members of the "good services" he had done for the 
public in the manufacturing of potash. (He also possessed 
Marlborough's only distillery and was the highest taxpayer 
in the town". ) The Council were unimpressed and refused 
to act on the petition. (Barnes never specified what he 
wished the Board to do, although he probably intended submitting 
further evidence regarding the conspiracy against him. ) 
79 
Barnes side-stepped formal legal proceedings and organised 
his own private mob. It was announced throughout Marlborough 
that on July 17 free liquor was to be distributed "to all that 
were for Barnes. " According to a Whig source (which allegation 
Barnes made no attempt to refute), he attracted "a great number" of 
supporters including five labourers whom he employed and eleven 
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others from Marlborough and nearby towns. The local Whigs 
accused this group of making an unprovoked assualt upon a "young 
lad" to his severe injury. The youth's offence was merely 
to walk through the town beating a drum. The Whigs compared 
the scene to a local re-enactment of the Boston Massacre. 
80 
In Barnes's version of the incident, the youth had been 
summoning the Sons of Liberty to a rendezvous at the house 
of one Alpheus Woods, whom Barnes suspected of writing the 
death threat. It is likely that he expected a visit from 
the Whig mob that evening. Barnes and his mob intercepted 
the youth and his compatriots. He admitted that one of 
his men injured the youth ( whom he alleged was a member of 
the Woods family), but only in retaliation because the youth 
and his friends were armed and were intent on a confrontation 
with him. 
81 
This incident demonstrates the farthest 
extent to which dissenters from the non-importation agreement 
were prepared to go in order to defend their interests and 
defy Whig-imposed authority. 
In Salem also, opposition to the local Whig merchants 
and the leadership in Boston by dissenters from the agreement 
became more open and forceful during the summer of 1770. 
On April 21, the Salem merchants reported that nine of their 
number had received imported goods. With this small number 
of defections, they voted to continue with the boycott on May 
1. On July 31, the-Boston merchants appointed a high-ranking 
committee, including William Molineux and William Phillips, 
to tour the eastern ports and gauge the extent to which the 
boycott was being observed. They pronounced to their 
"utmost Satisfaction" that it was being adhered to in Newbury. 
But when they came to Salem, they were met by a vociferous 
crowd. Between forty and fifty people waited on Molineux 
at his residence in town. He was handed a note signed by one 
"Philanthrop" which threatened drastic action: 
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General Molineux Understanding yt. You 
are come into this Town (who are at present 
in a peaceable State) to Raise a Spirit 
of Sedition; As a Friend to Mankind in 
general, I would Advise you immediately 
to depart this Place, with all those 
that have enlisted under your Piraticle 
Banner, otherwise. Be assur'd You 
will suffer the like fate, with the poor 
McMasters, whom you treated with such 
Unparallel'd Barbarity. 82 
On September 22, four importers led by Peter Frye 
persuaded an Under-Sheriff to issue a warrant and open the 
common store so that they could remove their goods, which they 
then sold. The four were proscribed for their actions 
and compelled to return what items they had remaining. 
83 
Other traders followed their example in defying the agreement. 
Matthew Mansfield, a shopkeeper, purchased goods from 
one wholesale merchant. He wrote to the Essex Gazette 
claiming that he was not the only one to have done so: 
"There are but very few shopkeepers in town who have not bought 
of him, and that his shop is as much or more frequented by 
the inhabitants of the town than it ever was. " At least 
"four large shops" were stocked with fresh deliveries of British 
goods, and people from the town and surrounding area "flocked 
to buy them. " He had done the same because he "found that 
the non-importation plan was pretty generally given up, &I 
tho't, as well I might, that it would be in vain to stand out 
any longer, unless I would stand alone. " 
84 
Meanwhile, events in Boston were running to a conclusion 
as the opponents of non-importation gathered strength. 
By September, the unity of the movement, comprising wholesale 
merchants, retail shopkeepers, artisans, craftsmen and townspeople, 
was broken. Thomas Hutchinson was convinced that nine- 
tenths of them wished to end the boycott. From September 
10 to 13, a group of dissidents met at the British Coffee 
House to discuss the adoption of "conciliating measures". 
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On the 13th, the Body and merchants met together for the last 
time before the Tea Party of 1773. Widespread support 
for the dissidents from traders and townspeople was evident 
when a compromise solution was agreed: it was proposed that 
a continental congress be set up to decide whether or not the 
colonies should persist with the boycott, which would remain 
in force pending its ruling. But this attempt to ensure 
intercolonial conformity was defeated by the news that Philadelphia 
abandoned non-importation on September 22. With both their 
major commercial rivals now in the market for British goods 
(New York had given up the boycott on July 9), the Bostonians 
could not hold out any longer. The dissidents, led by 
John Amory, reconvened on October 9. Two days later they 
won enough support in the merchants' meeting for their proposal 
that the importation of all British goods should be resumed, 
except tea. Without the opposition from the radical Whigs 
and the radicals among the artisans and townspeople that they 
had encountered in the Body, the dissidents were able to convince 
the majority of merchants that this was the right course of 
action to take. On October 18, the merchants' committees 
began the task of returning imported goods held in the common 
stores. The rest of Massachusetts soon followed suit. 
85 
****** 
The defeat of the non-importation agreement in 1770 was the 
first major success achieved by the friends of government in 
their struggle with the Whigs. Fearful of the economic 
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consequences of a prolonged embargo and repelled by the pro- 
scription of importers and dissenters from the agreement, 
persistent importers, moderate Whigs and Tories were quick 
to take advantage of the changing circumstances outside Massachusetts 
that effectively undermined the boycott and combined to lead the 
growing opposition. In the process, they spurned the assist- 
ance offered by acting Governor Thomas Hutchinson and chose 
to challenge the Whig-merchant leadership and the Body on their 
own terms. They rested content with their success and 
the coalition broke up immediately after the resumption of 
trade. The Non-Importation Controversy and the other major 
issues of 1767-1771 boosted the ranks of the friends of government. 
Approximately 116, or 16 per cent of the friends of government, turned 
against the Whig party during the Non-Consumption/Non-Importation 
Controversies. Many were moderates hitherto loyal to their 
party, and in 1774 the dissidents emerged again to lead the opposition 
to the Whigs. (See Appendix A. ) 
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CHAPTER NINE: THE FAILURE OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON, 1771-1773. 
The defeat of the Whigs' non-importation agreements was 
followed by a period of uneasy calm in Massachusetts. 
The colony's merchants resumed trading with Britain, except 
in tea, and were soon importing three times the value of goods 
that they had been in 1768 . The British Credit 
Crisis 
of 1772 slowed down the re-expansion of commerce (see Table 
6, p. 227 ). Thomas Hutchinson replaced Francis Bernard 
as Governor and received his commission in March 1771. 
Hutchinson was presented with several congratulatory addresses 
that augured well for political support in the future. 
1 
In the first few years of Hutchinson's administration, American 
affairs virtually disappeared from the Parliamentary agenda 
as M. P. s and ministers turned their attention to the conflict 
with Spain over the Falkland Islands. 
2 But much of Hutchinson's 
time was still spent embroiled in political conflicts, for 
the Whigs continued to protest against British colonial policies 
and challenge Parliamentary prerogatives. Hutchinson's 
main political objective was the same as it was in the 1760s, 
of trying to create a strong anti-radical party from among 
the friends of government. He asked the conservatives, 
moderates, and people of Massachusetts to place their faith 
in the existing constitutional arrangement without being able 
to assure them that their much vaunted liberties would be secure. 
As the period of quiet gave way to one of intense agitation in 
1773, these ideas, when compared to those of the Whig leaders, 
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appeared to be outmoded and unacceptable solutions to the dispute 
with Britain; Hutchinson attracted few supporters to the pro- 
government faction. His failure to build a politically 
strong coalition in the General Court and town meetings left 
the friends of government weak and ill-prepared to challenge 
the power of the radicals in these institutions. It was 
largely without the assistance of Hutchinson, the provincial 
administration and the British government that the friends 
of government mounted their most daring assault on the dominance 
of the Whigs in the summer of 1774. 
1. An Uneasy Calm. 
Hutchinson's accession to the Governorship improved the 
prospects of Tory office-seekers and those of his bwn extended family 
in particular. Andrew Oliver, his son Thomas's father- 
in-law, was promoted to Lieutenant-Governor on his recommendation. 
3 
Hutchinson's nephew, Nathaniel Rogers, solicited for the vacant 
post of Secretary of State, but with his untimely death it 
went to Thomas Flucker who was "for some time... considered 
as a Creditor of the Crown. " 
4 Old Benjamin Lynde succeeded 
Hutchinson as Chief Justice. With his resignation 
after only one year in office, the post went to Peter Oliver Sr. 
John Cushing also resigned from the Superior Court, and the vacancies 
on the bench were filled by Cushing's son William, Hutchinson's 
brother Foster and former councillor Nathaniel Ropes. "5 
Hutchinson continued to complain of his limited powers of patronage, 
and of the Whigs in the General Court6 But he resolved 
to continue in the spirit of Bernard's "reforming plan". 
Ten Tories were offered commissions in the province militia. 
7 
Timothy Ruggles was appointed Surveyor-General of the King's Forests, 
a sinecure worth at least £3,000 per annum, probably on the 
recommendations of Hutchinson and Bernard. 
8 The Whigs 
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were not forgotten in the distribution of offices. William 
Brattle was made Major-General of the militia. 
9 Late 
in 1771, Benjamin Church, an out-and-out radical, was recruited 
as a government spy. 
10 The moderate Samuel Quincy, who 
had defended Captain Preston during the Boston Massacre Trial, 
was offered and accepted the post of Solicitor-General, much 
to the chagrin of the Whigs. 
11 
Hutchinson made-a special effort to re-assure Tories 
that the proceedings of the Whigs were "condemned by all parties 
in England", and that action taken against the leaders of the 
protests by the government of Lord North could be expected 
soon. 
12 
Andrew Oliver was one Tory who was pessimistic 
that the Whigs could be silenced and the dispute over rights 
and liberties ended, for "the leaders of the people were never 
so open in asserting our independence of the British legislature. " 
13 
Rank-and-file Tories saw little prospect of a return to the 
"normalcy" of the pre-Stamp Act period, even if the British 
government was to take proscriptive or punitive action against 
the Whigs. Nathaniel Coffin did not like to see the troops 
withdrawn from Boston after the Massacre, and worried that riots 
would break out every time the Royal Navy ships left the harbour 
to patrol the coast. He was also alarmed at "the little 
attention... bestowed by Parliamen]t upon our matters, " because 
the radicals "have as strong a propensity to mischief as ever 
they had. " However, he doubted "whither they will have 
it in their power to kick up a Dust again. " 
14 
ý 
When the House of Representatives met on April 3, Hutchinson 
was convinced that the session would be "very peaceable and 
decent", for there was apparently no new issue on which the 
radicals could rally the other members and the moderates against 
him. Nonetheless, Hutchinson prevailed on Timothy Ruggles 
and other friends of government to attend the debates. 
15 
At first, the moderates joined the government's supporters 
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and treated Hutchinson with much candour. Ruggles's motion 
that the House present the new Governor with a congratulatory 
address was defeated by just one vote and then passed a second 
time. Ruggles and John Worthington were appointed to the 
committee which prepared the address - an acknowledgement by 
Speaker Cushing of the widespread support the Tories commanded 
on this occasion. 
16 
The radicals tried to raise a stir over Hutchinson's 
refusal to assent to two bills providing for his Governor's 
salary. They suspected that he was already in receipt 
of a Crown salary. Hutchinson declined "to enter into 
a Dispute", for as yet he had not received "full instructions" 
from/Britain. Confirmation of the award did not arrive 
until July 1772.17 The incident left Hutchinson 
unshaken and still confident of winning the support of the 
majority of members on any future contentious issue. He reason- 
ed that, "by their conduct", the radicals "have increased the 
number of my friends", and would continue to do so if they 
persisted in quarelling with. him. He expected the friends 
of government to do well at the polls. The Whigs were 
"afraid of a change of Members in many Towns. " 
18 The 
power of the "faction", he concluded, was "dying but it dies 
hard. " 19 
The radical Whig writers made a concerted effort to damage 
the electoral chances of the friends of government over the 
question of the Governor's salary. 
20 And it was claimed 
that not only Hutchinson but Secretary Flucker and Lieutenant- 
Governor Oliver were to receive awards from the Crown. 
21 
The election had mixed fortunes for the friends of government. 
Eleven Tories were returned to the House, a net gain of three 
members. Among them were five rescinders ousted in 1768 
and 1769 (John Calef, Matthew Mayhew, Josiah Edson, Chillingsworth 
Foster and Israel Williams ). Back into the House for 
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the first time since 1767 came Colonel Thomas Gilbert, an influential 
landowner from Freetown. The election of such prominent 
Tories as Gilbert and Edson led John Adams to conclude that 
in some parts of the province the power of the Whigs was on 
the wane. But the Tories position in the House was 
weakened by the loss of Timothy Ruggles and Daniel Oliver Jr., 
for Hardwick did not return any representatives in 1771. 
Once more, Hutchinson was disappointed that the moderates and 
Tories in the Boston town meeting did not put up a better show: 
Otis, Cushing, Hancock and Sam Adams were re-elected with 
near equal votes. 
22 (See Appendix B and Table 2, p. 86. ) 
The first session of the new House was short, but the 
radicals and their associates were still in the driving seat. 
On June 19, the House passed another protest about meeting 
at Cambridge. Hutchinson estimated that one-third of the 
members opposed its adoption and two-thirds supported it. 
On July 5, -he prorogued the General Court, and the Housedid 
not meet again until April 8,1772.23 
During 1770, Hutchinson had gained the confidence of 
the moderate Whig councillors, and in 1771 he managed to win 
the active co-operation of the Board. Hutchinson well 
knew that whenever the-General Court was not in session, 
the Council had been meeting separately without him for the 
purposes of instructing their agent, William Bollan. But 
like Francis Bernard in 1768, Hutchinson was prepared to acquiesce 
in the Council's unconstitutional procedures because, as he 
wrote in April 1771, the "Council are very nearly right" in 
attitude. 
24 Plainly, he had no desire to alienate the 
moderates as Bernard had done; since the Board had not asserted 
any "right" to meet without him in legislative sessions and 
defended their actions on the grounds of expediency, Hutchinson 
informed the members that he was prepared to tolerate their 
behaviour on condition that the councillors' reports were tabled 
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at formal meetings for approval. 
25 
However, Hutchinson's refusal to assent to any bills 
providing for Bollan's salary irked the moderates and the radicals. 
Further provocation came on July 18, when he laid before the 
Board royal instructions from Hillsborough condemning the appointment 
of a separate agent and exhorting them. to cease holding meetings at 
which the Governor was not present. 
26 But the instructions 
proved to be only a minor irritation to the Council's working 
relationship with Hutchinson. In September, Hutchinson 
wrote that "Most of the Council who were offended with Mr. 
Bernard have changed their Temper and behaviour but they dare 
27 
not openly oppose the leaders of the Faction. " 
In the Massachusetts Spy of November 14, Joseph Greenleaf 
as "Muscius Scaevola" delivered a stinging attack upon the 
Governor and the moderate councillors. Hutchinson was 
a "usurper" of the people's authority by removing the General 
Court from its traditional meeting place of Boston to Cambridge. 
"Scaevola" also protested that Hutchinson's recent proclamation 
calling for the Massachusetts clergy to offer prayers for peace 
in the province on Thanksgiving Day (November 21) gave the 
misleading impression that the province was in a state of turmoil 
and uproar. Another Whig, "Fidelis", claimed that this 
proposal originated with one of the councillors and that it 
had been supported by at least six other members of the Board. 
28 
Hutchinson was outraged. The "Scaevola" letter was 
reprinted in the first issue of the pro-government paper The 
Censor. founded-. by Hutchinson and Andrew Oliver. According 
to the editorial, it was an example of the "unbridled ambition, 
and daring phrenzy of aspiring demagogues" who "take pleasure 
29 in producing disorder in the machine of government. " 
The majority of councillors shared this view and agreed to 
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Hutchinson's request that Greenleaf be dismissed from his post 
of Justice of the Peace for Plymouth County. Never before 
had the Board agreed to annul the commission of a Whig J. P. 
Attorney-General Jonathan Sewall served the printer of the 
Massachusetts Spy, Isaiah Thomas, with a writ for libel, but 
a Grand Jury refused to support the indictment. 
30 
The "Scaevola" incident prompted Tories to take up their 
pens in defence of the Governor and Council. The most notable 
efforts came from Andrew Oliver as "Freeman" and Rev. Henry 
Caner as "Chronus". 
31 
Their thoughts ranged over a number 
of issues and codified, rationalized and arranged the main 
aspects of Tory ideology that had appeared in the 1760s. 
Following the Whigs' assault on the prerogative rights 
of the Governor and his duty to obey royal instructions, the 
Tories examined the sources from which the Whigs derived their 
arguments. The Massachusetts Charter, they maintained, 
was not a compact or an express contract in the Lockean mould 
that preserved the "inalienable" rights of the colonists to 
tax themselves or to decide where their assembly should meet. 
On the contrary, the Charter established the limits of their 
liberties and their subjection to Parliamentary authority in 
all matters; ipso facto, William III and Mary were never in 
a position to grant anything to the colonists that abrogated 
the prerogative of the Crown and the sovereignty of the King- 
in-Parliament. 32 "Freeman" catalogued the House's dispute 
with Hutchinson over meeting at Cambridge and defended the 
Governor's actions on the basis of his prerogative powers which 
he derived from the Charter, the Crown and royal instructions. 
33 
"Chronus" suggested that those who questioned the authority of the 
instructions were challenging the very foundation of the provincial 
government and denying "the authenticity of every act of those 
who derive their authority from his approbation or appointment. " 
The simple fact of life in Massachusetts was that royal instructions 
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and the powers of the Governor were the last remaining counter- 
weights to the popular party in the General Court and town 
meetings. In upholding the doctrine of the inviolability 
of Parliamentary supremacy, the Tories believed they were reiterating 
a common creed and widely held opinion that an "imperium in 
imperio" - or dual sovereignty - could not exist within the 
same empire. 
34 But they fully realised the unpopularity 
of this view in America. One reason for-. the radicals' electoral 
successes was their ability to convince voters that the Tories' 
arguments were reducible to the discredited Hobbeslian doctrines 
of passive obedience and non-resistance to established governments 
and authorities. 
35 
"Chronus" and "Freeman" reaffirmed their faith in the 
political leadership of the Massachusetts gentry, not all of 
whom had succumbed to the spell of liberty. 
36 It was 
the duty of the wealthy landowners and merchants and of everyone 
in the colony "to support the laws and dignity of that Government 
which protects you, and secures you to the quiet possession 
of your property. " 
37 "Such men", according to "Freeman", 
"in cases of real grievance, are most likely to procure redress 
if the people can be persuaded to listen to them" and adopt 
moderate petitions and remonstrances. 
38 
There were several inconsistencies and weak arguments 
in the Tories' case which the Whigs were quick to uncover. 
The General Court, noted Sam Adams (as "Candidus"), had sent 
numerous petitions to Parliament that had little effect on 
the decisions of M. P. s or ministers. Petitioning was 
a slow, cumbersome and unreliable process to obtain a redress 
of grievances, and petitions had been rendered ineffective 
by the misrepresentations contained in the Governor's covering 
letters. Here, Adams was on solid ground, for he could 
cite the failure of the House of Commons to admit the colonies' 
remonstrances against the Revenue Act and Stamp Duty, and the 
misrepresentations contained in Bernard's letters to Hillsborough 
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of 1768 as hard evidence. 
39 
The writings of "Chronus" and "Freeman" and the apparent 
willingness of the Council to co-operate with Governor Hutchinson 
were, for the Tories, the brightest moments in an otherwise 
dull, tense political climate. Hutchinson's next 
step was to try and win the active political support of 
the friends of government and the moderates in the 
General Court. But that, as it had been for Francis 
Bernard, proved to be no easy task. 
2. The Moderate Revival in the General Court, April-July 1772. 
When the House elected in 1771 met for its second session 
on April 8,1772, its members were still in a belligerent mood 
at having been called to Cambridge. Hutchinson answered 
their remonstrances with a high-handed declaration of his duty 
to obey royal instructions, and reminded the representatives 
that their continual protests would change neither his mind 
nor those of British ministers. However, he intimated 
that should they desist from challenging the King's prerogative 
to direct colonial governors he would give their request to 
return to Boston serious consideration. 
40 This offer 
was made on Hutchinson's own discretion without the prior approval 
of the Earl of Hillsborough. 
41 
Hutchinson found a receptive audience among the moderates 
and discontented Whigs. John Hancock, who, since the end 
of the Non-Importation Controversy had become dissatisfied 
with his role in the protest movement, introduced a motion 
that the assembly should return to Boston on the grounds that 
it was inconvenient to conduct its business and affairs elsewhere. 
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It was "opposed with firmness" by Sam Adams and his followers, 
for whom approval was held to be "tacitly giving up our own main 
principles" that had feulR d the dispute over the last two years. 
42 
Hancock's proposal, although supported by many moderates, was 
narrowly defeated (by "3 or 4 voices" according to Hutchinson 
or a majority of 9 according to Adams ). 
43 Heartened by 
the response of the moderates, Hutchinson reiterated his willingness 
to return the Court to Boston in his speech to the House of 
April 25, with which he also prorogued the assembly. 
44 
Hutchinson's conditional offer was made in what he believed 
was an atmosphere more conducive to compromise than before, 
and was a ploy to woo the moderates away from the radicals. 
45 
It 
was notan admission of defeat, for the Governor would brook no 
concession on the principles involved.. 
46 
Throughout this dispute, Hutchinson's stance had won the approbation of 
the North administration, 
47 
yet this alone had never been 
sufficient inducement for the deputies to return to a "just 
sense" of their duties. Now, as all could see, the Whigs 
were dividing amongst themselves, and Hutchinson was convinced 
that sooner or later the few Tories left in the House would 
emerge to lead the moderates and end the dominance of the radicals, 
whose stubborness was perpetuating the dispute. At this 
juncture, therefore, Hutchinson's proposition served the purpose 
of indicating to the moderates and "potential" friends of 
government that he was the only party who desired an end to 
the controversy, however false such a supposition actually may have 
been. "My intention in this... proceeding, " he wrote, "was 
to shew the People of the Province the strict regard I paid 
to His Majestys Instructions and to strengthen me to resist 
any future attempts to induce me to depart from them in other 
Instances. " 48 
Hutchinson knew from bitter experience how fickle the 




on the Tories to attend debates "when they... (were] most wanted. " 
Once again, the Whigs mounted a vigorous anti-Tory campaign 
against the friends of government. 
50 But the May elections 
boosted Hutchinson's hopes of a moderate revival in the House. 
The total number of Tories returned remained the same, eleven, 
and the potential leaders of a coalition were all re-elected: 
John Worthington, Israel Williams and Thomas Gilbert. 
This time around, however, many more moderates were elected, 
although exactly how many cannot be determined. 
51 
Hutchinson believed that this group of Tories and moderates, 
some friends of government others not, could join forces in 
a pro-government coalition,. despite the fact that the friends 
of government had not won a significant victory in the House 
since they managed to delay the adoption of the circular letter 
in January 1768. "We don't yet know our strength", he 
confessed to Francis Bernard. 
52 
Hutchinson counted on winning the support of the moderate 
councillors who had drifted in and out of the government camp 
over the years if the radicals continued to question and challenge 
the extent of Britain's authority in the colonies. He told 
Bernard that "Brattle, Gray and [Stephen] Hall are firm friends 
to government. " 
53 
The moderates were tired of the altercations 
between the Governor and the House and alarmed at the extremist 
doctrines put forward by both sides in the heat of the arguments. 
Harrison Gray explained his position to the exiled Whig John 
Boylston: 
you must not expect that I dabble in 
politics my Situation being such as would 
render it imprudent in me to interest 
my self in the quarrel of hot headed 
politicians 54 
Gray and Brattle were ridiculed for their moderatism as "Mrs. Gray" 
and "Madam Brattle". 
55 
For a moment, Hutchinson hoped 
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that the growing opposition to the radicals would be enough 
to persuade even James Bowdoin to give up the protests. 
Further encouragement came with the news that Bowdoin's Bon- 
in-law John Temple, Hutchinson's and Bernard's adversary had 
beenrecently appointed Surveyor-General of Customs in England. 
56 
But it was not to be, and Bowdoin remained a political enemy. 
More was expected of John Hancock, following his split with Sam 
Adams and other radicals. In May, Hutchinson informed 
Bernard that he had "settled it some months ago to accept Hancock" 
into the Council if the House elected him again. Hancock 
was elected, but refused to take his seat on the Board. 
57 
Neverthless, Hancock and Speaker Thomas Cushing visited 
Hutchinson before the General Court met on May 30 and inquired 
upon what terms he would consent to the assembly being returned 
to Boston. The Governor told them that the conditions 
had not changed since he had first made the proposition: "if 
there was anything in their Address or Message which tended 
to a denial of the Kings Authority to give Instructions to 
the Governor I would not consent to it. " But to appease 
the moderates and "to save appearances" for Hancock and Cushing, 
he promised not to renege on his part of the bargain if the 
address included the claim, made customary by previous Houses, 
that the Governor only had a right to remove the Court from 
Boston . in cases of necessity. Cushing and Hancock, continued 
Hutchinson, "encouraged me they would comply with my proposal 
if Mr. [Sam] Adams did not prevent it,,. 
58 Evidently, if 
Hutchinson's testimony is correct, Cushing and Hancock had 
taken the bait of compromise which he had laid in April and 
were prepared to defy Adams and the radicals in an effort 
to end the dispute over the *removal of the General Court. 
The Governor must have been elated, for the temporary defection 
from the radicals of the two Bostonians solved the immediate 




His next step was to make a plea to the members for con- 
ciliation: "I formed my Speech so as to avoid obliging them 
being a new House to take notice of any thing which had passed 
in former Assemblies. " It was a time to wipe the slate 
clean for the moderates, and Hutchinson restated his position 
concerning the Court being returned to Boston. 
59 The 
Council warmed to his proposal and suggested that a joint committee 
of the two chambers be appointed to prepare a reply to Hutchinson. 
But the representatives rejected this offer and appointed Sam 
Adams to a House committee to draw up the message. 
60 
The friends of government were unable to prevent the House 
approving the document prepared by Adams, which declared that 
the sole intention of the Governor in making the proposal was 
to obtain from the members "an explicit submission" to the Crown's 
prerogative and authority of Parliament; the removal of the 
assembly in the first place was totally injustified. 
Hutchinson thus refused to consent to an adjournment to Boston, 
although he did not prorogue the Court as he had threatened 
to do. 61 
Shortly thereafter, Hutchinson's hopes of building a 
pro-government coalition party were dealt a severe blow. 
News arrived in Boston confirming earlier reports that Hutchinson 
was to receive a gubernatorial salary from the Crown. The 
Whigs in the House were furious, and on June 6a committee enquired 
of Hutchinson whether he had already accepted the offer. 
Seven days later, Hutchinson confessed that he had received notice 
of the Crown's intention to make a provision for his salary, 
and for that reason must decline the annual award made by the 
62 
province. 
Hutchinson refused to postpone the controversy over his 
salary by proroguing the assembly. "A Dissolution would 
have/ 
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have done no good, " he told John Pownall, "but on the contrary 
might have lost me those good men who are now of the (louse 
upon a new Election. " 
63 As a matter of political expediency, 
Hutchinson relinquished the terms of concession that he demanded of 
the House in spite of Adams's most recent challenge to the 
royal prerogative. In taking this decision, Hutchinson's 
overriding concern was to placate the moderates in the House 
and Council whose support he was in danger of losing following 
the revelations about his Crown salary. 
64 
Hutchinson was well aware of the fact that the moderates and 
some of his oldest allies (including Israel Williams) were 
opposed to the idea of the Governor being made "independent" 
of the people and their representatives. 
65 Moreover, 
said Hutchinson, in the summer of 1772, "the friends of government 
in general pressed me to some expedient" and urged him to return 
the Court to Boston in-an attempt to assuage the growing Number of 
critics.. At first, Hutchinson "gave. them no encouragement. " 
66 
But after a few days, he consulted with the Council and laid before 
the members all the instructions and addresses relevant to 
the dispute on the removal of the assembly. To his relief, 
the councillors agreed unanimously that the House had now ceased 
to question the King's authority to instruct his Governors. 
They made no comment or objection relating to the contents of 
the House's last address. 
67 
On June 13, in the same breath 
that he admitted he was in receipt of a Crown salary, Hutchinson 
adjourned the General Court to Boston. 68 
Soon after the assembly convened at Boston, Hutchinson's 
hopes of winning the allegiance of the majority of members 
over the salary issue were quickly dashed. 
On July 3, the House approved a report berating the Governor 
for accepting the Crown's award. It was prepared by a 
committee of radicals (Sam Adams, Joseph Hawley and John Hancock, 
now/ 
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now reconciled with Adams ). The report contained four 
resolutions, the first of which asserted that Crown salaries 
for senior executives in the provincial administration were 
an "infraction" of the legislature's prerogative to provide 
financial support for the Governor and other officials. 
Hutchinson was informed that the House would vote the usual 
annual sum in respect of his salary. 
69 
The Salary Controversy re-united the Whig leadership 
and divided the moderates. When the first resolution was 
discussed by the members 
I 
between thirty and forty voted against 
it and seventy odd in favour of it. 
The minority was the best part of the 
House in the general esteem of the people. 
Several of them thereupon absented themselves 
from the House not thinking it worth 
while to attempt any thing against the 
rest of the proposed Resolves after the 
principal point had been carried. 70 
Seven days later, the House voted 85 votes to 19 in favour of recording 
the resolutions in the House Journals. 
71 (Unfortunately, 
we cannot put names to the division. ) Hutchinson reflected 
on the failure - as he saw it - of the moderates to trust 
in 
his leadership and concluded that he had "not known a more 
ordinary performance". The political situation in the 
House was as grim as it, had been in 1765-1766.72 
Once again, Hutchinson blamed his lack of support from 
the moderates on their fear of proscription by the Whigs and 
town meetings and of being associated with unpopular policies 
and ideologies. But he also realised that he himself had 
become a supreme political liability to the friends of government. 
In 1765 and 1766, moderates and neutrals may have been satisfied 
with Hutchinson's and Bernard's denials that they had anything 
to do with the introduction of the Stamp Act. Now, of 
course, / 
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course, Hutchinson could expect little consolation if he was 
to assert that the Crown salary had been forced upon him against 
his wishes. He was, in the end, placed in a situation 
where he had to justify his actions to men whose distaste 
for an expanded colonial civil list precluded any offer of 
political support, even though Hutchinson had met some of their 
other demands by returning the assembly to Boston. 
73 
In the aftermath of the votes, Hutchinson made a gross, 
vacuous error of political judgment. To him, the divisions 
were out of step with the pattern of politics of the past two 
years. He saw no reason to change his opinion that tranquil, ty 
would prevail when the radicals in the House had been subdued, 
by whatever means possible, on the basis of this one recent, 
untypical incident. The resolutions sprang "from an unhappy 
deluded set of Men intimidated by a few among them"; 
74 
whereas 
"the body of the people are less unfavourably disposed to government 
and especially to me personally that they have been for 7 years 
. past. 
" 75 Hutchinson calculated errone6usly that nearly 
100 representatives (out of a total of 129) would have voted 
against adoptino. the resolutions and entering them in the Journals 
had not doing so entailed the threat of being "branded as Tories 
and left out of the House next year. " 
76 Never before had 
either Hutchinson or Bernard commanded the almost unanimous 
support' of the House; nor would Hutchinson have been likely 
to acquire it on such a contentious issue. 
Hutchinson was convinced that if he reassured the moderates 
of his true intentions in taking the Crown award then they 
would not desert him entirely and could, perhaps, be won over 
to his point of view. He took a leaf out of Bernard's 
book and decided to make an "argumentative speech" to the assembly. 
It was not something Hutchinson relished, or a political tactic 
that he approved of. He had warned Bernard often against 
such/ 
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such ventures because they could be counter-productive: the 
Governor stood an equal chance of alienating some members as 
he did of attracting their support; the clearer he made his 
position on any particular issue, the easier it became for 
the radicals to turn his arguments against him and "pervert" 
the minds of hitherto friendly members. Nevertheless, 
Hutchinson believed that he had to take extraordinary steps 
to counter the contentious, extremist doctrines set forth in 
the July resolutions and persuade the representatives of his 
rectitude in accepting a Crown salary. And, as always, 
whatever action he took against the radicals and the Whig 
protest movement would go a long way to averting reprisals 
from the British Parliament. 77 
The speech Hutchinson delivered to the General Court 
on July 14 was designed to achieve the maximum effect possible. 
It was in essence, like Bernard's address to the assembly of 
September 25,1765, an attempt to provide both a political 
and an ideological focal point for the opposition to the radical 
Whigs. Hutchinson drew heavily on his own ordered, conservative- 
liberal political philosophy. He dissected and examined 
Tory doctrines and covered them with a popular Lockean gloss 
until they formed an intellectually coherent pattern that others 
could follow easily- and be inspired by. 
78 
For Hutchinson, the resolutions contained a number of 
false suppositions that threatened "to alter the constitutional 
dependence" of Massachusetts and the colonies upon the crown 
and the King-in-Parliament. The assertion of the House 
that it possessed a right to support the Governor challenged 
the sovereignty of Parliament to make laws binding on the province. 
It was fallacious to conceive the Charter to be a "pacts convents... 
or covenants settled by treaty between two independent states", 
when in fact it did not contain any provision of legislative 
powers/ 
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powers of self-government that were independent of the supreme 
authority of Parliament within the empire: an Imperium in imperio 
could not exist in one state. Hutchinson also made an 
oblique reference to the war with Spain over the Falkland Islands 
and reminded the members that the colonies were heavily dependent 
on Britain for military protection and that it was the duty 
of all Americans to contribute toward the cost of this defence. 
The House was "equally unfortunate" in its notions of the balance 
of powers in the constitution. It was the "concurrence 
of all the branches" - the King, Lords and Commons - and not 
so much their rigid separation, that made for the excellence 
of the British system both in Great Britain and the colonies. 
A Governor in the pay of the Crown would not alter substantially 
this arrangement, for the same historic checks and balances 
on the power of each branch would continue to exist. Indeed, 
the executive would be emancipated from one unfair aspect of 
control and influence possessed by the legislature. "Is 
it not reasonable"?, he asked, that the Governor "should be 
entitled to the like share of the freedom and independence, 
in the exercise of his judgment with the other branches? " 
After he had delivered the speech, Hutchinson prorogued 
the assembly and settled down to assess the impact 
of his discourses. 79 
3. Hutchinson, the Friends of Government and the Salary Controvers 
1772-1773. 
j 
Hutchinson was unable to silence his critics in the Boston 
press. His efforts to attract supporters were severely damaged 
when the dispute over his Crown salary took a new twist in 
late September, with the news arriving in Boston that the Judges 
of the Superior Court, the Attorney-General and the Solicitor- 
General/ 
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General were also to receive awards. 
80 The new arrangements 
were approved by William Legge, Lord Dartmouth, who succeeded 
Hillsborough as American Secretary in August. 
81 The Whigs, 
however, mounted an Ultimately successful campaign to prevent 
the Judges from retaining their awards, in which they were 
able to stifle the opposition provided by the friends of government 
and Governor Hutchinson. 
Sam Adams and the Boston radicals "thought it proper 
to take, what the Tories apprehend[ed] to be, leading steps" 
in organising the resistance to this latest attack on their 
liberties. 82 When Hutchinson rebuked the Boston town 
meeting for asking him to confirm reports concerning the awards 
made, to the Judges, an extraordinary meeting was called for 
November 2. It was decided to appoint a twenty-one man 
committee of correspondence to elicit support from the other 
towns of Massachusetts and towns in other colonies. Initially, 
Hutchinson underestimated the importance of this new body; 
it was, after all, only one of the many quasi-political organisations 
used by the Whigs. But the committee soon became the most 
influential of any of these bodies as it managed to co-ordinate 
the resistance movement's activities in the House of Representatives, 
Boston, other towns and other colonies. 
83 
One of the first tasks of the Boston committee of correspondence 
was to prepare three important documents for publication: "The 
State of the Rights of the Colonists"; its appendix "The Enumeration 
of the Violations of our Rights"; and a "Letter of Correspondence" 
to the Massachusetts towns. These documents were approved 
by the town meeting on November 30, and together were distributed 
to all the towns and districts in the province. Known popularly 
as the "Boston Pamphlet", its formal title was The Votes and 
Proceedings of the Town of Boston. 
84 
The "Boston Pamphlet" did not contain any new theory 
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or analysis of colonial rights. It reiterated the basic 
principles of Whig constitutional-political thinking from the 
time of John Locke as they applied to the colonists' grievances 
with British policies, 1764-1772. By accepting Crown salaries, 
the Judges and Governor would be breaking their contractual 
obligations to serve the people and their representatives in the 
assembly. 
85 The Pamphlet also contained a paragraph justifying 
the use of anti-Toryism in the proposed campaign of defiance 
and resistance. 
86 In asking the towns to submit their 
opinions on the Pamphlet, Boston did not request them 
to appoint committees of correspondence but instead "relied 
upon the force of example". 
87 
While the Pamphlet circulated through the province, the 
friends of government'rallied support against the Boston radicals 
principally on the issues of whether or not their towns should 
approve this latest statement of their rights and liberties 
and appoint committees of correspondence. 
In general, Tories and dissident moderates remained silent 
on the rights and wrongs of the Judges' or the Governor's Crown 
salaries. As with the Stamp Act, they saw no reason to 
defend in public a measure to which they were opposed,. even 
though they saw again the necessity of defending British authority. 
Samuel Adams's associates relayed information to Boston stating 
that'even the Tories [by which was also meant the dissident 
88 Whigs]... exclaim against the Independency of the Judges. " 
At Cambridge on December 14, councillor William Brattle 
"spake... very freely" on the Boston Pamphlet. He warned 
his neighbours that they were "too premature in acting upon 
this Matter, at present. " Brattle "was not alone in this 
Sentiment". As a solution to the controversy, he proposed 
that the General Court should increase the Judges's salaries 
"suitable to the Dignity and Importance of their Station". 
With/ 
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With an adequate income provided by the province, the Judges 
would surely decline the Crown's award. The proposal was 
rejected by the people of Cambridge, 
89 
although it was also 
made by friends of government elsewhere. 
90 Brattle did 
not approve of the Crown's provision for the Judges, but was 
looking for a way to avert conflict with Britain over this 
latest reform of the colonial system. In a series of letters 
written to John Adams and published in the press, Brattle argued 
that in accordance with existing constitutional theory and 
law, it was impossible to say for certain whether the Crown 
salaries were conditional on the Judges'"good behaviour", as 
Adams and the Whigs believed, or whether they were made for 
the duration of their appointments. 
91 
The efforts of the friends of government throughout the province 
were geared to convincing the moderates to abandon the radicals 
and ignore their call to resist British authority. "Q. E. D. " 
maintained that the refusal of wealthy merchants John Hancock 
and William Phillips, and the Speaker of the House Thomas Cushing 
to serve on the Boston committee of correspondence was evidence 
of a growing distaste for political extremism. 
92 Twenty- 
nine inhabitants of Marblehead, including Tories Thomas Robie 
and Jacob Fowle and moderates Jeremiah Lee and Robert Hooper, 
subscribed to a protest denouncing the ': irregular" proceedings 
of the town meeting of December 8 in voting its approval of the 
"Boston Pamphlet" and appointing a committee of correspondence. 
The protesters were "apprehensive that this town will incur 
a great degree of public censure" by its recent actions. 
93 
A "number of Frceholders" of Roxbury also declared their opposition 
to the Pamphlet and the Boston committee in their town meeting. 
94 
Peter Oliver reported that the people of Bridgewater, Taunton, and 
Middleborough were much divided in sentiment, 
95 
although the first 
two later voted their approval of the Pamphlet. In Littleton, 
Jeremiah Dummer Rogers urged the people to reject Boston's 
ideas and committee, but he was overruled and the town chose 
its own committee. 
96 These were isolated incidents where 
the/ 
293 
the friends of government were able to delay but never prevent 
the adoption of the "Boston Pamphlet" or the appointment of 
local committees of correspondence. Thomas Hutchinson 
estimated that by the new year around eighty towns had considered 
the Pamphlet and "declared against the supremacy of Parliament 
by adopting the resolves of Boston or by express resolves of 
their own. " 
97 
To Hutchinson, the "Boston Pamphlet" was plainly seditious. 
It contained "many Principles inferring Independence" which 
conviced him of the necessity of "immediate[ly] interposing". 
98 
He called the General Court together for January 6. He again 
overcame his aversion to making "argumentative speeches" in 
an effort to inspire the moderate representatives to desert 
the radicals and the Whigs who had already endorsed the Pamphlet. 
He thought "a calm and dispassionate State of the case... would 
have a good effect with many of the people who I knew were 
every day through the unwearied pains of the Leaders of [the] 
Opposition made Proselytes to these new opinions in Government. " 
Hutchinson's course was plotted with the approval of his advisers 
(probably Andrew Oliver, Peter Oliver and Thomas Flucker), 
who believed that his speech 
would be of great service by opening people's 
eyes and that it would have a lasting 
effect further to expose the absurdity 
of the strange principles in government 
which the greater part of all orders 
of men seem to have embraced through 
an unaccountable infatuation. 100 
99 
Hutchinson was no barrator. His speech, though much 
longer than was usual, was concise and to the point: it was 
like a schoolmaster's lecture. He stated his case forcefully, 
never pausing to examine in depth the doctrines he espoused 
or those of the Whigs he chose to mention. 
He began with the settlement of the colony by the Puritans. 
"It/ 
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"It was the sense of the kingdom, that they were to remain 
subject to the supreme authority of Parliament" when Charles 
I issued the colony's first charter of government. The 
Boston resolves, he interjected, denied that supremacy and 
promoted ideas "repugnant to the principles of the constitution". 
The rights of Englishmen, he continued, were not the same in 
all parts of the empire. But this did not infringe upon 
the colonists', natural rights: it was one case from every 
day life where people were required to submit to restraints 
upon their liberties in order that government could function 
properly. At bottom, however, Hutchinson knew "of no line 
that can be drawn between the supreme authority of Parliament 
and the total independence of the colonies. " As he had 
already said, "it is impossible [that] there should be two 
independent Legislatures in one and the same state. " 
Nor could Hutchinson agree with the Whigs that the "mere exercise" 
of Parliament's supremacy, whether in matters of taxation or 
otherwise, justified resitance to Britain. Most moderates 
and Tories would have agreed with him when he stated that objections 
to a specific act of ParliamentWJeVt not "sufficient ground 
for immediately denying or renouncing the authority [of Parliament], 
or refusing to submit to it. " The address restated the 
Tory doctrine that resistance to Parliamentary authority was 
productive of social and political discontent, ' which could be 
prevented if people were prepared to endure the implementation 
of offensive acts whilst petitioning for their repeal. 
101 
The Council's reply was delivered on January 25. 
It had been prepared by James Bowdoin and accepted without 
demur by the other councillors. 
102 According to Hutchinson, 
while "disavowing in express terms Independence on (of] the Parliament", 
it contained doctrines which "seem to infer it". 
103 From 
the Council's point of view, Hutchinson entertained the idea 
that Parliamentary authority in the colonies and the empire 
was "unlimited", when in fact its exercise was limited by a 
number/ 
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number of considerations; not the least of which were their 
natural and constitutional rights to consent to legislation 
passed by Parliament that concerned them. The Board 
also countered Hutchinson's Tory logic by stating that in the 
past ten years the disorders in the province had never threatened 
the foundations of government or the structure of society, 
but were instead an "effect" of an "original cause" - namely, 
Britain's attempt to deny Americans the full exercise of their 
constitutional and political rights. 
104 
The House's reply was prepared principally by Sam Adams 
and Joseph Hawley, and was a more radical document than the 
Council's. Worried that support for the Massachusetts 
Whigs was dropping off in other colonies and alarmed that Hutchinson 
might attract support from the moderates in the House, the 
radicals issued a clear statement of their views regarding 
the supremacy and authority of Parliament in the colonies: 
all interested parties would now know where they stood. 
105 
When the first charter was drawn up, Hutchinson was informed, 
New England had not been annexed to the realm. Therefore, 
the colonists were not subject to the sovereignty of Parliament 
when they were granted powers of self-government by Charles 
I, "the power and authority of Parliament, being constitutionally 
confined within the limits of the realm, and the nation collectively. " 
Hutchinson's reasoning was erroneous for it "puts it in the 
power of Parliament to bind us by as many laws as they please, 
and even to restrain us from making any laws at all.... (The] 
consequence is, either that the colonies are the vassals of 
the Parliament, or that they are totally independent". 
106 
Both the House and Council, concluded Hutchinson, were now 
prepared to challenge the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy 
in the colonies "upon such principles and such reasoning as 
must bring great dishonour upon them. " 
107 
The House and the Council embarked on a course of confrontation 
with Governor Hutchinson over the Salary Controversy and the 
wider/ 
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wider question of Parliamentary supremacy in which few dissentient 
voices were heard. 
The usual grants to the executive officers and the Judges 
of the Superior Court had already been made by the House with 
the Council's concurrence. 
108 When Hutchinson refused 
to assent to the bills, Secretary Flucker was called before 
the House. He told the members that Hutchinson had approved 
all the grants except those to the Judges. On February 
3, in response to an enquiry from the House, Hutchinson delivered 
a message stating that while he knew that Crown salaries would 
be distributed to the Judges , he had, as yet, no knowledge 
of when the payments would be made. 
109 
At first, it would seem that Hutchinson was determined 
to avoid a confrontation with the House. He had no plans 
to make another "argumentative speech" until the end. of the 
session, if at all. "But the few friends of Government 
pressed me... to it by urging that if I gave no opportunity 
for considering the [House's] reply [to his speech of January 
6] the construction among the people would be that I was afraid 
of their remarks upon the reply. " 
110 
Accordingly, on 
February 16, Hutchinson delivered a long address to the assembly in 
which he examined point by point the replies to his speech, 
and warned the members that their addresses gave encouragement to 
those desiring the independence of the colonies. 
111 
Hutchinson's latest discourse had little effect on the 
opinions of the majority of representatives. On the 19th, 
the Judges' salary bill passed the House in a revised form, 
with increased payments for the Judges. Hutchinson again 
withheld his assent, for not to have done so would "carry with 
it the strongest Appearance of counteracting the King. " 
112 
In retaliation, the House approved a series of resolutions 
on March 3 condemning the Crown's provisions for the Judges 
as unconstitutional. 
113 Soon after, Hutchinson ended 
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the session with another speech cataloguing "a few plain fundamental 
Principles of Government which carry within themselves such 
Evidence as cannot be resisted". 
114 An intellectual impasse 
had been reached with the Governor and his advisers defending 
the legislative supremacy of Parliament in the colonies, and 
the radicals in the House asserting that such a notion of unlimited 
sovereignty was inconsistent and incompatible with their inter- 
pretation of the colonists' political and constitutional rights. 
The ideological middle ground was fast disappearing. 
Hutchinson made few friends from his exchanges with the 
General Court. On May 28, the House voted on the suggestion 
of the Virginia House of Burgesses that a standing committee 
of correspondence be appointed by each of the colonial assemblies. 
This latest effort to organise intercolonial resistance was 
opposed by only four representatives: Abijah White, Thomas 
Gilbert, Jeremiah Learned and John Murray. 
115 Hutchinson 
was also unsuccessful in his attempt to inspire a conservative- 
moderate backlash against the Whigs in the towns over the "Boston 
Pamphlet", the committee of correspondence and the resolves 
of the House. By April, 119 of the province's 260 towns 
and districts had responded to Boston's enquiries; 25 more 
would do so in the next five months. The overwhelming 
majority expressed their support for the Boston Whigs and rejected 
the authority of Parliament to tax them and the authority of 
the Crown to pay the Superior Court Judges. 
116 Tory and 
moderate opposition to the Whigs was isolated and sporadic 
during 1773, as it had been in 1772. Middleborough, the 
home of Peter Oliver Sr., and Springfield, represented by John 
Worthington, were two towns that repudiated the Pamphlet. 
117 
In Barnstable, the town's representative, Edward Bacon, gathered 
much support to prevent the formation of a local committee 
of correspondence. 
118 
But there was no widespread or 
co-ordinated opposition to the Whigs from the friends of government. 
Hutchinson was one of the last observers to realise that 
the/ 
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the moderates hitherto loyal to the protest movement could 
not be won over by the rallying call of the doctrine of Parliamentary 
supremacy. Tories and most of the moderates who had already 
broken with the Whig leadership accepted and endorsed Hutchinson's 
views; but not the others. After seven or eight years 
of political, ideological, social, economic and constitutional 
conflicts, in which the moderates in general never questioned 
the inviolability of Parliamentary sovereignty, they were now being 
told that their defence of the colony's right of self-taxation 
and their opposition to the Crown's provisions for the Judges 
and Governor were disloyal and potentially subversive of all 
bonds that tied them to the Mother Country. The moderates 
in the assembly and towns did not necessarily reject Parliament's th 
superintending authority and supremacy, butA 
ýd 
nothing to 
oppose the radicals who were intent on asserting Massachusetts's 
legislative independence. Once again, it was clear that 
political action on behalf of the government did not materialise 
in response to the ideological divisions that prevailed in 
the province. 
4. The Political Destruction of Thomas Hutchinson. 
The Earl of Dartmouth and the North administration viewed 
the scene in Massachusetts with increasing consternation. 
Dartmouth was worried that Hutchinson's "argumentative speeches" 
to the House over the salary issue had exacerbated the conflict 
with the colonies. In late February, Hutchinson received 
a letter from Dartmouth dated December 9,1772, from 
which he - deduced that the British government tacitly approved of 
his strategy of confrontation. 
119 
It did not, however, 
and Hutchinson was commanded to desist from making "argumentative 
speeches" to the General Court. The instruction, according 




he felt he had been betrayed by the ministry. Hutchinson 
hurriedly dispatched his apologies to Dartmouth along with 
a justification of his conduct. 
120 Dartmouth further 
undermined Hutchinson's credibility when he by-passed official 
channels to send a "private and confidential" letter to Speaker 
Thomas Cushing expressing his concern at the "unhappy spirit 
of disunion and dissatisfaction" in Massachusetts and calling 
for peace. 
121 
What little credibility Hutchinson had left was destroyed 
by the publication of his-'correspondence with Thomas Whately of 
1767-1768, in which he had urged the reform of the structure 
of government in the colony to nullify the political power of 
the Whigs and recommended the arrest of the Whig leaders. 
These letters and others written by Andrew Oliver, Charles 
Paxton, Nathaniel Rogers, Robert Auchmuty" and two Rhode Island 
Tories, George Rome and Dr. Thomas Moffat, had been acquired 
by the House's agent Benjamin Franklin who dispatched them 
to Thomas Cushing in December 1772. In the hands of the 
Whigs, the letters were political dynamite, and their contents 
enough to convince the majority of moderates that the Governor 
fully intended to support moves to abridge their Charter rights 
and privileges. 
122 
Cushing laid the letters before the House on June 2. 
(Their contents were already common knowledge among the Whig 
leadership. ) After the public galleries were cleared, 
it was resolved by 101 votes to 5 that their "Tendency and 
Design" was to "overthrow" the constitutional arrangement. 
Hutchinson protested that the letters simply expressed his 
private opinions.. But on June 16, the House, with the 
concurrence of the Council, passed a series of resolutions 
condemning Hutchinson's conspiratorial actions and drew up 
a petition to the King calling for the removal of both Hutchinson 
and Lieutenant-Governor Oliver. Only twelve representatives 
voted against the measures (5 Tories and 7 moderates. ). 
Copies of the letters and the resolutions were published in 
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the province newspapers and distributed to the towns by the 
Boston committee of correspondence. 
123 
In Hutchinson's opinion, Sam Adams and "half a dozen 
or half a score" of Whigs had concocted this "barbarous conspiracy" 
to destroy his reputation. 
124 He realised. how 
successful they were in doing this. and also in turning 
the moderates against him for good. He thought it 
would be "to no good purpose" to engage in a lengthy defence 
of himself and his ideas. The resolves passed by the 
Council he considered the "most injurious", for they brought 
to an end his working relationship with the Board. 
125 
"* ***** 
Thomas Hutchinson recognised more than most observers 
the deep ideological and political divisions that existed in 
Massachusetts and how the return to political stability greatly 
depended on his attempt to bring together in. an anti-radical 
coalition the'Tories, dissident moderate-Whigs and moderates 
hitherto loyal to the Whig cause. His main objective was) 
and continued to bey"to reconcile to each other the friends 
of government and those moderate opposers of it [the provincial 
government] who wish to see an end to contention upon reasonable 
terms. " 
126 
In 1771 and 1772, there were indications that 
the political bases for such a broadly based movement existed, 
not the least of which reasons were the defeat of the non-importation 
agreement and the desire of many Whigs to end the disputes- 
between the Governor and the House. The ideological bases for 
such/ 
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such a movement had emerged between 1765 and 1770. 
But the radicals, ably led by the Boston committee of correspon- 
dence, engineered the political destruction of Thomas Hutchinson 
with the exposure of the Hutchinson-Oliver Letters in the summer 
of 1773. Hutchinson's exoneration came from the hand of 
Lord Dartmouth, whose efforts to end the disputes had also 
undermined Hutchinson's credibility, and arrived in the autumn. 
127 
But thereafter, the Governor was a virtual bystander to the 
political developments around him. He had little influence over 
the moderates and the friends of government in the towns, and 
precious few supporters in the General Court. Only 
10 per cent of friends of government were attracted to the 
Governor's cause by the issues of 1772-1773 (see Appendix A ). 
The Boston Tea Party, however, produced a wave of anti-radical 
sentiment in the province and colonies in general and provided 
the friends of government with an opportunity to gather more 
supporters. 
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CHAPTER TEN: THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT, 1774. 
The Boston Tea Party and the introduction of the 
Coercive Acts by the government of Lord North in the spring 
and summer of 1774 polarised ideological-political opinion 
in Massachusetts and the colonies to the extent that the Tories 
and dissident Whigs were able to gather enough support to mount 
a significant challenge to the power and influence of the Whig 
leadership. Their failure, however, to end the dominance 
of the radicals in the towns and districts of the province, 
as had been the case in the General Court, 1765-1773, ultimately 
contributed to the demise of the Loyalist pro-British elements, 
for it denied them a popular political base on which to build 
a counter-revolutionary movement after the commencement 
of military hostilities at Lexington and Concord in April, 
1775. 
1.. The Boston Tea Party and the Friends of Government, 1774. 
By the end of 1772, the East India Company was in the 
midst of a financial crisis. Lord North's ministry intervened 
in its affairs and in May and June 1773 persuaded Parliament 
to pass the Tea Act and the Regulating Act. The Company 
was permitted to send supplies of tea to America free of all 
duties payable in England. This put the Company and its 
agents/ 
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agents in a better position to undercut colonial merchants 
and smugglers of Dutch East India tea. As a matter of 
principle and expediency, the government refused to move for 
a repeal of the Townshend Duty of 3d per pound of tea payable 
in the colonies. (This also applied to the Company. ) 
North and his cabinet had no intention of making any further 
concessions to the Americans after they repealed the other 
Townshend Acts in 1770. The revenue from the Tea Duty 
would also help pay the salaries of senior colonial officials. 
The Company selected firms in Boston, New York, Philadelphia. 
and Charleston to sell and distribute the tea, pay all duties 
and deduct a commission of 6 per cent from the profits. 
The Boston consignees were the firms of Thomas and Elisha 
Hutchinson, Richard Clarke & Sons, and Benjamin Faneuil Jr. 
and Joshua Winslow. They were all large importers of tea, 
I 
and the first two firms were noted supporters of the government. ' 
The first signs of opposition to the new arrangements were 
in New York and Philadelphia. The Whigs of both cities 
threatened to tar and feather anyone who consumed or retailed 
dutied tea. The New York consignees took heed of the warnings 
and resigned their commissions on November 28. Their counter- 
parts in Philadelphia follwed suit the next day. In neither 
case had the shipments of tea yet arrived. 
2 
Throughout the dispute in Boston which culminated in 
the Tea Party, the main grievance of the Whigs was with the 
Townshend Duty and the principle of Parliamentary taxation. 
The North End Caucus, on November 2 and the Boston town meeting 
three days later resolved to prevent all attempts to land or 
vend the East India Company's tea and proscribe as enemies 
to the country persons who would be foolhardy enough to counter- 
act the wishes of the commonweal. The Boston committee of 
correspondence invited the co-operation of the committees and 
people of neighbouring towns, and together they plotted a 
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strategy of resistance. 
3 Until the tea actually arrived 
on Sunday, November 29, the Whigs concentrated their efforts 
on forcing the consignees to resign or give assurances that 
they would not handle the tea when it arrived. Newspaper 
articles, threats of violence and mob attacks on their property 
were tactics employed against the consignees, but without success. 
4 
When the first tea ship, the Dartmouth came into the harbour, 
the consignees fled from Boston for their own safety. 
5 
With the Dartmouth moored, its owner, Francis Rotch, or its captain, 
James Hall, had by law twenty days in which to pay the customs' 
duties (including, of course, the Tea Duty) or the vessel 
and her cargo would be liable to seizure. Henceforth, 
the efforts of the Whigs were directed at preventing Rotch, 
Hall or the consignees unloading the tea and paying the duties. 
A guard was appointed to watch over the Dartmouth. Two 
other tea ships arrived in the meantime: the Eleanor and the 
Beaver; the Wiliam was wrecked on Cape Cod. On December 
16, the day before the duties had to be paid for the Dartmouth, 
Francis Rotch and the captain of the Eleanor, James Bruce, 
finally agreed to return the tea to Britain and seek clearance 
from the customs house without paying the Tea Duty. They 
were refused clearance by both customs officers and Governor 
Hutchinson, and the guns of Castle William were turned to face 
the town and prevent an escape. On hearing 
this news from Rotch, the Body -some 5,000 strong - dispersed 
from Faneuil Hall and made its way to Griffin's wharf to witness 
the destruction of 90,000lbs of dutied tea, worth approximately 
£9,000, by a party of Bostonians dressed up as Mohawk Indians. 
6 
The Boston radicals were unrepentant. Sam Adams, Josiah 
Quincy Jr. and John Adams were three of many who asserted that 
the tea might have been "saved" but for the stubborness of 
the consignees and the refusal of the customs officers and 
the Governor to allow the cargoes to be returned to England. 
7 
In March, the Bostonians destroyed another cargo of dutied tea 
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brought in by the Fortune, which had no connection with the 
East India Company. By the end of 1774, "tea parties" 
had occured in most other colonies where the Company traded. 
8 
During the dispute, the Council had refused to come to the 
aid of the consignees. 
9 And in the aftermath, hitherto 
pro-government councillors sided against the government. 
John Erving and William Brattle joined the radicals in, 
blaming the obstinacy of the consignees and the government 
for creating a dealock that could be broken only by direct 
action. 
10 While they deplored the destruction of private 
property by the radicals, their hostility to the Townshend 
c Duty and their fear of proscription can explain their acquie n nce 
and reluctance to oppose the radicals and the town meeting, 
both during and after the dispute. The Council met at the 
home of William Brattle on December 21 and advised Hutchinson 
that the Attorney-General be directed to inquire into the incident. 
It was a hopeless task, for no witnesses could be found willing 
to testify against the "Mohawks" who destroyed the tea. 
11 
Isaac Royall, however, was sufficiently worried at the possible 
consequences of the Tea Party to send a letter to Lord Dartmouth 
praying for Britain to take "Lenitive, Pacific measures [against 
Boston] rather than warm coercive ones. " 
12 
Governor Hutchinson believed that from the outset of 
the dispute there had been a "concerted plan" to destroy the 
East India Company's tea if the consignees and shipowners did 
not comply with the demands of the Whigs. But with few 
exceptions, no-one in Boston seriously considered such action 
until the arrival of the Dartmouth, and then only as a last 
resort. 
13 
Nonetheless, the Tea Party was one of the most 
important events in the advent of the War of Independence. 
It convinced Tories and government officials that the 
province was on the verge of rebellion, as it had been during 
the crisis year of 1768.14 Such a line of reasoning - equating 
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the weakness of the provincial government to enforce acts of 
Parliament and protect citizens from proscription by the Whigs 
with the potential for a political and social revolution - 
had changed little since 1768-1770. Nathaniel Coffin concluded 
that "The foundation of this formidable [anti-government] power 
was laid at the time of our non-importation Plan... when our 
merchants gave up the direction of their Commerce to the People, 
by a number of Artfull Leaders under the mask of Patriotism. " 
15 
The Tories believed that this most recent outrage, the Boston Tea 
Party, involving as it did the destruction of private property, 
would, unlike the Stamp Act Riots when people were too scared 
to make their views public, provoke a popular conservative- 
moderate backlash against the Whig leadership and the Boston 
radicals in particular. At the same time, the Tories wished 
the British government to take punitive action against the 
radicals responsible for organising the Tea Party and the other 
disturbances over the years. A few approved the retention of 
the Tea Duty as a punishment of sorts, and maintained that 
it would be unwise for the North administration to make further 
concessions to the Americans' demands at this stage; 
16 in 
this, they differed markedly from the majority of friends of government, 
who soon made it clear that the repeal of the Tea Duty was 
essential to the resoration of good relations between Britain 
and the colonies. 
For the first time since the controversies of 1768, the 
friends of government rallied considerable support in the Massachusetts 
towns from those who feared the Boston radicals and the consequences 
of their actions. 
The first protest against the radicals was organised 
in Plymouth on December 13,, tf days before the Boston Tea Party. 
Led by Tories John Winslow and Thomas Foster, forty townspeople 
signed a paper condemning the town meeting for adopting the 
Philadelphia resolves against the Tea Duty and Tea Act six 
days/ 
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days before. The protest held that the Philadelphia resolves 
were "repugnant to our ideas of Liberty, law and reason", particularly 
that clause which justified the proscription of the consignees 
and all persons who handled dutied tea. They applauded 
the efforts of those who, in contrast, "by constitutional and 
lawful means have endeavoured to hinder their proceedings and 
prevent the bad effects thereof, [and] have in this instance 
shewn themselves to be firm friends to the freedom and true 
interests of this Country. " The Plymouth protestors did 
not deny the colonists their right to engage in lawful protests 
over specific acts of Parliament, but they did reject entirely 
the Whig imposed authority that threatened to propel the colonies 
on another course of confrontation with Britain and bring civil 
and social disorder in its wake. 
We do not think ourselves bound either 
in duty or gratitude to acknowledge any 
obligations to the body who composed 
that meeting [of December 71, nor to 
aid and support them in carrying their 
votes and resolves into execution, nor 
do we intend to hazard our lives and 
fortunes in their defence. But on 
the contrary We suppose it our indispensable Csicý 
duty (as the faithful and loyal subjects 
of his most gracious Majesty King GEORGE 
the third) to manifest our abhorrence 
and detestation of every measure which 
has a tendency to introduce anarchy, 
confusion, and disorder into the state, 
whether the same be proposed by Bodies 
of Men or by an individual. 17 
Opposition to the Whig leadership from the friends of government 
v 
also occurd in Boston. On December 21, the Body agreed 
on a resolution to suspend the sales of all tea imported from 
Britain and that smuggled from the Netherlands after January 
20. A committee was appointed to collect the signatures 
of the "Principal dealers" in tea. The response indicated 
the distrust and suspicion with which the schemes of the radicals 
were being viewed. Only 51 of the 95 firms consulted agreed 
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to sign outright. The remainder either refused or stipulated 
certain conditions on which they would subscribe: among them 
were the dissident moderates John and Jonathan Amory, Samuel 
Eliot. and Gilbert Deblois, and the notorious importers William 
Jackson and Theophilus Lillie. 
18 
Condemnation of the Boston Tea Party and the Boston radicals 
occurred throughout the province. Tories and dissident 
Whigs rejected the radicals' use of extra-legal intimidation 
and the violent destruction of private property-as legitimate 
methods of protest. Protests from the friends of government 
appeared in Freetown, Pittsfield. and Falmouth. 
19 In 
Marshfield, on January 31, the town meeting approved by one 
vote a series of resolutions (known as the Marshfield Resolves), 
prepared by a committee of seven friends of government, declaring 
the Boston Tea Party to be "illegal and unjust, and of a dangerous 
tendency". It would almost certainly provoke retribution 
from. Britain that "will effect our property, if not our liberties. " 
20 
In March, twenty-six friends of government led by the wealthy lawyer 
James Putnam and the Tory John Chandler entered a protest in 
the town records of Worcester after their town had adopted 
the Boston resolutions against the Tea Duty and Tea Act and approved 
21 the "Boston Pamphlet". 
But nowhere were the friends of government able to take 
advantage of the rise in anti-radical sentiment to overthrow 
the Whig leaders. Faced with (unspecified) threats from 
the local Whigs, Barnabas Hedge, one of the Plymouth protestors, 
confessed he "was guilty of a great Error", and his recantation 
was published in the Boston Gazette of December 27 as an example 
to other opponents of the Whigs. Sam Adams was confident 
in the abilities of the Plymouth Whigs to extract submissions 
from the other protestors. "Between you and me, " he wrote 
James Warren, "if the others whom they [the Tories] have press'd, 
or rather coaxed into their Service, have no more to say for 
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themsc? Lves that it seems he [Barnabas Hedge] has, the [government] 
Party have Nothing to boast of. " 
22 Thirteen protestors 
recanted on December 30, and by March all but twenty-three 
had publicly renounced their part in the protest. 
23 
The intimidation of the Plymouth protestors set the pattern 
for dealing with the friends of government who defied the Whigs. 
According to Adams, henceforth "most of them will see their 
Error, and for the future be aware of the Artifices of those 
who have misled and deceived them. " 
24 The Marshfield 
Tories and diss'Xdents were more resilient however. The 
Whigs, led by merchant Anthony Thomas, drew up a counter-protest 
that was signed by fifty townspeople. But no proscriptions 
followed, and the town was the scene of bitter disputes between 
the two groups throughout 1774 and the early part of 1775.25 
The friends of government in Boston, meanwhile, bided their time. 
Henry Hulton reported that "everyone is sensible of the power they 
[the Whigs] have assisted to raise... [and] feel the oppression, 
yet hardly any one dares to complain, or exert themselves to 
be, relieved. " 
26 
The majority of Boston's Tories and dissidents 
were waiting for the North administration to lead the way in 
dismantling the power structure built up by the Whigs and produce 
a solution to the disputes between the colonies and Britain. 
27 
It was not until they knew what that response would be that they 
emerged to challenge the radical Whig leadership. 
The conservative-moderate backlash after the Boston Tea 
Party had little visible effect on the proceedings of the House of 
Representatives, where the dominance of the Whig party continued 
unabated. The radicals resurrected the dispute over the 
provision of Crown salaries for the Superior Court Judges. 
The previous summer, Treasurer Harrison Gray (who had been left 
out of the Council in the 1773 elections because of his moderatism) 
informed the members that the Judges had accepted only half 
the awards made by the province for the reason, given by all 
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the Judges except Edmund Trowbridge, that the rest of their 
salary for that year would be paid by the Crown. On hearing 
this, the House resolved that in future it was the duty of 
the Judges "explicitly to declare" whether they would be taking 
grants from the Crown or the province. 
28 In the 1773- 
1774 session, the House voted increased awards to the Judges 
for the year ending January 1,1774 and set aside February 
3 for discussion of the Judges' conduct. 
29 
Trowbridge was the first to respond, with a letter to 
the House declaring that he had decided to accept the award 
made by the province and would reject that from the Crown. 
The other four Judges (Chief Justice Peter Oliver, Nathaniel 
Ropes, William Cushing, and Foster Hutchinson) were allowed 
until 10 a. m. on February 8 to reply. 
30 Cushing, Hutchinson 
and Ropes (who died shortly thereafter) followed Trowbridge's 
example to the satisfaction of the House. 
31 
Oliver, however, refused to give up his Crown salary and 
delivered a quite unexpectedly daring reply. His letter 
catalogued a judicial and governmental career (he had been 
on the bench since 1756) in which he had always been underpaid 
by the General Court, to the detriment of his personal and 
business finances. He had "repeatedly attempted" to resign 
his place on the Superior Court bench but had always been di 
suaded 
by representatives who promised that he would eventually obtain 
relief. Thus, when he was granted a salary from the Crown 
for the period July 5,1772 to January 5,1774 his acceptance 
"proceeded from Necessity & not Avarice. " 
32 
Consequently, on February 11, the House approved a petition 
to Governor Hutchinson calling for Oliver's dismisal from the 
Superior Court and the office of Chief Justice. (The Governor 
had the authority to dismiss a Judge if he obtained the consent 
of the Council. ) Opposition to the radicals' proposal 
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was minimal. Ninety-six representatives voted in favour 
of its adoption, while only nine opposed it (Tories Elisha 
Jones, Thomas Gilbert, Josiah Edson and Abijah White and four 
moderates including Daniel Leonard. ) 
33 Three days later, 
Hutchinson was requested to seek the Council's advice on the 
question of adjourning the Superior Court due to meet on the 
15th, for jurors had already let it be known that they would 
not serve in a court in which Oliver presided. Hutchinson 
ignored both the petition and the request. In the event, 
however, Oliver thought it best to stay away from the Court. 
34 
In a symbolic demonstration of its unity and power, the 
House voted itself into a committee, and on the 18th, the represe- 
ntatives en masse presented the Governor and Council with copies 
of the petition for Oliver's removal and other papers relating 
to the salary controversy. 
35 Hutchinson had no intention 
of sacrificing one of his oldest friends and political allies 
and refused to discuss the matter with the Board. - He 
justified his actions before the House on the basis of the 
Governor's discretionary powers to c611 the Council together 
for whatever purpose he'chose and to veto bills passed 
by the lower chamber. 
36 
The House pressed on. On February 22, the members 
resolved that Chief Justice Oliver should be impeached for 
"High Crimes and Misdemeanours" (reducjble to the charge of 
accepting a Crown salary), although the order for his removal 
had not been issued by the Governor-in-Council. The articles 
of impeachment, prepared by radicals Sam Adams, Robert Treat 
Paine and Joseph Hawley, were approved on the 24th by ninety- 
two votes to eight. 
37 
Hutchinson again refused to consider 
the House's request for Oliver's dismissal and this latest attempt 
to put him on trial. 
38 
to him again on March 1. 
opposition to the Whigs. 
when/ 
Nevertheless, the articles were presented 
Once more, there was only a token 
Seventy-eight members were present 
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when the decision to continue with the impeachment was taken, 
and of these, seventy-one voted in favour. (The House 
also voted grants to all the Judges and civil officers except 
Oliver. ) 39 
The attempt to impeach Oliver came to naught, for the 
Governor simply refused to act on the petition and discuss 
it or the articles with the Council. But the votes taken 
in the House on February 11 and 24 and March 1 revealed how 
solid the radical-moderate alliance had become, albeit 
in an issue which concerned the fate-of a prominent Tory. 
The House justified its proceedings on the basis of implied 
powers in the Charter, although for Hutchinson the whole affair 
was a charade based on a trumped up charge. 
40 The moderates 
in the Council, however, (Brattle, Erving, Danforth, Russell, 
George Leonard Jr., James Gowen and Timothy Woodbridge) acquiesced 
in the Board's decision to declare its support for the House 
in this matter. 
41 
The clamour from both moderates and radicals for the 
impeachment of Peter Oliver brought to an end a period that 
had begun promisingly enough for Hutchinson and the friends 
of government with a conservative-moderate inspired backlash 
against the Whigs following the Boston Tea Party. But 
the friends of government were unable to attract enough political 
support to end the dominance of the radical Whig leadership 
in Boston and the towns. Summing up, John Adams'wrote 
that for "many years" there was "not Spirit enough on Either 
Side to bring the Question [of dominance] to a compleat Division. " 
But now he rejoiced that "The Tories [by which he also meant 
the dissident moderates] were never... in such a state of Humiliation, 
as at this Moment. " 
42 
clearly, the friends of government were 
a minority group in the towns, and numbered just a handful 
of the members of the House. On March 9, Thomas Hutchinson 
prorogued the General Court for the last time. He had 
been granted leave of absence by Britain. He intended 
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to visit Britain and make his report in person to 
the government and the King. 
43 
2. The Friends of Government and the Response to the Coercive Acts. 
News of the Boston Tea Party arrived in London on January 19 
or 20. Beginning on the 29th, Lord North's cabinet held 
meetings continuing over several weeks to decide on what action 
to take in response. - Attitudes of firmness and resolution 
typified the cabinet's discussions and came to determine its 
American policy. Ministers, whose information on the situation 
in Massachusetts was based largely on the reports sent by Governor 
Hutchinson, believed that a small group of radical conspirators 
had been the cause of virtually all the troubles. Such 
a view ignored the fact that the Boston Whigs commanded overwhelming 
popular support in Massachusetts and the colonies in general. 
But the basic assumption behind the ministry's proposals - 
the so-called Coercive Acts - was that the majority of colonists 
had little sympathy with Boston and would see the justification 
for punitive measures. Another view was that if the American 
"rebellion" was not crushed it would incite similar revolts 
elsewhere in the empire. 
44 
The primary concern of the British government was to 
punish Boston and its inhabitants for their part in the destruction 
of the East India Company's tea. To most ministers, further 
concessions to the Americans were anathema: it was inconceivable 
that the Tea Duty and the Tea Act should be repealed in the 
light of renewed, violent resistance to British authority. 
Even the colonial Secretary, Lord Dartmouth, saw the necessity 
of punishing the Bostonians, although he had a reputation for 
favouring conciliating measures such as the repeal of the Townshend 
Duty on tea. 
45 
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The first of the Coercive Acts was the Boston Port Act, which 
received the royal assent on March 31. Boston harbour 
was to be closed to incoming vessels on June 1 and outgoing 
traffic on June 15. The customs house was to be removed 
to Plymouth, and the Customs Commissioners and the General 
Court were to conduct business at Salem. Fuel and provisions 
were to be allowed into Boston by an overland route from Marblehead. 
The act was to remain in force until the King was satisfied 
that the Bostonians had made full restitution to the East India 
Company and to those who had suffered in the riots of November 
and December 1773. No indemnity clause specifying the 
conditions of restitution was actually written into the act, 
and so nothing bound George III and the North administration 
to order the port to be re-opened. 
46 
The second aspect of the government's programme was to 
restore and reinvigorate the authority of the provincial government 
in Massachusetts. To this end, it implemented some of the 
reforms suggested by Thomas Hutchinson, Francis Bernard and 
British officials in the 1760s. The Massachusetts Government 
Act, which passed Parliament in May, established a mandamus 
Council for the province. The Governor was given new powers 
to appoint Sheriffs and Judges of the County Courts, which 
before had been done with the consent and approval of the Council. 
Also, henceforth, jurors were to be selected by the Sheriffs 
instead of by the freeholders, and could be removed at the discretion 
of the Governor. Town meetings, where the power and influence 
of the Whigs loomed large, were to be restricted to one per 
year for the purposes of electing local officials, the permission 
of the Governor being required for all other meetings. 
47 
The North ministry also engineered the introduction of 
the Administration of Justice Act. This measure enabled 
the Governor to send to England for trial government officials 
accused of crimes committed in Massachusetts, thus preventing 
the/ 
315 
the repeat of such scenarios as the trial of Captain Preston. 
The Quartering Act, which became law on June 2, authorized 
the Commander-in-Chief of British forces in North America, 
General Thomas Gage, to seize unoccupied buildings for the 
accommodation of the troops if towns did not provide adequate 
barracks. This was to prevent the recurrence of the difficulties 
that Gage and his subordinates had encountered in Boston and 
New York during the 1760s, when the civil authorities refused 
to assist in quartering the troops. Finally, the Quebec 
Act of June 22, which granted freedom of worship to that province's 
Roman Catholics, although not strictly part of the administration's 
programme, was viewed as such by most of New England's anti- 
Catholic Congregationalists. 48 
The North ministry also saw fit to replace Governor Hutchinson 
with General Gage. Gage reached Boston on May 13 accompanied 
by-three regiments of troops. 
49 
Boston received full news of the enactment of the Port 
Bill on May 10 and copies of all the other Coercive Acts by 
mid-July. 
50 
To the distress of the Whigs, the Coercive 
51 
Acts had relatively straightforward passages through Parliament. "' 
The colonists were reminded of an important lesson they had learned 
during the Stamp Act Crisis: petitions and remonstrances against 
grievous acts of Parliament were singularly ineffective methods 
of protest. 
52 
The Whigs could do little to prevent the execution of 
the Port Act, for the British troops and Royal Navy were deployed 
to enforce it. Nonetheless, they evolved a strategy of 
retaliation and resistance that was, in the end, successful in 
defeating the implementation of the other Coercive Acts. 
At first, the Boston radicals pressed for the adoption 
of unilateral non-importation/non-consumption agreements in 
Boston/ 
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Boston and-the eastern ports. On May 12, the committees 
of correspondence of nine towns met and voted in favour of 
suspending trade with Great Britain and the West Indies from 
June 15. The Boston town meeting met the next day to consider 
this proposal. But after a long debate, the townspeople 
refused to endorse a unilateral embargo and voted to adopt 
the boycott on condition that other towns and colonies participated. 
Circulars were distributed to the Massachusetts towns and ports 
as far south as Philadelphia. 
53 On the 18th, the Bostonians 
were informed that Salem, Newburyport and other towns would 
join the boycott "provided it becomes general through the continent". 
Although their proposal for an immediate boycott had not met with 
widespread approval, the Boston committee began to press the 
town's merchants to countermand the orders they had sent to 
Britain for fall goods in preparation for an embargo. 
54 
Most moderate Whigs in Boston acquiesced in the 
leadership of the Boston committee. At first, they supported 
a unilateral boycott. 
55 
But the dissidents, among 
them George Erving, led the attack on the radicals' proposal 
in the town meetings. 
56 
The dissidents agreed with the radicals and other Whigs 
that the Coercive Acts were unjust and a threat to their Charter 
privileges. 
57 
The Port Act, moreover, was a death knell 
to the town's economic recovery from the effects of the British 
Credit Crisis and the high rate of currency exchange by which 
wholesale merchants such as the Amorys had found it difficult 
to secure credit abroad. 
58 The Amorys and others quickly 
moved their operations to Salem and ignored the committee of 
correspondence's directive to countermand orders for British 
goods. Furthermore, while they agreed with the radicals 
and the moderates over some aspects of the controversy, the 
dissident Whigs were determined to try and prevent the radicals 




Acts. In their view, the radicals had precipitated the 
crisis when they destroyed the East India Company's tea and 
threatened to exacerbate the dispute by calling for the adoption 
of a unilateral embargo on trade with Britain. 
59 Thus, 
to put an end to the controversy and avert commercial disaster, 
the dissident Whigs resolved on a compromise solution. 
At the town meeting of May 13, John Amory suggested that 
Boston should compensate the East India Company for the destruction 
of its property. George Erving offered to contribute 
£2,000 sterling to the fund (nearly one quarter of the actual 
value of the tea) if others would join him. 
60 According 
to the moderate Whig John Andrews, there were "many among us, 
who are for compromising matters, and put forward a subscription 
to pay for the Tea. " Amory's motion, however, "was in 
general rejected, though he urged the matter much. " 
61 
Undaunted, at the end of the month a party of five men met 
privately with Governor Gage to inquire of the cost and method 
of repayment. Gage was equivocal and gave them no support, 
intimating that he and the British government would prefer 
to assist a formal application from the town meeting or the 
General Court. 62 
Tories were heartened by the efforts of the dissidents 
to reach a compromise solution, and both groups came together 
on an anti-radical platform. 
The Tories believed that the breakdown of governmental 
authority and the levelling of social distinctions would follow 
on from the radicals'calls for resistance to the Port Act. 
63 
But they simply could not get this message across to the public on 
their own and required the assistance of the dissidents. 
With the introduction of the Port Act, the Tories were once 
again placed in an unenviable predicament by imperial policies 
and circumstances over which they had no control. The 
majority/ 
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majority did not like the Port Act any more than the Whigs. 
The closure of Boston harbour was not the solution to the crisis in 
British-American relations that they had in mind: the act made 
no distinctions of loyalty, politics or class, for it punished 
the innocent as well as the-guilty. 
64 It would have been 
a wholly artificial exercise for the Massachusetts Tories to 
have defended the Port Act in public and would certainly have 
alienated the dissidents and the moderates: any calls for submission 
to Parliamentary authority would have left them open to accusations 
from all sides that they were prepared to have the colonists endure 
the "despotic" schemes of the British government and the unbridled 
authority of Parliament whilst relying on British initiatives to 
repeal the Port Act. 
65 
The dissidents, however, came 
up with a more attractive plan of action. 
The friends of government organised their growing number 
of supporters at the end of May. The occasions for a demon- 
stration of their strength came with Thomas Hutchinson's departure 
for England, scheduled for June 1, and his replacement as Governor 
by General Gage. It was customary for the merchants and 
professional men of the province to present congratulatory 
addresses to a departing or incoming Governor on behalf of 
their respective interest groups. This time, the addresses 
served as a rallying point for the friends of government, for 
those persons loyal to the Whig cause refused to take part. 
They also acted as a substitute for the nigh impossible task 
of mounting an effective propaganda campaign against the Whigs. 
An address to Hutchinson circulated throughout Boston 
in the last week of May and collected 123 signatures (representing 
between one-sixth and one-fifth of the town's voting population. ) 
The subscribers expressed their "entire Satisfaction" in Hutchinson's 
conduct as Governor, although many such as Harrison Gray and 
John Erving Jr. had numbered among his political opponents 
in the past. The subscribers "greatly deplore(ed]" the 
"Calamities"/ 
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"Calamities" that were "impending" with the closure of the 
harbour. They wished that the Port Act had been "couched 
with less Rigour" and its implementation delayed until the 
town had had the chance to make sufficient restitution to the 
East India Company. The addressers pledged their support 
to any scheme that would reimburse the Company as "Testimony 
against such lawless proceedings" as the Boston Tea Party in 
the hope that the British government would feel moved to effect 
the repeal of the Port Act. They urged Hutchinson to work 
for the relief of the town when he reached England, and this 
he did. The address was presented to the former Governor 
on May 30, the day after Admiral Samuel Graves had stationed 
nine ships in the harbour ready to enforce the act, and published 
in the Boston newspapers. 
66 
The Whigs throughout the province denounced the addressers 
as sycophants and Tories. A full meeting of the Boston 
merchants on the 24th disavowed the subscription, and at Marblehead, 
when the names of the addressers were read aloud in the town 
meeting, they were "honoured with a general Hiss. " 
67 
Nathaniel Coffin and the Tories, however, were overjoyed at 
the response from Bostonians. "The Spirit of the [Whig 
Party] which has for so many years reigned triumphant here, 
begins to break. " 68 
Hutchinson received similar addresses from 24 of the 
province's lawyers, 31 merchants and townspeople of Marblehead 
and 6 of his neighbours at Milton. Before General Gage 
left Boston on June 11 to attend the General Court at Salem, 
he too received a congratulatory address from over 120 Bostonians 
and a welcoming address from 47 inhabitants of Salem. 
Gage, like Hutchinson, was asked to promote the friends of 
government's proposal to compensate the East India Company 
and work for a repeal of the Port Act. 
69 
320 
The addresses to Hutchinson and Gage were signed by 239 
different people. One-fifth of the subscribers (51 or 
21.34 per cent) were Tories-or persons who'had come into conflict 
with the Whig leadership before 1774. Thirty-four Whigs 
were among the addressers, including moderates such as Joseph 
Green and Thomas Gray and many Sons of Liberty. However, 
for the time being, moderate councillors Samuel Danforth, Isaac 
Royall, William Brattle and John Erving remained aloof. 
The overwhelming majority of subscribers (188 or 78.67 per 
cent) were taking sides ih public for the first time. 
70 
It was the first significant demonstration of public support 
for the Tories and the dissident Whigs in eastern Massachusetts 
since the conflict began in 1765. "A few months since, " 
observed Nathaniel Coffin, himself an addresser, "such a Slip 
would have exposed the Addressers to every species of Indignity, 
and perhaps to Exile. " Indeed, he continued, "had not 
their fear prevented them,... some hundreds more" would have 
signed the addresses. 
71 (See Appendix A. ) 
To be sure, immediate economic considerations of trade 
and commerce were powerful'motivating. factors for many of the 
subscribers: none would have relished the prospect of the port 
of Boston being closed and, 'doübtless, would have given their 
support to any scheme that sought to avert the impending distress. 
But by supporting such schemes as that suggested by John Amory, 
the addressers were declaring in public their faith in the 
politics of compromise and rejecting the political and ideological 
leadership of the radicals who preached resistance to British 
authority and advocated the proscription of dissenters. 
72 
(Curiously, John and Jonathan Amory did not sign the Boston 
addresses, probably because they were in Salem on business. ) 
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3. The Defeat of the Friends of Government. 
With the friends of government gaining strength, moderate 
counsels were now heard in the Boston town meeting. The 
town finally adopted a limited non-consumption agreement 
instead of the unilateral boycott on trade with Britain as suggested 
by the radicals. The agreement covered only those items 
imported from Britain that could be "obtained among Ourselves", 
and did not include goods from the West Indies. The subscription, 
however, was shown to every family in the town. Subscribers 
pledged not to purchase anything from shopkeepers or merchants 
who persisted in retailing the listed goods. 
73 Nonetheless, 
since the bulk of manufactured goods were imported into the 
colony, the agreement would have had little effect on trade with 
Britain. 74 The radicals' position was further weakened 
when, from the end of May, news filtered through of the responses 
of other colonies to their scheme for a total boycott on imports 
from Britain. Deep political, ideological, social and 
economic divisions in New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia 
were preventing local radicals from securing immediate approval 
for the embargo. Instead, over the spring and summer, 
most colonies resolved that a continental congress should be 
called to decide the vexed question of non-importation. 
75 
The Boston radicals, however, were not inactive and tried to 
force their proposals on the people of Massachusetts and eliminate 
their opponents from the political arena. 
On June 1, the Boston committee of correspondence made 
a decision to act independently of the town meeting, td whose 
authority it was beholden. When, the next day, the province 
received word of the introduction of the Administration of 
Justice Act and the Massachusetts Government Act, the committee 
used this information as a pretext to push for the adoption 
of a unilateral non-consumption agreement, since the town had 
expressed support for restrictions on the consumption of British 
goods/ 
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goods but shown little enthusiasm for non-importation. 
On June 5, the committee circulated to the Massachusetts towns 
copies of the "Solemn League and Covenant" drafted by Dr. Joseph 
Warren without seeking the prior approval of the town meeting 
as was customary (though, perhaps, not mandatory, for the committee 
was an extra-legal association ). 
76 Previously, all schemes 
for the non-consumption and non-importation of British goods 
had been considered at either town meetings or merchants' meetings. 
The Solemn League and Covenant called for the suspension of 
"all commercial intercourse" with Great Britain, beginning 
on August 31 and continuing until such time as Britain saw 
fit to repeal the Port Act and the other Coercive Acts. 
As with previous boycotts, subscribers were instructed to desist 
from "trade commerce and dealings" with any person who sold or purchased 
British goods. In one swoop, the Covenant resurrected 
the threat of social, political and economic ostracism and 
intimidation for dissenters. It was an ambitious attempt to 
enforce an orthodoxy of opinion. Signatures were to be 
sought not only from shopkeepers and merchants, but, according 
to the committee's covering letter, from "all adult persons 
of both sexes" in every town and district in the province. 
Those who refused to subscribe were to be proscribed as "enemies" 
to their country. 
77 One possible effect of the Covenant, 
if it was generally adhered to, would be to present the colony's 
merchants with a fait accompli regarding the adoption of non- 
importation: if the people of Massachusetts could be removed 
from the market in British goods, it would be futile for 
the merchants to continue importing through Salem or any other 
port. 
78 
Opposition to the Covenant materialised quickly in the 
capital. Merchants were alarmed at the prospect of being 
forced to accept a total embargo on trade with Britain. 
They complained bitterly of having to submit to the dictates 
of an extra-legal body. 
79 
Aside from being illegal, said 
"P. R. 11 / 
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"P. R. ", the Covenant would endanger the repeal of the Coercive 
Acts. 80 George Erving began inquiring into the committee 
of correspondence's actions in by-passing the town meeting and 
solicited support among the moderate Whig merchants. 
81 
Erving and the friends of government began to attract the interest 
of Whigs hitherto loyal to the leadership, including Samuel 
Barratt, Henderson Inches, Edward Payne and John Rowe. 
82 
John Andrews, for example, who had supported the idea of non- 
importation when it was suggested in May, now baulked at the 
Covenant and the "cursed zeal" of the radicals in threatening 
the colony'_s traders with proscription. 
83 The friends 
of government gained more adherents when news arrived in the 
second week of June that New York and Philadelphia refused 
to enter into any boycott until advised by a continental congress. 
Not wishing to leave the market free to their major competitors and 
alarmed by the threat of proscription, more than eight hundred 
merchants, shopkeepers, and tradesmen met on June 15 to consider 
the Covenant and its implications; many declared that they 
would not subscribe and wished to withdraw from the town's 
limited non-consumption agreement. "Most of the considerate 
part of the Community", wrote Nathaniel Coffin, "began to think 
of nothing else than paying for the Tea and complying with 
the other Requisitions of the [Port] Act. " 
85 But the 
assembly could not reach a decision on whether to support Amory's 
scheme,. for, according to John Rowe, they were "much divided 
in Sentiment. " 
86 
84 
The issue of repayment was effectively settled at the town 
meeting of June 17 when the friends of government were intimidated 
into silence and submission. Radicals rose to declare that anyone 
in favour of repayment was an "enemy" to their country, for 
in complying with the conditions of restitution they would, 
ipso facto, be endorsing Britain's punitive policy. 
87 
Harrison Gray alleged later that as the townspeople entered 
the town hall the merchants and tradesmen were threatened with 
retribution/ 
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retribution if they voted against the Whig leaders. 
88 
Nathaniel Coffin, who did not attend the meeting, observed 
that by such methods the radicals "wrought an intire Change" 
in the attitudes of these persons. "Without one dissention", 
the meeting resolved "against paying for the Tea or taking 
any measure that might tend to soften the [British] Government, 
and to wait the Event of a General Congress. " 
89 The radicals 
won a vote an a motion instructing the committee of correspondence 
to write to the other colonies informing them of the town's 
decision to press ahead with a non-consumption agreement without 
waiting for the approval of the congress. - No mention was 
made of the Solemn League and Covenant, but the vote was a 
tacit acknowledgment of support for the unilateral non-consumption 
agreement. The town meeting then adjourned to June 27.90 
The position of the friends of government was further 
undermined by developments in the General Court at Salem. 
91 
On June 7, the Court appointed a nine man committee to report 
on the state of the province. Eight of the members were 
prominent Whig leaders, among them Samuel and John Adams, James 
Bowdoin, Thomas Cushing and Robert Treat Paine. These 
men spoke loudly in favour of resistance to the Coercive Acts 
and against making any compensation to the East India Company; 
non-consumption and non-importation of British goods, they 
reasoned, was the best strategy to follow. 
92 
The other member of the committee was Daniel Leonard, 
a lawyer and a moderate who represented Taunton. According 
to Robert Treat Paine, Leonard was a man of "natural good Sense & 
Eloquence, polite & of engaging Address. " He wielded 
considerable influence in the House, particularly among the moderates 
who supported the Whig leaders, though Leonard was regarded 
as a friend of government. He "had changed his principles, 
& considered himself now at Market to make the best of them. " 
93 
Paine and his associates-feared that Leonard would inform 
Governor/ 
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Governor Gage of their proceedings, and so hatched a remarkable 
plot to hoodwink Leonard. The Whig members of the committee 
met secretly without Leonard to plan the report that would 
be submitted to the General Court. But they also sat with 
Leonard at formal committee meetings. The charade lasted 
for three days and nights until the committee adjourned, and 
Leonard, accompanied by Paine, set out for a meeting of the 
Bristol County Inferior Court at Taunton, convinced that the 
other members of the committee discountenanced resistance to 
the Coercive Acts and favoured reimbursing the East India 
Company. With Leonard conveniently out of the way, the 
committee prepared a set of resolves urging the General Court 
to appoint a delegation to attend the continental congress 
when it met. The report was accepted on June 17, before 
Gage was informed of the proceedings and dissolved the assembly. 
It was also decided to call a provincial congress together 
for October, because Gage had given no indication of when the 
Court would be reconvened. 
94 
The votes of the Boston town meeting and the General 
Court on June 17 convinced the friends of government that the 
only way to effect a compromise with Great Britain over the 
Coercive Acts and defeat the Solemn League and Covenant was 
to destroy the Boston committee of correspondence, the main power 
base of the radicals now that the General Court was not 
in session. 
When the people of Boston met at Faneuil Hall on the morning 
of June 27, a motion was passed that the committee of correspondence 
lay before the assembly copies of all its letters to other 
colonies and towns written since May 10. In this way, 
the friends of government hoped to expose the duplicity of 
the committee members in circulating the Covenant and claiming 
erroneously that "thousands" had already subscribed to it. 
Before the debate began, the meeting was adjourned the larger 
Old/ 
326 
Old South Meeting House, where 5,000 people had gathered on 
the night of the Boston Tea Party - an indication that this 
was an assembly of the Body and not a regular town meeting. 
95 
The friends of government turned out in force. "There 
was nigh as many torys [friends of government]... as Wigs", observed 
Jonathan Williams, including Richard Lechmere, the Ervings, 
the Amorys, the Greens and the Hubbards - all determined on 
a showdown with the radicals. 
96 
At 3 p. m., the town clerk, 
William Cooper, began to read aloud the committee's letters. 
After a while, the patience of the friends of government gave 
way, and Cooper was interrupted by a speaker proposing that 
he proceed directly to reading the Solemn League and Covenant 
and the committee's covering letter which they had sent out 
to the towns. When Cooper had finished, one of the Amorys 
(almost certainly John) rose and delivered a "long speech" 
which he had prepared carefully beforehand. 
97 Amory proposed 
"that some censure be now passed by the town, on the conduct 
of the committee of correspondence and that said committee 
be annihilated. " It was "seconded by many Voices. " 
98 
A few of the addressers spoke out against the committee, among 
them Thomas Gray, Francis Green, Ezekiel Goldthwait and Harrison 
Gray. 99 When Cooper read out the committee's correspondence 
with New York and Philadelphia, the addressers had been incensed 
to find themselves insulted and slighted as "traitors". 
This "rais'd such warm emotions in their breasts, that nothing 
less than the committee's being annihilated would satisfy 'em. " 
100 
John Amory's proposal was-also supported by moderate 
Whig merchants who had not signed the addresses: Samuel Eliot, the 
Amorys' ex-business agent, Edward Payne, their brother-in- 
law, and Samuel Barratt. Eliot delivered a speech "in 
so masterly a stile and manner as to gain ye plaudits of... 
an almost universal clap. " The reason why Eliot's speech 
was so appealing was that his own case paralleled that of other 
merchants/ 
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merchants whose trading interests were placed in jeopardy by 
the Covenant and who feared proscription if they opposed the 
radicals. Eliot expected to receive a large consignment 
of goods from Britain which "he can't possibly... sell according 
to the tenor of the Covenant. " The merchants of New York, 
Philadelphia and Rhode Island would benefit at Eliot's expense. 
101 
Other Whig merchants, such as John Rowe and John Andrews, who were 
taken aback by Amory's open attack on the committee were, nevertheless, 
prepared to acquiesce in its abolition if it meant that the 
Covenant would be annulled. 
102 
Speakers in defence of the committee included Sam Adams, 
who relinquished the chair that he might participate, Joseph 
Warren, William Molineux, Josiah Quincy Jr., Thomas Young 
and Benjamin Kent. 
103 All except Kent were members of 
the committee that Adams had helped to found in 1772 and thatte 
friends of government set out to destroy. 
104 
The arguments raged until dark, and the meeting was adjourned 
to the next morning. When the votes were eventually cast 
later that day, Amory's motion was defeated "by a great Majority". 
105 
According to Nathaniel Coffin, "The Hands held up for the motion were 
ab[ou]t one fifth of those against. " 
106 We do not know 
the exact number who supported the proposal, for only 700 of 
the many thousands present could vote at town meetings; one-fifth 
would represent about'140 persons, 20 or so more than signed 
the Boston addresses to Hutchinson and Gage. 
The victory for the radicals "occasion'd a general Hissing" 
directed at the friends of government who supported Amory, 
"which determined the minority to quit the Ground. They 
all went off in a Body. " Their decision to leave the meeting, 
according to Coffin, was 
an unfortunate maneuvre as it prevented 
a motion that was intended to be made 
for/ 
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for a Committee to fall on ways & means 
to pay for the Tea. In this they 
would have been probably as successful as 
in their other motion, but it would have 
given the opposition an opportunity of 
protesting against their [the radicals'] 
proceedings in this important particular 
as they have done against their proceedings 
relative to the Committee [of correspondence]. 107 
Evidently, the friends of government intended to introduce 
a motion calling for the town to sanction moves to reimburse 
the East India Company after they had won the vote to abolish 
the committee of correspondence. This proposal, as Coffin 
rightly noted, stood little chance of being adopted following 
the defeat of their. first motion, and because compensation had been 
rejected by the town meeting and General Court on June 17. 
Nonetheless, had the friends of government gone ahead and 
tabled their second proposal, instead of walking out en masse, 
then they would have continued the meeting and provided another 
focal point of opposition to the Whig leadership for the anti- 
radical minority; there was always the possibility that more 
moderates would defect or that the radicals' silent detractors, 
such as John Rowe, would find the courage to speak out. 
-As it was, when the friends of government had left the 
Meeting House, the assembly passed a vote by a "vast Majority" 
praising the "upright Intentions" and "honest Zeal" of the 
committee of correspondence. The committee members were 
urged to "persevere" in their business "with their usual Activity 
& Firmness. " The meeting was then adjourned to July 19.108 
After their defeat, the friends of government circulated 
a protest against the Solemn League and Covenant. The 
protest was an unequivocal rejection of political extremism 
and, in effect, an appeal to the moderates still loyal 
to the Whig leadership and non-aligned persons to join the 
anti-radical coalition. The Covenant was held to be of 
a/ 
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a "most dangerous Nature and Tendency". It had been 
"clandestinely dispers'd" by the committee of correspondence 
and was calculated to ruin the colony's traders and force 
them, sooner or later, to accept a unilateral non-importation 
agreement. The "Dissentients" freely admitted that they 
were "gentlemen of different [political] Sentiments", but 
none could acceed to any of the principles and ideas set forth 
in the committee's letters that were read at the meeting. 
Particularly obnoxious was the members' blatant anti-Toryism: 
they had "falsly, maliciously, and scandalously villified 
and abused the Character of many of us, only for dissenting 
from them in Opinion -a Right which we shall claim, so long 
as we hold any Claim to Freedom and Liberty. " 
109 
The protest was signed by roughly the same people who 
had subscribed to the addresses. Eighteen people who 
signed the protest did not sign the address. It is likely 
that many of them were artisans such as George Lush, a tanner, 
or small traders who first questioned the leadership and policies 
of the radicals at the meeting of the Trade on June 15.110 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the friends of government did 
not win many adherents to their cause by their attack on the 
committee of correspondence, although many townspeople were 
sympathetic. 
A second protest,. known disparagingly as the "Little 
Pope", was drawn up on June 29. The seven merchants who 
subscribed did not sign the first protest: dissidents John 
and Thomas Amory, the moderates Edward Payne, Samuel Eliot, 
It John Andrews and Samuel Bradstreet, and the previously uncommi ̂ ed 
Frederick William Geyer. Their main objections were with 
the "secret manner" in which the committee of correspondence 
had operated and the' decision to circulate the Covenant 
"without the Knowledge and Approbation of the Town. " 
111 
Governor Gage acknowledged the efforts of the protesters 
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on June 29, when he issued a proclamation declaring that the 
Covenant was a "traitorous combination", and warned that subscribers 
or anyone promoting it was liable to be arrested. 
112 
While the friends of government made some headway in 
Boston, there was little support for them in the Massachusetts 
towns. "The Addressers and Protesters meet with a cool 
Reception in the Country", observed one Whig. At Norwich, 
Connecticut, an addresser was threatened with a carting if he 
did notleave the town immediately. 
113 
According to historian 
Richard D. Brown, while the towns in general reacted with "surprise 
and indignation" at the Covenant - only seven actually entered 
into a covenant - virtually all reaffirmed their faith in Boston's 
leadership and their participation in the protest movement. 
114 
Only in a few towns did the friends of government attempt to 
make inroads ink the power of the Whigs. It was reported 
that during the May elections Dr. Isaac Winslow of Marshfield 
and Elisha Jones of Weston used bribery to try and win seats 
in the General Court; Jones was successful. 
115 One Whig 
wrote to the proprietors of the Boston Evening Post claiming 
that Peter Oliver was organising a protest against the Boston 
Covenant and committee of correspondence in his home town of 
Middleborough. 
116 
In nearby Plymouth, local landowner 
Edward Winslow and "a few-Insignificant Tories" (according 
to James Warren) appeared at a town meeting and "played their 
Game by holding up the Terrors of the Governor's Proclamation 
[of June 29]". But the Whigs had "little to fear" from 
this exercise, and the town adopted the Boston Covenant on 
July 1.117 In Deerfield, Rev. Jonathan Ashley organised 
"tea parties" in defiance of the Covenant, and enraged Tories 
cut down the town's Liberty Pole. 
118 
The most significant demonstration of anti-radical feeling 
was in Worcester, a town where the friends of government had 
rallied/ 
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rallied against the Whigs' for voting their approval of the 
"Boston Pamphlet". On May 20, a town committee presented 
to the town meeting a set of instructions for their representative, 
the Whig Jonathan Bigelow, that was an explicit endorsement 
of the Boston radicals' policies: Bigelow was told to support 
moves to resist the implementation of the Port Act and oppose 
any proposal to compensate the East India Company. The 
instructions were approved by the town. But the friends 
of government tried to gain a reconsideration of the vote. 
A petition signed by forty-three freeholders was handed to 
the selectmen on May 30 requesting them to call a town meeting 
for that purpose. The petition asked for an examination 
"into the proceedings and conduct" of the local committee of 
correspondence and declared that the instructions given to 
Bigelow were intended "to serve seditious purposes". A 
meeting was set for June 20. (During which time, the committee 
of correspondence edited and revised a copy of the Solemn League 
and Covenant, which they distributed to towns throughout the 
province. ) But the vote of May 20 was not overturned. 
The friends of government, organised by the Chandlers and Putnams, 
drew up a protest that was signed by fifty-two people and entered 
secretly in the town records. (The town clerk was a Chandler. ) 
119 
Like the Boston friends of government, the Worcester protestors 
expressed their "deepest concern for public peace and order", 
following the exposure of the "crafty and insidious practices 
of some evil-minded persons. " Theyalso blamed the local 
committee of correspondence for inciting the common people 
to resist British authority and spend''their time in discoursing 




The events that took place in Boston on June 27 and 28 
were among the most important of the American Revolution. 
The dissident Whigs had set in motion a campaign to destroy 
the right arm of the radicals' political machine - the Boston 
committee of correspondence - in an attempt to reach a compromise 
with Britain over the repreal of the Coercive Acts. There 
were ideological differences of opinion within the anti-radical 
minority, as the protestors against the Solemn League and Covenant 
were at pains to point out, but what they had in common was 
a political purpose, a desire to end the crisis in British- 
American relations by pursuing an alternative course of action 
to the radicals' strategy of resistance designed to placate 
the North administration. To achieve their goal) they had 
first to destroy the power of the radicals. It was a tall 
order. As always, the success of the dissidents' schemes 
depended on their ability to attract the support of the majority 
of moderates who remained loyal to the Whig-leadership and 
to inspire persons who had taken no part in earlier conflicts 
to take sides on this issue. But few Whigs defected to 
their cause. More encouraging was the fact that nearly 80 per 
cent of the addressers to Hutchinson and Gage were declaring 
their allegiances for the first time. Altogether, the 
friends of government numbered some 600 persons, but they were 
still too weak to defeat the radicals. Their failure at 
a critical juncture in the dispute with Britain left the radicals 
and their allies in an unassailable position to continue and 
expand their plan of resistance to Britain which involved the 
proscription and intimidation of all political opponents. 
Boston and the province in general, wrote one Tory, was now 
a "gloomy place", for the people were "divided into... parties, 
at variance, & quarrelling with each other, some appear desponding, 
others full of rage. " 121 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: LOYALISM AND THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT. 
From the summer of 1774, Americans were confronted with a 
steadily narrowing range of political choices. The dispute 
between Britain and the colonies took on the appearance of a civil 
war when,, following the commencement of military hostilities, 
Americans let their allegiances be known and divided into Loyalists, 
Patriots and neutrals. The main task of this chapter 
is to trace the part played by the friends of government in 
the Loyalist "movement" in Massachusetts. We must provide 
an explanation that can account for the particular weakness 
of the Loyalists in that colony. 
Loyalists were found in each of the thirteen colonies that 
became the United States of America. More than 19,000 colonists 
joined the Loyalist regiments that were set up by the British 
and leading colonials during the War of Independence. Over 
100,000 Loyalists left America and settled in the Canadas, Nova 
Scotia, Great Britain and the West Indies. The Loyalists 
formed about 16 per cent of the total population of the colonies (or 
513,000 of 3,210,000 based on figures for 1783. ) 
1 In 
each province they were outnumbered by the Patriots. The 
Loyalists were probably most numerous in Georgia and South Carolina, 
where they formed between 20 and 40 per cent of combatants, 
and in New York where they were some 15 per cent of inhabitants. 
Major seaboard towns occupied by the British during 
the war, including New York, Philadelphia, Charleston 
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and Boston, contained greater numbers of Loyalists than did 
the rural interiors of the provinces in which they were situated. 
2 
Massachusetts was one colony where the Loyalists were weak, 
though it had witnessed growing opposition to the Whigs since 
1765. The colony's 1,427 adult male Loyalists formed just 
1.89 per cent of the white adult male population (see Table 
9 ). They were scattered throughout the province in 157 
of its 260 towns and districts. But nowhere did they constitute 
a majority of the local population. Only in Boston and 
the frontier town of Jericho (renamed Hancock in 1776) did 
they comprise significant proportions of adult males, around 
one fifth and one-third respectively. Appendix D shows 
that 6'6 per cent of towns in which Loyalists were found (103) 
contained less than five Loyalists. 
The numerical insignificance of the friends of government 
in 1775 (they represented 0.96 per cent of adult males) and the foregoing 
and following accounts of the political and ideological conflicts 
in the province hold the keys to explaining the weakness of 
the Loyalists in Massachusetts. Firstly, in their call 
for resistance to the Coercive Acts, the Whig leaders won the 
active and tacit support of the majority of New Englanders 
and Patriots in other colonies, and with this popular backing 
were able to bring about the collapse of British imperial authority 
in all parts of the province except Boston. Consequently, 
the Patriots assumed the de facto control of government in 
the countryside and towns. Thus, secondly, while the friends 
of government were ideologically disposed to defending the colonial 
regime and British authority only half the total number in 
the colony were prepared to take an active part in the struggle 
against the Patriots. Many were reluctant to fight for 
Britain's interests against such overwhelming odds or run the 
risk of proscription and intimidation. Thirdly, the friends 
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a viable and attractive alternative to the radicals' strategy 
of resistance and were unable to inspire widespread defections 
from the Whig movement. Fourthly, the withdrawal of British 
troops from Boston in March 1776 left the Patriots in control 
of the entire colony and gave them a free hand to extend the 
proscription of political dissenters and would-be Loyalists. 
Massachusetts was never a major battleground during the War 
of Independence, and the British were unable to give much encour- 
agement to the Loyalists and their sympathizers. Finally, 
the composition of the friends of government and the Loyalists 
reveals that the loyal friends of government were concentrated 
in the east of the province and were primarily persons employed 
in commerce and the professions. The yeoman farmers of 
the West and south and Maine, -and the artisans of Boston gave 
the friends of government little support in their battles with 
the Whigs 1765-1775, although from 1776 onwards some became 
Loyalists. Only in Boston can we say that there had developed 
a political base for a popular Loyalist counter-revolutionary 
movement. 
1. The Collapse of the Provincial Government and British Authority. 
As is well known, the Patriots won the support of the 
overwhelming majority of the people of Massachusetts for their 
strategy of resistance to the Coercive Acts, in the process 
attracting the allegiance of many groups, such as the western 
farmers, who had taken little part in provincial and imperial 
politics before 1774.3 With the assistance of mobs comprised 
of yeoman, artisans, merchants, gentlemen, selectmen and militia 
officers, the Patriot leaders engineered the destruction of 
British authority and the power of the provincial government 
outside of Boston in the autumn of 1774. Mandamus councillors, 
judges, court officials, jurors and sheriffs submitted to 
the/ 
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the dictates of the Patriots and refused to carry out their 
duties in accordance with the Masssachusetts Government Act. 
The Patriots, already in control of the House of Representatives, 
set up their own interim government with a House and Council, 
county conventions, provincial and continental congresses, and 
local committees. It was, according to historian Richard D. 
Brown, a "revolutionary assumption of authority". 
4 
From the outset of the controversy over the Coercive 
Acts, the Whigs had made it abundantly clear that theywould 
resist attempts by government officials and friends of government 
to execute the acts. 
5 The resolutions of the Berkshire 
and Worcester conventions in July and August reiterated this 
policy. 
6 The Whigs fully appreciated the facts that since 
1765 anti-Toryism had been successful in undermining the political 
credibility and resolve of their opponents and the extra- 
legal intimidation of government officials had contributed 
to Britain's decisions to repeal offensive acts of Parliament. 
To the friends of government, the proscription of political 
dissenters and government officials was inconsistent with the 
Whigs' professed faith in the doctrines of natural rights and 
the "Rights of Englishmen", 
7 but there was little they could 
do to prevent them. The friends of government, Governor 
Thomas Gage and the British government held no illusions about 
the severe problems to be faced when it came to enforcing the 
Coercive Acts upon an unwilling people. 
On August 6, Gage received from Lord Dartmouth a list 
of the thirty-six mandamus councillors appointed under the 
Massachusetts Government Act, with instructions to assemble 
them at the earliest possible opportunity. 
8 The councillors 
were a mixture of Tories and dissident Whigs, Bostonians and 
men from the country towns. The Tories included Secretary 
Thomas Flucker, Chief Justice Peter Oliver and Judge Foster 
Hutchinson. The dissident moderate Whigs were well represented 
by Harrison Gray, Samuel Danforth, John Erving and his son, 
Isaac/ 
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Isaac Royall and the new Lieutenant-Governor, Thomas Oliver. 
(Andrew Oliver had died in March. They were not closely 
related. ) The Boston merchants offered commissions included 
James Boutineau, Thomas Hutchinson Jr., Jonathan Simpson; 
and Joseph Green. Those from the country towns were men 
influential in local and provincial politics: Israel Williams 
and John Worthington of Hampshire County; Timothy Paine, Timothy 
Ruggles, and John Murray of Worcester; Josiah Edson, Nathaniel 
Ray Thomas and George Watson of Plymouth; Daniel Leonard of 
Bristol; and Isaac Winslow of Suffolk. Andrew Oliver Jr. 
and William Browne of Salem were also offered places. 
Whatever the ministry's sources of information were respecting 
the choice of councillors, it is clear that careful consideration 
was given to selecting some of the most prominent friends of 
government. 
9 (There was no place for John Amory because 
the list was compiled before he had led the assault on the 
radicals. He almost certainly would not have accepted 
the appointment. ) 
Gage called the first Council meeting for August 8. 
Eleven councillors took the oath of office. Another fourteen 
were sworn in on the 16th. Eight refused to accept the 
commissions and tendered their resignations: Williams, Worthington, 
Royall, John Erving Sr., Green, James Russell, William Vassal 
and Robert Hooper. Answers were not received from two, 
Thomas Palmer and Jeremiah Powell, and one other died before 
a reply could be sent (Timothy Woodbridge ). Some pleaded 
"age and infirmities" as the reason for not serving on the 
Council, but according to Gage the real reason was that they 
suffered from "timidity" and would "choose to avoid the present 
disputes. " 10 John Erving, for example, had "connections 
with all sides, and would keep well with all. " He did 
not resign his place until August 25 or 26, and was invited 
to attend the Provincial Congress in October. He refused 
the Whigs' offer, but like many friends of government his 
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loyalty was not settled until 1775 (when he signed the farewell 
address to Gage )"11 
The most serious losses were John Worthington and Israel 
Williams. Gage had depended upon the pair and their associates 
to carry the western counties in the face of new activity in 
support of the Whigs. Williams wrote the Governor urging 
him "to defend us against the fury of the Mob[s], which are rising 
in many places. " He did not ask for military assistance, 
however, for neither he nor Worthington were prepared to counter- 
act the "enthusiastick frenzy and... madness" that- now prevailed 
in Hampshire County. 12 Their fear of proscription and 
persecution was not misplaced. A mob had tried to prevent 
Timothy Ruggles from leaving Hardwick to go to Boston to take 
the oath. Joseph Green had had his house daubed with 
Hillsborough paint. 
13 The reluctance of such staunch 
Tories as Williams and Worthington to give their services to 
a government and empire much in need of them suggests that 
attitudes of defeatism and despondency were commonplace among 
leading friends of government at this time. 
14 
These attitudes were also characteristic of the councillors 
who remained. At the second meeting of the Council on 
August 16, Gage asked the members to consider Boston's deliberate 
evasion of the clause in the Massachusetts Government Act restricting 
town meetings: to one-per year. (The selectmen had been 
continuing the meeting by adjou5 ents. ) The councillors 
agreed that Boston's tactic was part of the Whigs' strategy 
of resistance, but "nearly the whole [were] unwilling to debate 
upon it, terming it a Point of Law. " Gage was advised 
to consult a Crown lawyer. When Gage requested the Council's 
advice on his plans to dismiss a sheriff from office, the Board 
declined to offer an opinion and referred Gage to the terms 
of the Massachusetts Government by which the Governor had the 
sole power to appoint and remove sheriffs. 
15 
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The bubble burst in the last week of August when councillors 
who lived outside of Boston were confronted with mobs calling 
for their resignations. On his way home to Taunton after 
taking the oath, Daniel Leonard learned that his neighbours 
were determined "to deal" with him. He fled back to Boston, 
just managing to escape an angry mob some five hundred strong 
that laid siege to his house. 
16 John Murray, Joshua Loring, 
Josiah Edson and William Pepperell also managed to escape 
the fury of the mobs by fleeing to Boston. They*were spared 
the indignity of being forced to resign their seats in public. 
17 
Timothy Paine, however, was made to deliver his resignation on 
Worcester Common before a crowd of two thousand assembled from 
the neighbouring towns and led by militia officers and three 
representatives from the General Court. 
18 
Friends of government who did not hold office in the 
provincial administration were not immune from intimidation. 
On August 22, the Whigs extracted recantations from 43 of 
the 52 subscribers to the Worcester Protest. The protestors 
were summoned to the town's King's Head Tavern and made to 
sign a paper admitting that they "did not so well consider 
the contents" of the Protest before they signed it. They 
"had no other intention than to bear... testimony against mobs 
and riots, notwithstanding any thing in said protest to the 
contrary. " This language minimised the level of ideological 
conflict in the town. It portayed the protestors as misguided 
conservatives who, like some moderates, were anxious about 
the possibility of civil and social disorder breaking out. 
Two days later, five other protestors were called before a 
town meeting to abjure their ideological principles. Those 
protestors who had not yet recanted, including James Putnam 
and William Paine, were banned from holding town office. 
19 
Governor Gage knew full well that if British authority 
was to be re 
^ 
red in the province at large troops would have 
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to be deployed to protect government officials and friends 
of government. But Gage had just 3,000 troops at his disposal, 
based in Boston, and this small force could offer only limited 
assistance to Loyalists. Moreover, if detachments of troops 
were sent out into the countryside it would weaken the garrison 
at Boston and leave the capital open to attack by the Patriots. 
20 
Gage had nearly provoked a military confrontation when he ordered 
two companies to Salem to prevent a meeting of the Essex County 
Convention. Three thousand Whigs were ready to intervene 
when conflict was averted by the withdrawal of the soldiers 
and the release of a few radicals who had been arrested. 
21 
Gage was further alarmed by a report he received from William 
Brattle on August 20. In his capac ity as commander of 
the province militia, Brattle informed the Governor that 
the Whigs. had'been removing vast--quantities of ammunition from 
the Medford powder house in preparation for an armed struggle. 
(With this action, Brattle threw in his lot with Britain. ) 
22 
When the mandamus Council met for the third time on Wednesday, 
August 31, it was in an atmosphere of intense alarm. The 
meeting was held in the Council chamber at Boston in contravention 
of the Massachusetts Government Act, for the members declared 
that they would be "watched, stopped and insulted" if they 
had to travel to Salem. Gage called them together to ask 
their advice on whether he should send the troops into the 
countryside to protect the friends of government and government 
officials. He faced the additional problem that the Superior 
Court was due to meet at Worcester in early September and the 
Whigs had declared their intentions to halt its proceedings. 
23 
In what was a fateful moment, the councillors "Unanimously 
Advised" the Governor to concentrate his forces in Boston because 
resistance was "so general", and to wait for reinforcements 
from Britain. 24 The councillors' decision was based on their 
personal experiences of the previous weeks, their political 
ideology and recollections of. events since the troubles began 
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in 1765. One and all they concluded that the province 
was on the brink of revolution. Present at the meeting 
were those councillors who had been forced to abandon their 
homes in the countryside and take refuge in Boston: Ruggles, 
Edson, Murray, Leonard, Loring and Pepper; ell. Before 
the meeting commenced, Gage asked each of these men to write 
down an account of their confrontations with the mobs. Then, 
together with a letter from Timothy Paine recounting his experiences, 
Gage laid them before the whole Council and had Secretary Flucker 
copy them into the record books. The letters provided 
the central evidence on which the Council's decision was based. 
The councillors warned Gage not to split his forces, for they 
were convinced that in the meantime the provincial government 
was powerless to prevent the disintegration of its authority. 
They also concluded that if troops were used at this juncture, 
it would precipitate a bloody civil war in which the government 
side was bound to come off worst. The letters made no 
mention of any counter-revolutionary activity by the friends 
of government. 
25 
(The next Council meeting was in July 1775. ) 
Gage accepted the accuracy of the councillors' analyses and 
acted upon their advice. 
26 Orders were issued to erect 
fortifications on Boston Neck, and the men-of-war in the harbour 
were brought in closer to the town. The Customs Commissioners 
and their assistants returned from Salem. 
27 The only 
military activity outside of Boston during September came on 
the 1st when a company of troops was dispatched to seize the 
ammunition held at Medford. The sorts provoked a response 
from the Whigs and country people that showed just how near 
to war both sides were. Within twenty-four hours, a mob 
of 3,000 armed men assembled on Cambridge Common ready to march 
on Boston. They were readily assisted by over 10,000 men 
from Middlesex County, and many more thousands mustered in 
Connecticut. 28 
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With the troops confined to Boston, the Whigs acted with 
impunity in compelling councillors, government officials and 
friends of government to submit to their authority. The 
Cambridge mob quickly forced Thomas Oliver, Samuel Danforth 
and Joseph Lee to resign their seats on the Council. They 
also received a written pledge from Sheriff David Phips that 
he would not issue any more writs and venires under the Massachusetts 
Government Act. The mob then visited the homes of William 
Brattle and Jonathan Sewall, but the old general had already 
fled to Castle William and Sewall was in Boston. 
29 
Days before, Thomas Hutchinson Jr. and Isaac Winslow had tendered 
their resignations, and Jonathan Simpson, Andrew Oliver Jr. 
and George Watson soon followed suit. 
30 William Browne 
was the only councillor who refused to give up his commission when 
approached by the Whigs, although soon afterward he too fled 
to Boston. 31 Abijah Willard, another councillor, signed 
a recantation promising that he would not sit on the Council, but 
he did not resign his seat and continued to attend meetings. 
32 
Joseph Lee explained succinctly the dilemma of those who were 
compelled to give up their places on the Council and those whose 
duty it was to enforce the Coercive Acts. He was "obliged 
to submitt to the rage of the times", for the resentment toward 
the Coercive Acts "threatens a catastrophe greatly to be dreaded, 
and exposes the Members of the Council to such continual injurys 
and insults as I am unable to sustain. " 
33 
Of the 25 councillors who had been sworn in only 16 were 
left. Gage found willing replacements in John Vassal and 
Nathaniel Hatch, and their appoinments were confirmed by Britain. 
The Earl of Dartmouth also instructed Gage to admit George 
Erving into the Council, no doubt in recognition of the part 
played by Erving in the Boston town meeting. 
34 
On September 6, at the request of the Worcester Convention, 




who had fled to Boston, pledged before an assembly of 6,000 
people that they would not conduct business in accordance with 
the Massachusetts Government Acts. 35 Similar pledges 
were elicited from the court officers, Justices of the Peace, 
and Sheriffs of Suffolk, Middlesex and Hampshire counties. 
36 
Those who had to endure the humiliating ritual of signing papers 
in public included Israel Williams, John Worthington, Peter Frye 
and Elisha Jones. Whenever possible, the Whigs had 
the recantations and pledges printed in the province newspapers 
as examples to those who still dared to defy their authority. 
37 
Meanwhile, in Boston, jurors refused to take their seats in court 
until Chief Justice Peter Oliver retired from the bench. 
38 
The Whigs also continued with the proscription of the 
friends of government. They extracted recantations from 
the Easton protestors and, between September and December, 
from at least six addressers. 
39 On December 28, for example, 
the Marblehead town meeting proclaimed the addressers to be 
the "inveterate Enemies of America" and promised "to the utmost 
of our power, [to] break off all Connections in Commerce, and in 
every other Way... until they shall satisfy America for their 
past Misconduct, and give some manifest Tokens of a good Disposition 
to join their Country in its just Cause. " Twelve of the Marblehead 
and Salem addressers signed recantations in the spring of 1775.40 
For the moment, the Whigs were content to make examples of the 
friends of government and have them renounce their ideological 
and political principles. 
41 
Wholesale proscriptions were 
not possible because the majority of friends of government 
were secure in Boston. 
In the space of a few weeks in August and September, 
1774, the people of Massachusetts witnessed massive demonstrations 
of popular anti-British sentiment never before seen in the 
colony. 
42 To the Tories, the province was "in a thorough 
state of Anarchy". 
43 
Nathaniel Coffin considered the 
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the Suffolk Resolves to be tantamount to a declaration of war 
on Britain because they recommended that the colonists organise 
for their military defence. He also feared that "a general 
Massacre" of the friends of government "scatter'd about the 
Country" would follow on from the recantations and proscriptions. 
44 
Boston was the "only part of the Colonies which can boast of 
Freedom, every Man being at Liberty to say & do what he pleases, 
provided he keeps himself within the laws. " 
45 Coffin's 
friend James Murray was extremely critical of the British government 
for doing little to arrest the deterioration of its authority 
in Massachusetts. However, he believed that the North 
administration could still avert a military conflict by meeting 
some of the Americans' early demands for greater representation 
within the empire. He favoured the setting up of an American 
parliament "Similar to that of Ireland". Alternatively, 
if the British chose a hawkish policy, he felt sure that a 
display of British military strength would be enough to deter 
the Whigs from taking further hostile measures. 
46 Murray 
and Coffin remained silent on the vexed question of whether 
the repeal of the Coercive Acts would necessarily have to precede 
any settlement that offered concessions to the Americans. 
The dissident moderate Whigs were also worried that the province 
was on the edge of revolt. But where the Tories were now 
equivodal on the question of the repeal of the Coercive Acts, 
the moderates continued to insist that repeal and the reimbursement 
of the East-India Company must precede any accommodation. 
They trusted that the Continental Congress, due to meet at Philadelphia 
in September, would recommend such a policy. So too they 
hoped would the new Parliament to be returned on November 30.47 
"Hostile preparations" by any of the parties involved, concluded 
Harrison Gray,,. would remove the basis for a solution to be 
worked out. 
48 
For the moment, with the power of Britain and the provincial 
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government in decline the attention of the friends of government 
was focused on developments at the Continental Congress where 
they hoped that moderate counsels would prevail. 
49 
2. The Continental Congress and the Loyalist Case. 
The first Continental Congress that met in Philadelphia 
during September and October 1774 was a watershed for the 
friends of government, for it failed to produce a compromise 
solution to the colonies' disputes with Britain. 
The decisions and resolutions of the Congress embodied 
virtually all the demands of the Massachusetts Whigs. 
When the Boston silversmith Paul Revere brought a copy of the 
Suffolk Resolves to Philadelphia on September 16, they were 
immediately approved. The Congress promised military aid 
for the Bostonians if required. Furthermore, the Declaration 
of Rights and Grievances itemised thirteen acts of Parliament 
passed since 1763 that New Englanders and Americans in general 
had been labouring to repeal. On October 20, the Congress 
adopted the Continekal Association: the non-importation of 
British, Irish, and West Indies goods and slaves was to take 
effect'on December 1,1774 and remain in force until the Coercive 
Acts and all the duties on trade had been overturned. 
The signatories pledged their respective colonies not to consume 
dutied tea or East India tea, nor to purchase them from importers. 
The non-exportation of American products was also approved, 
but was suspended until September 10,1775. One of the 
Congress's most far-reaching proposals was that voters for 
the legislatures of the various colonies should choose a committee 
of inspection for "every county, city, and town" to enforce 
the embargo. 
50 
Once again, in Massachusetts the committees 
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took upon themselves the duty of not only enforcing trading 
restrictions, but of ensuring political and ideological conformity. 
The Continental Congress captured the attention of the 
Massachusetts friends of government and conservatives of all 
colonies. Beginning on September 8 with the publication 
of the American Querist by Thomas Bradbury Chandler of New 
Jersey, the Loyalists mounted a, briefly sustained propaganda 
campaign against the Congress and the Whig leaders. 
51 
Four Massachusetts Loyalists took part in this public debate. 
Between December 12,1774 and April 3,1775, Daniel Leonard 
wrote his "Massachusettensis" letters for the Massachusetts 
Gazette. They were also collected and published in pamphlet 
form. John Adams, who believed that "Massachusettensis" 
was his erstwhile associate Jonathan Sewall, replied with his 
"Novanglus" papers. 
52 Harrison Gray, Jonathan Sewall 
and Rev. Jacob Bailey were the other pamphleteers from Massachusetts. 
53 
The 'Loyalist pamphleteers argued thbt by assuming dual 
powers of government with the provincial administrations the 
Continental Congress had infringed the sovereign authority 
of Parliament to regulate the government of the colonies. 
Instead of "exhorting" Americans to "return immediately to 
their duty" and "pursue the business of their respective stations 
and occupations", they had set the lower orders up as "politicians 
and patriots" and "inflame[d] their minds with resentment against 
their lawful superiors. " 
54 
The adoption of the Suffolk 
Resolves and the Association left the way open for a Cromwellian 
usurpation of authority by New England's "inveterate enemies" 
to monarchy. 
55 
The conservatives maintained forcefully that 
the delegates to the Congress had had no mandate from their 
constituents to pursue a policy of resistance. 
56 What 
the Congress should have done was to have endorsed the Plan 
of Union between Britain and the colonies proposed by the Pennsylvania 
delegate Joseph Galloway, which provided for a clearer delineation 
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of American political rights within a reformed constitutional 
structure. The Congress should also have petitioned the 
King and Parliament for a redress of greivances, in the process 
acknowledging-Parliamentary supremacy. 
57 
But the 'Loyalists' plea for constitutional and political 
reform was an unattractive solution to most Americans because 
they refused to make any concessions on the legislative supremacy 
of Parliament in the colonies. By 1774, Whigs such as 
John Adams had come to the conclusion that Parliament did 
not have the authority to regulate all aspects of government 
in America. Parliamentary sovereignty extended only to the 
regulation of commerce. Adams argued that a division 
of powers existed within the empire and that the provincial 
assemblies were the de jure source of legislative supremacy 
in the colonies. 
58 
On the other hand, the Loyalists held that 
Parliament was the source of legislative supremacy in the colonies, 
although they were of the opinion that it would be wise for 
Parliament to restrict-the exercise of its sovereign powers. 
To deny that sovereignty in one part of the empire, as the 
Whigs now did, was to undermine its jurisdiction in the rest. 
Whether the colonists liked it or not, they were bound by the 
laws and acts of the British Parliament. 
59 
This did not mean-that Parliament possessed a despotic 
power over Americans. The Loyalist pamphleteers asserted that that 
august body would never enact truly oppressive legislation. 
Daniel Leonard observed that "an argument drawn from the actual 
abuse of power, will not conclude to the illegality of such 
a power; much less will an argument drawn from the capability 
of its being abused. " 
60 This line of reasoning placed 
the Loyalist writers in an uncomfortable position and led them 
to make an incongruous justification of the Coercive Acts as 
being/ 
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being Draconian measures consistent with a moderate exercise 
of power. They were "meant as punishments for crimes against 
the state, and to make examples of those who were considered 
as the greatest offenders. " The pamphleteers did not call 
for the immediate repeal of the Coercive Acts and asserted 
that the colonists must give an explicit acknowledgement of 
Parliamentary supremacy and past "political errors and offences", 
as well as pay compensation to the East India Company, before 
the acts would be revoked. 
61 
After nine years of debate over the nature and extent 
of the colonists' political and constitutional rights, the 
Loyalist- writers had little to offer Americans by way of assurance 
as to what their rights were within the empire and by what 
means they could best redress their grievances. For as 
the New York Whig Alexander Hamilton explained to Chandler's 
associate Rev. Samuel Seabury, petitions and remonstrances 
had been sent to the King and Parliament many times before, 
and in most cases had had little effect on the opinions of. M. P. s 
and ministers. There was nothing to "prove their likelihood" 
of succeeding with the Coercive Acts. With a taste for 
hard-headed economic thinking, Hamilton argued that the Stamp 
Act and Townshend Acts had been repealed because the colonists' 
non-importation policies had damaged British manufacturing 
and commercial interests. Thus, he concluded, with Britain 
standing intransigent on the question of colonial rights, the 
Continental Association was the only non-military option left 
open to the Americans that stood any real chance of success. 
62 
The most telling arguments made by the Loyalist pamphleteers 
were those concerned with the immediate political, social 
and economic consequences of resistance to Britain. The 
Whigs admitted that the restrictions on trade with Great Britain 
would cause a stagnation in the American economy, but emphasised 
the self-sufficiency and buoyancy of the economy to withstand 
shortages. / 
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shortages. They claimed that the worst effects of the boycott 
would be felt in Britain and Ireland, not America. The 
loss of the vital colonial markets would reduce "prodigious 
nembers" to "beggary and misery". 
63 In contrast, the 
Loyalists minimised the potential impact of the Association 
on the British Isles and argued that it would be the colonists 
who would suffer the greatest hardships. There would be 
"clamours, discords, confusion, mobs, riots, insurrections, 
rebellions", not against Britain but against the Congress who 
had brought this "monster" to life. 64 With the prospect 
of unemployment in shipbuilding and all trades related to commerce, 
the Loyalists conjured up a disturbing vision of class warfare 
in America. "In a phrenzy of despair", the cold and hungry 
will, "overthrow those whose situations they envied. " 
65 
For Daniel Leonard, resistance to Britain "dissolves the social 
bond,. annihilates--the security resulting from law and government, 
introduces fraud, violence, rapine, murder, sacrilege, and 
the long train of evils that riot uncontrouled in a state of 
nature.... I once thought it chimerical. " 
66 Robert Treat 
Paine was one Whig who was alarmed at Leonard's portrait of 
this Manichean, class conscious, Hobbesian nightmare of the 
return to a state of nature. "Massachusettensis" had "drawn 
the most frightful picture his Imagination could Suggest" of 
life in an independent America. 
67 
The Loyalists also attacked the ideological orthodoxy 
imposed on Americans by the Whigs. James Christie of Baltimore 
published an account of his mistreatment by local Whigs, "for 
68 
not acceding to what... [he] deem[ed] treason and rebellion. " 
The Anglican Loyalists resurrected the spectre of religious per- 
secution for all minority sects after the Whigs of New England 
bitterly denounced the Quebec Act for providing freedom of 
worship for Roman Catholics. 
69 Leonard and Chandler claimed 
that'the Whigs were denying the Americans "liberty of thinking 
and acting for themselves" when they set up committees of inspection, 
burned/ 
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burned Loyalist pamphlets and smashed rival printing presses. 
70 
They appealed to Tories, moderates. and all "who are friends to 
to order and government, and enemies to the riots and disturbances 
of abusive mobs... [to] assume the courage openly to declare 
their sentiments. " 
71 
With the sole exception of their defence of the Coercive 
Acts, which the Massachusetts friends of government 
were labouring to repeal, the Loyalist writers voiced the 
concerns, fears and aspirations of the friends of government. 
They raised many issues which had received the undivided attention 
of the friends of government throughout the 1760s and 1770s: 
the inviolability of Parliamentary supyemacy in the face of 
Whig demands; the prospect of social and civil disorder breaking 
out if resistance to British authority continued; the extra- 
legal proscription of political dissenters. At the same 
time that they examined the arguments of the Whigs, the Loyalists 
evinced a measured criticism of British colonial policies. 
Disappointed in the failure of the Congress to deliver 
a compromise solution to the dispute with Britain, Nathaniel 
Coffin was "fully convinced" that Britain would deploy troops 
to enforce and maintain its authority. In which case, 
he confidently asserted that "notwithstanding the power of 
the Party against Government... there would be a defection of 
at least one half of the Inhabitants from the [Whig] Cause. 
Many would act on the Side of Government & many others would 
not act against it. " This, he claimed, was the opinion 
of every man he had spoken with during November. 
72 Coffin 
was to be woefully disappointed, for it was the Patriots and 
not the Loyalists who ; won the support of most moderates, whom 
Thomas Paine called "Men of Passive tempers. " 
73 As well as 
the failure of the Loyalist pamphleteers to provide an attractive 
alternative policy to resistance, the collapse of the power of the 
provincial government and the proscription of dissenters deterred 
many would-be Loyalists from becoming actively involved in 
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the conflict on the side of Britain. 
3. The Friends of Government and the Loyalist Counter-Revolution. 
The friends of government did not all yield to the Whigs. 
A total of 391 became Loyalists. Reports suggest that 
least 625 other persons joined the loyal friends of government 
and took part in Loyalist uprisings against the Whigs and Patriots. 
Unfortunately, their identities are unknown, To their 
efforts must be added those of 1,060 Loyalists who were not 
friends of government but engaged in counter-revolutionary 
activity, 1775-1783, or were proscribed by the Patriot government. 
The Loyalist uprisings and associations of 1774-1775 
constituted the basis of an endemic, popular, conservative, 
pro-British counter-revolutionary movement. They entailed 
a commitment on the participants' parts to overturn the power 
of government exercised by the local Whig committees and the 
Provincial and Continental Congresses. 
The first report on the formation of a Loyalist association 
dates from December 1774. Colonel Elisha Jones of Weston 
gathered together sixty men to protect the town from the Whig 
mobs. Nothing further is known of the association's activities 
and Jones eventually fled to Boston. 
74 At the same time, 
Nathan Aldis, a prosperous yeoman of Wrentham in Suffolk County, 
began collecting the names of those townspeople willing to 
assist Governor Gage and the British to put down the rebellion. 
After the commencement of hostilities, Robert Cook, a veteran 
of the French and Indian War, raised a force of twenty-five 
men to protect the town from Patriot soldiers. But when 
Cook was arrested, the Wrentham Loyalists soon scattered. 
75 
From the turn of the year, fourteen freeholders of Petersham 
in Worcester, under the leadership of local landowner Thomas 
Beaman, / 
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Beaman, met regularly as a Tory Club. They were determined 
to "repel Force with Force" if their lives and property were 
threatened by the Whigs. The local Whigs viewed the Tory 
Club as being a potentially subversive organisation. The 
town meeting declared the Tories to be "traiterous Parricides 
to the Cause of Freedom". Neither side hazarded an armed 
confrontation in Petersham, although both were involved in 
a riot. Eventually, Beaman and a few others sought refuge 
in Boston. 76 
More promising were the efforts of Colonel Thomas Gilbert 
and his brother Samuel. In August 1774, Thomas Gilbert 
had been insulted by a mob of local Whigs. Over the next 
few months, he collected a force of some three hundred Loyalists. 
Gage promised to send reinforcements of regular troops. 
But the troops never arrived, and on April 9,1775, two thousand 
Patriots laid siege to Gilbert's house in Freetown and dispersed 
his private army. The Gilberts fled to Boston. 
77 
The most concerted effort to organise Loyalist resistance 
was in Plymouth County. On January 20, the friends of government of 
Marshfield and Scituate, under the leadership of mandamus councillor 
Nathaniel Ray Thomas, petitioned Governor Gage to send troops 
for the protection of 240 "loyally disposed people". Acc- 
ording'to Gage, this was "the first instance of an Application 
to Government for assistance. " (It probably pre-dated 
the Gilberts' request. ) Four days later, 100 troops from 
the 14th Regiment were dispatched to Marshfield and billeted 
in. the home of councillor Thomas. The schooner Diana took 
up a position just off the Plymouth coast. The purpose 
of the exercise, said John Rowe, was "to keep the People there 
Quiet & Peaceable" and protect the friends of government. 
There was little strategic value in occupying a town some twenty- 
two miles from Boston and in the middle of Patriot territory. 
While the troops were there, the friends of government won 
a vote in the town meeting, called with Gage's permission, 
"not/ 
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"not to adhere to or be bound by the resolves and recommendations" 
of the Provincial and Continental Congresses. 
78 
The Whigs, however, made plans to attack the loyal friends 
of government. It was rumoured in Boston that "the Tories 
are like to be drove out of Marshfield & Scituate. " And 
so they were. Immediately following the skirmishes at 
Lexington and Concord, the troops were withdrawn to Boston. 
Many Loyalists left the town before it was occupied by the 
Patriots. On June 19,1776, Marshfield declared for the 
independence of the colonies, anticipating Congress's vote 
by fifteen days. 79 
Given the upsurge in popular support for Loyalist uprisings 
and associations, it may be the case that there were many more 
colonists who rejected the authority and ideals of the Whigs 
and Patriots, 1765-1783, than those whose identities can be 
established from existing sources. 
Meanwhile, in Boston Timothy Ruggles drew up a subscription 
paper for an association of all men who would pledge "upon 
all occasions, with our Lives, and Fortunes, [to] stand by 
and assist each other, in the defence of his Life, Liberty, 
and Property. " The signatories were to refuse to "acknowledge, 
or submit to the pretended authority, of any Congresses, Committees 
of Correspondence, or other unconstitutional Assemblies. " 
80 
Governor Gage and the British government were enthusiastic 
about Ruggles's scheme. They saw it as a means of augmenting 
the regular forces until such time as reinforcements arrived. 
It would also encourage friends of government throughout the 
province to take up arms for Britain. 
81 
But in Boston itself there was little initial support 
for the association. Gage found the friends of government 
"shy of making open declarations". They would "first 
know/ 
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know the resolutions from home" before committing themselves. 
Nathaniel Coffin reported that the friends of government were as 
yet unwilling to risk everything in a civil war, because they were 
uncertain whether the North administration would resort to 
a military solution and because at the moment Gage's meagre 
force stood virtually no chance of success against overwhelming 
numbers. Coffin informed Charles Steuart that 
Whenever they can meet with a support 
there will in every part of this province 
be a great defection from our seditious 
Leaders, Great numbers from principle, 
& much greater thro' fear of loosing 
their property & lives will [en]list 
on the side of Government whenever it 
acts with vigor. 82 
Moreover, while the situation in Boston afforded the friends of government 
little comfort, 
83 they did not face the same imperatives to 
organise associations for their defence because they were protected 
by the garrison. The Boston Association was not formed 
until October 1775, long after hostilities had begun. 
Shortly, thereafter, the Loyal Irish Volunteers and the Loyal 
North British Volunteers were set up, drawing their officers 
and men from the immigrant merchants and shopkeepers left in 
the town. 84 
Nonetheless, when the friends of government of Boston 
did organise the Association they remained steadfastly loyal, 
partly because they did not encounter the threats of proscription 
and intimidation that friends of government elsewhere met with. 
Virtually all those who signed the Boston addresses to Hutchinson 
and Gage in 1774 became Loyalists. But nearly two-thirds 
of the Marblehead addressers and almost one-half of the Salem 
addressers did not (see Table 10 ). A few, such as Dr. 
Archelaus Putnam, became Patriots. 85 
Throughout 1775, Gage continually asked the British government 
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TABLE 10: LOYALISM AND THE ADDRESSERS OF 1774. 
Addressers. 1774 
To Hutchinson, 
Boston, May 30 
To Hutchinson, 




Marblehead, May 25 
To Hutchinson, 
Milton, c. May 
To Gage, 
Salem, June 11 
To Gage, 
Boston, June 8 
Source: Appendix A. 













to send reinforcements. At the beginning of April 1775, he had 
approximately 4,000 troops under his command, drawn from eleven 
different regiments. Neither Gage nor the friends of government 
believed that this was an adequate force to defend Boston, 
let alone to support Loyalist uprisings. Gage estimated 
that at least 20,000 regular troops were needed to subdue 
the colonies, which, as it proved, was a widely optimistic guess. 
However, Lord North, Secretary Dartmouth and the cabinet decided 
that Gage had sufficient troops at his disposal to thwart any 
attack mounted by the Patriots against Boston and to take punitve 
measures against them in and around the capital. 
The same force was also to lend assistance to the loyal friends 
of government in the countryside. It was under instructions 
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from Dartmouth to "put to the test" his soldiers that on April 19 
Gage sent a detachment of troops to raid the town of Concord 
by way of Lexington, some seventeen miles north-west of Boston. 
The engagements with the local Patriots precipitated war between 
Britain and the colonies. 
86 
Within days, thousands of ill-trained New Englanders 
flocked to join the Patriot forces encamped at Roxbury, Watertown 
and Cambridge. Both sides settled down to endure a siege. 
The Patriots, under the command of General Artemis Ward 
then-General George Washington of Virginia, fluctuated between 
15,000 and 20,000 at any one time. Gage allowed whoever 
wanted to to leave Boston on condition of surrendering their 
arms. The town's population dwindled from around 16,000 
to just over 3,000.87 Thomas Oliver estimated that at 
least 500 of the inhabitants were "truly loyal subjects... as 
have exhibited the strongest proofs of their attachment to 
Government. " 
88 The British, aided by a few Loyalists, 
engaged the Patriots encamped on Breed's Hill in nearby Charlestown 
(the battle of Bunker's Hill) and achieved a Pyrrhic victory, 
for British casualties were more than twice those of the Americans. 
Thomas Boylston, who remained in Boston because he had violated the 
Continental Association, was one Loyalist who complained of 
the "Supineness" of the British commanders in trying to prevent 
the encirclement of the town by the Patriots. 
90 Gage 
was replaced by General Sir William Howe in October. 
That same month a British squadron shelled the town of Falmouth 
after local Patriots had arrested a few Loyalists and refused 
to surrender the town's guns. 
91 
With the evacuation of Boston by the British on St. Patrick's 
Day, March 17,1776, Loyalist resistance to the Patriots collapsed. 
The fleet that sailed for Halifax carried with it 403 Loyalists 
plus their families, among them 160 friends of government. 
The decision to take the Loyalists could have been taken in part 




The evacuees included actual and potential leaders of a Loyalist 
counter-revolution such as Thomas Gilbert, Timothy Ruggles, 
Nathaniel Ray Thomas, Nathaniel Coffin and John Chandler. 
92 
Before and during the siege of Boston, the British could 
offer little or no help to the Loyalists scattered throughout 
the countryside; now they could offer none. General Gage 
had drawn up plans for an invasion of New England and expected 
that the Loyalists in rural areas would flock to the royal 
standard. 
93 Gage overestimated the extent of support 
for the British in the Northern colonies, and in any case his 
plan was never implemented. Lord North's government preferred 
to mount a three pronged assualt on the Hudson valley, upper 
New York and the Southern colonies which, if successful, would 
have split the colonies and isolated New England. But 
Britain's "grand design" of encircling New England ended with 
General Burgoyne's defeat at Bennington, near the Massachusetts- 
Vermont border, on August 16,1777 and his surrender at Saratoga 
two months later (see Map y ). Burgoyne unfairly blamed 
his defeat on the meagre support he received from the New England 
Loyalists. When the British troops entered the Hudson 
valley and the Southern colonies they acted as a catalyst for 
inciting Loyalist uprisings against the Patriots and, as American 
dissatisfaction with the war grew, as an agent for changing 
people', s allegiances. These areas witnessed some of the 
bloodiest internecine'strife of the war, with atrocities 
being committed by both*Loyalists and Patriots. 
94 This 
did not happen in Massachusetts, for the province never became 
a battleground. 
On the whole, the friends of government took little part 
in Loyalist counter-revolutionary activities after the evacuation 
of Boston. The departure of leading friends of government 
deprived the Loyalists in many areas of an effective local 
leadership, a fact not lost on the Patriot John Adams. 
95 
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proscribed by them, 1776-1783, were not friends of government. 
(This calculation is based on Table 9. ) At bottom, this 
fact reflects the growing dissatisfaction of the population 
in general with the war and the Patriot regime, and suggests 
too that those persons who declared for Britain after 1775 
were latent opponents of the Whigs. Covert means were 
employed by the Loyalists to undermine the Patriot war effort. 
Loyalists of Lancaster, Shrewsbury and Lunenberg in Worcester 
County were suspected of counterfeiting Continental currency. 
96 
Loyalists who escaped proscription in Barnstable and Deerfield 
were able to give battle to the Patriots in the town meetings. 
97 
The failure of the friends of government and Loyalists to 
mount effective resistance to the Patriots can also be attributed 
to the thoroughness with which the Patriots counteracted the 
Loyalist threat. The Patriots used the institutions of 
the colonial regime (the General Court, the town meetings 
and county courts), of which they had gained control, and their 
own system of extra-legal organisations (such as the Provincial 
Congress and local committees of inspection) to immobilise 
the Loyalists. 
After the commencement of hostilities at Lexington and 
Concord, a general popular enmity towards the friends of government 
was supplanted by suspicions that they were a potentially subversive 
and politically dangerous group. 
98 On May 8,1775, the' 
Provincial Congress instructed the committees of inspection 
to "watch carefully and diligently" persons likely to assist 
the British. The committees were given the authority to 
disarm Loyalists and send to Congress for trial those persons 
suspected of treason. 
99 
In August, the General Court 
acted upon the suggestion of General Washington that a committee 
be appointed to "Strictly Examine the Character and Circumstances" 
of people coming out of Boston. 
100 Two months later, 
the Continental Congress directed the various Patriot governments 
to/ 
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to watch suspected Loyalists and arrest known subversives. 
Thereafter, state legislatures and local committees of inspection 
and safety arrested, imprisoned, expelled and sent for trial 
Loyalists who refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the 
new regime or engaged with the British to undermine it. 
By 1780, thirteen states, including Massachusetts, had passed 
acts confiscating the estates of Loyalist absentees. 
101 
The Loyalists, including the friends of government, who 
did not leave Massachusetts were quickly overwhelmed. 
In 1775 and 1776, over two hundred Loyalists were disarmed 
or arrested or put on trial. Another three hundred suffered 
similar fates between 1777 and 1783 (see Table 11 ). In 
towns such as Worcester, where there had been bitter pre-war 
political disputes, the Loyalist threat evaporated. In 
the space of fourteen days in May 1775, the local committee 
of safety disarmed twenty-nine Loyalists, sent one to Watertown 
for trial by the Provincial Congress and imprisoned nineteen. 
102 
Even clergymen were apprehended if they preached against resistance 
to Britain or the independence of the colonies, or offered 
prayers for the King and the royal family. 
103 
In general, the 600 or so Loyalists'who remained in Massachusetts 
after the evacuation of Boston were not treated harshly. 
If found guilty of making a seditious speech, they were usually 
fined. 104 On suspicion of treasonable activities, they 
were confined to the limits of the town, placed under house 
arrest or sent to the town jail; occasionally, they appeared 
before the Provincial Congress or General Court. 
105 All 
transgressors were required to take an oath of allegiance to 
the United States and sign a recantation of their past conduct 
and political principles. Less than half the number of 
Loyalists arrested between 1775 and 1783 suffered imprisonment, 
and then sentences rarely exceeded eighteen months. On 
the whole, the treatment of the Massachusetts Loyalists compares 
favourably/ 
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favourably to that of Loyalists in other colonies and of political 
dissenters during the French Revolution. 106 
TABLE 11: THE PROSCRIPTION OF THE LOYALISTS 
Undeter- 
1775-76 1777-83 1775-83 mined 





Mobbed 17 7 19 
Note: Some Loyalists are included in more than one category. 
Sources: David E. Maas, comp. and ed., Divided Hearts. Massachusetts 
Loyalists, 1765-1790: A. Biographical Directory (Boston, 1980); 
Edward A. Jones, The Loyalists of Massachusetts: Their Memorials, 
Petitions, and Claims (London, 1930); James H. Stark, The Loyalists 
of Massachusetts and the Other Side of the American Revolution 
(Boston, 1910); John Noble, "Some Massachusetts Tories", PCSM)5 
(1897-1898), pp. 257-297; Massachusetts Loyalist Claimants, 
XIII-XIV, MHS. 
The Patriots of Boston favoured tougher measures in dealing 
with the Loyalists. When they reoccupied the town in March 
1776, they compiled a list of eighty-six suspected Loyalists 
remaining in the town, including John Erving and Thomas Amory. 
They were at once confined to the town limits, "as their being 
Suffered to go at large may be attended with danger to ye Public. " 




leniency with which the oath of allegiance was being administered. 
Loyalists were being offered more than one chance to take it. 
108 
As Burgoyne's force drew closer to the Massachusetts border, their 
anxiety increased. In March 1777, a committee of twelve 
men, one from each ward, was formed to compile a directory 
of "Refugees & other disaffected Persons" who had fled to Boston 
after the commencement of hostilities. 
109 In early May, 
the town petitioned the General Court to recommend the "necessary 
Confinement" of all suspected Loyalists of "every rank". 
By an act of May 10, the Court empowered towns to choose by 
ballot "some Person firmly attached to the American Cause 
to procure Evidence that may be had of [those of an]... Inimical 
Disposition. " 110 By the following March, the Bostonians 
had gathered the names of 160 "Inimical Persons", although 
137 had already left the state. 
111 
The final episode in the proscription of the Loyalists 
was the attempt to deprive them of their political rights and 
property. The Banishment Act of September 1778 deprived 
308 Loyalists of their rights of citizenship in the state of 
Massachusetts. If they returned to the state without permission, 
they could be extradited or imprisoned. One hundred and eighty- 
seven of those named in the list had already left Massachusetts. 
112 
In 1779, the Massachusetts legislature passed two acts confisc- 
ating the estates of the Loyalist absentees. The first, 
"An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Certain Notorious Conspirators", 
applied to twenty-nine persons who had been prominent friends 
of government, including the Hutchinsons, Olivers and mandamus 
councillors. The second, "An Act for Confiscating the 
Estates of Certain Persons Commonly Called Absentees", did 
not name those to whom it applied, but stated that persons 
who had left "their usual place of habitation" since April 19, 
1775 without permission of the Patriot authorities were liable 
to have their property seized by the state. 
113 
365 
In some states, especially New York, the confiscation 
and sale of Loyalist property led to a certain democratization 
of landholding and redistribution of wealth among middle-class 
farmers. But confiscation was not popular in Massachusetts, 
even with the Patriot leaders. According to one historian, 
the policy was "meant to alter Massachusetts as little as possible. " 
Virtually no democratization of landholding or redistribution 
of wealth from the top to the bottom of society occured. 
114 
(One hundred and twenty-one friends of government had their 
estates confiscated or labe .d for confiscation. ) Rather, 
we can view the Banishment Act and the Confiscation Acts as 
being the culmination of the Whig leaders' attempts to eradicate 
all political and ideological opposition that had begun during 
the Stamp Act Crisis of 1765-1766. 
The Peace of Paris of 1783, by which the Continental 
Congress was obliged to recommend the states to restore confiscated 
property, encouraged many Loyalists to return to Massachusetts 
and reclaim their land. 
115 But for those who could not return 
or recover their property, the Revolution left a bitter legacy. 
It was, according to Harrison Gray, "the greatest political 
Curse, that Righteous Heaven ever inflicted on a People. " 
In the "Frenzy of their Zeal", the Americans had "reprobated 
their Allegiance to best of sovereigns, exchanged the best 
constituted Government under Heaven for one... inconsistent 
with Liberty and for fear of a distant and Ideal Tyranny they 




Following the collapse of the authority and power of 
the provincial government outside of Boston in the autumn of 
1774, many friends of government who had opposed the Whigs, 
1765-1774, now displayed a marked reluctance to defy them. 
Most feared proscription and intimidation, for those that had 
dared to stand against the Whigs were forced publicly 
to abjure their political ideology and promise to submit to 
the authority of the Whigs in the future. The Whigs already 
commanded the support of the overwhelming majority of Massa- 
chusetts's population, and the provincial government and Britain 
were powerless to prevent the proscriptions and recantations. 
Consequently, after the commencement of military hostilities 
between Britain and the colonies, the thoroughness with which 
the Patriots dispersed the threat offered by the friends of 
government who remained loyal to Britain and other Loyalists 
was a major contributory factor in preventing the development 
of a Loyalist counter-revolutionary "movement" in Massachusetts. 
So too were the refusal of almost half the friends of government 
to declare their allegiance to Britain and the inability of 
the British to offer military assistance to Loyalists and would- 
be Loyalists scattered throughout the province. Only in 
Boston during 1775 and 1776 did there emerge a popular-based 
Loyalist movement which did not collapse until the British 
evacuated the town. 
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CHAPTER 12: THE COMPOSITION OF THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT 
AND THE LOYALISTS. 
Why did some friends of government become Loyalists and 
others not? To answer this question, this chapter examines 
such, diversity in composition as there was among the friends 
of government, and between them and the Loyalists. Comparisons 
are also made with the Whigs and Patriots. It would be 
foolhardy to single out one particular motive or reason why 
some colonists became Loyalists and others did not. A 
myriad of factors was responsible for the ways in which Americans 
behaved politically, 1775-1783. Immediate personal concerns 
were just as important to them as deep-seated imperial, ideological, 
social, economic and religious issues. Moreover, matters 
of allegiance seldom involved clear-cut choices, for they were 
dependent upon circumstances and policies of governments over 
which the majority of colonists had little direct control, 
as well as upon considerations of self-interest and principle. 
1 
Appendices A, D and E, however, provide fresh information on 
the statistical predisposition of the people of Massachusetts 
to become Loyalists and supplement the studies of ideology 
and politics as behavioural determinants pursued already in 
this dissertation. 
Of the 727 friends of government listed in Appendix A, 
391 became committed Loyalists while 14 joined the Patriot 
side. A further 308 friends of government took no part 
in/ 
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in the War of Independence and remained scrupulously neutral 
in their affiliation, if not, perhaps, in their private thoughts 
and opinions. Fourteen others either died or left Massachusetts 
before 1775 and have been omitted from the sample studied. 
2 
Thus, overall, the Revolution split the friends of government 
into Loyalists and neutrals. The main question confronting 
the friends of government from 1775 onwards, therefore, was 
not which to support, 'but whether or not to become actively 
involved in the British cause. 
The composition of the friends of government and the Loyalists 
varied from colony to colony and usually reflected the broad 
social characteristics of the communities in which they resided. 
Like'the Whigs or Patriots, they were not socially homogeneous 
groups and came from virtually every rank in society. 
They were gentry farmers, yeoman freeholders, labourers, merchants, 
shopkeepers, mariners, government officials, lawyers, clergymen, 
physicians and artisans. 
3 Free blacks, Indians, women, 
Jews, Quakers, Anglicans and immigrants from the British Isles 
also numbered among the Loyalists. 
4 The disparity in 
origins, occupations, wealth, social status, ethnicity. and 
religion of the Loyalists, friends of government, Whigs and 
Patriots reflected--the. -profound changes 
that had occurred in 
colonial society during the eighteenth-century when society 
became less mobile, more stratified and prone to internal 
conflicts. 
As Table 12 indicates, generational conflict was not 
a significant feature of the Revolution in Massachusetts. 
The average ages of the friends of government, Loyalists and 
Patriots in 1775 were very similar. However, the slightly 
higher reading for friends of government who did not become 
Loyalists suggests that there was a reluctance among sixty- 
and seventy-year olds whose sympathies lay with Britain to 
take an active part in the war. 
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TABLE 12: AVERAGE AGES OF THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT, LOYALISTS 
AND PATRIOTS IN 1775. 
Group Average Age 
Friends of Government 45.92 
Loyal Friends of Government 44.73 
Neutral Friends of Government 51.59 
Loyalists 41.80 
Patriots 46.50 
Sources: For the friends of government, Appendix A; for the Loyalists 
Maas, Biographical Directory; for the Patriots, John Tyler, Smugglers 
& Patriots: Boston Merchants and the Advent of the American Revolution 
(Boston, 1986), p. 242. 
TABLE 13: EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT AND 
LOYALISTS. 
Exclu- 
College FOG Loyal-FOG Non-Loyal. FOG sions -Loyalists 






Total 116 90 22 4,160 
Sources: Appendix A; Maas, Biographical Directory; "A List of Graduates 
of/ 
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Table 13, contd. 
of Harvard University of anti-Revolutionary or Loyalist. Principles, 
in Classes Prior to the Revolution", American Quarterly Register, 
13 (May 1841), pp. 403-416,14 (November 1841), pp. 167-172. 
The educational backgrounds of the friends of government and 
Loyalists reveals little about their political motivation. 
(See Table 13. ) Almost one-sixth of Harvard graduates 
alive in 1774 became Loyalists. But the college was not 
a breeding ground for Loyalists. It counted just as many, 
if not more, Patriots among its alumni. " 
There are no obvious correlations between the religious 
affiliations of the friends of government and Loyalism. 
The paucity of readings recorded in Table 14 renders any conclusion 
suspect if it is applied to all 727 friends of government. 
The Anglicans were the most numerous religious group among 
those whose faith can be established. But it is probable 
that the vast majority of friends of government, like the Whigs 
or Patriots, were members of the established Congregational 
Church. 
All but a handful of friends of government who belonged 
to the Church of England became Loyalists. This fact on 
it own does not prove that Anglicans were predisposed toward 
Loyalism for religious, ideological or other reasons more 
than any other religious group. Sixty-eight per cent of 
friends of government who were Congregationalists and all those 
who were Sandemanians became Loyalists. 
Theologically speaking, the Anglicans had most in common 
with those with whom they quarrelled most bitterly over religious 
matters and politics - Arminian Congregationalists such as 
Jonathan Mayhew and Charles Chauncy. It was ironic that 
both/ 
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TABLE 14: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS OF THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT 
AND LOYALISTS. 
Exclu- 
















Total 106 92 12 2 122 
I 
Sources: For the friends of government, Appendix A; for the Loyalists 
Maas, Biographical Directory, Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, 
Stark, Loyalists of Massachusetts, and Massachusetts Loyalist 
Claimants, XIII-XIV, MHS. 
both Anglicans and Arminians were hostile to the "enthusiasm" of the 
Great Awakening of the 1740s and 1750s and found comfort in 
the Enlightenment's ideals of toleration, moderation and "natural 
religion", yet were unable to reach a compromise over the Church 
of England's predicament as a minority church in the Northern 
colonies and allow the6Anglicans the right to establish an 
American episcopate. 
Politically, the Anglican friends of government were 
much divided during the 1760s. Some, such as the Ervings 
and/ 
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and the Debloises, supported the Whig cause, while others were 
Tories. Ideologically and politically, however, the Anglican 
clergy were a united group. Almost to a man, they were 
Tories who became Loyalists. Leading Churchmen throughout 
the colonies, including Henry Caner, had been in dispute with 
the Congregationalists and Presbyterians over the administration 
of the colonial colleges and the Church's proposals for an 
episcopate, during which conflicts they maintained that their 
plans would bolster the colonists' political loyalty to Britain. 
7 
As has been noted, by no means did all rank-and-file Anglicans 
share this view (see Chapter Two, p. 66 )' 
On the whole, the Church of England met the social rather 
than'the political or ideological demands of the friends of 
government and Loyalists. Episcopalianism was "in good 
part a lower class movement" in New England, but in Boston 
and Cambridge it was a much more socially desirable faith. 
8 
The Church of England had missions established in at least nine 
Massachusetts towns other than Boston. 
9 But many, 
if not most, of the Anglican friends of government who became 
Loyalists were members of King's Chapel and Trinity Church, 
Boston, and Christ's Church, Cambridge, and, according to the 
annual rental value of their property, belonged to the towns' gentry. 
Like the Anglican clergy, the Sandemanians were political and 
ideological conservatives who preached obedience and submission 
to British authority. They were a small Calvinist sect 
with little influence on politics, the congregation in Boston 
numbering no more than thirty families. 
11 As we have 
seen, however, one of their number, Colborn Barrell, played 
a conspicuous part in the opposition to the Whigs during the 
Non-Importation Controversy of 1768-1770 (see Chapter Seven, 
pp. 231-234 ) The Sandemanians exalted the virtues of pacifism, 
and refused to obey the Patriots' calls to arms in 1775-1776.12 
But, as we can see from Table 14, around one-third of heads 
of/ 
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of Sandemanian families overcame their conscientious objections to 
war and declared their allegiance to Britain. Isaac Winslow 
of Boston, for example, reasoned that in Britain's hour of 
need 
No thing in our profession dissolves 
the obligation of our being servants, 
and faithful ones to[o], to those kingdoms 
which are of this world and therefore 
must be defended by the sword. 13 
In terms of places of birth, there is again little to 
separate the majority of friends of government and Loyalists. 
Like the Whigs and Patriots, both groups were overwhelmingly 
native-born (see Table 15 ). The friends of government, 
however, contained a higher percentage of foreigners than the 
Loyalists, about 10 per cent more. What is significant 
is that 76 per cent of friends of government who were immigrants 
to Massachusetts became Loyalists, the Scots being the most 
numerous of the immigrant groups. This fact supports the 
commonly held view among historians that an immigrants ties 
to his or her native country, together with the Americans' 
hostility toward foreign-born merchants and government officials, 
particularly the Scots, were in some areas responsible for 
pulling and pushing immigrants in the direction of Loyalism. 
Anti-Scottish prejudice surfaced in Massachusetts during the 
non-importation controversy as it did in Virginia, Maryland 
and the Carolinas throughout the Revolutionary period. 
14 
Another common view among historians is that office-holders 
in the various provincial administrations were the most likely 
of all colonists to become Loyalists, particularly in New England. 
The allegiance of many senior officials lay with Britain in 
part because they were prepared to defend against the Patriots 
the existing systems of government which had provided them 
with the opportunities to advance their careers. The Whigs 
and Patriots condemned two aspects or "abuses" of the colonial 
systems/ 
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TABLE 15: BIRTHPLACES OF THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT AND LOYALISTS. 
Exclu- 
Origin FOG Loyal FOG Non-Loyal FOG sions Loyalists 
AMERICA 
Massach- 170 142 23 5 314 
usetts 
New Eng- 761 12 
land 





Great 10 82 
Britain 
Scotland 28 18 9 













TOTAL 248 205 36 7 420 
Sources: For the friends of government, Appendix A; for the Loyalists 
Maas, Biographical Directory, Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, 
Stark, Loyalists of Massachusetts, and Massachusetts Loyalist 
Claimants, XIII-XIV. 
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systems from which many Loyalists had profited: plural 
officeholding and political appointments. 15 
A 
The public service record of the Massachusetts friends 
of government (excluding membership of the House of Representatives) 
.. 
shows that 60 per cent of those who were officeholders ^ 
became 
Loyalists (see Table 16. ). However, as with the Anglicans, 
we should not conclude that officeholders were automatically 
predisposed toward Loyalism. Table 17 demonstrates that 
r 
the number of officeholders who became Patriots was roughly n 
the same as those who. became Loyalists. Officeholders 
comprised less than one-quarter of the friends of government 
and less than one-fifth of adult male Loyalists. Thus, 
as with the immigrants and other minority groups who became 
Loyalists, the exceptional circumstances and motivation which 
determined the responses of officeholders to the Revolution 
cannot be applied to the friends of government and Loyalists 
as a whole. 
TABLE 16: OFFICE- HOLDING AMONG THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT AND 
LOYALISTS. 
Exclu- 
Group ! sions Officeholders 
X- 
Friends of Government 170 
Loyal Friends of Government 102 
Non-Loyal Friends of Government 9 59 
Loyalists 193 
Sources: For the friends of government, Appendix A was cross- 
referenced with William H. Whitmore, The Massachusetts Civil 
List/ 
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TABLE 16, contd. 
List for the Colonial and provincial Periods, 1630-1774... 
(Albany, 1870); for the Loyalists, David E. Maas, "The Return 
of the Massachusetts Loyalists, " Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation 
University of Wisconsin, 1972, p. 15. 
The geographical distribution of the friends of government 
and Loyalists is a good indicator of the differences in compo- 
sition that existed between the two groups. 
Table 9 (pp. 335-336) shows that the overwhelming majority 
of the friends of government and Loyalists resided in the ports 
and commercial-farming communities of eastern Massachusetts, 
in counties adjoining the Atlantic Ocean. It can be calculated 
from the data presented in Appendix D that nearly 60 per cent 
of all Loyalists lived in just nine towns which, with two exceptions, 
were situated on the eastern seaboard. 
16 Boston alone 
accounted for 36 per cent of adult male Loyalists and 33 per 
cent'of friends of government. These conclusions confirm 
the accuracy of the observations made by previous historians 
who asserted that the Loyalists and pre-war conservatives were 
concentrated on the eastern seaboard of America. However, 
one fact overlooked in the past is that over one-fifth of Loyalists 
(22.78 per cent) came from the western counties of Berkshire, 
Hampshire and Worcester, while only 14.62 per cent of friends 
of government resided in the west. 
17 
The wider significance of these conclusions is to indicate 
the main areas of opposition to the Patriots after the commence- 
ment of hostilities. Friends of government who lived in 
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TABLE 17: THE ALLEGIANCES OF SENIOR OFFICE-HOLDERS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
APPOINTED, 1761-1774. 
Office Office-holders Loyalists Patriots 
ELECTED 
Speaker of 312 
the House 
Council+ 59 11 29 
Treasurer 110 
Commissioner of 100 






Judges, Superior 10 41 
Court 
Judges, Inferior 93 17 26 
Courts 
Judges, Probate 24 35 
Courts 
Registers, Probate 24 83 
Courts 
Sheriffs 24 11 5 
Attorney-General 310 
Solicitor-General 220 
Justices of the 768 102 73 
Peace 
Total 1,019 165 144 
Note: / 
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TABLE 17, contd. 
Note: Some officeholders held more than one office. 
*The list includes all senior posts carrying a stipend, grant, or 
salary paid by the province or Great Britain. Customs 
officers and militia officers were excluded because complete 
inventories of appointments could not be found. Members 
of the House of Representatives have been excluded because 
their expenses were met by the towns to whom they were directly 
responsible. 
+"Excluding mandamus councillors. 
Sources: Office-holders in Whitmore, Massachusetts Civil List were 
cross-referenced with Appendix A and Maas, Biographical Directory 
to establish the identity of Loyalists. Sources for the Patriots 
include Tyler, Smugglers & Patriots, pp. 258-277; Stephen E. Patterson, 
Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts (Madison, 
Wisc., 1973), pp. 204-205; Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors 
of the Revolutionary War 17 vols. (Boston, 1896-1908); Thwing 
File, MHS; National Society of the Daughters of the American 
Revolution, Dar Patriot Index (Washington, 1966). 
all friends of government to become Loyalists. 
18 
In 
absolute terms, the biggest decreases in the number of active 
opponents of the Whigs/Patriots through 1775 occurred in the 
counties of Essex, Suffolk, Worcester, Plymouth and Middlesex. 
These were counties where the friends of government had been 
strongest but where the proscription of would-be Loyalists 
was rife. With the exception of Suffolk and Worcester 
Counties, the most dramatic increases in opposition to the 
Patriots were in counties where the friends of government had 
been weak but where anti-Toryism was uncommon before 1775: 
Berkshire, Hampshire, Cumberland, Lincoln, Barnstable and 
Bristol. / 
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Bristol. Columns five and six of Table 18 suggest that 
opposition increased principally among the yeomanry of the 
western counties and Maine, and among government officials 
and artisans of the East. We may conclude, therefore, 
that in general after 1775 the friends of government played 
little or no part in the activities of the Loyalists in the 
West and South of Massachusetts or in the district of Maine. 
The analysis of the occupations of the friends of government 
and the Loyalists given in Table 18 and Appendix E supports 
the view that both groups were drawn primarily from the East 
of the province and that the Loyalists were stronger in the 
West than the friends of government. Three-quarters of 
the province's working population were employed in the agricult- 
ural sector, the majority of whom were yeoman freeholders, 
yet less than one-fifth of the friends of government and 28.80 
per cent of the Loyalists made their living form the soil. 
Whereas less than 3 per cent of the colony's workers were employed 
in commercial occupations as merchants; shopkeepers, mariners, 
etc., one-third of all Loyalists and nearly half the friends 
of government were engaged in commercial employment. It 
can be deduced from Appendix E that 95 per cent of Loyalists 
working in the commercial sector of the economy resided in 
the eastern seaboard counties. Similarly, Table 18 shows 
that both the friends of government and the Loyalists contained 
over five times the percentage of professionals (teachers, 
lawyers, physicians and clergymen) per head of the total working 
population (c. 2-3 per cent. ) The proportions of friends of 
government and Loyalists who were artisans were also smaller 
than the average figure for the province (3.13 per cent and 
6.46 per cent respectively, as compared to 10 per cent. ) 
Only a handful of friends of government and Loyalists were 
women or labourers. In short, from the information available 
it can be said that the friends of government and the Loyalists 
did not represent cross-sections of Massachusetts's working 
population/ 
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Loyal Non-Loyal Exclu- Loyal- Differ- Percen- 
Occupation FOG FOG FOG sions ists ential tages 
LAND 




Yeomen 58 29 29 187 158 544.83 
Other 532 11 8 266.67 
GOVERNMENT 20 14 24 64 50 357.14 
COMMERCE 
Merchants 174 117 51 6 187 70 59.83 
Shopkeepers 38 23 15 48 25 108.70 
Other 23 14 9 76 62 442.86 
PROFESSIONAL 
Physicians 26 21 5 50 29 138.10 
Lawyers 41 30 92 37 7 23.33 
Clergy 21 15 6 35 20 133.33 
Teachers 633 13 10 333.33 
ARTISANS 15 14 1 57 43 307.14 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Innkeeper 11076 600.00 
Women 000 17 17 - 
Labourer 707 15 15 - 
Males under 000.7 7- 
16 years 
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Loyal Non-Loyal Exclu- Loyal- Differ- Percen- 
Occupation FOG FOG FOG sions ists ential Cages 
Other 14 95 21 12 133.33 
Total 480 319 149 12 883 564 176.18 
*Ami and Elizabeth Cuming were counted as shopkeepers. 
Sources: Appendices A and E. 
population for they contained disproportionately high numbers 
of men employed in the commercial and professional sectors 
of the economy and correspondingly lower numbers of yeoman, 
artisans, women and labourers. 
19 
In terms of wealth, the friends of government and the 
Loyalists were noticeably different. The annual rental 
values of property belonging to 34.25 per cent of friends of 
government and 29.84 per cent of Loyalists were recorded in 
the province tax list of 1771. In comparing the different 
levels of wealth between the two groups, we notice that a far 
higher proportion of Loyalists were assessed below £19: 62.82 
per cent, as compared to 45.38 per cent. Thus, 54.62 per 
cent of friends of government and 37.64 per cent of Loyalists 
were assessed in the upper deciles. Because the numbers 
of readings for both groups are so small and apply principally 
to middle and upper class persons, it would be wrong to make 
too/ 
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too much of this conclusion. 
20 Nonetheless, the differences 
in wealth between the two groups are consistent with the view 
that the Loyalists contained greater numbers of middle class 
yeomen, artisans and minor government officials than the friends 
of government, for the tax assessments of these occupational 
groups were usually lower than that of merchants, professional 
men and landowning gentry. By the same token, there was 
a greater probability that friends of government would become 
Loyalists if the annual rental value of their real and personal 
property exceeded £19. (See Table 19. ) 
Comparisons in wealth of the friends of government and 
Whigs of Boston, Marshfield and Worcester in Table 20 demonstrate 
that, there was little difference between the two groups. 
The proportions of each group assessed below £19 and above 
were roughly similar, although the Whigs of Boston included 
greater numbers of wealthier citizens 
21 Previous studies 
have shown that the Whig and Patriot leaders were overwhelmingly 
of middle and upper class origins 
22 
and that no significant 
disparity existed in the levels of wealth for the Loyalists 
and Patriots. 
23 
On the basis of this evidence, it can 
be said that class conflict was not an important feature of 
the Revolution in Massachusetts. However, these studies 
of the tax list do not account for the fact that the Whigs 
and Patriots commanded that support of lower class tradesmen, 
labourers and artisans. From the time of the non-importation 
controversy (if we momentarily exclude the Stamp Act Riots), these 
people exerted an increasing influence on political developments 
in Boston and the east. The friends of government could 
count on no such support. We can regard this as confirmation 
of the Tories' assertions (and worst fears) that the Whig leaders 
were engaged in revolutionary political activity that to some 
extent forebade a social revolution. 
Genealogy is another basic consideration for establishing 
the social characteristics of the friends of government and 
Loyalists ./ 
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TABLE 19: ASSESSED ANNUAL VALUES OF PROPERTY OF THE FRIENDS 
OF GOVERNMENT AND LOYALISTS. 
Loyal 
FOG/ 
Wealth in ' Loyalist In 
Annual Rental Loyal Non-Loyal Exclu- ... Loyal- Differ- 
Percen- 
Value £ FOG FOG FOG sions lets ential toes 
0-9 61 27 
10 - 19 52 30 
20 - 29 57 39 
30 - 39 18 12 
40 - 49 36 32 
50 -'59 86 
60 - 69 99 
70 - 79 21 
80 - 89 31 
90 - 99 11 
ý>I100 22 
34 167 140 518.52 
21 1 105 75 250.00 
17 1 73 34 87.18 
51 22 10 83.33 







Total 249 160 854 436 276 172.50 
Note: Readings for business partnerships recorded only once. 
Sources: For the friends of government, Appendix A; for the Loyalists, 
the lists of names'in Maas, Biographical -Director , Jones, Loyalists 
of Massachusetts, Stark, Loyalists of Massachusetts, Massachusetts 
Loyalist Claimants were cross-referenced with Bettye Hobbs 
Pruitt, ed., The Massachusetts Tax Evaluation List of 1771 
(Boston, 1978). 
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TABLE 20: ASSESSED ANNUAL VALUES OF PROPERTY OF THE FRIENDS 
OF GOVERNMENT AND WHIGS FROM SELECTED TOWNS. 
BOSTON. 
Wealth in In In 
Annual Rental Percen- Percen- 
Value £ Town FOG taxes Whias* taxes 
0-9 282 _2 2.06 3 2.05 
10 - 19 478 14 14.43 23 15.75 
20 - 29 423 28 28.87 36 24.66 
30 -/ 39 118 11 11.34 31 21.23 
40 - 49 134 30 30.93 29 19.86 
50 - 59 25 3 3.09 9 6.16 
60 - 69 19 8 8.25 7 4.79 
70 - 79 511.03 4 2.74 
80 - 89 70021.37 
90 - 99 10010.68 
3100 20010.68 
1,494 97 100.00 140 100.00 
I 
Note: 2,275 citizens are named in the extant lists for Boston, but 
only 1,494 were assessed. 
*Excluding Whig friends of government. 
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TABLE 20, contd. 
MARSHFIELD. 
Wealth in In In 
Annual Rental Percen- Percen- 
Value £ Town FOG tapes Whigs tapes 
0-9 119 3 20.00 17 60.71 
10 - 19 32 7 46.67 7 25.00 
20 - 29 82 13.33 2 7.14 
30 - 39 116.67 00 
40 - 49 30027.14 
50 - 59 
60 - 69 
70 -, 79 
80 - 89 111.67 00 
90 - 99 111.67 00 
>100 
Total 165 15 100.00 28 100.00 
Note: 250 persons were named in the tax list but only 165 were 
assessed. 
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TABLE 20, contd. 
WORCESTER. 
Wealth in In In 
Annual Rental Percen- Percen- 
Value £ Town FOG tages Whigs tages__ 
0-9 204 17 60.71 29 74.36 
10 - 19 37 7 25.00 9 23.08 
20 - 29 53 10.71 1 2.56 
30 - 39 
40 - 49 113.57 00 
50 - 59 
60 - 69 
70 -' 79 
80 - 89 
90 - 99 
100 
Total 247 28 100.00 39 100.00 
Note: 333 persons were named in the list but only 247 were 
assessed. , 
Sources: For the friends of government, Appendix A. Lists 
of Whigs are, for Boston: "An Alphabetical List of the Sons 
of Liberty who Dined at Liberty Tree, Dorchester, August 14, 
1769", Procs. MHS, 1st ser., 11 (1869), pp. 140-142. For Marshfield, 
the signatories to a Whig protest against the resolves of the town 
meeting of February 23,1774 are in BGCJ, February 28,1774 1/2. 
The names of Worcester Whigs were taken from the membership' list 
of the American Political Society in Albert A. Lovell, Worcester 
in/ 
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TABLE 20, contd. 
in the War of the Revolution... (Worcester, Mass., 1876), pp. 21-24. 
The names of all the Whigs were then cross-referenced with Pruitt, 
ed., Massachusetts Tax Evaluation List of 1771. 
Loyalists. A list of the most prominent families given in 
Table 21 reads like an eighteenth-century social register. 
Many friends of government and Loyalists were descendants of 
the puritan settlers who came to Massachusetts during the Great 
Migration of 1630-1640. Others, such as the Amorys and 
the Ervings, arrived in Boston in the late seventeenth- or 
early eighteenth-centuries and were quickly assimilated into 
colonial society. 
24 A few were intermarried with some 
of the Bay colony's most distinguished families. 
25 
Overall, the political and ideological divisions of the 
Revolution were not reflected in the genealogical composition 
of the Loyalists and Patriots. With few exceptions, Patriot 
leaders could trace their ancestry back to the Puritan settlers. 
26 
Family 'ties between Patriots and Loyalists enhanced a common history. 
Naturally, one effect of the Revolution was to split families. 
27 
But a closer look at the patterns of intermarriage among those 
friends of government who became Loyalists in Table 22 suggests 
that familial ties played a part in determining their allegiance. 
The Putnam-Chandlers of Worcester, the Amorys and the Coffins 
(the largest of the Loyalist families), for example, like the 
better known Hutchinson-Olivers, represented informal quasi- 
political units which by 1774 provided the leadership for the 
opponents of the Whig protest movement 
28 (see Table 23 ). 
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TABLE 21: GENEALOGY OF THE FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT AND LOYALISTS. 
Family Origin 
Arrival in Linear Descendants 


























































1685 to SC. 3 
















1710s to NY. 3 
and Mass. 
1698-1710 3 
Mid-17thC. to 2 








































TABLE 21, contd. 
Arrival in Linear Descendants 
Family Origin Massachusetts FOG Loyalists 
Phips England 1673 11 
Putnam England 1640 53 
Pynchon England 1630 10 
Quincy England 1630s 11 
Royall England 1629 11 
Ruggles England 1630 24 
Salton- England 1630 12 
sta11. 
Sewall England 1634 22 
Sparhawk England 1670s 26 
Vassal England 1630 24 
White England 1620 9 11 
Winslow England 1620 10 8 
Total 105 146 
Note: Friends of government and Loyalists are not always the 
same people. 
Sources: The Genealogical tables of most of these families 
are found in NEHGR. Ships' passengers lists, 1620-1640 
were used to establish the arrival dates of immigrant families, 
in Charles Edward Banks, The Planters of the Commonwealth: 
A Study of the Emigrants and Emigration in Colonial Times 
(ed. Baltimore, 1972). Also useful were collections of 
family papers: the Coffin Papers, Jeffries Papers, Samuel Quincy 
Papers, Robie-Sewall Papers, Boylston Papers at the MHS. 
Other sources were: Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts; Stark, 
Loyalists of Massachusetts; Thwing File, MHS; Sibley's Harvard 
Graduates. 
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TABLE 22: INTERMARRIAGES OF-THE FAMILIES OF FRIENDS OF GOVERMENT 
WHO BECAME LOYALISTS. 
Thomas Amory M 
John Amory m 
Moses Badger m 
Jacob Bailey m 
George Bethune m 
James Boutineau M 
Clark Chandler M 
John Chandler m 
Rufus Chandler M 
Richard Clarke m 
Nathaniel Coffin m 
Gilbert Deblois M 
Philip Dumaresque m 
George Erving m 
Samuel Fitch m 
Ralph Inman M 
Peter Oliver Jr. m 
Thomas Oliver m 
Robert Pagan m 
Timothy Paine m 
Peter Frye m 
Sylvester Gardiner m 
Elisha Hutchinson m 
Thomas Hutchinson Jr. m 
William Pepperrell m 
David Phips m 
Jonathan Simpson M 
Jonathan simpson Jr. m 
George Spooner m 
John Vassal m 
John Watson m 
Gideon White m 
Isaac Winslow/ 
Elizabeth Coffin, f. William, 1765 
Catherine Greene, f. Rufus 
Mary Saltonstall, f. Richard, 1771 
Sally Weeks, f. Joshua W., 1761 
Mary Faneuil, f. Benjamin, 1754 
Susannah Faneuil, 1738 
Elizabeth Ruggles 
Dorothy Paine, 1741 
Eleanor Putnam, f. James 
Elizabeth Winslow, f. Edward 
Elizabeth Barnes, f. Henry 
Anne Coffin, f. William 
Rebecca Gardiner, f. Sylvester, 1763 
Lucy Winslow, f. Isaac, 1768 
Elizabeth Lloyd, f. Henry, 1753 
Elizabeth Murray, f. John 
Sarah Hutchinson, f. Thomas, 1770 
Elizabeth Vassal, f. John 
Miriam Pote, f. Jeremiah 
Sarah Chandler, f. John 
Love Pickman, f. Benjamin 
Abigail Pickman, f. Benjamin 
Mary Watson, f. George 
Sarah Oliver, f. Andrew, 1770 
Elizabeth Royall, f. Isaac, 1770 
Mary Greenleaf, f. Stephen, 1753 
Margaret Lechmere, f. Richard 
Jane Borland, f. John 
Phoebe Borland, f. John 
Elizabeth Oliver, 1761 
Lucy Marston, f. Benjamin, 1769 
- Watson, f. George 
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TABLE 22, contd. 
Isaac Winslow m Mary Davis, f. Benjamin, 1772 
(1743-1793) 
Pelham Winslow m Joanna White, f. Gideon, 1770 
Note-. Non-Loyalist males underlined. 
Source: Maas, Biographical Directory. 
The above observations were applied equally to friends 
of government who were Tories, Whigs or of indeterminate- 
affiliation before 1775. However, less than half 
the Tories (79 of 176) became Loyalists as compared to two- 
thirds of the Whigs (see Appendix V). For most Whigs 
who had broken with the Whig leadership of the protest 
movement, there was no turning back. We may regard 
the high percentage of neutrals among the friends of government 
as confirmation of the view that anti-Toryism intimidated early 
opponents of the Whig protest movement into silence by 1775. 
Overall, those friends of government who took an early stand 
against the Whig movement, 1765-1771, were more inclined to 
become neutrals than Loyalists (see Table 24 ). The overwhelming 
majority of friends of government who were Loyalists became 
actively involved in politics for the first time in 1774 or 
1775. We may regard this fact as confirmation of the view 
that the ideological and political conflicts of the 1760s and 
1770s in Massachusetts and the colonies had a major impact 
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TABLE 23, contd. 
AMORY FAMILY. 
Thomas Amory m Rebecca Holmes 
(1682-1728) 1 (1700-1770) 
Thomas Mary 
(1722-1784) (b. 1723) 





Rebecca John Jonathan 
(b. 1725) (1728-1805) (1726-1797) 
m Edward 
Payne m Catherine 
PATRIOT Greene 
John Chandler m Dorothy Paine (d. 1745) 
(1720-1800) 1 Mary Church (d. 1783) 
I Clark 
(1743-1804) 
Rufus Gardner Nathaniel William Elizabeth 
(1747-1823) (b. 1749)(1750-1801)(1752-1795) m James 
m Eleanor Putnam 
Putnam, f. James 
Note: Non-Loyalist males underlined. 
Sources: Maas, Biographical Directory, Passim; Stark, Loyalists 
of Massachusetts, pp. 233-243; Gertrude E. Meredith, The Descendants 
of Hugh Amory, 1605-1805 (London, 1901). 
ý 
395 
TABLE 24: THE POLITICAL AWARENESS AND ACTIVITY OF THE 
FRIENDS OF GOVERNMENT: DATES. 
Period Loyal FOG Non-Loyal FOG Exclusions 
Unknown 13 13 
1765-1766 31 32 
1767-1771 51 61 
1772-1773 30 45 
1774 1.76 131 





Total 396 317 . 14 
Source: Appendix A. 
****** 
There were no major differences in composition between the 
friends of government and the Loyalists in matters of age, 
education, religion, public service. and place of birth. 
Similarly, both groups were concentrated in Boston and the 
ports and commercial-farming towns of the eastern seaboard. 
Neither represented a cross-section of Massachusetts's adult 
working/ 
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working population, for they contained disproportionately high 
numbers of men employed'in commerce and the professions. 
Differences that existed between the two groups in terms of 
geographical distribution, occupations and wealth indicate 
that after 1776 the Loyalists drew greater support from the 
yeomen farmers of the west and south of the province and Maine, - 
areas where the friends of government had been weak - and 
from women, artisans, labourers and government officials. 
In other words, the friends of government were a more socially 
homogeneous group than the Loyalists. Here, perhaps, was 
one of their most important failings: their inability to attract 
support from western farmers, artisans and the lower orders. 
These groups supported the Whigs and the Patriots. Statistically, 
some friends of government showed a greater tendency than others 
to become Loyalists: Anglicans, Sandemanians, immigrants 
(especially the Scots), office-holders, wealthy merchants and 
shopkeepers, and those who were married into the families of 
other friends of government. Historians have been aware 
that these sub-groups made up a significant proportion of 
Massachusetts's Loyalists. However, the peculiar factors 
of motivation which operated for each of these groups cannot 
be applied to the loyal friends of government as a whole. 
One factor which can, and has been overlooked in the past, 
is the effect of the political and ideological conflicts of 
1765-1775 on the opponents of the Whig protest movement. 
Friends of government who took an active part in politics for 
the first time in 1774 or 1775 made up the bulk of the loyal 
friends of government. These men responded to the leadership 
of the dissident moderate Whigs and the Tories, who had been 
to the fore in the opposition to the Whigs since the 1760s, 
before they declared their allegiance to Britain. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN: CONCLUSION 
We have now come full circle in our attempt to understand 
more fully the problem of why the Loyalists were unable to 
prevent the Revolution. To what extent, therefore, does 
the foregoing account of the ideology and political behaviour 
of the Massachusetts friends of government enrich our aware- 
ness of the problem and provide some answers? 
Firstly, the roots of Loyalist ideology lay in the reponses 
of the friends of government to the revolutionary movement 
from the time of the Stamp Act Crisis of 1765-1766. 
The Stamp Act Riots had a profound impact on senior government 
officials and Tories. For government officials there was 
the disturbing realisation--that--British ministers and M. P. s 
did not understand how far British authority in the colonies 
was dependent upon a consenus of political opinion and the 
willingness of people to submit to the exercise of that authority. 
Rioters and popular political leaders had rendered the implementation 
of an act of Parliament null and void. Tories were also 
concerned that the riots and the protests of the Whigs would 
lead to political and social revolution in the colonies. 
While they shared the Whigs' desire to have the Stamp Act and 
later the Townshend Acts repealed, they differed in the preferred 
methods by which the colonists should proceed: whereas the 
Whigs pursued a dual strategy of resistance and formal legal 
protests, the Tories discountenanced resistance to British 
authority/ 
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authority and argued that Americans ought to submit to unpalatable 
acts of Parliament until such time as Britain took heed of 
their petitions and supplications and repealed the measures. 
But on the whole, the Tories were less concerned with. the rights 
and wrongs of Britain's colonial policies than they were with 
the possible consequences of resistance, for they perceived 
a cause and effect relationship between resistance to Parliamentary 
authority and the decline in the traditional authority 
and power of the provincial government. The Whigs 
appeared to them to be leading Americans along the road to indepen- 
dence, civil war and political revolution that would also level many 
social distinctions. 
The colonies may not have been on the verge of revolution 
or rebellion in 1765,1768 or 1770, and the Tories' fears may 
seem to us now to be exaggerated and alarmist. But that 
does not make them any less real. In view of the profound 
effect that the Stamp Act Riots, the Liberty Riot, the Non- 
Importation Controversy and the Boston Tea Party had upon the 
ideology of rank-and-file Tories such as Nathaniel Coffin, 
we must not underestimate or take for granted the'strength 
of their convictions and beliefs. 
On the other hand, we cannot readily attribute the defection 
of the Whig friends of government from the protest movement 
solely to ideogical factors. Economics, in particular, 
played a major part in determining the political behaviour 
of moderates such the Amory brothers during the Non-Importation 
Controversy of 1768-1770. The dis 
ndents 
embraced a brand 
of Whiggism that reflected the economic and political climates 
of the day. Their support for non-importation was conditional 
on the capacity of the Whig-merchant leadership to enforce 
favourable trading restrictions that permitted no advantages 
to merchants and shopkeepers who broke the agreements. 
The decisions of the New York and Philadelphia merchants to 
give up non-importation effectively undermined the Boston agreement, 
for/ 
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for it destroyed the basis of intercolonial economic-political 
co-operation upon which the success of the boycott had depended. 
Thus, when the radicals and Whig-merchant leadership moved 
to continue with the total boycott, the Amorys and the dissidents 
organised the merchants in a successful attempt to end the 
embargo on all British goods. By the same token, from 
1765 to 1773, the dissidents in the General Court and town 
meetings - such as John Erving - sided with the provincial 
government in moments of political quiet, but joined the radicals 
and other moderate Whigs in opposition on every contentious 
issue when they perceived the political rights and liberties 
of Americans to be endangered by British policies. Nonetheless, 
the crux of the matter for most dissidents in deciding to oppose 
. the 
Whig leadership, especially for the Amorys and the merchants 
in 1770, was a desire to re-assert control over their own political 
and economic destinies, which had been denied them by the radicals' 
dominance of the Whig movement: this was the ideological basis 
of their response to the Revolution. 
But while proto-Loyalist ideology in some measure cut 
across political boundaries, it did not traverse social ones. 
The friends of government were upper and middle class merchants, 
shopkeepers, professionals, gentry farmers and yeomen. 
Unlike the Whigs, they could never muster much support among 
the western farmers and the artisans and lower orders of the 
east coast towns. The lack of political support from 
these groups contributed to the inability of the friends of 
government to defeat the Whigs in the town meetings. 
Secondly, the study of the political behaviour of the 
friends of government demonstrates that in general they locked 
a political coherence born of a common purpose. It was 
only in Boston that the friends of government created a counter- 
revolutionary "movement" or "party". The Bostonians' 
exertions to destroy the influence of the Whig leaders and 
party/ 
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party were not matched by those of the friends of government 
in the General Court and in towns elsewhere in the province. 
The sixty Tories who sat in the House of Representatives 
between 1764 and 1774 did not take part in public affairs and 
the political life of the province with a sense of collective 
identity or group responsibility. They were not an organised 
political faction but a loose congregation of individuals who 
shared a common political ideology. The Tories did vote 
together on certain issues, but, unlike the Whigs, rarely if 
ever met to plan their strategy for the duration of a session. 
The royal governors had to court their allegiance on virtually 
every issue as it arose. Francis Bernard and Thomas Hutchinson 
were never quite sure as to how the friends of government in 
the House would vote (and, of course, Tory representatives 
were often instructed by their constituents to vote against 
the government. ) In short, the Tories and moderates in 
the House who voted with them did not function as a court party. 
Similarly, Governor Bernard was unable to win the active 
and consistent support of the Tories and moderates who sat 
on the Council. Indeed, he eventually alienated men of 
both factions, partly because of his careless political manage- 
ment. Thomas Hutchinson made some headway in gaining the 
confidence, and co-operation of the moderate councillors when 
he took over as acting governor in 1769. But like his 
predecessor, Hutchinson-could not achieve his main political 
objective of forging a Tory-moderate coalition party in the 
General Court. Increasingly, his political ideas and solutions 
to the imperial disputes were made to appear unattractive, 
outmoded and unrealistic by his enemies. Hutchinson won 
over few adherents in the period 1771-1773, before the publication 
of his letters to Thomas Whately of 1768 brought about his 
political destruction. 




Protests against the Whigs were organised by friends 
of government in Salem, Marblehead, Plymouth, Marshfield, Petersham, 
Worcester and other towns. But they were sporadic, short-lived 
affairs and did not give birth to any lasting political organisation 
or infrastructure that could have co-ordinated the activities 
of friends of government throughout the province and between 
those in the town meetings and those in the assembly. 
The Whigs, of course, by eighteenth-century standards, created 
a powerful popular political machine outwith the institutions 
of government based on voluntary associations, political clubs, 
local committees, county conventions, and the Provincial and 
Continental Congresses. 
Thirdly, the reasons for the political demise of the 
friends of government are not difficult to pin-point. 
Bernard and Hutchinson had the unenviable task of trying 
to win their political allegiance on such grossly unpopular 
measures and issues as the Stamp Act, the rescinding of the 
circular letter of 1768, the arrival of British troops in Boston, 
and the provision of Crown salaries for government officials 
and judges. 
Paradoxically, while the attention of Tories outside 
the General Court was focused on the fundamental consequences 
of resistance to British authority, the Tories and moderates 
in the assembly, between 1764 and 1774, chose to ignore the 
messages contained in the ideologically charged "argumentative 
speeches" delivered to them by Bernard and Hutchinson in order 
to join with the Whigs to protest against the Stamp Act, Townshend 
Acts and the provision of Crown salaries for colonial officials. 
In public life at least, the friends of government preferred 
to concentrate on the immediate issues at hand - namely, the 
repeal/ 
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repeal of those acts - rather than follow the dictates of their 
political ideology and leadership offered by the royal governors. 
The friends of government believed that if the unpopular reforms 
could be overturned peace would return to the province and 
the colonies. 
Yet, at the same time, it must be said that the friends 
of government and moderates who remained loyal to the Whig 
cause were often reluctant to cross or defy the Whig leadership. 
Anti-Toryism was a highly effective political weapon in the 
Whigs' armoury. It fulfilled the dual purpose of maximising 
the level of popular liberal support for the Whigs and discouraging 
political opposition from senior government officials, friends 
of government in the General Court and town meetings, and merchants 
in the eastern ports during the Non-Importation Controversy. 
The success of anti-Tory propaganda lay in its portrayal of 
dissenting Whigs and conservatives as outcasts from the Puritan- 
Whig commonwealth of interests. They were, it was said, 
collaborators with an oppressive programme of "foreign" legislation 
who were prepared to sacrifice colonial liberties in exchange 
for better and newer rewards from the empire. The Whigs 
used anti-Toryism as a tactic to unite a diverse and heterogeneous 
political movement against both an external enemy - Britain - 
and an internal enemy - the "Tories". --- Anti-Toryism contributed 
to the electoral successes of the Whig party, 1766-1770, that 
irrevocably altered the distribution of political power in 
their favour in the House, Council and town meetings. 
This fact can, to some extent, explain the paradox of why the 
a. 
roup to Bernard and friends of government did not respond asg 
Hutchinson's "argumentative speeches" and take collective political 
action upon their behalf: in simple terms, the friends of 
government were not prepared to risk being proscribed as "Tories". 
We can place anti-Toryism within the broader context 
of American anti-libertarian traditions that have existed since 
the/ 
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the seventeenth-century. I suggest that the friends or 
government were among the first victims or the American liberal 
consenus of opinion that was remarkably intolerant of those 
who chose to oppose the commonwealth or interests. To the 
friends of government, anti-Toryism was the incarnation or 
the "democratic tyranny" much feared by conservatives in the 
eighteenth-century. 
One measure of the extent to which the political influence 
of the friends of government was collapsing during the 1760s 
and 1770s was the recommendations made by Francis Bernard, 
Thomas Hutchinson and other senior officials to the British 
government to introduce sweeping constitutional reforms to 
Massachusetts designed to reduce the political power of the 
Whigs. Hard times, they reasoned, demanded drastic action, 
such as the appointment of a mandamus Council. In part, 
the necessity of changing the "rules" of political battle stemmed 
from the fact that by 1769-1770 the friends of government in 
the General Court could not compete adequately by the existing 
"rules". In their official and private correspondence 
with Britain, Bernard and Hutchinson discoursed freely on the 
plight of the friends of government and the criticisms that 
they made of British colonial policies in order to justify 
the need to reform the structure of government in Massachusetts. 
Also, they portrayed the reforms as being in themselves sensible 
long-term solutions to the crisis of authority facing the provincial 
government. Historians have been sparing in their acknowledg- 
ments that Bernard and Hutchinson realised that the success 
of Britain's policies depended upon the political behaviour 
of the friends of government as much as it did the capability 
of the provincial government to execute them. It is unclear 
if British ministers and M. P. s shared this opinion or if their 
ignorance of the predicament of the friends of government 
had a detrimental effect on Britain's handling of the disputes 
with the colonies. 
1 Our knowledge of the American 
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Revolution would be greatly improved by further research into 
this topic. 
Despite a catalogue of political disappointments, by 
the summer of 1774, in the aftermath of the Boston Tea Party 
and the introduction of the Coercive Acts, a community of feeling 
had developed among the Tories and dissident Whigs of Boston, 
and many others of no previous political affiliation. 
These friends of government came together in an anti-Whig coalition 
with a broad ideological base. Their ideas and proposals 
embraced much of what the Tories had been saying since the 
1760s and what the Loyalist pamphleteers were soon to articulate: 
a defence of the legislative supremacy of Parliament in the colonies 
(coupled with a repeal of the Coercive Acts); a rejection of 
the Whigs' strategy of resistance in favour of dutiful and 
respectful remonstrances to the King and Parliament; and opposition 
to the Whig orthodoxy of opinion. The coalition's main 
political purposes were to detroy the Boston commmittee of 
correspondence and the Solemn League and Covenant, and reach 
a compromise with Britain over the destruction of the East 
India Company's tea in order to have the Coercive Acts repealed. 
Their action was taken largely without the assistance of the 
provincial government and the new governor, General Thomas 
Gage. 
Finally, however, the defeat of the friends of government 
in Boston marked the end of their political influence in the 
colony and was soon followed by the collapse of the authority 
of the provincial government in the countryside. After 
military hostilities commenced in April 1775 only half the 
friends of government were prepared to denounce the Patriot 
cause and declare their allegiance and loyalty to Britain. 
The British forces stationed in Boston could offer the Loyalists 
and potential Loyalists little in the way of protection, and 
the Patriots had a free hand to arrest and apprehend them. 
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Significantly, from 1776 through 1783, the Loyalists drew much 
support from areas where the proscription and intimidation 
of the loyal friends of government had been rare and where 
the friends of government overall had been weakest, such as 
in the West and South of Massachusetts and in the district 
of Maine. 
The failure of the Massachusetts Loyalists to halt the 
progress of the revolutionary movement in their colony can 
be traced to the ideological and political conflicts of the 
1760s and 1770s when the friends of government emerged to challenge 
the political power of the Whig party but could not overthrow 
it. They were unable to form durable political alliances 
with the moderates, the majority of whom remained loyal to 
the protest movement and the Whig leadership. Nor did 
the friends of government take collective political action 
to defeat the Whigs in response to the pleas of the royal governors. 
The essential weakness of the friends of government was their 
inability to inspire themselves and others to act in defence 
of the interests of the provincial government and Great Britain 
until 1774, when it was virtually too late to do anything to 
end the political hegemony of the Whigs. Their political 
shortcomings can be attributed to the effectiveness of the Whigs' 
anti Tory campaigns in undermining their resolve and political 
credibility and in preventing large-scale defections from the 
protest movement. Also, the general unpopularity of Britain's 
colonial policies made the friends of government extremely 
reluctant to defend publicly British authority on any single 
major issue, although, paradoxically, they called for an end to 
resistance and submission to parliamentary authority. 
The unsuccessful attempt by the friends of government in Boston 
in 1774 to undermine the power of the Whigs and the destruction 
of the power of the provincial government outside the capital 
during the autumn and winter left the way open for the Whigs 
to extend their policy of resistance to Britain and continue 
the/ 
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the proscription of those who chose to remain loyal to Britain. 
Only a tiny fraction of the colony's adult male population became 
Loyalists, and less than 30 per cent of them were friends of 
government. A popular Loyalist counter-revolutionary movement 
could never have occurred in Massachusetts, for although the 
ideological bases for such a movement took shape between 1765 
and 1774, its political form never fully developed outside 
of Boston and had all but ceased to exist when the British 
withdrew their forces to Nova Scotia in 1776. 
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